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 “If I were to wish for anything, I should not wish for wealth and power, but for the 
passionate sense of the potential, for the eye which, ever young and ardent, sees the 
possible. Pleasure disappoints possibility never. And what wine is so sparkling, what 
so fragrant, what so intoxicating, as possibility!” (Søren Kierkegaard 1843) 
 
I. Introduction 
A. Research Problem 
The present work is dedicated to the recognition of entrepreneurial opportunities; probably 
one of the most fascinating entrepreneurial behaviours. And indeed, many scholars in the field 
regard this activity as the core of entrepreneurship, building a kind of opportunity school 
within the scientific community (Grichnik 2006). Whether put as impressive and dramatic 
creative destruction (Schumpeter 1934) or more modestly seen as the alertness for relevant 
information (Kirzner 1979), it is the identification and exploitation of opportunities that is 
seen as the central entrepreneurial element (Shane 2003).  
However, many scholars in the field of economics do not account for this genuine creativity 
of economic agents introducing novelty and change; conscious of the fact that actually other 
methods and models ought to be implemented, they restrict themselves to exact methods and 
mechanistic models: “Now we know that the actual experience was not an equilibrium 
experience; there were surprises, and unforeseen changes of cause. But it is hardly possible 
that the hypothetical experience should not be an equilibrium experience, for it is under our 
control, so there can be no surprises in it. If then we compare the actual experience, which is 
not an equilibrium experience, with a hypothetical experience, which is, we are cheating; so 
to make the comparison fair we are bond to doctor the actual suppressing the surprises, even 
though we admit they are important.” (Hicks 1979, p. 56)  
The present work tries to look at this creative element, arguing that change and progress, 
whether in economic systems, sciences, or wherever, seem to originate in the recombination 
of known structures and their reinterpretation in a new context (Röpke 1977).  
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B. Purpose of Study 
Admittedly, the recognition of entrepreneurial opportunities by individuals is a fairly diverse 
and complex phenomenon (Gartner and Shaver 2004), reason why it seems necessary 
bringing together central insights in such fields as economics, business studies, and 
psychology in an interdisciplinary manner. However, whatever perspective is chosen the main 
issue in research on opportunity recognition are the underlying dynamics of how and why 
some people and not others are able to discover and exploit particular entrepreneurial 
opportunities (e.g. Baron 1998; Gaglio 2004; Gaglio and Katz 2001)? 
During the last decades, most scholars tried to explain this central phenomenon of 
entrepreneurship as a function of the types of people engaged in entrepreneurial activity; this 
perspective resulted in a neglect of the role of opportunities (Eckhardt and Shane 2003). In the 
1960s and 1970s a variety of studies (e.g. McClelland 1965) intended to shed light on 
personalities, backgrounds, early experiences, and traits reported by entrepreneurs and non-
entrepreneurs (Baron 1998; Ucbasaran 2004). However, the rationally inferred conviction 
“[…] that these people were somehow distinct“ (Mitchell et al. 2002, p. 95) was not supported 
empirically with these studies since they showed weak, disconfirming, or non-significant 
results (Low and MacMillan 1988; Mitchell et al. 2002; Pendergast 2003; White et al. 2003): 
not even one unique set of personality traits could be reported by these research efforts 
(Mitchell et al. 2002). It is argued here that the main weakness of such a person-centric 
perspective lies in the conjecture of stable differences among economic agents; considering 
that entrepreneurial activity is episodic, it is unlikely to find personal attributes with a high 
explanatory power explaining why some economic agents engage in entrepreneurial activity 
and others do not (Eckhardt and Shane 2003).  
However since then there has been a shift in the focus of research in the field of 
entrepreneurship from the former attempts to identify individuals in society exhibiting certain 
entrepreneurial characteristics towards an understanding of the nexus of such enterprising 
individuals and valuable opportunities respectively different economic situations (Baron 
2000; Busenitz and Barney 1997; Eckhardt and Shane 2003; Krueger 1993; Shane 2000; 
Shane 2003; Venkatamaran 1997).  
More recently, during the last years, many scholars in the discipline have adopted a cognitive 
perspective to account for this and to explain entrepreneurial phenomena (Mitchell et al., 
2002, 2007). Similarly, in the present work the predominant perspective from which the 
Introduction 
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phenomenon is approached is a psychological one, arguing that such can provide a general 
framework on this phenomenon. The motivation behind this is the conviction that “[…] 
cognitive perspective suggests several reasons why some persons are better at the task of 
identifying opportunities than others.” (Baron 2004, p. 67) Such an approach has the main 
advantage that there is no need to invent new ways of understanding how individuals make 
sense of their situations because reasonably adequate theories and methods already exist in 
other disciplines, such as cognitive psychology (Gartner and Shaver 2004).  
The present work intends to contribute to entrepreneurship research by choosing the 
perspective of cognitive psychology; the central question intended to be answered is if there 
exist certain cognitive styles, preferences, or heuristics an individual applies in processing 
information that facilitate or inhibit the recognition of entrepreneurial opportunities? 
 
C. Proceeding 
In order to answer the central research problem and contribute to the discipline, the following 
chapter II aims at introducing the general concept of opportunity recognition in 
entrepreneurship. By reviewing ontological issues, entrepreneurship as research phenomenon, 
and, based on this, the identification of entrepreneurial opportunities the general fundament is 
laid for answering the central research question. These considerations will show that 
particular modes of human thinking seem to be highly determining for this entrepreneurial 
behaviour. 
Therefore, chapter III will deal with the basics of human thinking and cognitive psychology 
scientifically dealing with it. In order to model the entrepreneur and its thinking in 
opportunity recognition afterwards, central ideas and terms for conceiving the human mind 
and human thinking are sketched. Particular emphasis is put on the aspects that characterise 
creative thinking, especially on individual differences that have explanatory power for 
assessing variation in creative performance; besides contextual factors given by the situation 
thinking is situated in, it will become evident that an individual’s way of processing 
information, expressed via cognitive preferences, strategies, heuristics, or styles, is one of the 
strongest distinctive features in this regard. 
Having introduced the phenomenon of opportunity recognition as entrepreneurial behaviour 
and outlined the concepts and terms to adopt a cognitive perspective on it, the central chapter 
Introduction 
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IV can finally deal with its detailed modelling. However, before other scholar’s efforts to 
explain entrepreneurship from a thinking perspective are reviewed here; reason for doing this 
separated from the initial considerations on entrepreneurship is simply that the reader has now 
been provided with necessary cognitive concepts to thoroughly comprehend these approaches. 
After treating preliminary thoughts, basic assertions for theorising in the present context and 
briefly sketching the reference model of creative thinking, part C deals with the actual 
cognitive model of opportunity recognition. Besides the information processes executed, 
central cognitive styles are suggested that seem promising in explaining individual differences 
in the ability to recognise entrepreneurial opportunities.  
This rather theoretical treatment provides the hypotheses to be tested in the empirical study 
outlined in chapter V. There, it is shown how data is collected, i.e. which general survey 
design, sample, and measures have been chosen to investigate the operationalised hypotheses. 
Before causally analysing this data concerning reliability and validity of constructs used as 
well as the hypotheses developed, the basics of such causality analysis and its mathematical 
foundation, structural equation models, are introduced.  
In conclusion, these results are interpreted and discussed regarding their theoretical and 
practical implications for entrepreneurship theory, practice, and education. Particularly, 
opportunities to teach the ability of recognising entrepreneurial opportunities via facilitating 
cognitive styles are sketched and possible starting points for future research given. 
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“Find a scientific man who proposes to get along without any metaphysics […] and 
you have found one whose doctrines are thoroughly vitiated by the crude and 
uncriticised metaphysics with which they are packed. We must philosophise, said the 
great naturalist Aristotle - if only to avoid philosophising. Every man of us has a 
metaphysics, and has to have one; and it will influence his life greatly. Far better, 
then, that that metaphysics should be criticised and not be allowed to run loose.” 
(Charles Sanders Peirce, Notes on Scientific Philosophy, CP.1.129. cited in Sowa 
2000, p. 51). 
 
“The egregious sin of the standard economist is of another kind. Because he denies 
the necessity of paying any attention to the evolutionary aspects of the economic 
process […].” (Georgescu-Roegen 1971, p. 325) 
 
II. Opportunity Recognition in the Concept of Entrepreneurship  
The present chapter II aims at introducing the central footing for theorising about human 
action in economic systems, in particular entrepreneurial individuals who introduce novelty 
and induce change and transformation in such systems. It starts with a brief treatment of 
metaphysical questions in part 1 of chapter A; more precisely it is dealt with the general being 
or existence of things, i.e. the ontology of the world (Aune 1985), and what humans can know 
and justify, i.e. epistemology (Audi 2003). Apparently, assuming different perspectives on the 
world has a significant impact on the way economic agents are modelled in economic 
theories. Particularly, this applies to such accounts that adopt a relativist view and aim at 
grasping novelty and change in economic systems; these issues are discussed in the remaining 
parts 2 and 3 of chapter II.A.  
These considerations ought to show that it is the subjective element of specific creative 
humans that allows introducing true newness in economics: entrepreneurs. The first part of 
chapter of II.B is dedicated to this group of economic agents. The following part presents a 
model of economic human action in time that is able to cast truly creative agency, in which 
the previous arguments on relativist approaches to economics fall into place: During the entire 
Opportunity Recognition in the Concept of Entrepreneurship 
 12 
subsequent work, it will be recurred and referred to this basic model in modelling the 
recognition of entrepreneurial opportunities. Part B of chapter II is concluded by a succinct 
introduction to the concept of entrepreneurship, which is a process view on entrepreneur’s 
behaviour in an economic context. 
It will become evident that, on a basic level, entrepreneurial behaviour is regarded as the 
identification and exploitation of entrepreneurial opportunities; hence, the latter concept is 
introduced in the beginning of part C. As the present work is going to deal with the 
entrepreneurial process’ initial stage, i.e. with opportunity identification, the following two 
parts will briefly review research attempts to model this phenomenon and variables that have 
been found to determine the recognition of entrepreneurial opportunities respectively.  
 
A. Ontological Foundation 
1. Metaphysics: Realism versus Relativism 
Evidently, the issue of the relation between the human mind and the external world is as old 
as Western philosophy itself; however, the clear distinction between mind and matter is often 
attributed to Descartes (1641). According to his so called Cartesian dualism there exist two 
different sorts of substances: body and mind, which are utterly distinct and independent of 
each other. While bodies are just a one kind of matter and, therefore, constrained by the laws 
of physics, minds are free (Lycan 1999). This was controversially discussed until Identity 
Theory was introduced and offered a widely accepted solution, which was most important to 
the development of modern psychology (Place 1999; Smart 1959). According to this view, at 
least some mental states and events are genuinely inner and genuinely episodic; by no means, 
this is meant in the sense of dualism since the core is that these mental states are 
neurophysical, i.e. identical with states and events occurring in the central nervous system 
(Lycan 1999).  
However, leaving out a detailed discussion of the issue whether a border between subject and 
object makes any sense at all, all philosophical approaches could be located on a dichotomy 
regarding their ontological stance, marked by the endpoints of realism and relativism (Crotty 
1998). Realistic approaches claim that there exists a reality of objects of study independent of 
subjects, i.e. objects that can be located in time or space. Such approaches aim at proving the 
objective existence of the object at hand; thus, the truth of a proposition made about them is 
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seen independent of thinking and language. Approaches to realism differ, as indicated by the 
dichotomy, to the degree to which the subject-independent world can be observed by the 
human mind: totally, partially, or not at all (Ötsch 2007). For instance, metaphysical realism 
varies in having rather optimistic or rather pessimistic attitudes as to the perceptibility of our 
world’s structure. An optimistic view would assume that the universe has an intrinsic nature 
and that it is principally knowable by humans. In turn, less optimistic would be a notion that 
humans can only attain approximately correct or accurate descriptions of any of the universe’s 
aspects (Grandy 1997). Often alleged approaches to realism are naive realism (Weber 1996), 
somehow marking the endpoint of the dichotomy because the human mind is seen to have 
direct contact to the objective world; further streams are representative realism, resembling to 
Locke’s critical realism, or empiric realism often related to Kant, who postulated a world that 
exists independent of a single creature but not independent of the general existence of 
perceiving creatures. These creatures are postulated to objectively recognise, for instance in 
that they can impose the forms of space and time on things (Dancy and Sosa 1992).  
The rejection of realism is a central characteristic of philosophical relativism, in which reality 
and insight about reality are not absolute but relative. From time to time, the terms of 
metaphysical constructivism or idealism are heard in this context: They refer to such a 
relativist view that the objects of the world are constructed by humans (Lycan 1999), 
contradicting metaphysical realism, which claims that it exists independently of minds and 
thoughts. Within this view it could be differentiated between individualistic constructivism 
that postulates individual constructions of the world, and social constructivism that postulates 
shared views or constructions (Grandy 1997).  
The elemental arguments of modern relativism could be described by three main theses 
(Wendel 1990): The first proposition is called (1) thesis of epistemological immanence and 
asserts that there is no such thing like an external structure of the world since every thing is 
co-construed by the cognitive subject. It follows that any proposition about the structure of 
the world is created by the subject, respectively thinking processes in his mind. Therefore, 
every internal representation of the external world in the human mind does not simply 
represent, depict, or mirror an external world independent of the subject, but is instead 
actively construed by the subject. Further, the second main aspect of relativistic approaches is 
called (2) thesis of the ontological immanence. If the thesis of epistemological immanency is 
applied to a hypothetical comparison between an imagined object and the same object, how it 
should look like independent of the human construction; it follows that there cannot exist 
Opportunity Recognition in the Concept of Entrepreneurship 
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objects independent of thinking and recognising. Reason is that it is impossible to compare a 
subject view on a thing to a hypothetically objective thing: to mentally design such an 
objective thing is seen as a thinking process, which is necessarily subject to individual 
construction. The third central element or philosophical relativism is could be named (3) 
thesis of epistemic equality of sets of statements. Most approaches refuse such radical 
relativism and replace it by the denial of an ultimate instance or method of proof (verification) 
for an unambiguous and ultimate judgement on rival views of the world or set of statements. 
Such approaches assume that the available method of verification allows for the existence of 
different, incommensurate set of propositions, i.e. paradigms and theories, which are seen as 
equal since none of them can be ultimately proven right or wrong (Wendel 1990).  
While naive realism has been named as one endpoint of the mentioned dichotomy, radical 
constructivism might represent the other: Its assertions are based on modern neurosciences 
and claim that cognition is pure construction and self-referring since the subject only disposes 
of knowledge if this is created by own operations in the cognitive apparatus. This strand 
totally rejects the idea of realities and representations in the sense that cognition has a pure 
adaptive function, not depicting an objective reality (Nüse et al. 1991). Along these lines, 
evolutionary epistemologists regard knowledge from an instrumentalist, respectively 
pragmatic angle since it is assumed to be built up by single ‘concepts’, which first enter the 
general concept of experience (Glasersfeld 1981). In evolutionary terms, knowledge becomes 
a selection mechanism, creating viable ways of survival or adoption of the system (in this case 
the human). Therefore, the system only allows for a finite number of viable ways to work in 
the experiential world (Campbell 1960).  
The approach particularly earns the attribute of being radical because the whole external 
world is a construct, not represented in the cognitive apparatus, but only functioning as a 
trigger, selecting the ways of behaviour determined by the cognitive system. External 
information is not seen as objective data, but as result of internal operations within the 
structural determinants of the internal system. Put simple, radical constructivism claims that 
the brain only understands its own ‘language’, which, therefore, can be seen independent of 
the external trigger since everything has been translated by the sensory receptors. This 
assumption or view is referring to the principle of unspecific coding of the brain, which 
means that the sensory receptors of all systems of senses all send similar electronic impulses. 
Thus, the brain only distinguishes between different degrees of stimulus intensity and not at 
all between the physical or chemical nature of the stimulus. It is this pure reduction to one 
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quantitative differentiation that leads radical constructivists to deny a relation between any 
characteristics of a subject-independent external world and human cognition. This means that 
radical constructivism regards the human mind, respectively the brain, as an autopoietic 
system (Dzurisin and Segal 2001; v. Foerster 1985; Nüse et al. 1991). Such systems are 
characterised by circular processes, i.e. the fact that all components are organised cyclically 
and reproduce themselves within the system. Important is that such autopoietic systems 
operate closed, which means that each state is determined by previous states. Such systems 
can only be influenced externally as far as allowed by the internal organisation of the system. 
This finally implies that external objective components totally lose their relevance; they are 
constructions of the human mind (Nüse et al. 1991). 
As already said, the majority of arguments brought up against such radical constructivist 
approaches object that it is principally impossible to justify relativist positions, if they are 
applied to themselves (Ötsch 2007). Some of the main arguments criticising relativistic and 
radical constructivist positions are: How can relativistic propositions be true if truth is only a 
subjective category? Similarly, it could be asked how their approach can be based on 
empirical neuroscientific results, because if this is accepted, such data is somehow realistic. 
Furthermore, it is often objected that relativistic models can only be one instrument to explain 
scientific propositions since according to the third thesis regarding epistemic equality all 
theories are regarded as instruments. Additionally, it is asked how scientists as observers, who 
are a closed system themselves, can make any assertions about the human mind if it is a 
perfectly closed system existing independent of cognitive worlds and gives rise to such 
(Wendel 1990)?  
It is argued that such approaches cannot be finally proven right with their own methods of 
verification since they do not allow for absolute and objective facts. The thesis of epistemic 
equality of sets of statements offers a solution to the circular problem of relativist 
philosophical approaches: Given this premise, it is simply unnecessary to base constructivist 
epistemological positions on absolute theses since it cannot be proven right anyway. 
Accordingly, more recently approaches based on relativist arguments to varying degrees can 
be found in many sciences in one form or another. Practically all post-modern approaches 
contain relativist elements, often emphasising the historical, social, and cultural relativity of 
ideas and knowledge, thereby criticising all purely positivistic and empirical-oriented 
sciences. Consequently, empirical data is regarded as interpretative construction. 
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Generally speaking, in the field of psychology, important to the present work, the term 
constructivism stands for such approaches that refrain from representational theories of 
perception. These regard perception and cognition as passive-receptive processes of depicting 
external stimuli into internal images in the tradition of Descartes (1641). The whole process is 
therefore predominantly determined by the external stimuli to be translated. In contrast to 
such representational theories, constructivist approaches consider perception and cognition to 
be active, nevertheless often subconscious, selection and composition processes. Perception is 
not simply determined by external stimuli, but a creative mixture of external and internal 
information since external stimuli are creatively framed by extant knowledge structures, say 
memories, heuristics, etc. This process results in cognitive constructs or mental models, not 
passive pictures of the external world; this view is called cognitive constructivism and could 
be seen as the view that individual cognitive agents understand the world and make their life 
by using mental representations that they have constructed strongly based on their personal 
history (Grandy 1997; Ötsch 2007). 
Consequently, the central statement of cognitive constructivism is that whatever is momentary 
available in memory is product of a constructive process in which the conscious thought is 
built deliberately (Seel 2000). This also means that human memory and knowledge are not 
accurate archivists, but rather continuously alter our episodic knowledge (Seel 2000). This 
assertion requires here to underline that the term representation, used quite often later on in 
this work, does not refer to a realistic philosophical position, but rather merely denotes the 
result of the construction process in an individual’s mind. In this view, cognition is rather is 
the confirmation or rejection of a hypothesis that an individual builds about the situation in a 
given moment in time (Pöppel 1988).  
The fact that an individual’s episodic memory adjusts our past to the present need and 
primarily intends to be consistent with the particular environment and its requirements can be 
shown quite evidently by briefly presenting a study of Neisser and Harsch (1992). One day 
after the Challenger crash (a crash down of an US-American space-shuttle in 1986, in which 
seven astronauts died) they asked college students to write down answers to seven questions 
concerning the circumstances they came to know about the accident. Then, three years later, 
the students were confronted with the same questionnaire: Approx. 75% of the students did 
not even recall that they had already answered exactly the same questions, and in average 
only 2.9% of the answers were consistent with the answers given right after the crash. One 
fourth of the students did not even answer one question concordantly.i Even more 
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surprisingly, hints and suggestions as to their initial answers were not able to refresh their 
memory and a lot of the students were surprised hearing their original answers. In addition to 
these findings, the students’ conviction of accurate memory was barely correlated positively 
with their statements’ accurateness in the sense of concordance (Neisser and Harsch 2000). 
This exemplary study underlines a central proposition of cognitive constructivism: 
Knowledge is not seen as a reproduction of something in the external world; it is a personal 
construction with which the individual constructs meaning by connecting parts of knowledge 
and experience with organised extant knowledge structures (Resnick 1985).  
Although economics do not deal with epistemological issues in a first instance, it should be 
quite palpable by now that it is an extremely important issue insofar that the epistemological 
and the observer problem are relevant to economic theorising as for any other social science. 
The view assumed by the scientist in this question is crucial since it lays the fundament for 
each economic theory, for methodology allowed, for policy implications, and of course, the 
role of the economist himself (Ötsch 2007). Hence, the following paragraph will sketch 
differences in modelling economic behaviour subject to a realistic or relativistic ontology. 
 
2. Modelling Economic Agents 
Regarding the question how to model humans in economic theories, the stance of realist 
philosophical approaches that human cognition is able to accurately represent the externally 
given structure of the world in the sense that it is reproduced perfectly, if no disturbing factors 
interfere the process of perception implies that the economic agent can principally come to a 
state, in which its subjective representation equals to the objective phenomenon. This implies 
for the analysis of economic phenomena that the researcher assumes, without any explicit 
epistemological explanation, that economic agents have accurate information about a given 
reality (Hesse 1990). As many scholars point out, e.g. Hesse (1990) or Gerrard (1993), 
mainstream economics, largely bound to this fundament, was thereby able to take advantage 
of the application of exact theories to investigate economic phenomena.  
Ontologically, the fundament for all these models is a mechanistic view of the world. It is 
assumed that everything in the world is principally conceivable as a machine. Already Adam 
Smith (1776) considered everything to be subject of a big plan of nature. This view has the 
comfortable methodological advantage that every process in time can be logically deducted if 
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the exogenously given laws of nature at work and the initial conditions are known to the 
researcher (Coulter 1996).  
Consequently, the main task of the researcher in such deductive-nomological models consists 
in reducing the incomplete information about the law-like generalisations in order to find out, 
how the machine at hand works; many scientists even claim that it is the only way economic 
science can be done (Morgenstern 1976; see for an overview Arrows and Intriligator 1981). 
Scholars alleging this approach claim to do exact science since they are based on logic 
(Blaseio 1986) and, therefore, use exact methods of thought (Morgenstern 1976), claiming 
that theories and laws that are developed in such a manner apply universally in space and time 
(Dopfer 2001). 
Similar to such an evidently unrealistic conjecture of perfect information in objective manner 
early theories on human decision making, still dominant in neoclassical economics, assume 
rationality to prevail. Bascially, rationality in economics is seen in instrumentalist terms, i.e. 
that the rational agent makes choice of optimal means to given ends (Gerrard 1993; Robbins 
1932). It is assumed that each individual is confronted with an economic problem, in which it 
must select courses of actions that will secure the fulfilment of as many of its goals with 
respect to given means; often called securing efficiency or maximising goal satisfaction 
(Kirzner 1973). The common feature of all such Robbinsian formulations of the problem is 
the need to achieve the pattern of manipulation of given means that will correspond most 
faithfully to the given hierarchy of ends. Such an economic agent is aware of a complete set 
of alternatives, in which such rational decisions can be taken according to objectively 
ascertainable utility functions (Blaseio 1986). Giving an example, a pioneering work 
introducing several axioms that were assumed guiding a rational decision maker’s preferences 
has been published by Neumann and Morgenstern (1947).  
Subsequently, several influential contributions have been made that showed aspects of 
decision making behaviour that differ from rational choice and claimed for the introduction of 
more appropriate, respectively more realistic descriptions. Among such approaches, Simon’s 
(1955) concept of bounded rationality definitely ought to be mentioned. His term was 
intended to express that human agents aim at taking rational choices, but are limited in their 
cognitive capacity to process all relevant information (see also chapter III.B.2), and, therefore, 
are inherently subject to uncertainty that prevails in making decisions. These 
neurophysiologic limits result in that humans cannot consider ex ante all eventualities 
(Feldmann 1999).  
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Although realist approaches have recently intended, and apparently achieved, to draw a more 
realistic picture of economic agents, they are still all based on the central conjecture that the 
human can be modelled as an automaton. From such a perspective, they only assume that the 
mechanism is (so far) too complex to be fully understood and modelled in nomological-
deductive models (Hesse 1990); anyhow, it is principally possible. However, subsequent 
studies and discussions revealed that their axioms of rational choice are generally of rather 
normative nature and not realistically describing or predicting observable decision making by 
humans (Kahneman and Tversky 1984). If such effects, e.g. framing, can be observed in 
experiments, it must not only be asked if they can also been find in real-life situations, but 
also whether they should be considered as anomalies, which would a realist philosopher 
claim, or ubiquitous phenomena following a relativistic position? 
However, gradually the passive picture of perceiving humans in philosophy has disappeared 
and given space to so called subjectivist views on epistemology as an active process, having 
an influence on the conceptualisation of human agency in economics. Directed to the scholars 
that defend exact sciences as the only way for doing research it could be argued that Gödel’s 
theorems in mathematics or Schrödinger’s arguments in physics show that formal methods of 
exact sciences are not per se capable of describing a complete field of study; in each of field 
objects can be identified, which cannot be captured with axiomatic-deductive models (Hesse 
1990; Ötsch 2007).  
According to such an argumentation most criticism concerning neoclassicism in economics 
can be traced back to the immanent characteristics of formal languages, such as mathematics, 
on which they are built (Blaseio 1986). One main argument against the application of exact 
methods in some fields of social sciences is that logic seems no to be as neutral as many 
scholars allege (e.g. like Morgenstern 1976), insofar that the use of mathematics introduces a 
somehow alien element into social sciences (Blaseio 1986). Nevertheless, it seems that 
mainstream economics prefers to base its theories and models on the exact approach, which 
turns out to be an anachronism since mathematics and physics have already abandoned the 
claim of an omnipotent formal analytic (exact) picture of the world, admitting the 
foundational crisis of mathematics (Blaseio 1986; von Weizsäcker 1977).  
The fact that the implications of this foundational crisis have to a large extent not been 
noticed by the social sciences is now taking vengeance. Consequently, it must be criticised 
that many scholars seem not to realise that the mathematical analysis can no longer be seen as 
apodictic truth in any field of economic study, but might result in sets of objects, which are 
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highly consistent but not explain the phenomena at hand. It is the central insight that already 
Einstein and Bohr were confronted with that concepts, in which simple empirical theorems 
are formulated, only become a clear sense in relation to a theory, a framework they can be 
understood in (Weizsäcker 1977, p. 583). This textual vacuum is particularly devastating in 
theories of human action or behaviour that are committed to formal consistency, and, 
therefore, immune against mathematical criticism, but while useful in explaining a variety of 
things, definitely do not explain historical or emerging events that characterise human 
behaviour (Blaseio 1986).  
In a way, the important works of Max Weber, Karl Popper, and Friedrich von Hayek in social 
sciences all claim as central point that there exists no such thing as conscious perception or 
cognition without active interpretation (Hesse 1990; Koch 1998). In particular Max Weber 
and Alfred Schutz argued that, therefore, not only action but also meaning attributed to it, 
must be considered in doing research on economic phenomena, thus, being epistemologically 
committed to fallibilistic ideas (Morton 1977; Weick 1969, 1995). They particularly 
emphasise that an understanding of economic actions like coordination must also be based on 
actions and the interpretation of their meaning by other economic agents (Yu 2001). Thus, 
this view alleges that interpretation is a highly social phenomenon since “[…] it is a process 
of perceiving the other and him or her interaction within symbolic frameworks so that we can 
make some sense out of what the other is doing.” (Weigert 1981, p. 74)  
Since such questions touch the underlying ontological level, they have deeper implications 
than simply assuming that humans are limited in their capacity to reproduce the one and only 
structure of nature, ruled by the laws of nature; central terms of microeconomics even lose 
their meaning. Therefore, it is now briefly outline how economic agents are modelled in 
relativist economic theories. 
Assuming a relativist or constructivist position in opposition to the prevailing, explicitly or 
implicitly realism-based models of economic agents leads to paradigmatic changes: In the 
present context particularly the terms of complete and incomplete information about which an 
economic actor can know, or not, are touched since they become misleading in their original 
neo-classicist sense. The central research question in this context shifts from defining the 
degree to which an individual possesses information about a situation and options of action, 
which accrue from it, i.e. the question how much information is gained, to questions of which 
information and of what type are considered and used by the individual; i.e. which 
information and how (Hesse 1990). Expressed in general terms, “ […] the question whether 
Opportunity Recognition in the Concept of Entrepreneurship 
 21
some idea is ‘objective’ is itself a matter for subjective judgment […]” (Shackle 1979, p. 30), 
i.e. a matter of public and general acceptance (Shackle 1979).  
A relativist ontological stance also resolves the bounded rationality-problem of 
microeconomic decision models: The core of the problem is that most real world problems are 
so complex that the human mind is not able to process all information available and relevant. 
However, in a subjectivist view even complete information, in the sense of having all relevant 
information available, does not lead to perfect equivalence of the subjective and objective 
situation. From such a view follows that it is methodologically ineligible to assume simple 
situations in which such equivalence might prevail; ontologically argued such situations do 
not exist and make these questions negligible. What mainly remains is the question, which 
information is processed and considered by a specific subject in time (Hesse 1990).  
Approaches and theories that assume human agents to actively interpret their environment are 
often called subjectivistic; one term for the philosophical conviction that imputes primacy to 
subjective experiences as fundament of all human observations and actions (Farber 1959). In 
economics it is said that during the last decades modern Austrian economics has emerged out 
of the classical subjectivist tradition (see Buchanan 1982; Coats 1983; Lachmann 1982).  
Often cited in this regard is Lachmann’s radical subjectivism that mainly embraced three 
interrelated themes: the (1) explanatory primacy of subjective evaluation, the (2) importance 
of expectations, and the (3) inadequacy of equilibrium models of the market (Koppl and 
Littlechild 1986; Mongiovi 1998; Zappia 1998). He viewed historical events as the outcome 
of purposeful human action that originates in the formation of plans. Since it is purposeful 
action that economists seek to understand, their principal task, according to Lachmann, is to 
elucidate the mental processes by which plans are formed. His interpretation of subjectivism 
entails the individualistic methodological doctrine that economic explanation must trace all 
causality to such mental acts, which differ from person to person.  
Lachmann distinguished three levels of subjectivism (Lachmann 1990). First, the subjectivism 
of wants recognises that different people have different tastes and pursue different ends. 
Second, the subjectivism of ends and means recognises that people may pursue similar ends 
in dissimilar ways. People have diverse, sometimes erroneous, ideas about the best ways to 
achieve any goal. Finally, the subjectivism of active minds embraces that in all aspects of 
action the active mind may produces interpretations and possibilities the observing economist 
can imagine in advance. For him subjectivism means ”[T]he mental activity of ordering and 
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formulating ends, allocating means to them, making and revising plans, determining when 
action has been successful, all these are its forms of expression.” (Lachmann 1982, p. 37)  
The radical subjectivism to which Lachmann was committed went far beyond the 
specification of agents’ references as part of the data which regulate prices, outputs, and 
distribution in a market economy. Instead, his notion of subjectivism derives from the fact 
that agents must form plans on the basis of their interpretation of events that take place in a 
changing world about which they have incomplete knowledge. The mental acts that precede 
action are therefore the products of human ingenuity - imaginative responses to the 
uncertainty of social existence - and are, to a significant degree, based on agents’ expectations 
about nature’s future states.  
Early on in his work, Lachmann (1943) stated that expectations are themselves shaped by the 
course of economic events; they cannot be regarded as parametric. Nor, according to him, can 
any scholar connect them in any systematic way to observable phenomena: Lachmann denies 
the possibility of establishing any univocal link between events and the expectations to which 
they give rise, assuming a rather radical constructivist position and denying the value of 
nomological-deductive models of human action. A given configuration of events, he argues 
for instance, can generate any number of expectational responses. For example, considering a 
price rise in a particular market could lead some agents to expect further price increases and 
others to expect a reduction in price, with corresponding consequences for theirs subsequent 
actions. Thus, expectations “[…] have to be regarded as economically indeterminate.” 
(Lachmann 1943, p. 67)  
As already indicated, various studies found arguments substantiating a subjectivistic view. 
Many of these studies were based on psychology, leading to the emergence of research 
strands such as behavioural or cognitive economics. Very prominent amongst such findings 
are so called framing effects in human behaviour. Mainly referring to the axiomatic principles 
of dominance and invarianceii in rational choice, Kahneman und Tversky (1979, 1981, 1984) 
argue that human decisions are subject to such effects. The term refers to subjective, non-
rational perceptions of decision situations, which elicit observable decisions and are predicted 
differently by rational choice theory.  
It was shown in empirical studies on expected utility theory that the choices of individuals are 
significantly influenced by the framing of the situation (Ötsch 2007). In such experiments on 
economic agent’s decision making, subjects changed their decisions regarding the same facts 
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such as payoffs or occurrence probability if other decision frames were offered to them. For 
instance, it matters for the choice of individuals if the possible outcomes of a gamble are 
framed either as gains or losses relative to the status quo or as an asset position that 
incorporates initial wealth (Tversky and Kahneman 1981). Most notably, even individuals 
that were informed about framing effects still were not invariant to options that were 
rationally equal. This leads to the conclusion that framing effects rather resemble perceptual 
illusions than computational errors (Kahneman and Tversky 1984).  
By illustrating further effects of the influence of mere framing of outcomes and contingencies 
in decision situations on decision behaviour, it is pointed to an individual’s subjective 
representation of a situation. This also equals to subjective values and utility functions that are 
underlined in the psychophysical treatment of risky choice, called prospect theory (Kahneman 
and Tversky 1979). 
About the same time Kahneman and Tversky published their results, extended research on 
organisational decisions - linking individuals’ cognitive representations of the environment 
and organisational actions - has highlighted that decision makers have interpretational 
frameworks on which they base their decisions since the issues they encounter are mostly 
ambiguous and therefore require interpretation (Dutton and Jackson 1987; Daft and Weick 
1984; Jackson and Dutton 1988; Kiesler and Sproull 1982; Miller et al. 1982). In particular 
the role of schemas is underlined in categorising perceptions of a situation. This notion is 
based on cognitive economics literature (Earl 1983), arguing that under genuine uncertainty, 
human agents attempt to cope with the stimuli of the external world by constructing, 
templates of features of the world and then seeing whether or not these templates actually fit 
(Yu 2001).  
Reviewing literature on human cognition, it soon becomes clear that all the arguments 
brought up are common knowledge on human cognition applied to economic situations or 
settings. For instance, it is said that if humans are confronted with a particular situation, they 
endeavour to derive a set of usable conceptions of the external world through mental 
experimentation based on experiences, i.e. humans categorise the situations they are 
confronted with to give them a meaning; to interpret them (Choi 1993). Such categories are 
mainly built up by previous experiences and associated with particular actions (Lane at al. 
1996), accumulated in everyday situations, and largely biographically determined (Berger and 
Berger 1976): It is dealt with idiosyncratic stock of knowledge that is used to interpret 
incoming events (Yu 2001). The past actions are adjusted to the present situation, which is 
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similar (by definition perceive similar since it is activated) but not identical to the one it is 
categorised to (probably derived from the prototype and the attached action taken to react to 
the situation).  
Summarising this, economic agents have made previous experiences, which make up an 
idiosyncratic stock of knowledge; new economic situations they are subsequently confronted 
with are understood by the personal interpretation framework, which is based on the stock of 
knowledge. Then, the experience gained from this situation is added to the stock of 
knowledge, thus also influencing future decision making (Shane 2000). Resulting, individuals 
possess routines or rules of thumb with which they solve problems in everyday life (Yu 
2001). Such interpretative concepts - often named routines (deBono 1980) - are crucial for 
human life, consequently also for economic actions. In addition, it implies that economic 
agents react differently to an objectively similar stimulus (when other economic approaches 
just see the situation at hand, assuming a homogenous behaviour (mostly rational) (O’Driscoll 
and Rizzo 1985) and make up different expectations of the future (Lachmann 1970). What is 
the conclusion of this proposition for the present work? Hereafter, it is assumed that effects, 
such as framing, are not simply an empiric heuristic problem but indicate a basic 
epistemological problem of each economic theory.  
According to Hayek (1945), in economics a twofold subjectivism prevails, which imposes a 
basic problem of generating relevant knowledge on economic agents and scientists (Wegner 
1996). This is the crucial point where creativity comes into economics: Alternatives or 
options for action do not exist in the world, but are the result of mental hypotheses about 
possible alternatives or options (Hayek 1956; Lachmann 1979). Simultaneously, subjective 
creativity - in the sense of producing novel outcomes - is the source of endogenous change 
and will be the main topic of the present work, marking the central characteristic of special 
economic agents: entrepreneurs. It has been outlined above what it basically means to assume 
a relativist or subjectivist stance in theorising about economic human action. However, 
nothing has been said yet about some implications such a view has for explaining 
entrepreneurial behaviour.  
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3. Time and Novelty in Relativist Economic Theories 
Adopting a subjectivistic or relativistic view, the economist as a scientist is confronted with 
the epistemological problem that an individual’s perceived options of action can only be 
partially deduced by objectivated model data. It is not observable how these data are 
transformed into options of action, in particular if these are novel (Hesse 1990; Ötsch 2007). 
For scholars the main problem arises that it is impossible to accurately identify, what part of 
human cognition can be attributed undoubtedly to a subject-independent external world. 
However, this does not automatically imply that there is no such neutral or objective reality 
existing (Crotty 1998), but rather that there is an inescapable mist covering all assertions, in 
particular also involving the scientist as a subject himself (Koch 1998).  
What is most relevant to the present work in that regard is that in a mechanistic world, 
creativity or the introduction of novelty is attributed to a creator outside the machine, who 
moulds law-like generalisations (see left hand-side in Figure 1). Admittedly, parts of the 
world can be described and understood in this sense (von Förster 1985); however, many 
economists, amongst them Austrian economists and evolutionary economists, accept such a 
mechanistic model only for parts of the world; these are embedded in processes that cannot be 
described as machines (see right hand-side in Figure 1) (Herrmann-Pillath 2001; Hesse 1990): 
The formal analytic view of the world is applicable to fields in which structure and order, i.e. 
stability, prevails but not to phenomena in which novelty and change are decisive (Blaseio 
1988); i.e. to real economic evolution (Georgescu-Roegen 1971).  
In methodological terms, it follows that quantitative, statistical data and econometric methods 
can only be applied to certain parts of the object of study. Concluding, knowledge about facts 
and options of action economic agents possess in a situation are not objective in the sense that 
they can be deducted from given external information, i.e. market data. Rather it is a 
subjective process of interpretation, which finally leads to the subjectively perceived options 
of action.  
Assuming a mechanistic stance based on logic, the classical view of homo oeconomicus is 
quite reasonable since it is located in a bivalent world: In such, the postulate of identity 
prescribes that a thing can only exist or not. This implies an objectivity of the world, in which 
an individual can objectively recognise the world around him (Blaseio 1988). However, as 
has been said such a metaphysical view of the world is outdated; therefore, a variety of efforts 
to implement more realistic models of humans as economic agents have been taken recently.  
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In particular, evolutionary economics consider the integration of the creative element as 
essential part of human behaviour in economic situations as one of the most important 
aspects, distinguishing it from other approaches (Budzinski 2001; Coriat and Dosi 1998). 
Similarly, such subjectivism is often seen as the fundamental tenet distinguishing Austrian 
economics from neoclassicism (Horwitz 1994). Following such a position brings up another 
important aspect: the issue where the border lies between phenomena that can be modelled as 
a machine and, therefore, can be investigated with exact methods, and creative elements or 
processes that elude from such approaches.  
It is important that researchers are aware of the border of their models and theories and do not 
limit their research to a too narrow field of research they regard as representing the complete 
field that can be modelled like a machine (Eucken 1939; Hesse 1990); a research field with 
aspects that ought to be modelled different is schown on the right-hand side in Figure 1. It is 
most important to the present work to consider this assertion since it might be objected that a 
subjectivistic approach to economic phenomena must result in a historic science, simply 
explaining phenomena ex post, simply because the introduction of inherent novelty alters the 
laws at work (Blaseio 1986).  
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Figure 1 Ontological Controversy: The world with endogenised and exogenised creativity (based on: 
Hesse (1990), p. 54). 
However, the present work is not intended to theorise about singular changes, but about the 
whole process dealing with classes or types of information and information processes that are 
used by all human actors to produce novel conjectures. This is exactly the argument, which is 
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brought up by evolutionary economists, who accept that singular processes of change cannot 
be captured with any metaphysical approach and therefore focus on the variation and selection 
processes that influence the whole process (Dopfer 2001; Herrmann-Pillath 2001; Metcalfe 
2001), thereby clearly defining what can be investigated with their models and what cannot.  
 
Summarising these arguments for the purpose of the present work, it can be stated that the 
human mind of economic agents at a certain point in time offers different alternative 
representations of a situation in the external world based on their previously accumulated 
stock of idiosyncratic knowledge (Koch 1998). For somebody not too familiar with economic 
theories it might be surprising that time as a relevant factor is so explicitly mentioned in a 
work like the present. However, it is that in many approaches of mainstream economics time 
is not considered as a relevant dimension since the formal analytic view is based on the logic 
of being that needs no time or subject (Blaseio 1986). Time is regarded as a frame, an ether, 
that comprises all economic agents and all their actions; and while humans act in time, 
neoclassical economics stays principally objective and timeless, thereby excluding surprise, 
novelty and everything unpredictable, i.e. inherent change (Röpke 1977; Shackle 1972).  
Reason is that time has been rejected in such economic theories in order to achieve 
demonstrative proof (Shackle 1972). Simultaneously, the main argument that is brought up 
against time as a mere dimension of space based on exact sciences and the formal analytic 
approach. Thus, even though the future is not necessarily modelled deterministic, probabilities 
of occurrence can be given for possible future events, and, thereby, endogenous novelty can 
be excluded (Blaseio 1986); by doing so, time is modelled as a spatial coordinate (Hicks 
1976). Such a set of potential states is only based on the presence and will be replaced by ex 
ante unconceivable new sets; anyway since Gödel we do know that - generally - recognisable 
opportunities or possibilities cannot be completely formalised.  
Therefore, in contradiction to scholars following so called discovery theory (Alvarez 2005) it 
is her argued that a complete theory of opportunities is impossible at any time; the set of 
opportunities grows (Weizsäcker 1977). Here, it becomes evident that the stance of a truly 
changing world, with truly created entrepreneurial opportunities, automatically implies the 
allowance for time in such a model.  
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Inherently immanent to the concept of entrepreneurship is the term of novelty. 
Philosophically, in a realist approach something that is realised expresses itself to the actor 
and the scientist; such novelty can be grasped by formal models. Novelty is related to a given 
reality that can be formally depicted by a space of possible actions (Blaseio 1986). Therefore, 
it is possible to distinguish between subjective aspects like preferences and objective aspects 
such as possible actions (Ötsch 2007).  
Assuming a relativist or subjectivist position, novelty cannot be identified interpersonally 
since tagging something as new is not an objective attribution, but dependent on the observer. 
Novelty becomes a category that is bound to the observer and subjective and objective 
components cannot be clearly dissected; it is an attribute that arises from a certain perception. 
This perception is dependent on individuals that dispose of an idiosyncratic set of extant 
knowledge categories, which allows them to classify something as new (Hesse 1990). This 
subjective cognitive effort is a creative act and related cognitive processes sources of 
innovation. As said, different individuals perceive an equal situation unequally, even if the 
same external stimuli hit their mind (Ötsch 2007). However, it will be the core of the present 
work to model such subjective cognitive processing that typically leads to novel outcomes in 
a given type of economic settings.  
On a macroeconomic level, the subjectivist view that knowledge is idiosyncratic - note again 
that this is ontologically different from asymmetrically distributed as in a realist world - 
implies that economic agents build their own expectations based on different knowledge 
bases; therefore, it is this characteristic subjective nature of expectations that finally 
determines market processes (Koppl and Mongiovi 1998). These differences between subjects 
and their perceptions of identical situations built under uncertainty are the essence of 
entrepreneurship: being different (Casson 2003; Knight 1921). Please note that in a 
subjectivist conception decisions and expectations are not subject to risk but uncertainty since 
no probabilities can be calculated ex ante because inherent change and transformation cannot 
be predicted in a space of events (Alvarez 2005; Pendergast 2003; Shane 2003).  
Again, it must be underlined that reasoning about novelty and corresponding models 
conceived within the framework of fallibilism, explicitly integrating creative agents, is 
accompanied by epistemological complications and it seems to be a prerequisite for research 
efforts to highlight, what can actually be captured if it seems that actually no general 
statement about individuals can be given.  
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A solution to the problem that humans systematically construct their own ideas is seen in 
networks of axiomatically independent theories that could be developed; this allows 
explaining a phenomenon by general (subject-independent) laws but nevertheless remained a 
singular event within the framework of another theory. This ontological insight justifies 
interdisciplinary research on primordial economic phenomena since the status of singularity 
in one theory leaves the status unaffected in another, if they are axiomatically independent of 
each other (Herrmann-Pillath 2001). This general insight can be applied to economic change; 
in this regard Witt (1993, 2001) refers to the argument that singular revelations of a change's 
content into a system make previously expected conditions, as in nomological-deductive 
models, irrelevant. Therefore, the nature of novelty implies that it’s meaning and 
informational content, resulting in new states of the economic system, cannot be positively 
anticipated; but what can be defined are the conditions a novel solution must meet, 
disregarding the actual properties in this particular case (Witt 2001).  
However, while it is admitted in the present work that it is impossible to escape this trap and 
it cannot be anticipated to which actual state or new configuration a system evolves, the 
author is deeply convinced that human thinking patterns that produce novel outcomes in a 
specific economic system are not themselves subject to change from a psychological point of 
view. Since in this psychological system of reference no singular phenomenon exists 
(Hermann-Pillath 2001), by taking a closer look to the field of psychology, the “[…] 
innovative environment […]” (Witt 2001, p. 51) for activities of the human mind that produce 
specific novelty in economic settings meeting specific properties can be studied by searching 
for laws. 
Accordingly, it is no wonder that a variety of scholars has argued against the denial of 
creativity and time in economics for phenomena, in which evolution and change are 
dominant, reasoning that “[…] time is what brings new knowledge.” (Shackle 1972, p. 151) 
In such “[…] new means are continually invented, new economic wants created, and new 
distributive rules introduced. The question is why a science interested in economic means, 
end, and distribution should dogmatically refuse to study also the process by which new 
economic means, new economic ends, and new economic relations are created.” (Georgescu-
Roegen 1971, p. 320)  
Trying this, some economists embraced time by introducing historical moments that are not 
conceivable ex ante and represent singular, irrevocable events (Georgescu-Roegen 1971; Witt 
2001). According to such a creative theory (Alvarez 2005) “[...] opportunities do not pre-exist 
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- either to be recognised or to be discovered. Instead they get created as the residual of a 
process that involves intense dynamic interaction and negotiation between stakeholders 
seeking to operationalise their (often vague and unformed) aspirations and values into 
concrete products, services and institutions that constitute the economy.” (Sarasvathy et al. 
2003, pp. 156-157) Consequently, it matters for the scientist when the object of study is 
observed, gearing research to economic agents, to human beings, and their originality or 
creativity (Witt 2001). It is this aspect that finally justifies including a relevant time 
dimension and not only referring to exclusive law-like regularities as in exact approaches 
(Blaseio 1986; Shackle 1972, 1979).  
Consequently, some economists' approaches, e.g. in evolutionary economics, are based on the 
assumption that there do not exist invariant and universal laws, but these are evolutionary 
products and only temporarily valid (Dopfer 2001). Evidently, it is the explicit introduction of 
unprogrammable subjects that allows using terms like time, subject evolution, creativity, or 
novelty that turn out to be somehow synonymous in that the existence of one phenomenon 
implies the existence of the others (Blaseio 1986). Without digging to deep into the textual 
criticism of neoclassicism for neglecting subject and time, it is concluded here that turning 
away from the Robbinsian economic agent is mainly justified by the lack of neutrality of 
logistics and mathematics and the textual restrictions that the application of the formal 
method in modelling economic agents imposes; as Shackle put it: “Time and logic are alien to 
each other.” (Shackle 1972, p. 255)  
The temporal aspect has found particular entrance to evolutionary economics, which is quite 
palpable since explaining evolution and transformation is at the core of this strand. For the 
present work it is stated that formal models might promise insights regarding human action in 
stable systems, but hardly for creativity and true change (Blaseio 1986). Consequently, time is 
implicitly and explicitly considered as a relevant aspect in investigating entrepreneurial 
opportunities. Any description of entrepreneurial opportunities must include the aspect of 
path-dependency in the sense that there exist only few ways to capitalise on a venture idea, 
and the availability of these paths is constrained by time and space; it is therefore rather an 
evolving process of opportunity windows that open and close (Fiet et al. 2004b; Hougaard 
2005); in other words, some opportunities do exist for years or decades, while others are 
strictly time-bound in a short period (Baron 2004).  
In such a dynamic view, for instance considering business or technological cycles, the number 
of entrepreneurial opportunities varies (Bünstorf 2006; Murmann and Tushman 2001). It 
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seems that along a technological cycle, entrepreneurial opportunities particularly emerge in 
phases before a particular technology becomes dominant and in phases of incremental change 
(Murmann and Tushman 2001). Embracing such a dynamic aspect in defining entrepreneurial 
opportunities underlines the importance of time in the context of entrepreneurship and 
opportunity recognition, which will be accounted for in developing a model of opportunity 
recognition in time. 
In a work like the present, in which psychological insights are crucial, it seems to be of 
interest which position this discipline holds about the integration of time in theories on human 
action since these considerations are so closely intertwined with economic theorising they are 
presented here and not in the following chapter III on human thinking. Apparently, in the field 
of psychology time is of relevance; e.g. it is a common truism that the human mind evolves 
with the years and whole research streams are built on the developmental aspect (e.g. Harris 
and Butterworth 2002).  However, on a basic cognitive level it could be asked how the human 
mind comes to a conscious image of time. Studies were able to show that the human mind has 
a kind of integrative mechanism that allows transforming physical stimulus into a subjective 
perception of time. This means that all stimuli entering the human mind within a given period 
of time are coordinated into a subjective simultaneity of events (Pöppel 1988). For the 
purpose of the present work - a work in the information processing paradigm (see chapter 
III.A.3) - it is not of interest, how this synchronisation is neuronally executed; it is rather 
relevant that such a neuronal mechanism provides the fundament for a feeling or subjective 
perception of time in the human mind. It results the proposition that events are temporally 
integrated into subjective representations of the presence that are updated every three seconds, 
as depicted in Figure 2 (Pöppel 1988).  
Mental 
Events
Temporal
Integration
 
Figure 2 Temporal Integration of Consecutive Mental Events (Pöppel 1988). 
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Even though the frequency of updates is not of high importance in the present context it 
should be underlined that this does by no means imply that the human mind produces isolated 
representations. It is central to consider that human experience is characterised by time as a 
flow; i.e. the representations are linked with each other and the content of one representation 
always determines the content of the following. Hence, this linkage is the reason why we do 
not realise that our conscious presence is only limited to a few seconds since for our 
understanding of the world contents are decisive; therefore, the formal temporal isolation of 
the representations itself is not content of our consciousness and therefore not relevant.  
Summarising this, it can be stated that semantic linkages between contents of the single 
subjective representations lead to a continuous perception of our own perceptive capabilities 
(Pöppel 1985, 1988). In an economic context the temporal aspect has found particular 
entrance to evolutionary economics. This is not a matter of course since many neoclassical 
microeconomic models allow for only one decision or action in time (e.g. Debreu 1959), 
defining human behaviour for an infinite number of periods.  
Following the above mentioned arguments, in the present work a certain discrete action at a 
certain point in time (tn) is based on previous decisions and actions (in tn-m) and has 
implications for following decisions and actions (in tn+m) (see all the literature on paths and 
path dependency in evolutionary economics; see for an overview Lundvall 1992; Muller 
2001). The cognitive processes that are central in modelling economic thinking are the 
semantic linkages that guide the changes in the mental representations.  
Given the subjective nature of economic agents in general, it must be asked how economists 
went about to model the entrepreneur as such an individual introducing novelty into economic 
systems? Consequently, following part of this chapter introduces the most influential 
conceptualisations. 
 
B. Entrepreneurship 
1. Entrepreneurs: Humans that Introduce Novelty to Economics 
However, even if it is often agreed on the general importance of subjectivism in relevant 
theories, research streams such as Austrian economics are rather heterogeneous concerning 
this issue. Particularly concerning an economic agent’s reasoning the differences that are 
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subsumed under the term of subjectivity are significant. Some approaches that might be 
tagged or intended to be in a subjectivist tradition might still remain in a principally realistic 
model of the world with humans conceivable as automatons. Concerning the introduction of 
novelty into economic systems mainly two approaches should be mentioned, which were 
asserted by Hayek as well as Kirzner on the one hand and Lachmann on the other (Sarasvathy 
et al. 2003). Between these two main approaches to an individual’s creativity “[…] the 
cleavage lies in the exclusion of the creative dimension of the human mind from the Kirzner-
Hayek conception: by contrast with Lachmann’s view, agents are limited to discovery, 
discovery of profit opportunities and discovery of knowledge.” (Gloria-Palermo 1999, p. 62)  
In the former notion of the market process, agents do not initially possess more knowledge, 
but the existence of profit opportunities creates incentives to discover new knowledge. 
Therefore, the actual entrepreneurial activity lies in the exploitation of opportunities, which 
have emerged through market insufficiencies. By exploiting these, new knowledge diffuses in 
the market, transforming the entrepreneurial action into an equilibrating act (Shane 2003).  
Again, the Hayekian and Kirznerian approach to the market process differ in that the former 
does not believe in an “[…] immutable reality that is out there and waiting to be discovered 
once and for all.“ (Gloria-Palermo 1999, p. 66) Hayek rather assumes that the world is in 
continuous change and unexpected deviances result of changes in exogenous variables; thus, 
inferring that there can never a long-term equilibrium exist (Hayek 1945). It should be evident 
that such a conception is somehow closer to a relativist conception of the world in the sense 
that the ubiquitous construction of reality ontologically precludes a state of equilibrium. 
However, both Hayek and Kirzner, attribute a discovering function to the individual, which 
does not require creativity for finding entrepreneurial opportunities.  
Lachmann’s concept strongly differs in this point from the above presented notions: while in 
these an agent’s plans are regarded as a subjective interpretation of past experience, 
Lachmann introduced a creative dimension (Lachmann 1969). He argues that through the 
interaction of knowledge - as a symptom of any economic situation through its interpretation 
in the context of past experience - and expectations as the interpretation of the future situation 
- are created through imagination, totally representing a constructivist stance and allowing for 
the investigations that are intended to be carried out in the present work (Lachmann 1969).  
In summary, it can be said that although the importance of entrepreneurial individuals is 
uncontroversial within Austrian economics, the entrepreneur is attributed a different role in 
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the different strands of this research stream and in economic theory in general; a controversy, 
which can be traced back to their ontological fundament. Apparently, these notions also differ 
as to the explanations for situations, in which individuals are able to recognise entrepreneurial 
opportunities (Ripsas 1998).  
The two most prominent approaches concerning this issue and somehow representing the two 
fundamentally different ontological views treated here, are named after the authors, who 
mainly shaped the concepts: Kirzner and Schumpeter (Sarasvathy 2004; Yu 2001). The main 
disagreement is seen in the role of information for the existence of entrepreneurial 
opportunities and the corresponding ontological consequences: Kirzner claims that a 
differential access to existent, therefore somehow objective, information is sufficient to 
identify opportunities, while Schumpeter was convinced that new, and therefore subjectively 
created, information is necessary for the alert individual to identify an entrepreneurial 
opportunity. Thus, two modes of entrepreneurship can be differentiated: the Kirznerian rather 
being imitative and equilibrating and the Schumpeterian innovative and destructive or 
disequilibrative opportunities (Yu 2001).  
Ontologically, Kirzner assumed a given stock of opportunities that is principally of a finite 
nature and sees the role of economic agents in overcoming shortcomings in the discovery of 
such entrepreneurial opportunities (see also Boland 1978), while Schumpeter emphasises the 
constructive force of humans that results in endogenous change and a principally infinite 
number of opportunities. Conceptually, it could be concluded that Kirzner builds his concept 
on humans’ incapabilities and Schumpeter on their capabilities (Blaseio 1986).  
In some more detail, Kirzner built his concept of entrepreneurship upon the fundament laid by 
Mises’ human action theory (Yu 2001). In a nutshell, Kirzner argues that individuals use 
existent information to come to an expectation about efficient resource combinations. 
However since his economic agents act in a world of imperfect knowledge, they consequently 
construe imperfect expectations or beliefs and commit mistakes in allocating resources, 
somehow in a sense of bounded rationality (Kirzner 1973). If an individual subjectively 
designs a more efficient expectation, it hopes to make a profit from it. Therefore, Kirzner 
regards imperfect knowledge of market participants as the main source for entrepreneurial 
opportunities. Principally, each individual who is first to detect is able to grasp them. At the 
same time, this process of making profit represents a process of eliminating imperfect market 
knowledge or reducing the boundaries on rationality (Kirzner 1978). Since imperfection of 
markets is reduced, entrepreneurial activity has equilibrating effects. This does not imply that 
Opportunity Recognition in the Concept of Entrepreneurship 
 35
Kirzner assumed an economy would ever reach the state of equilibrium (Kirzner 1999). 
However, this broad view of the equilibrating entrepreneur, consequently, includes arbitrage 
activities since they are also equilibrating (White 1976).  
Central to his approach and his explication of change in markets is the described alertness of 
entrepreneurial individuals that allows making discoveries that are valuable in the satisfaction 
of human wants or needs (Alvarez 2005; Yu 2001). Kirzner himself defines entrepreneurial 
alertness “[…] as an attitude of receptiveness to available, but hitherto overlooked 
opportunities.” (Kirzner 1997, p. 72) This means that entrepreneurs have a superior or more 
accurate perception for objective signals in the external world.iii Accordingly, it is not the 
mere possession of knowledge that explains entrepreneurship, but an individual’s ability to 
find relevant market data.iv Emphasis is put on the process of discovery of relevant 
information and not information itself (Kirzner 1973).  
In some more detail, the alertness to an opportunity is contingent on two main factors: (1) The 
attractiveness of the perceived opportunity, and (2) its ability to be grasped (Kirzner 1979). 
Initially, Kirzner alleged a rather passive view of opportunities as being ‘ready’ out there, 
neglecting an entrepreneur’s creativity, who rather stumbles over them:v “He is alert, waiting, 
continually receptive to something that may turn up […].” (Kirzner 1979, p. 7) This also 
implied that individuals do not actively search for opportunities, but are rather hit or surprised 
by a hitherto oversee opportunity (Sarasvathy et al. 2003; Yu 2001).  
In contrast to Kirzner’s somehow realism-based conception of the world, Schumpeter argued 
that new information is used by specific individuals, the entrepreneurs, to develop new 
combinations of productive goods (Schumpeter 1934). Therefore, his view on entrepreneurial 
activity is not necessarily based on imperfect information in markets, but on newly generated 
information available to the innovative individual at hand. It should be apparent by now, 
where the principal ontological difference between these conceptions lies: subjective 
individuals can always generate new information idiosyncratically by construing their own 
reality. Such innovations can be (1) the introduction of a new good - that is one with which 
consumers are not yet familiar - or of a new quality of a good. (2) The introduction of a new 
method of production […]. (3) The opening of a new market that is a market into which the 
particular branch of manufacture of the country in question has not previously entered, 
whether or not this market has existed before. (4) The conquest of a new source of supply of 
raw materials or half-manufactured goods […]. (5) The carrying out of the new organisation 
of any industry […].” (Schumpeter 1934, p. 66; enumeration added) The types of innovation 
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named by Schumpeter already show that in his conception the entrepreneur is a rather 
disequilibrative force, not simply by keeping an economy grow, but by changing the whole 
course or trajectory of doing something itself by construing genuinely new ways (Schumpeter 
1934). 
Interestingly, after being criticised for the exclusion of the creative element (see for instance 
White 1976), Kirzner refined his approach and accepted the view that there also exist 
situations, in which creative imagination is applied by individuals to shape the future (Kirzner 
1982). He did that mainly by introducing the distinction between single-period and multi-
period markets, admitting that for the latter imagination can be of some significance (Kirzner 
1982). Important in the context of the present work is that Kirzner (1999) himself admitted 
that for the understanding of the psychological profile, which characterises the real-world 
entrepreneur, the Schumpeterian entrepreneur is more valid and accurate.  
However, although the views seem on the contrary from an ontological perspective, the 
literature nowadays often ignores such basic differences and alleges a pluralistic view, not 
considering the Schumpeterian and Kirznerian view as concurring conceptions for the same 
phenomenon. It is argued that they rather describe two different types of entrepreneurial 
opportunities (Shane and Venkatamaran 2000). While Schumpeterian opportunities result 
from forces that are triggered off by market disequilibria, Kirznerian opportunities rather 
emerge through routine activities and imitation. As already mentioned, this has equilibrating 
effects and brings the economy closer to its economic equilibrium (Yu 2001). Put briefly, the 
latter actions reinforce established processes, while the former change the existing system 
radically (Gloria-Palermo 1998). 
 
2. Economic Human Action in Time 
In the present work it is assumed that such a progress can be achieved by approaches 
explicitly integrating cognitive factors since not only modern psychologists but also social 
scientists and economists agree on the particular importance of cognitive factors for human 
behaviour (Blaseio 1986). Such insights are explicitly considered in theories of problem-
solving, which were introduced in economic settings by Popper (1959), and are incompatible 
with the utilitarian tradition (Hesse 1990). Perhaps the most importance difference lies in that 
problem-solving approaches explicitly allow for context (Granovetter 1985; Esser 2003), 
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which is typical for cognitive approaches as will be pointed out in chapter II.A.2. This 
dependence of human behaviour on time and space it is embedded in has, if considered, 
massive impacts on what microeconomic models must consider (Albert 2005). Hereafter, 
Hesse’s (1990) model of human action in time is introduced that integrates the ontological 
stance of the present work; by doing so, it should become evident, how the introduction of 
cognitive constructivism alters the fundamentals of theorising about economic agent’s 
behaviour. What does this actually imply for the present work and all economic research that 
regards human behaviour as the basic analytical element of its ontology? First and foremost, 
models used in such approaches to describe human behaviour must explicitly embrace 
creativity. However, it still remains the challenging task to determine what in the world can 
be thought of as machine and what as creative element. Hereafter, a model of human action in 
time is presented that seems to be in accordance with all the arguments mentioned so far, and 
functions as the fundament for the model of opportunity identification to be developed in the 
present work.  
Based on a deductive-nomological model, like they have been most popular in mainstream 
economics for a long time, Hesse (1990) has developed a model of human action in time that 
explicitly considers creativity of the human mind. The general question is how action in time 
can be seen and modelled? Based on methodological individualism, only humans are 
considered as actors in this approach, thereby, excluding any direct role of constructed forces 
like history, evolution, or capital. However, first of all it will be shown how a mechanistic 
model of human action typically explains the outcome (of the human act) as logical from the 
situation the human being is situated in. This provides a framework for the subsequent 
integration of the creative element. Basically, mechanistic models are developed like 
deductive-nomological explanations: such consist of at least one universal condition alleging 
that at each point in time and space specified consequences occur if certain conditions prevail. 
These two elements (the explanan) lay the ground for logical deductions of the phenomena 
(the eplanandum); here human action (see column 1 Figure 3). 
Consider a model of human agency that distinguishes two broad types of actions: (1) reflexes, 
e.g. stimulus-reaction, or actions in affect, and (2) reflected action. These two differ 
conceptually in that the latter kind of action involves conscious reflection or verbalisation 
about conditions and options of choice of the particular situation at hand. This means in other 
words that the latter includes a significantly higher degree of intentionality (Pöppel 1988; 
Searle 1983). Since only reflected action seems to be relevant to the present work (it can be 
Opportunity Recognition in the Concept of Entrepreneurship 
 38 
assumed that the choice of recombining resources or finding and exploiting entrepreneurial 
opportunities represents a reflected action, consciously elaborated on by the individual), only 
such types of action will be considered in the following (Hesse 1990). If such human action is 
to be explained, neoclassical models base on the principle of rationality as nomological 
hypothesis. This represents the linkage between observable action and mental operations of 
the situational constitution and the order of choices. At this stage, rationality only means that 
the choice, which has been identified to be the best, has actually been chosen and executed.  
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Figure 3 Situational logic (based on Hesse 1990, p. 58). 
However, before the principle of rationality can be applied, the available choices must be 
evaluated and put into a hierarchical order. This problem of ordering alternatives is subject of 
constraint-choices approaches and can be solved mathematically by optimisation techniques 
(see column 2 Figure 3) (see e.g. Eisenführ and Weber 1999). With such a view on human 
decision making the principle of causality can be kept, which is methodologically convenient 
since the same relevant conditions always lead to the same result (Blaseio 1986). So far, this 
model is ontologically quite similar to neoclassical approaches and the human could be 
programmed as an automaton. The central cleavage lies in the perception of the conditions in 
a situation: This perception and resulting available options are contingent on an individual’s 
idiosyncratic knowledge about events and objects, its heuristics about correlations and effects, 
and its economic capacity (see column 3 in Figure 3). Accordingly, it is simple unrealistic to 
assume that similar conditions are given for different individuals, independent of any 
complexity of the situation at hand; consequently, pure deductive-nomological models are not 
fruitful in explaining human action (Coulter 1996). This resembles to the general principle of 
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irreversibility states that dynamic development cannot be rescinded by an inversely directed 
development and, therefore, there a world with exactly the same conditions only exists once 
(Schrödinger 1967). 
Some may argue that modern neoclassical microeconomics and their subjective utilitarism, 
have abandoned the homo oeconomicus and are exactly assuming this view. However, 
ontologically there exists a difference: the present model does not claim that the subjective 
and objective situations correspond or certain mathematical rules for ordering options are 
applied. Therefore, it cannot be justified to infer bounded or limited rationality, if humans in 
real situations do not apply the definitions of a situation or rules of ordering that economic 
researchers regard as correct. In such a view there is no such thing as bounded rationality 
since it is ontologically assumed that the situation subjectively ‘is’ as the individual at hand 
perceives, and that another subject (the researcher) cannot claim to know or perceive the ‘real’ 
conditions of a situation (Hesse 1990). If such objective conditions could be defined, the 
application of a nomological-deductive model for human action in time would be rather 
simple and correspond to the one outlined above. However, it is the main argument alleged 
here that this is ontologically impossible: Central reason is that the mental situation imposing 
the conditions for subsequent processes results from an idiosyncratic construction by the 
individual.  
In summary, the classical microeconomic base unit of human action is consequently 
expanded, adding to the principle of rationality the principle of cognitive creation (Esser 
2003; Shackle 1972). This means that the task of economic agents is no longer simply 
allocation in a given framework of means and ends, but also the construction of idiosyncratic 
means-ends frameworks. This principle of creativity or creative cognition is what accounts for 
the systematically ‘false’ construction of means-ends frameworks of economic agents, i.e. the 
principal impossibility to establish universal and true statements about the world, that 
characterises fallibilistic approaches like the present (Herrmann-Pillath 2001). It also follows 
from the constructivist stance that the exact microeconomic approach, which only allows for 
allocation problems, does not describe a well-defined number of situations, but simply 
neglects an essential aspect of each economic situation (Hesse 1990). Here, it is even alleged 
that it is such an expanded view on human action or choice that allows for introducing novelty 
in economic systems: “Economic choice does not consist in comparing the items in a list, 
known to be complete, of given fully specified rival and certainly attainable results. It consists 
in first creating, by conjecture and reasoned imagination on the basis of mere suggestions 
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offered by visible or recorded circumstance, the things on which hope can be fixed.” (Shackle 
1972, p. 96) 
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Figure 4 Human Action in Time (Hesse 1990). 
Figure 4 depicts a model of human action in time that is built up on the constructivist 
ontological stance outlined above and expands the typical microeconomic model. As already 
indicated, the model identifies a certain discrete action in tn that is based on actions in tn-m and 
has implications for tn+m. Therefore, actions in time result from discrete creative acts. This 
leads to a particular configuration containing personal knowledge, heuristics, economic 
capacity, objectives, and rules of ordering at each point in time. This partially observable 
configuration of an economic agent’s mind is not the basis providing the conditions for the 
principle of rationality as the nomological hypothesis. Rather, the human mind subjectively 
transforms these into an unobservable mental situation, containing a personal description of 
the situation, options of actions, and rules for ordering them. This process of coming to such a 
mental situation is named the process of cognitive creation, which can be seen as a principle, 
how an individual transforms the initial base of action into an idiosyncratic mental situation 
(Hesse 1990).  
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The application of the principle of rationality on such subjective mental situations leads again 
to the partially observable action; however, this is not the core topic of the present work since 
it rather resembles to the decision to act upon an entrepreneurial opportunity in the 
entrepreneurial process, and is therefore neglected here. It is more important to take a look 
into the literature of cognitive psychology to see, whether the principle of cognitive creation 
cannot be modelled in some more detail, thereby not directly moving the borders of what can 
be described by exact methods but at least being more precise about the principle of cognitive 
creation in economic settings.  
The present work is an attempt to enter the residual concept of creativity, the bounded 
uncertainty (Shackle 1972) in economic settings that has often been named as the source of 
novelty and change, but remains a scientifically untouched construct (Blaseio 1986). 
However, what some economists regard as a central insight, that “[…] novelty is the 
transformation of existing knowledge, its reinterpretation; in some degree necessarily its 
denial and refutation […]” (Shackle 1972, p. 56), is uncontroversial in cognitive psychology 
and has already been modelled and investigated for a long period. In fact, the basic ideas of 
such models that novelty in economic systems, in which uncertainty prevails, cannot be 
modelled with nomological-deductive models for many realistic situations gain more and 
more acceptance.  
For instance, Sarasvathy (2001) argues that in many situations it is not the goal or end that is 
given, but a set of means, for which economic agents conceive a set of potential ends of 
which one is selected as being worth to be pursued (Mitchell et al. 2007). She distinguishes 
between two types of decision situations; the classical decision making situation in which a 
given goal is intended to be achieved in well structured and specific situation, by choosing 
between a set of alternative means or cause available at the moment of the decision is called a 
causation-dominated decision process. Such models resemble to the ones that have been 
described as insufficient to account for entrepreneurial behaviour since it is impossible to 
describe constraints on possible means and the criteria for selecting between them. Therefore, 
decisions involving effectuation are proposed that differ in that they start with a given set of 
means and very general aspirations of the individual at hand, which are not explicit but rather 
a set of possible effects. For these, economic agents develop subjective constraints and 
criteria for selecting between them (Sarsvathy 2001). 
Summarising what has been said so far, entrepreneurship is the introduction of novelty into 
economic systems. It is a process that is highly influenced by mental aspects, here named 
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opportunity identification. Consequently, accounting for cognitive constructivism, the present 
work is an attempt to base an agent-based model of entrepreneurial discovery on a post-
modernist fundament in a double sense: the model is based on a relativist or subjectivist 
fundament, modelling the economic agent in such terms and regards economic systems as 
such systems that are marked by their inner coherency and pragmatic usability (Lakatos 1970; 
Popper 1935; see for more details chapter III.A.3). While the former refers to the argument 
that economic agents come to different hypotheses about future situations, i.e. making 
Popperian conjectures (Hamilton and Harper 1994; Meyer 2000), the latter is particularly 
important in this context since it makes change and subjectivism inherent phenomena of 
economic analysis. This means that inter-subjectivity, i.e. the agreement of individuals on a 
statement, replaces any objective nature of statements. Further, assuming a constructivist 
ontological perspective, a model of human action must explicitly consider human cognition 
and creativity; thus, thinking and cognition are central topics in this issue. This is the reason 
why, after discussing the conceptualisation of entrepreneurial behaviour more thoroughly in 
the next paragraphs, chapter II will take a closer look at the way creative thinking can 
modelled in contemporary psychology.  
 
3. Entrepreneurship: The Process of Introducing Novelty to Economic Systems 
Entrepreneurial activity of economic agents has played a significant role in explaining 
economic growth and job creation and recently many attempts were made by governments to 
promote it (Ko 2004). It is argued that certain economic agents are responsible for changes in 
economic structures and, thus, are the most important engines of economic growth (Baron 
1998; Hayek 1945; Timmons 1990b). Most generally, entrepreneurship occurs when an 
economic agent notices and acts respectively recognises and exploits a profit opportunity 
(Eckhardt and Shane 2003; Venkatamaran 1979). The central elements of such a notion of 
entrepreneurship are the entrepreneurial individual and the entrepreneurial opportunity to act 
upon. Nevertheless, for a long time mainstream economic theory has neglected the 
importance of entrepreneurship: most of the dominating equilibrium models in economics 
regard all profit opportunities as already exploited (Holcombe 2003). This assumption denies 
the agreed-upon fact that, although economic forces pull the economy towards equilibrium, 
this is a moving target that is never reached (Holcombe 2003).  
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Historically, the concept of entrepreneurship and entrepreneurial opportunities is often related 
to a particular research strand in economics: Austrian economics. During the last decades 
modern Austrian economics has emerged out of the classical subjectivist tradition (see 
Buchanan 1982; Coats 1983; Lachmann 1982); it is also called Austrian market process 
theory and is related to neoclassical economics, but aims at building upon more realistic 
conjectures. Despite the heterogeneity of Austrian economics (Gloria-Palermo 1999), an 
attempt to summarise these fundamental assumptions or constitutional characteristics might 
name methodological individualism, general uncertainty and real time, subjectivism, dynamic 
market process theory instead of static equilibrium theory, invisible-hand-explanations, and 
deductive methodology (Budzinksi 2000; Kirzner 1992). Perhaps most notable about Austrian 
economics for the context of the present work is its view on individuals: Most approaches in 
this research stream bring economic agents to the fore and aim at integrating subjective 
human behaviour. It is the main objective of Austrian economists to explain change in 
economic systems endogenously and, therefore, regarding dynamic market processes 
triggered off by entrepreneurial individuals and their decisions (Röpke 1977).  
Opposed to this, in the prevailing neoclassical paradigm the economic analysis of individual 
decision making is found in its economic aspect. This has been understood in terms of the 
allocation of scarce means among competing ends; that is rational decision making (Robbins 
1932). This particular conception of economising or maximising individual economic agents 
resulted in the idea of the market as built up by a multitude of economising individuals, of 
which each takes his decisions with according to a given series of ends and means (Kirzner 
1973). Such a view became the dominant research paradigm in economics in the 1930s and 
1940s, ending a period of pluralism in the way economic phenomena were approached. 
Neoclassical economics was based on the idea of economic equilibriums, originating in 
physics and mechanistic metaphysics and had almost suppressed the historical, non-
mechanistic metaphysical approach to economics that was widely spread in strands, such as 
the Scottish school, the German historical school and the American (Venablian) 
institutionalist school (Dopfer 2001).  
Neoclassical models assume perfect competition in markets, which means that every 
economic agent has perfect knowledge about all economic opportunities; apparently, this 
notion leads to main difficulties in explaining entrepreneurial behaviour since in case perfect 
competition prevails the price mechanisms of a market are incapable of guiding an agent’s 
decision to exploit an entrepreneurial opportunity or not. In some more detail, mainstream 
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economists assume that a price contains all information of all market participants, necessary 
for allocating resources. This implies that the allocation of resources is a rather mechanistic 
decision process of mathematical nature, which can be rationally derived by the complete 
information given. Market equilibrium is reached by the optimisation of information 
contained in the price; this is through selling if prices increase and, vice versa, purchase if 
prices decrease. Is the market in equilibrium, that is a pareto-optimal state in which no gains 
from trade exist (Eckhardt and Shane 2003), agents have no reason to change their selling and 
purchasing behaviour since no allocation represents a superior alternative (Hayek 1945).  
However, an entrepreneur aims at combining resources in a new manner to gain a profit. This 
means that he does not solve an optimisation problem in known means-ends frameworks, but 
faces a non-optimisation task through the implementation of new means-ends frameworks 
(Shane 2003). A “[…] means-ends framework is a way of thinking about the relationship 
between actions and outcomes.” (Shane 2003, p. 40) Economic agents build expectations 
about the profitability of different resource combinations, thereby creating new means-ends 
frameworks: Based on these, the economic agent has to take decisions about the use of 
resources; however, as already indicated, the price cannot support the decision since 
information about a new good’s price (or more general: a new resource combination) is not 
available until the good has not been introduced into the market. Put differently, the price 
cannot tell the agent if he can make a profit with the new resource combination since he 
cannot calculate the earnings and compare them with the costs. “Therefore, prices and 
revenues for new products cannot determine the resource allocation decisions of the 
entrepreneur that lead her to acquire the resources to develop a new product.” (Shane 2003, p. 
57) Entrepreneurial decisions cannot be optimisation decisions and, therefore, cannot be 
based on market prices since optimisation is based on known prices and quantities, but these 
do not exist for future moments in time, for which economic agents must build expectations 
(Eckhardt and Shane 2003; O’Driscoll and Rizzo 1985); the result is that uncertainty prevails 
(Knight 1921).  
Because an economic agent’s expectations are subject to uncertainty, the opportunity to 
realise an entrepreneurial profit arises: this could be defined by the difference expected 
between the ex-post value of a resource combination and the ex-ante costs for acquiring the 
necessary resource and their recombination (Rumelt 1987). Uncertainty represents a 
precondition for this profit because only given this condition the current owner of resources is 
willing to sell them to the entrepreneur at a price that allows the latter to realise a profit. If 
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certainty prevailed, the owner would know the recombined resources’ value and would sell 
them for a higher price riding away the profit opportunity. In summary, uncertainty gives the 
entrepreneur the chance to come to a superior assessment of resource combinations and their 
value, consequently allowing him to buy them at a lower price than he can sell them (Shane 
2003).  
However, as has been shown, there are different ways of interpreting this subjective element 
in economic behaviour and the nature of knowledge and information ontologically, which has 
important influences on the modelling of human agents in economic situations. However, 
independent of the reasons why this is the case, it is central to entrepreneurial activity that 
individuals expect a profit from buying, selling or transformating resources: the entrepreneur 
perceives a new means-ends framework (Eckhardt and Shane 2003). Therefore, a means-ends 
framework could be simply seen as an individual expectation about the value of resources. 
These are different since the price does not contain all information and information is 
dispersed, which converts individual knowledge into one of the central aspects of economic 
behaviour. Such a framework is fundamental to entrepreneurial decisions since it indicates 
entrepreneurs that prices do not accurately represent the value of products or services; a 
situation, of which the entrepreneur is convinced that it can be altered by a superior resource 
allocation, implying the gain of profit through selling the output of the new resource 
combination (Casson 2003).  
In fact, irrespective of the ontological stance, it is an undisputed insight that knowledge is not 
given to anyone in totality, an argument which is usually attributed to Hayek (1945), who 
asserted that the fundamental economic problem is not the allocation of resources but instead 
a problem of dispersion of knowledge and utilisation of information (Holcombe 2003). Hayek 
postulated the concept of dispersed knowledge in an economy, which was fundamental for the 
concept of entrepreneurial opportunities. He distinguished between two types of knowledge: 
(1) scientific knowledge (in the sense of general rules) held by experts, which he assumed to 
be overrated in its importance for economics, and (2) the knowledge of the particular 
circumstances of time and place. Hayek pointed out that practically every individual 
possesses some advantage over all others since it disposes of unique information of which 
beneficial use might be made (Sarasvathy et al. 2003).vi  
In many or even most cases, such knowledge is not easily transferable to others. Certain 
knowledge, for instance in form of abilities, can be acquired by experience, but is difficult to 
articulate to others. In consequence, entrepreneurial opportunities of a specific type will be 
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available to some economic agents, but not to others; expressing the important role that 
knowledge plays for the recognition or construction of entrepreneurial opportunities. This 
argument has led to a variety of research in entrepreneurship focussing on the differences in 
prior knowledge as a central aspect of entrepreneurial opportunities and the process of 
entrepreneurship (see Shane 2000 and chapter IV.A.3). In summary, the notion of dispersed 
knowledge has two fundamental implications for understanding entrepreneurship and the 
concept of entrepreneurial opportunities: firstly, dispersed knowledge implies uncertainty or 
ambiguity, which gives rise to opportunities. Secondly, dispersed knowledge is an explanation 
for the notion of a nexus between entrepreneurial individuals and a particular opportunity, 
through which new markets are discovered, created, and exploited (Shane 2003).  
What all these scholars dealing with such topics implicitly or explicitly claim is that 
investigating these processes by focussing on specific economic actors can significantly 
contribute to an understanding of economic phenomena; in one form or another it is the 
subjective human behaviour that accounts for many phenomena in economic systems. Many 
economists in such strands as Austrian economics or evolutionary economics conceptualised 
their notion of market process and economic interaction on the conjecture of economic 
behaviour under uncertainty, converting it into one of the central topics in economic research 
(Sarasvathy et al. 2003). Their approaches include a broader notion of human action (Mises 
1949).  
For instance, Mises’s human-action concept, unlike that of allocation and economising, does 
not restrain the decision making individual (or the economic analysis of these decisions) to a 
framework of given ends and means. In this concept of human action, the actions of 
individuals intend to remove uneasiness and to make themselves better off (Kirzner 1973). 
This notion is broader than economising since it does not constrain the analysis of the 
decision to the allocation problem posed by the juxtaposition of scarce means and multiple 
ends, assuming a rather mechanical computation of the solution to the maximisation problem, 
implicitly posed by the configuration of the given ends and means (Kirzner 1973). Instead 
much more emphasis is put on the subjective perception of the ends-mean framework within 
which allocation and economising is to take place.  
Another extremely influential scholar emphasising the role of cognition for economic agents' 
decision making and, thus, of the individual was Hayek, who developed the concept of the 
human mind as a movement pattern detector (Hayek 1967). He assumed that individuals 
dispose of patterns with which they reduce the complexity of their environment. The patterns 
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were built during previous situations. Perception or economic thinking is therefore modelled 
as a process of classifying perceived stimuli into extant concepts or schemas; these processes 
of understanding the world inherently and inextricably include an interpretative element: 
Perception, thinking, and behaviour are therefore highly idiosyncratic and only explicable 
considering an individuals experiences (Hayek 1967). It will become apparent in chapter III, 
how modern this conception of human thinking is and how strongly it resembles to 
contemporary models of human thinking (North 1999); also similar to the general conception 
of human thinking used in the present work, which becomes particularly visible by 
considering the role attributed to the information-process of category selection. 
Considering the importance that is attributed to the subjective element, it somehow appears a 
methodological necessity to start with the individual. And indeed, methodological 
individualism is regarded as one of the fundamental characteristics of research in Austrian 
Economics for instance (see Hodgson 1988; Udehn 2001; Winter 1993). However since the 
present work does not benefit from an in-depth discussion of individualism it should be 
satisfactory to state: “The key element in classical statement of methodological individualism 
is a refusal to examine the institutional or other forces which are involved in the moulding of 
individual preferences and purposes.” (Hodgson 1986, p. 211) This means that theories 
adhering to it begin with the individual as methodological starting point for all explanations 
and inferences of economic phenomena. Thus, human behaviour is seen as active, creative 
and human instead of passive, automatic, and mechanistic as in the neoclassical paradigm 
(Kirzner 1978; O’Driscoll and Rizzo 1985).  
This individualism is based on the assumption that all social processes can be explained best 
on the basis of individual behaviour. Consequently, “although in modern economics, 
collections of individuals are sometimes treated as ‚entities’ for analytical purposes […] the 
ultimate unit of analysis is always the individual; more aggregative analysis must be regarded 
as only provisionally legitimate. In other words, the economist is always sensitive to the 
possibility that the holistic treatment of groups of individuals may mislead greatly, or involve 
overlooking dimension of reality that are extremely important.” (Brennan and Tullock 1982, 
p. 225) This corresponds to Popper’s conviction that collective phenomena can be tracked 
back to individuals (Popper 1987). Accordingly, methodological individualism claims that 
research should not pay primary attention to organisations or collectives; rather, theories 
about social phenomena should start with the views and behaviours of individuals since 
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without their actions the phenomena would not even become evident (Richter and Furubotn 
2003).  
Hence, since largely based on Austrian economics, most entrepreneurship research brings the 
individual to the fore (e.g. Baum 2003; Baum et al. 2003; Baumnol 1993), in particular those 
efforts focusing on the aspect of opportunity identification (e.g. Shane 2003; Shane and 
Venkatamaran 2000; Lumpkin et al. 2001). The indicated importance of methodological 
individualism for research in this discipline becomes apparent in a recent definition of 
entrepreneurship as the field which deals with “[…] individuals who create opportunities 
where others do not, and who attempt to exploit those opportunities through various modes of 
organising, without regard to resources currently controlled.” (Mitchell et al. 2002, p. 96) 
Despite its indisputable value for research, methodological individualism causes problems if 
interactive processes are regarded to be crucial: “As much care was taken in uncovering the 
different economic roles that might be combined in ‚the entrepreneur’ as in discussing the 
problems that arise if the roles are divided among many individuals.” (Winter 1993, p. 182) 
Despite possible shortcomings of methodological individualism, an increasing number of 
researchers started bringing together the disciplines of psychology, of which many are 
individualistic, and economics; it is argued that both fields aim at explaining human 
behaviour and social phenomena from the perspective of the actor himself (Yu 2001). Thus, 
research on entrepreneurship has a multidisciplinary tradition and bases its theoretical models 
in a rather eclectically manner on insights of various disciplines, such as economics, 
sociology, psychology or strategic research (MacMillan and Katz 1992; Mitchell et al. 2002, 
2004). The reason - as already shown - is simply that “[…] entrepreneurial behaviour can not 
be explained by economic theory alone because psychological, cultural, and sociological 
factors are important, too.” (Ripsas 1998, p. 110) After briefly introducing the main 
characteristics of the fundament on which many research efforts on entrepreneurship are built 
upon, hereafter a general theory of entrepreneurship is outlined that seems to meet the claims 
for integrating the individual and the opportunity, as well as an interdisciplinary nature of the 
phenomenon in explaining entrepreneurial behaviour. 
The general notion of an entrepreneurial element in economic systems led to the development 
of concepts designed to model the entrepreneurial process. As already hinted at, 
entrepreneurship can be seen as the process that includes all the acts an individual or 
economic agent executes to take advantage of a profit opportunity that is present in the 
economy (Holcombe 2003). Put differently, “[…] entrepreneurship is about individuals who 
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create opportunities where others do not, and who attempt to exploit those opportunities 
through various modes of organising, without regard to resources currently controlled.“ 
(Mitchell et al. 2002, p. 96) The two main process-based elements of such a notion of 
entrepreneurship are the identification and exploitation of entrepreneurial opportunities by 
individuals.  
A currently popular general model, outlining the entrepreneurial process, is Shane’s (2003) 
general theory of entrepreneurship; it is characterised by the conjecture that a focus on the 
individual is important but, nevertheless, insufficient to explain the whole phenomenon. 
Rather the central point is the nexus between entrepreneurial individual and the 
entrepreneurial opportunity, corresponding to the notion of the present work.vii  In this model, 
the economy is subject to continuous change and disequilibrium. This gives rise to situations, 
in which individuals can recombine existent resources, thereby bringing them into a new 
form, of which they are convinced it yields a profit by increased income exceeding the cost 
for creating the new form. Here, the entrepreneur is the alert individual that recognises the 
existence of such opportunities and, based on this, develops a business idea to exploit it. This 
includes a marketable product or service, which is offered to other economic agents 
(opportunity identification). Having this idea, the entrepreneur obtains the necessary 
resources, designs an appropriate organisation or other possibilities of exploiting the 
opportunity, as well as a strategy to realise it (opportunity exploitation). The model considers 
a set of factors on the individual, the industry, and the institutional level that influence the 
central activities in the entrepreneurial process. In the context of the present work it seems 
noteworthy that Shane explicitly suggests an interdisciplinary approach to the phenomenon, 
integrating economic, psychological, and sociological theories (Shane 2003).  
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Figure 5 The Entrepreneurial Process (Shane 2003). 
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This model depicted in Figure 5, shows that the identification of entrepreneurial opportunities 
is the first step in the entrepreneurial process, necessary and essential for all others that follow 
(Baron 2004; Kirzner 1979; Shane and Venkatamaran 2000; Venkatamaran 1997). Most 
generally, the term refers to all the efforts of economic agents of “[…] identifying ideas for 
new products, services, markets, or means of production that are not currently being 
exploited.” (Baron 2004, p. 48) Shane (2003) defines opportunity identification as “[…] a 
situation in which a person can exploit a new business idea that has the potential to generate a 
profit.” (Shane 2003, p.5) In such a view the opportunity identification or discovery process 
(alertness) can be conceptualised in the following way: an economic actor experiences new 
events in every moment and receiving this external information, he uses his interpretation 
framework to make the best use of what has become available (Yu 2001); some scholars 
would say, the economic agent conceives the best available means-ends framework (for 
instance Shane 2003). If eventually an event is perceived that is difficult to interpret 
individuals react differently: some will simply reject this new event as a deviance or an 
obstacle not fitting into the activated interpretation framework; some might even simply 
ignore it in this case. However, individuals that are alert are able to see things differently and 
move out of the routine track deriving from their interpretation framework and create (Yu 
2001).  
In this context it should be noted that an individual ‘can’ exploit an entrepreneurial 
opportunity identified, but not necessarily must do so; this somehow trivial statement is 
important to doing research on the entrepreneurial process and underlines the clear distinction 
made here between opportunity identification and exploitation. For purposes of clarification, 
these two are strictly separated. This is of crucial importance to entrepreneurship research 
efforts in general and in particular for the cognitive approach of this work. It is only a 
methodological comfort to include all entrepreneurs active in a market in a sample to 
investigate opportunity identification. Theoretically, the exploitation of an idea must not be 
connected with its discovery and the corresponding individual.  
Consequently, whenever the term opportunity identification is used in the present work, it 
refers to the mental creation of wealth (McClelland 1976; Stevenson et al. 1998) and ends 
with the “[…] ideas for services or products that meet needs at acceptable prices.” (Herron 
and Sapienza 1992, p. 51) This definition explicitly excludes the organisational element 
(Gaglio and Katz 2001) insofar that the entrepreneurial individual can identify an opportunity 
in any role or position in the market. In a first instance it is not of interest if the individual is 
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self-employed, a manager in an existing firm, or whatsoever; this view allows the 
accommodation of opportunity identification wherever it occurs in the economy, as long as it 
is the identification of potential new goods or services in order to exploit an opportunity 
(Gaglio and Katz 2001). Theories dedicated to creating ventures must target on other 
variables.  
Figure 6 points out this differentiation alleged in this work: Some individuals identify 
entrepreneurial opportunities; they build up population I. That an opportunity is recognised 
does not automatically mean that it will be exploited. The business idea might be forgotten, 
not be realised due many reasons, e.g. lack of capital, or might be transferred to individuals in 
population II. These are individuals that have not identified an opportunity themselves but 
have adopted it through transfer by a transfer channel, such as a license, or probably their 
social network (see Braun 2006). Population III represents the entrepreneur that is typically 
referred to in works on entrepreneurship: the one who discovers an entrepreneurial 
opportunity and finds measures and ways to bring it to a market, and, therefore, belongs to 
population I and II. A methodological weakness of most studies on opportunity identification 
is that they suggest they would investigate population III; in fact, they target individuals, 
which belong to population II, that is have started a business, but not necessarily also belong 
to population I, which is actually intended to be researched.  
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Individuals that identify
entrepreneurial opportunities 
(potential entrepreneurs)
Population II:
Individuals that exploit
entrepreneurial 
opportunities (executing
entrepreneurs)
Population III:
Individuals that identify
and exploit an 
entrepreneurial 
opportunity 
(entrepreneurs)
Transfer: licensing, 
franchising, etc.
 
Figure 6 Entrepreneurial Populations. 
This clear separation has important implications for studies on opportunity identification. The 
sample, which should be theoretically surveyed, ought to be drawn from population III or I. In 
order to overcome this methodological shortcoming, the present study assumes that any 
Opportunity Recognition in the Concept of Entrepreneurship 
 52 
individual can potentially belong to population I and recognise entrepreneurial opportunities 
since practically every individual as economic agent is ceaselessly confronted with economic 
situations that hold potential opportunities. They only differ to the degree to which the 
solution they have for an economic problem situation might be regarded as entrepreneurial. 
This central assumption of the present view will be discussed thoroughly in the following 
chapters.  
It should be apparent by now that the general notion of entrepreneurship and opportunity 
identification in the present work are heavily based on conceptions of the Austrian economic 
school. Derived from these ideas and the general notion of entrepreneurship briefly outlined 
above, it has become the central question in entrepreneurship research, why some people and 
not others are able to discover and exploit particular entrepreneurial opportunities? (Baron 
1998; Gaglio and Katz 2001; Hills et al. 2004a, b; Mitchell et al. 2004; Mitchell et al. 2002; 
Shane 2000; Stevenson and Jarillo-Massi 1990; Timmons et al. 1987; Venkatamaran 1997). 
Although this fundamental question already indicates that research on opportunity 
identification is one of the essential parts (if not the most important one) of entrepreneurship, 
research on this topic is still in its infancy and is rather a scattering of descriptive studies than 
a systematic research program of theory testing and development (Gaglio and Katz 2001). 
The operational implication for research in this field “[…] is that sufficient evidence about the 
nature of opportunity recognition needs to be generated before on could reasonably offer 
hypotheses.” (Gartner and Shaver 2004, p. 35)  
The research program on this central aspect is still directed to gain fundamental insights, 
providing footage for forthcoming efforts. Before further considerations are made in the 
following chapters, some terminological remarks are now given to clearly distinguish several 
terms used and avoid unnecessary confusion in dealing with this issue. The terms of discovery 
and identification of entrepreneurial opportunities are understood as referring to the general 
concept in a very general sense. They contain all aspects that are related to the topic, not 
implying a certain perspective assumed. In contrast, under the term of opportunity recognition 
all considerations are subsumed that assume a cognitive perspective aiming at applying a 
psychological view on the phenomenon. Such a distinction should help the reader to go 
through the explanations and comments in the present work.  
Another amendment might be of interest for the attentive or alert reader: the author is fully 
aware of the paradox, the use of the above mentioned terms might cause in assuming a 
constructivist position. Terms like discovery, identification, or recognition somehow suggest 
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that there is something that exists out there that is an entrepreneurial opportunity in an 
objective sense. However, it is one of the central arguments of the present work that it must 
be distinguished between economic situations that are out there, but are under certain 
conditions and circumstance subjectively transformed or construed by an individual into an 
entrepreneurial opportunity. Therefore, a term like opportunity construction would be more 
appropriate to describe the approach selected here. Nevertheless, the philosophical position 
alleged here also points out that everything is seen, understood, and evaluated in relation to a 
reference system:  
Here, this is the terminological reference system that has been introduced by the scientific 
community dealing with this phenomenon. In order to provide a basis for scientific discourse 
and mutual enrichment, the terms mentioned are overtaken and applied in the present work. 
Similarly, the term of entrepreneurial opportunities is central to the phenomenon of 
entrepreneurship and apparently deserves a more detailed discussion. In the following 
paragraph, the central objective is to provide the reader with a provisional definition, until the 
particular view of the present work is introduced and a corresponding definition or view on 
entrepreneurial opportunities can be established. 
 
C. Entrepreneurial Opportunities and their Identification 
1. Entrepreneurial Opportunities 
It has already been outlined that entrepreneurs and entrepreneurial opportunities are the two 
central aspects of entrepreneurship. And indeed, if it is asked what delineates the domain of 
entrepreneurship as a distinct academic and scientific endeavour, various scholars emphasise 
the fundamental and critical role of opportunities in entrepreneurship (Corbett 2005; Gaglio 
1997; Gaglio 2004; Gaglio and Katz 2001; Kirzner 1979; Shane and Venkatamaran 2000). 
They represent an integral part, without which entrepreneurship could not even take place 
(Shane and Venkatamaran 2000; Singh 2000). It could even be said that entrepreneurship is 
opportunity-driven (Hart et al. 1995); this importance is also in many definitions of 
entrepreneurship that regard it as a process through which individuals pursue opportunities 
(e.g. Stevenson and Jarillo 1990; Stevenson et al. 1989; Stewart 1911).  
Etymologically, independent of an economic setting, an opportunity is defined as “[…] a 
favourable junction of circumstances, or a good chance for advancement or progress.” 
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(Webster’s Dictionary 1988, p. 828); or “[…] a time, condition, or set of circumstances 
permitting or favourable to a particular action or purpose.” (Oxford Dictionary of English 
2004) Both definitions emphasise the dependence on circumstance. Again, this can be defined 
as “[…] a condition, fact, or event accompanying, conditioning or determining another, or a 
piece of evidence that indicates the probability of an event, or the sum of essential and 
environmental factors […]” (Webster’s Dictionary 1988, p. 242) or “[…] the condition or 
state of affairs; surrounding and affecting an agent; esp. the external conditions prevailing at 
the time.” (Oxford Dictionary of English 2004) Broadly speaking it could be inferred from 
these definitions that opportunities are “favourable events” (Gartner and Shaver 2004, p. 30).  
As the previous considerations have already implicitly, and sometimes even explicitly, 
indicated, the metaphysical position chosen for a model of entrepreneurship also alters the 
corresponding conceptual nature of entrepreneurial opportunities (Gartner and Shaver 2004). 
The central question for the topic of opportunity identification in this context might consist in 
whether entrepreneurial opportunities are assumed to exist in the world in some objective 
sense, waiting to be discovered by the enterprising individual, or whether they are thought to 
be socially constructed by such individuals, therefore only existing in dependence on the 
entrepreneur (Alvarez 2005; Chandler et al. 2003; Gartner et al. 1999; Gatewoods et al. 1994; 
Sarasvathy et al. 2002).  
An objective view of the world is based on logic and assumes that there is a reality, which can 
be perceived accurately by imperfect human agents; it follows that agents must remove the 
obstacle of accurate perception of the objective world in order to discover entrepreneurial 
opportunities. Principally, it follows, given that human agents are theoretically capable of 
removing all insufficiencies in order to obtain perfect recognition of the objective world, i.e. 
to become perfectly rational decision-makers (Boland 1978), that there exists an end of 
economic development resulting in equilibrium with rational decision-makers (Kirzner 1973). 
Thus, irrespective of an individual’s perceptions of the external world, the latter itself has a 
substantive influence on the outcomes of the individual’s behaviour and choices (Carrol and 
Hannan 2000; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978).  
In such an objective view, knowledge exists without a context of how and why individuals are 
related to or interact with it (Gartner and Shaver 2004). This means that entrepreneurial 
opportunities exist independent of subjects (Kirzner 1997), which either accurately perceive 
them or not (Shane and Venkatamaran 2000). Such a view is significantly more similar to the 
view on humans in neoclassicism than the described subjective, constructivist perspective 
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locating the original source of change in the creative forces of humans (Alvarez 2005). This 
means for the conception of entrepreneurial opportunities that they are construed and human 
creativity is an infinite, inexhaustible source of new entrepreneurial opportunities, stimulating 
continuous change and evolution in economic system. 
Focussing more on creative individuals, it has been pointed out that in a relativist or 
subjective view decisions of individuals are based on their perceptions of the salient features 
of the environment, irrespective of how an environment might be objectively measured (if it 
can be done) (Lawrence and Lorsch 1967; March and Olson 1976). In the context of 
entrepreneurial opportunities this view implies that individuals act to explore their ability to 
influence and make sense of the situation they are situated in, i.e. the entrepreneur actually 
constructs opportunities.  
According to a subjective view, an entrepreneurial opportunity, therefore, is the opportunity 
to construct new products, services, or markets (Aldrich and Martinez 2003; Sarasvathy 
2004). Such a view already intimates the role of mental constructs in the process of 
opportunity identification (Yu 2001). In this work, Sarasvathy’s conviction is shared “[…] 
that these opportunities are a result of the efforts of particular entrepreneurs striving to 
construct corridors from their personal experiences to stable economic and sociological 
institutions that comprise organisations and markets we see in the world.“ (Sarasvathy 2004, 
p. 11; see also Sarasvathy 2003) 
However, while utterly supporting a constructivist stance, for the purpose of the present work 
it is not decisive to choose some point on this dichotomy between a subjectivist and 
objectivist view since it touches not the core of the present work: For the view of cognitive 
constructivism assumed in this work, it is actually not interesting of which ontological nature 
objects (here: opportunities) are since it is an interesting, but still a rather philosophical 
question. “Nevertheless, the issue of whether opportunities have already existed or not is 
irrelevant in the subjectivist framework. What is important is that an opportunity needs to be 
identified by the entrepreneur.” (Yu 2001, p. 50) In other words, the present work focuses on 
construing individuals that have subjective perceptions of the external world in any case, 
thereby assuming a social constructivist view, implicitly adopted in most studies in the field 
(Gaglio and Katz 2001; Gartner and Shaver 2004). It is assumed in a social-psychological 
perspective that people behave as if there exist opportunities that some individuals, but not all 
individuals, will identify and eventually exploit. Hence, independent of the underlying 
ontology, opportunities are construed and not identified or discovered. This also includes that 
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individuals make sense of the situation they are confronted with, based on knowledge, 
sometimes called interpretative frameworks (Gartner and Shaver 2004), they already possess 
(Gooding and Kinicki 1995).  
This view only stands in line with a substantial base of theoretical work on decision making in 
general (Simon 1960; Tversky and Kahnemann 1981). Put differently, entrepreneurs offer 
their opinion about an event’s or set of stimulus’ meaning through the creation and 
introduction of a new means-ends frameworks (a new product, service, or process), which are 
legitimated or rejected by other economic actors in the market place through purchase, 
consumption, and imitation (Gaglio and Katz 2001). Following such a position, the relevant 
questions as to entrepreneurs should focus on an entrepreneur’s perceptions and decision 
making behaviour; i.e. how market environments are represented and interpreted in the mind 
of the entrepreneur so that opportunity identification occurs? 
 Further, it ought to be clarified if, and in case the answer is yes how, these representations 
and interpretations differ from those of other economic agents? (Shaver and Scott 1991) 
Along these lines Baron (2004) argues that opportunities exist as a potential, a pattern that 
could potentially observed, coming into existence in the external world as a result of changes 
in the economic system; but this externally existing object is only the potential for opportunity 
that has to be converted into an entrepreneurial opportunity by active cognitive processing of 
the human mind. 
In summary, the present work assumes a view based on cognitive constructivism, seen in the 
subjectivist tradition (Hesse 1990; Koch 1998). This conception of reality and its ontology, 
respectively the epistemology, has several implications for the present concept of 
entrepreneurial opportunities. Accordingly, an opportunity is regarded as […] a kind of 
subjective utility mapping, wherein one assesses how valued a future state might be and how 
reasonable it is for one to expect to be able to attain that state.” (Krackhardt 1995, p. 54) 
Applying this philosophical stance to the field of research on opportunity identification also 
means to find processes that explain the mental construction of such future states in economic 
situations. In order to point out the consequences of such a constructivist ontological position 
in modelling economic agents and to demarcate differences to classical economic 
conceptions, often related to the term homo oeconomicus, the general model of human action 
in time underlying the present work is presented in the following; it is one of an array of more 
recent models that move away from traditional concepts of economic agents since the strict 
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disjunction of neoclassical economy and psychological theories has turned out to be an 
obstacle for the progress of economic thinking (Albert 2005). 
However, if this the term of opportunity refers to everything in the environment, which is not 
about the entrepreneur, someone is entering an old and controversially discussed issue: if 
individuals and environment can be seen independent of each other (Gartner and Shaver 
2004). Assuming a subjectivistic perspective, it could be said that an entrepreneurial 
opportunity is perceived as a desirable future state that is different from the current state and it 
is regarded as feasible to achieve (Christensen et al. 1994).  
In an economic context, the term of opportunities was strongly influenced by Penrose (1959), 
who conceptualised a theory of the firm based on the notion that entrepreneurs recognise 
productive opportunities and provide the necessary resources to exploit them. “The productive 
activities of such a firm are governed by what we shall call its ‚productive opportunity’, 
which comprises all of the productive possibilities that its ‚entrepreneurs’ see and can take 
advantage of.“ (Penrose 1959, p. 31) 
However, although entrepreneurial opportunities are seen as crucial to entrepreneurship, in 
fact every economic agent tries to make a profit from opportunities on a daily basis: 
Entrepreneurial opportunities that are dealt with in this work are different from those typically 
recognised by managers (business opportunities) in existing organisations. It is referred to 
such opportunities that are proven business opportunities in which the opportunity and 
economic problem solution have been identified and the problem solving procedures already 
demonstrated and documented (Gaglio and Katz 2001). In fact, the terms of business idea or 
idea generation are quite often terminologically confused in the context of opportunity 
identification and cognition. However, while an idea is surely a core attribute or a prerequisite 
of an opportunity (Timmons 1990), an idea is not necessarily equivalent to an opportunity 
(Ko 2004). Rather, it is a stepping-stone in the process towards an opportunity. In this sense 
an idea is rather a novel thought, which in most cases must be refined and adjusted to obtain a 
marketable good (Ko 2004).  
However, more practically several attempts have been undertaken to be more precisely in 
differentiating entrepreneurship or entrepreneurial opportunities from ‘mere’ opportunities in 
this context, which can be categorised into three general concepts, which are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive: timing of the pursuit; way of pursuit, and kind of opportunity 
identification (Gaglio 2004). (1) It has been argued that entrepreneurs are the first to identify 
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and pursue new business opportunities, while non-entrepreneurs just imitate, in case a venture 
turns out to be successful (Kirzner 1979, 1985); therefore they see the difference in the timing 
of pursuit. (2) Other scholars rather emphasise the way of pursuit: Entrepreneurs engage in 
the act of venture creation, while other economic agents prefer other organisational 
arrangements (Timmons et al. 1987). (3) A third perspective sees the main difference in the 
kind of business opportunity that is identified: those that are innovative or radical to a society 
or industry are regarded as entrepreneurial opportunities (Gaglio and Katz 2001; Schumpeter 
1934; Shane and Venkatamaran 2000).  
However, most generally, an entrepreneurial opportunity can only be discovered by 
entrepreneurs who differentiate it from a business opportunity, which can be identified by all 
economic agents (Gaglio 2004). This somewhat tautological argument can be enhanced by 
regarding an entrepreneurial opportunity as a new means-ends framework, differing from 
optimisation opportunities in altering means and ends, instead of taken them as given; these 
are creative options of combining resources constructed by entrepreneurial individuals. 
Therefore, applied to the issue of the present work, an entrepreneurial opportunity could be 
defined “[...] as a situation in which a person can create a new means-ends framework for 
recombining resources that the entrepreneur believes will yield a profit […]“ (Shane 2003, p. 
18); this formation of new means, ends, or means-ends relationships results in new goods, 
services, raw materials, markets and organising methods (Eckhardt and Shane 2003).  
However, the question arises, what occurrences in economic processes lead to entrepreneurial 
opportunities, and what are their sources or origins? The major source for opportunities is 
change in an economy or a market: as has been described, a market in equilibrium does not 
yield any profit opportunity. However, continuous change of manifold nature gives 
entrepreneurial agents to take advantage and realise such a profit (Holcombe 2003). Factors 
that might disequilibrate the market are technological changes, political and regulatory 
changes, as well as social and demographic changes (Shane 2003).  
Concerning the latter, sociological theory explicitly suggests that changes in the institutional 
structure give rise to the emergence of entrepreneurial opportunities since new niches for 
resource recombination arise (Swaminathan and Wade 2001). Further to this, factors that 
enhance production possibilities give rise to entrepreneurial opportunities in several ways: For 
instance, income growth allows entrepreneurs to market new goods or expand the market for 
such goods, if they are income-elastic (Holcombe 2003). Holcombe (2003) mentions another 
important aspect, namely that entrepreneurial activity - the exploitation of an opportunity - 
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itself is an important source of new entrepreneurial opportunities. The main argument is that 
change introduced by some entrepreneurs (e.g. the internet), gives rise to new opportunities 
(e.g. all online-services).  
Whether approached from an economic or psychological perspective: Entrepreneurial 
opportunities must be characterised by several cues that allow economic agents to identify or 
construct them; in addition, this allows putting the term into more concrete terms for 
subsequent use. Such essential characteristics are outlined hereafter. It should be noted that 
each characteristic is required to some degree for an entrepreneurial opportunity to exist, but 
nevertheless their importance varies across economic situations, time, and societies (Baron 
2004).  
Generally, it could be seen as a common denominator of entrepreneurial opportunities that 
they all offer an individual to create (1) economic value through taking a particular action. At 
this stage it does not matter if action is really taken or really profitable, but rather an 
individual has the expectation and intention to form a better future (Sarasvathy 2004) or the 
economic agent simply perceives a potential economic value in a situation (Baron 2004). 
Consequently, a valuable economic opportunity can be exploited to (2) create new wealth, 
typically providing entrepreneurs with idiosyncratic advantages resulting from specific 
knowledge. However, they are not only valuable, but also resources for exploitation are rare 
and they are (3) imperfectly imitable (Fiet et al. 2004b). 
 Further to this, Baron (2004) states that “[…] an opportunity involves the potential to create 
something new […] that has the potential to generate economic value (i.e., profit), and that is 
viewed as desirable in the society in which it occurs (i.e., its development is consistent with 
existing legal and moral standards, and would, therefore, not be blocked or constrained by 
these standards).” (Baron 2004, p. 50) Such a definition covers the essential aspects and adds 
the characteristics of (4) perceived desirability and (5) newness or novelty. Again, the fourth 
characteristic emphasises that it is up to the individual at hand to perceive an opportunity as 
desirable, for instance socially (Baron 2004). But the problem arises that perceived 
desirability can differ greatly over time and across societies. Under certain circumstances 
changing health, legal, and moral standards can convert a formerly viable opportunity into an 
illegal action; as has happened with cocaine and marijuana, which were legal in the US until 
approximately as medical drugs (Baron 2004). Alternatively, Hills et al. (2004a, b) view an 
opportunity rather from a customer value perspective. They regard customer value as a 
perceived preference (by the customer) for and evaluation of a product’s attributes, attribute 
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performances, and consequences arising from use that facilitated or hinders obtaining the 
customer’s goals and purposes. Consequently an entrepreneur perceives a new opportunity if 
he sees a chance to create such value and construct a marketable good around this opportunity 
or chance (Santos and Eisenhardt 2005).  
Concerning the fifth aspect of novelty, it is important to note in this context that it is a highly 
relative term. In a normative sense it can be restricted to new products or services, new 
markets, new production processes, new raw material, new ways of organising existing 
technologies, and so on that would be generally viewed by experts as representing something 
that does not currently exist. An opportunity identified in this sense is not currently developed 
or exploited by another entrepreneur, nor has it ever been. Alternatively, a prima facie 
newness by a single individual could be assumed to be a sufficient requirement (Baron 2004).  
Another indicator for assessing the degree of novelty might be to find out to which degree the 
new problem solution departures from standard business practices within an industry: If only 
little, it is what Schumpeter (1934) called routine combinations. Opportunities of this type are 
pursued by non-entrepreneurs in the name of efficiency and improvement of the return on 
investment (Gaglio 2004). In that sense they resemble to Kirznerian (1979) opportunities. In 
turn, entrepreneurial opportunities are seen as discontinuous innovations, brought about by 
what Schumpeter (1934) calls new combination or Kirzner (1985) names breaking existing 
means-ends frameworks. Unfortunately, the concept of novelty is accompanied by many 
problems for the scholar dealing with it, as chapter II.A related to central philosophical 
considerations on creative economic behaviour has pointed out. 
Notwithstanding, many scholars in the field distinguish opportunities according to their 
degree of newness. For instance, Yu (2001) distinguishes two kinds of entrepreneurial 
discoveries: despite explicitly using the approach of Dosi et al. (1997), the ordinary and 
extraordinary type resemble to the Schumpeterian and Kirznerian notions of entrepreneurship. 
They mainly differ as to the implications they have for economic systems when they are 
exploited and explored, exhibiting a different degree of technological breakthrough or 
magnitude of creativity involved (Yu 2001). Further, Gaglio (2004) suggests a typology of 
opportunities based on previous research on innovation. The main idea is that innovation can 
be depicted as a continuum along which it can be indicated how discrepant the product, 
service, or process is in comparison to the respective market’s or industry’s existing offering 
and operating procedures. The result is an opportunity scale shown in.  
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Imitative
(Substitutive)
Incremental Evolutionary Radical Revolutionary
(Discontinuous)
 
Figure 7 Entrepreneurial Opportunity Scale (Gaglio 2004). 
Ignoring the problem of defining newness or novelty, at this point (see chapter II.A.3) it 
shows an increasing degree of newness from left to right; nevertheless it is not really a 
continuum, but rather a Likert-type scale. Imitative opportunities are rather substitutes that 
copy existing and well-known business products, services, or processes in an industry. They 
represent something new to the individual or the enterprise at hand, but not to the industry or 
the world (since they already exist somewhere else; otherwise they could not be copied); in 
the field of marketing, those are sometimes called me-too innovations (Christensen and 
Raynor 2003). Incremental ideas or opportunities are such that are obvious and expected 
improvements of existing products, services, or processes. But efficiency can be improved by 
making it cheaper, better, or faster; such are for instance extensions or upgrades that are 
clearly predictable (Mascitelli 2000). Theoretically, it is totally new to the individual or 
enterprise and the industry, but has not such a deep impact since it is expected and does not 
require extensive changes. 
Evolutionary opportunities are new to the individual or enterprise and new to the industry, but 
not new to the world. For instance, it could be thought of technologies imported from other 
industries. Again different, radical opportunities represent products or processes still based on 
familiar but reengineered features or technologies. Literature on innovation quantifies that 
such innovation produce a five or ten-fold performance improvement or at least a 30-50% 
reduction in costs (Chandy and Tellis 2000; O’Connor and Rice 2001).  
However, the perhaps most eye-catching opportunities are revolutionary or discontinuous, 
sometimes even called a breakthrough: such an opportunity is new to everyone, the individual 
or enterprise, industry or the world. Such innovations offer advanced capabilities that could 
not be obtained by extension or adoption of already existing technologies. Typically, such 
paradigm shifts hit an industry or market unanticipated and persistently change the nature and 
the rules of the game (O’Connor and Rice 2001). Such opportunities correspond to 
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Schumpeterian creative destruction and Kirznerian break of existing means-ends frameworks. 
Often, such developments trigger off the emergence of a new industry.  
This points us to a sixth characteristic, which has already been given, that entrepreneurial 
opportunities are (6) path-dependent and always hold a linkage to previous goods or services. 
Problematic is in this context that an opportunity can be located on different locations of the 
entrepreneurial opportunity scale, depending on who is confronted with it. Thus, according to 
cognitive subjectivity, it can be simply judged or perceived differently. It might be most 
feasible and most acceptable to draw on the social consensus in an industry to find a common 
denominator for the degree of novelty (Gaglio 2004).  
Summarising this paragraph with a provisional definition of an entrepreneurial opportunity 
based on existing literature, it is said that an entrepreneurial opportunity is regarded as an 
economic situation, an individual is confronted with at a point in space and time and thinks an 
economic value is contained that allows to create wealth, which is socially desired, by 
measures that are imperfectly imitable and bear a form of newness or novelty. Apparently, 
many scholars have undertaken efforts to explain, how individual identify such opportunities. 
Some influential contributions to answering this question are outlined in the following 
paragraph; however, the following treatment of the issue is limited to general research 
attempts, which is here called research on opportunity identification, and not particularly 
those adopting a cognitive perspective, which is here named research opportunity recognition, 
and will be dealt with in some more detail in chapter IV.A. 
 
2. Research on Identification of Entrepreneurial Opportunities 
As the previous considerations have already suggested, research on opportunity identification 
is highly heterogeneous with different strands focussing on different aspects of the 
phenomenon. The variety of studies in Butler’s editorial book (2004) on ‘Opportunity 
Identification and Entrepreneurial Behavior’ provides a good impression, from which variety 
of perspectives the topic can be approached, such as social psychology, cognitive psychology, 
venture founding, innovation, or cultural aspects.  
While early research on entrepreneurship and opportunity identification was focused on 
individual differences and personal characteristics of entrepreneurs, more recent approaches 
try to find integrated process models, depicting entrepreneurial phenomena (Bygrave 1995; 
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Hills et al. 1997). However, like most efforts in the field of entrepreneurship, research on 
opportunity recognition is still highly focussed on the individual, the entrepreneur as person 
discovering and pursuing an opportunity (Casson 1982; Kirzner 1979; Schumpeter 1934). 
Individuality is reflected in the superordinate question already mentioned, why some people 
and not others identify entrepreneurial opportunities (Dimov 2004, p. 136). In pursuing such a 
methodological individualism, the personality trait-approach already mentioned was as 
unsuccessful in terms of explaining the phenomenon of opportunity identification as (Gartner 
1989). Nevertheless, the individual still seems to be a good point of departure since it has a 
cognitive influence throughout the process on the surrounding environment (Shaver and Scott 
1991) and individuals accumulate specific knowledge applied in the opportunity identification 
process (Shane 2000).  
Not surprisingly, given the streams’ infancy, no unifying theoretical framework for 
understanding or explaining the nature of opportunity identification and its role in the 
entrepreneurial process has been agreed on yet (Baron 2004). For instance, several scholars 
demand to regard opportunity recognition as an interaction between individual and context 
instead of simply focussing on the individual (Dimov 2004). This does not only accord with 
the theories on leadership and human behaviour, but is also emphasised in other fields of 
economics, such as evolutionary economics (see e.g. Braun 2006), and has actually also been 
considered in recent theories of entrepreneurship (see e.g. Shane 2003).  
General models almost unanimously name two main aspects to which individuals differ and 
can help to explain why some identify entrepreneurial opportunities and some do not: firstly, 
superior knowledge or information necessary to identify opportunities and, secondly, superior 
cognitive capabilities to make the mental connections between these information, which 
finally can lead to opportunities (see for instance Ko 2004; Mitchell et al. 2002; Shane 2003; 
Shane and Venkatamaran 2000; Venkatamaran 1997). Apparently, these resemble to the two 
main elements of human thinking that will be outlined to represent the methodological 
building blocks of cognitive psychology in chapter III.A.1. However, before dealing with that 
in more detail some often cited approaches to generally model the opportunity identification 
process are introduced. 
The reference to psychological aspects of human thinking is also apparent in general attempts 
to model opportunity identification, if argued that it is a special case of creative thinking. 
Following this view, several general process models, which might be subsumed as the 
creativity-based approach to opportunity identification (Corbett 2005), have been introduced. 
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The relationship between the conception of discovering an entrepreneurial opportunity and 
the creative process in general can be regarded as an analogy (Dimov 2004) since previous 
attempts to apply a creative process framework to opportunity recognition have fallen back on 
the discrete stage-model of Wallas (1926) (see for details on that model chapter III.C.1). 
 For instance, Long and McMullan (1984) proposed a four-stage model based on this concept, 
including the stages of pre-vision, point of vision, opportunity elaboration, and decision to 
proceed. Methodologically, these surveys were based on retrospective reports of 
entrepreneurs about the origin and elements of ‘their’ opportunity recognition process. As 
result of such studies, opportunity identification has been modelled as a complex process of 
multiple stages since researchers and entrepreneurs reflecting about ‘their’ opportunity 
identification unanimously state that it is not a discrete event, but rather a process (Hills et al. 
1997); this corresponds to insights of cognitive psychology about thinking processes. For 
instance, Hills, Shrader, and Lumpkin (1999) asked business owners and entrepreneurs about 
the degree to which they agreed to several statements regarding the opportunity recognition 
process.  
Their results showed a high consistency with the model proposed by Wallas (1926). Since a 
detailed presentation of all of them would fill a chapter of its own with relatively limited 
value for the present work it is refrained from a detailed review of all these approaches (see 
for an overview Hills et al. 1997; Lumpkin et al. 2001; Singh et al. 1999a). Instead, only one 
model will be presented in some more detail, functioning as an example for a lot of models 
(see for other studies trying to identify and map the stages or phases of the opportunity 
identification process: Ardichvili et al. 2003; Herron and Sapienza 1992; Long and McCullan 
1984).  
This model of Lumpkin et al. (2001, 2004) is precisely such a model based on the conjecture 
that opportunity recognition is a form of creativity. Consequently, it is based on an often 
referred to five step model of creative thinking, (see for instance Csikszentmihalyi 1996), and 
applied to the setting of entrepreneurial discovery. Corresponding to Shane and 
Venkataraman’s (2000) primary components of opportunity identification, Lumpkin et al. 
structure their model into discovery and formation phases.  
While the discovery phase includes sub-stages of preparation, incubation, and insight, the 
stages of evaluation and elaboration belong to the formation phase (Lumpkin et al. 2004). 
During the (1) preparation phase an individual accumulates knowledge by collecting 
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experience in a field of interest. This is accompanied by the development of sensitivity to the 
issues and problems in this domain. The following phase of (2) incubation is not considered 
as a conscious act of problem solving or systematic analysis. Rather, it is seen as an intuitive, 
non-linear, mostly unconscious or even unintended way to develop possibilities or options. 
Initially, the third phase of (3) insight has been seen as the illuminating moment, in which the 
individual consciously realises that his idea might be an entrepreneurial opportunity. “This 
moment of conscious awareness involves a cognitive shift that crystallises awareness and 
forever changes the way a concept is framed.“ (Lumpkin et al. 2001, p. 16)  
The central idea, which entered the conscious mind in the aha-moment, is subsequently 
subject to (4) evaluation: This includes an assessment of the considerations executed so far as 
to their viability and feasibility; in other words, the thinking processes are verified, which 
apparently also implies that the assumptions made in the first two phases are reflected; efforts 
in this stage are more or less all about the central question: “Is the business concept 
sufficiently valuable and worthwhile to pursue?“ (Lumpkin et al. 2001, p. 18) The final stage 
of this model, the phase of (5) elaboration refers to the detailed work out of the 
entrepreneurial opportunity, by operationalising the previously developed question and the 
ideas to answer it. Lumpkin et al. (2001) mention writing a business plan as a typical 
elaborating activity. Very often, ideas and assumptions made in earlier stages are refined as a 
result of feedback processes. Therefore, the rather linear process described receives a 
recursive character by integrating learning loops (see for more Braun 2006; Kappelhoff 
2004).  
However, in view of the recent developments in cognitive research on creative thought (see 
chapter III.C.2), such stage approaches seem outdated and not adequate to account for 
different types of entrepreneurial opportunities and to answer how these particular types are 
related to the discovering individual. Generally, it can be criticised that the approaches are 
rather descriptive than capable to discover interpersonal differences (Dimov 2004). 
Consequently, more recent attempts in the field of entrepreneurship focus on cognitive 
processes involved in opportunity recognition, such as conceptual combination, analogy, and 
initial problem formulation (Ward 2004). The present work follows this recent research trend, 
focussing on information processing or cognitive processes not on the somehow fuzzy term of 
creativity.  
Another way of approaching the phenomenon of opportunity identification chosen by scholar 
consists in regarding it as a search process. Along such lines, Bhave’s (1994) often cited 
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process model of new venture creation proposed two ways leading to opportunity 
identification. On the one hand, the decision can be taken to start up a business, and, on the 
other hand, a need can be first recognised to which a solution is subsequently developed. This 
already implies the distinction of whether the intentional decision to start a business comes 
first and is then followed by a search for an opportunity, or, vice versa, an opportunity is 
recognised, which then leads to the decision to exploit it. 
Along these lines, some authors propose the distinction between deliberate or intentional 
search and serendipity (Long and McCullan 1984; Koller 1988). However, a wide range of 
scholars argue that systematic search for an entrepreneurial opportunity is impossible. They 
bring up different arguments basing on Kirzner’s (1979) notion of alertness without search, 
such as that an individual is only able to possess limited knowledge and, therefore, is limited 
in its ability to conduct an optimal search (Baumnol 1993; Casson 1995). Also very popular is 
the contention that it is simply impossible to search systematically for anything that is yet 
unknown. This notion implies that any discovery happens to be accidentally, rather surprising 
the discovering individual (Baumnol 1993; Sarasvathy et al. 2003; Yu 2001; Kirzner 1997) 
and cannot be planned (Baumnol 1993; Kaish and Gilad 1991; Kirzner 1997; Sarasvathy et al. 
2003; Shane and Venkatamaran 2000; Venkatamaran 1997; Yu 2001). This view is supported 
by empirical results suggesting that the identification of entrepreneurial opportunities is rather 
based on personal insights and intuitive processes than on systematic search efforts (Singh et 
al. 1999a). Other scholars reason that this restricts most research on discovery in the field on 
actual entrepreneurial behaviour, thus impeding the development of prescriptive theories of 
discovery (Fiet et al. 2004b). 
In fact, experimental studies suggest that the importance of entrepreneurial alertness in the 
sense of a special talent that is not possessed by the average individual is generally overrated 
(Fiet et al. 2002; Fiet et al. 2004a). Instead there is evidence that the execution of a 
constrained systematic search reduces the cost of investment in the acquisition of specific 
information related to the cost of the search (Fiet et al. 2004b; Yu 2001), inducing more 
detailed research of entrepreneurial alertness as motivated propensity (Gaglio and Katz 2001). 
This conviction is corroborated by further empirical evidence, which claims that the 
likelihood of identifying an opportunity can be increased by deliberately searching for 
relevant information (Ko 2004). Such studies compared entrepreneurs and managers and their 
search for information. Their results hinted to different behaviours (Gilad et al. 1989; Gaglio 
and Taub 1992), in particular that entrepreneurs spend more time on searching for information 
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(Kaish and Gilad 1991). However, such findings are somewhat questionable; e.g. an often 
cited study of Kaish and Gilad (1991) war replicated by Busenitz (1996) with a random 
sample, but only little support was found for the initially supported hypotheses that 
entrepreneurs really spend more time searching for information. 
Indeed, the argument brought up by critics of this view - that it cannot be searched for a yet 
unknown object - has some validity since on a fundamental level it is plausible that it is 
impossible to detect something, of which most characteristics are unknown. But this paradox 
can be solved if it is assumed that aspiring entrepreneurs are not systematically searching for 
a particular object (an entrepreneurial opportunity), but are rather ‘screening’ their 
information channels for signals; a process called strong interference (Platt 1964).viii An 
approach to model this is the systematic search approach (Fiet et al. 2004b) based on 
Ronstadt’s (1988) corridor principle, which emphasises proactive efforts, but does not 
indicate to what purpose that activity ought to be directed. Fiet et al. (2004b) suggest, based 
on their findings of repeat entrepreneurs, that aspiring entrepreneurs should direct their search 
to domains, in which they already possess prior specific knowledge. They conclude that some 
entrepreneurs do not wait to let the information hit them (like the concept of alertness 
suggests), but rather search for it proactively. Therefore, these refined studies support the 
arguments of older works in the field, which assumed systematic search efforts by 
entrepreneurs to be of value for discovering entrepreneurial opportunities (see for example 
Timmons et al. 1987). Other studies in the sub-stream focussing on search efforts try to find 
out how individuals decide to search for opportunities. This idea is based on the notion of 
problemistic search (Cyert and March 1963). This assumes that search efforts are triggered off 
by unrealised expectations.  
In the context of the present work, it must be asked which conditions induce individuals to 
search for entrepreneurial opportunities. For instance, Heron and Sapienza (1992) suggest that 
current performance under aspiration level might play a significant role. The perhaps most 
obvious reason for an individual to gain relevant information for discovering an 
entrepreneurial opportunity are its own efforts to gain such information in the situation at 
hand. In order to distinguish this from prior knowledge, it could be simply assumed that such 
information is obtained by the individual at the same time the opportunity is discovered or 
constructed. This means these two processes take place - more or less - simultaneously. In 
contrast, the considerations as to prior knowledge focus on previous situations in which 
information is accumulated.  
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However, regarding the issue treated here, the literature offers a controversial discussion 
whether this process of information acquisition is of a passive nature, or proactive efforts are 
of importance as well. Another solution to resolving the controversy might consist in 
differentiating between types of opportunities; some scholars argue that the type of 
knowledge, which is relevant to the opportunity, has an influence of the opportunity itself (Yu 
2001). Some knowledge can be gained and learned by deliberate efforts, such as technological 
knowledge, know-how, where to buy or sell, etc. In turn, other knowledge can only be 
acquired in a non-deliberate manner, rather absorbed from everyday experience (Kirzner 
1979). Therefore, different economic situations allow for a varying degree of proactive 
information search for entrepreneurial opportunities.  
In reviewing the efforts to answer the question of how opportunities are recognised and why 
some people and not other recognise certain types Dimov (2004) identifies two main research 
streams: event-driven and outcome-driven studies (see also Aldrich 2001; Van de Ven and 
Engleman 2004). Such a distinction makes sense in terms of highlighting that two different 
research orientations provide different insights as to entrepreneurship and opportunity 
identification. Event-driven approaches are rather built forward, starting with observed events 
and the development to the outcome; outcome-driven approaches begin with recording 
outcomes of interest to identifying significant prior causes; consequently, they are rather built 
backward. Methodologically, this implies that the former approaches attempt to describe a 
sequence of events in the realisation of a particular outcome, while the latter are rather based 
on statistical association between a set of independent and dependent variables (Dimov 2004; 
Van de Ven and Engleman 2004). 
In the domain of opportunity identification this distinction leads to two different research 
questions: while event-driven approaches try to answer the question of how opportunity 
identification occurs by describing the sequential steps inherent; outcome-driven approaches 
attempt to shed light on the factors that contribute to or deter the identification of 
opportunities, thus trying to answer the question why some people and not others are 
successful in doing so (Dimov 2004, p. 137). The present study, as will become clear later on, 
methodologically belongs to the latter stream since it is hypothesised that certain cognitive 
preferences and abilities (independent variables) lead to the recognition of profitable and 
novel entrepreneurial opportunities (dependent variable). After reviewing such general 
models providing a framework for investigating the phenomenon, such central variables that 
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have been found to influence the probability of an individual to identify entrepreneurial 
opportunities are now presented.  
 
3. Determinants of Identifying Entrepreneurial Opportunities 
Tied up to the two central cognitive elements, which will be introduced in chapter III.A.2, 
variables could be differentiated in two main categories: firstly, knowledge and information 
about the external world, and, secondly, individual characteristics. The distinction between 
these major groups is not new and can be found in different studies, trying to systematise the 
phenomena of opportunity recognition. For instance, Venkatamaran (1997) focuses on three 
main aspects in which individuals differ and that might have an influence on the ability to 
identify entrepreneurial opportunities: (1) knowledge and information, (2) cognitive 
differences, and (3) behavioural differences. He emphasises that individuals are differently 
endowed with knowledge. Additionally, they differ regarding the set of skills, aptitudes, 
insights, and circumstances that are necessary to make the connection between such specific 
knowledge and an entrepreneurial opportunity. Put differently, it follows that opportunities 
are not given by information hitting the individual, but rather such information are processed 
by humans to produce entrepreneurial opportunities (Corbett 2005). Consequently, 
investigations on the identification of opportunities must deal with information and 
knowledge individuals possess and the way it is processed in their minds (Venkatamaran 
1997). Many other scholars agree on these two major factors of knowledge and information 
on the one hand and cognitive properties on the other (e.g. Shane and Venkatamaran 2000; 
Shane 2003). Therefore, the most relevant literature on individual variables moulding 
opportunity identification is reviewed according to these two major categories.  
However, the distinction appears to be somewhat fuzzy, but such confusion can be prevented 
by considering the time-dimension: In the model of human action in time, which has been 
introduced, knowledge and information available build up the basis for action. Being more 
precise, it can be distinguished between knowledge, heuristics, and preferences that have been 
acquired through prior actions in previous periods (in tn-m). Such learning processes guiding 
current decisions and actions in the current situation (in tn) are subject of many studies 
focussing on economic agent’s learning (Brenner 1999; Riechmann 2001). However, such 
individual characteristics built up by previous situations (and therefore previously available 
information) should be distinguished from information that is available and cognitive 
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processes operated in the situation at hand, in tn. Such a differentiation is necessary to 
distinguish interpersonal variances in the ability to recognise entrepreneurial opportunities. 
Concluding, it will be distinguished between knowledge, resulting from tn-m, and information 
and cognitive processes or abilities in tn. 
Concerning individual differences regarding superior knowledge and access to information, it 
is argued quite generally that some individuals possess exclusive information, which enables 
them to discover entrepreneurial opportunities other economic actors ignore since they simply 
lack relevant information (see Hayek (1945). Perhaps, one might instantly think of path-
breaking new insights in scientific research. But such informational advantages, triggered off 
by information asymmetries are “[…] virtually universal in the economy, representing a 
significant component of almost all transaction.“ (Arrow 1985, p. 37) In the following, it will 
be presented a literature review on studies especially focusing on the aspect of opportunity 
identification and information respectively knowledge. It will be started with knowledge 
acquired in tn-m that represents prior knowledge for the situation in tn . 
This idiosyncratic stock of knowledge previously accumulated can increase the likelihood of 
opportunity identification as well (Ko 2004). Each individual has a different stock of personal 
prior information acquired through life experience, which increases the chance to identify an 
opportunity in specific situations (Shane 2000). Empirical studies suggest that a few different 
aspects are of particular interest in this context: the form of job function(s), the general 
variation in experience, and special interest (Shane 2003; Vesper 1996).  
Concerning an individual’s job experience, it is perhaps palpable that a physician or chemist 
has a higher probability of obtaining relevant information for identifying an entrepreneurial 
opportunity than does an historian. This is because they are typically more frequently 
confronted with information that might be of interest for an entrepreneurial opportunity, i.e. 
they accumulate knowledge that can be transformed into a marketable good or service (Shane 
2003). More generally, this suggests that certain professions have a privileged access to 
relevant information; particularly, jobs in research and development should be mentioned 
since there new information is generated that triggers off technological change (Hippel 1986, 
1988). This statement can be generalised to any job where information is generated or first 
obtained from the typical sources of entrepreneurial opportunities. Empirical research, albeit 
of exploratory nature, suggests that business owners have indeed obtained prior knowledge by 
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working in a company offering a similar or even the same product or service (Young and 
Francis 1991).  
In addition to job positions, Shane (2003) uses the metaphor of a puzzle to emphasise the role 
of varying life experience in the process of opportunity identification. He states that new 
incoming information might serve as the connecting element between previously available 
information, which allows an individual to recognise an opportunity. Individual differences in 
life experience are likely to influence the probability to obtain such crucial information in tn. 
Frequently, such knowledge, respectively such relevant information, is acquired during 
former jobs in different organisations. A high degree of such experience and expertise is 
therefore hypothesised to increase the ability to recognise entrepreneurial opportunities 
(Romanelli and Schoonhoven 2001). Similarly, some scholars argue that such ability grows 
with the number of markets an individual has collected experience in (Shane 2003).  
In summary, it could be concluded that at any given point in time only some individuals are 
able to identify a given opportunity since they have previously acquired relevant knowledge 
to correctly ‘understand’ the incoming information (Gaglio 2004; Venkatamaran 1997). This 
corresponds to Ronstadt’s (1988) corridor principle, already mentioned here (see previous 
chapter II.C.2, and shows that prior knowledge and incoming information are closely 
interrelated. Accordingly, Shane (2000) stated that the eight cases studies he executed 
supported the hypothesis that entrepreneurs tend to engage in markets, where they have 
previous experience. Further to this, Ardichvili et al. (2003) came to four specific propositions 
about the relation between knowledge and opportunity recognition, in particular concerning 
the types of knowledge an individual possesses. They argue that (1) special interest 
knowledge and general industry knowledge, (2) prior knowledge of markets, (3) prior 
knowledge of customer problems, and (4) prior knowledge of ways to serve markets will all 
increase the likelihood of successful entrepreneurial opportunity identification.  
Shane (2000) alleges another classification distinguishing three dimensions according to 
which type of relevant information for opportunity recognition individuals differ. (1) Firstly, 
prior knowledge about markets enables individuals to understand demand conditions (Shane 
2003). For example, such information or knowledge could be about crucial relationships, 
sales techniques or requirements for capital acquisition (Hippel 1988). (2) Secondly, prior 
knowledge about how to serve markets puts individuals into the position to understand and 
know the rules and operations in the markets. Particularly, in identifying production or 
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marketing gains from introducing a new product or service in the market (Johnson 1986). (3) 
Thirdly and finally, prior knowledge about customer problems increases the probability of 
identifying opportunities by assisting in finding a new product or service that solves a 
customer problem or satisfies a, so-far, unmet need (Hippel 1988). Further empirical research 
claims that successful entrepreneurs have obtained information from private sources, 
compared to average entrepreneurs, which gained such information through public sources 
such as magazines or newspaper. It could be inferred that private sources of information are 
more promising as random search (Hills and Shrader 1998).  
As indicated, studies on prior knowledge focus on occurrences in tn. Further research tries to 
shed a light on the variables that determine the access to relevant information in tn. Here, the 
social relations of the individual are often mentioned as one of the most important factors 
influencing an individual’s behaviour. The argument that all transactions and economic 
actions, even in markets, are socially embedded (Granovetter 1985) has led to a controversial 
discussion, whether the individual level is the right one to investigate on, or rather a holistic 
perspective sheds more light on a phenomenon (see for more Braun 2006).ix Scholars 
assuming a holistic view might investigate an individual’s social network. A social network 
could be defined as “[…] a specific set of linkages among a defined set of actors, with the 
additional property that the characteristics of these linkages as a whole may be used to 
interpret the social behaviour of the actors involved.” (Mitchell 1969, p. 2) Apparently, there 
exist many other possibilities to define an individual’s network (see e.g. Pappi 1987 or 
Koschatzky 2001); however, it is assumed that type, quantity, and speed of information that 
an entrepreneur receives are mainly contingent on the structure of his social network (Shane 
2003), an analysis of relationships building it up might offer interesting insights on 
opportunity identification.  
A rather sketchy perspective would distinguish the relationships as to the dimensions of form, 
content, and intensity, though it should be noted that only the two latter constitute a network’s 
structure (Sydow 1992). The content of a relation or network is determined by the object of 
exchange, which can be theoretically everything that is exchangeable. Since the social 
network is seen as a channel for gaining superior information the relevant object of exchange 
in the context of opportunity identification is information or knowledge. The fact that social 
relationships differ as to their intensity has led to a range of studies focussing on the effects of 
such differences for a variety of phenomena. 
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An influential classification of relationships distinguishes between weak and strong ties. 
These terms were mainly shaped by Granovetter (1973), who introduced them to distinguish 
relations with different degrees of intensity: weak ties are those that show a low degree of 
intensity, while strong ties are located on the opposite end of this dichotomy. He further 
assumed that individuals can only maintain a limited number of strong ties since it requires 
relatively high effort to keep them (Granovetter 1973). Additionally, and relevant in this 
context, such strong ties provide relatively trustworthy information, e.g. via relations to close 
friends or associates (Shane 2003). This so called network closure argument (Coleman 1988) 
argues that close relations typically provide high-quality information and, therefore, reduce 
the risk of uncertainty (Arenius and De Clerq 2005). To which degree this quality of 
information is crucial in the process of opportunity identification is not clear. Its role heavily 
depends on the notion of opportunity identification given, e.g. if the refinement of the 
business idea is included or not. However, such relations are of importance for developing a 
whole business idea, for instance in building up a trustworthy network of potential investors 
(Shane and Cable 2002). At this stage, considering social networks and innovation, the 
concept of liability of newness should be mentioned: It is assumed that newness in economic 
actions is generally accompanied by problems or challenges. Social networks are assumed to 
support in resolving such obstacles by providing necessary knowledge and resources 
(Stinchcombe 1965). 
In turn, weak ties are those with rather casual acquaintances; information gathered from such 
contacts is seen as less trustworthy, but it is said that they are an importance source for non-
redundant information (Granovetter 1974). They are assumed to be of particular importance 
for networks dealing with information and diffusion processes (Sydow 1992). In this context, 
redundant relations are those to more than one actor of the same time; in turn, non-
redundancy refers to a unique relation (Burt 1992; Koschatzky 2001). Such non-redundancy 
in social ties, often referred to as structural holes (Burt 1992), is assumed to increase the 
likelihood of gaining access to the right complement of information necessary for recognising 
an entrepreneurial opportunity (Aldrich 1999; Shane 2003). This is because such weak ties are 
assumed to increase the likelihood of gaining unique information (Arenius and DeClerq 2005; 
Granovetter 1973; Hills et al. 1997; Thornton and Flynn 2003). More precisely, it can be said 
that the more weak ties an entrepreneur possesses, the more diverse information he possesses 
(Ko 2004). In turn, entrepreneurs that lack weak ties seem to be disadvantaged since they do 
not receive information from distant parts of their social system (Granovetter 1973).  
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Several further empirical studies have been dedicated to the role of social networks in the 
identification of entrepreneurial opportunities. Koller (1988) found out that approximately the 
half of the eighty-two firm founders in his sample had their business idea suggested through a 
business associate, a relative, or another social contact. More precisely, and considering the 
dimension mentioned above, Kaish and Gilad (1991) found evidence suggesting that 
entrepreneurs rather use distant contacts or weak ties of their social network than closer ones 
to identify opportunities. In a replication of this study, Busenitz (1996) could not verify their 
findings, but rather stated that individuals are more likely to obtain relevant information from 
contacts they regard as trustworthy.  
Hills et al. (1997) distinguished between solo and network entrepreneurs, depending on the 
degree to which they use their social network for opportunity identification. Their research 
suggests that the latter are significantly more successful; however their use of the concepts of 
solo and network entrepreneurs appears critical (see for a more detailed criticism of this study 
Braun 2006). In an attempt to refine their research on this issue, the same group of scholars 
found out that the more diverse an individual’s network is, the higher is the likelihood of 
opportunity identification (Singh et al. 1999b). Further results have shown that entrepreneurs 
judge colleagues, friends and relatives as one of their most important sources for relevant 
information, only exceeded by the importance of relevant experience (Singh et al. 1999b). In a 
recent study, Arenius and DeClerq (2005) have gathered evidence indicating that the higher 
an individual’s background, the higher is the likelihood that it identifies an entrepreneurial 
opportunity. But they argue that it is not just the superior prior knowledge accumulated, but 
foremost the integration in a social network of more knowledgeable individuals.  
While it could be argued that everything mentally developed outside the individual’s mind at 
hand is only information acquired through personal relations, some scholars argue that in such 
a process of opportunity recognition, cognitive processes of more than one individual are 
actively involved. Taken aside the methodological discussion of individualism or holism 
already discussed in chapter II.B.3, it is argued that feedback processes in the process of 
opportunity identification can be executed by members of the individual’s social network 
(Singh et al. 1999b; Thornton and Flynn 2003). This could be regarded as an internalisation of 
external cognitive processes, which could be called in the context of entrepreneurial 
opportunities a “[…] social network-opportunity recognition relationship.“ (Singh et al.1999b, 
p. 12)  
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In summary, it is generally assumed that individuals with more diverse information sources 
have a higher probability of being successful (Aldrich et al. 1987). It seems that in particular 
diverse social ties provide a superior access to relevant information for opportunity 
identification (Aldrich and Zimmer 1986). Nevertheless, the availability of relevant 
information and knowledge alone is not a sufficient fundament for the identification of 
entrepreneurial opportunities: Incoming information must be correctly or accurately to 
processed against the background of prior knowledge. 
Many attempts have already been done by researchers in the domain of entrepreneurial 
cognition research to shed light on such mental operations in recognising entrepreneurial 
opportunities; these are presented in-depth in chapters IV.A.2 and IV.C, after the 
psychological fundament is the following chapter III. Then, the reader has gained a more 
thorough understanding of basics in cognitive psychology and can more easily comprehend 
arguments and thoughts in this research stream. However, here it is intended to provide a 
general overview on important variables on opportunity identification; many of them are 
general abilities or concepts that stem from psychology. These are an individual’s (1) 
absorptive capacity, (2) cognitive capabilities, (3) and creativity (Shane 2003). They are 
presented at this point in a rather general manner to conclude the brief review on opportunity 
identification pegging the present work’s research field. 
To begin with, an individual’s absorptive capacity could equally be classified as superior 
knowledge since it is mainly dependent on an individual’s stock of knowledge; it has an 
ambiguous position, a kind of hermaphrodite between knowledge and cognitive capabilities. 
However, most authors regard it as a capability since its importance arises from the fact that it 
facilitates further processing of information in the human mind (Gaglio 2004; Shane 2003). 
Furthermore, it seems sensible mentioning it here since it makes an impact in tn. As has been 
pointed out, individuals differ as to their stock of knowledge; this creates an absorptive 
capacity, which not only facilitates the acquisition of additional information about 
technologies, markets, and production process, but also further information processing. This 
increases the capability of formulating new mean-ends frameworks (Cohen and Levinthal 
1990).  
Two main reasons are given, why such capacity influences the likelihood of recognising an 
entrepreneurial opportunity. Firstly, new information is categorised in the context of extant 
knowledge structures. In case that an individual possesses a strong base of relevant 
information or knowledge, it has a superior ability to interpret incoming information (Yu 
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2001). Secondly, this increases an individual’s ability to solve problems; it is assumed that 
superior problem solutions can be devised confronted with a given problem situation (Shane 
2003). Apparently, an individual’s absorptive capacity is contingent on the type of 
information that is necessary for recognising an entrepreneurial opportunity. For instance, 
knowledge how to serve markets supports individuals in estimating, which production or 
marketing gains can be expected from the introduction of a new product or service, and, even 
more importantly, if this action yields a profit. An individual is more likely to recognise an 
opportunity if a product or service is introduced into the market, if aware of how these are 
produced or distributed, how new input can be integrated into the production process, or 
which sources of supply are available (Shane 2000).  
As already pointed out, it is intended to understand how incoming information is processed in 
tn against the background of extant knowledge structures obtained in tn-m. The question how 
information is processed in entrepreneurial mind has long been used to explain differences in 
the ability to identify entrepreneurial opportunities (Ko 2004; Shane 2003). Shane (2003) 
distinguishes four broad categories of cognitive processes, which he regards crucial to the 
identification of entrepreneurial opportunities: intelligence, perceptive ability, creativity, and 
risk avoidance, i.e. not seeing risks. 
Already Knight (1921) argued that intelligent individuals are more likely to discover 
entrepreneurial opportunities because it requires collecting and processing information. 
Ceteris paribus, intelligent individuals can better execute these processes and, thus, are better 
in discovering opportunities and building expectations about the outcomes of resource 
recombinations (Knight 1921). Additionally, it could be hypothesised that intelligent 
individuals can choose from a larger variety of opportunities since their intelligence provides 
them with a higher number of available means-ends frameworks. This would also mean that 
they are able to find more valuable opportunities; that is such, which yield higher profits 
(Shane 2003; Yu 2001). Similarly, it has been argued that uncertainty prevails in markets, 
which implies that certain individuals might have a superior ability to build expectations and 
possess a superior or more accurate vision of the future; i.e. possess a superior perceptive 
ability.  
Further to absorptive capacity and cognitive capabilities, creativity is one of the most 
prominent individual characteristics mentioned in the context of the entrepreneurial mind. It is 
often seen as a cognitive capability as well (Shane 2003), although, as will be discussed later, 
the concept itself is rather fuzzy (see chapter III.C.2). However, creativity is often invoked in 
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explaining opportunity identification, a circumstance that might be traced back to Schumpeter 
(1934), who introduced the concept of creative destruction in this context. Thus, it is no 
wonder that researchers tried to model the process of opportunity identification as creativity 
in economic settings.  
As a capability, it is hypothesised that creativity promotes the creation of new means-ends 
frameworks, which might be equal to an opportunity, and that it helps in finding solutions to 
problems (Hills et al. 1997; Shane 2003). Indeed, empirical evidence suggest that 
entrepreneurs are typically creative (Shane 2003); although it is questionable if some scholars, 
such as Kirzner, would subscribe to that statement since it is not necessarily the case. 
Creativity seems - equally to intelligence - helpful in finding more valuable opportunities. It 
could be argued that a creative individual recognises more opportunities than a less creative 
one. Given that both choose the subjectively most valuable opportunity, it is likely that the 
creative individuals discover a more valuable on (Shane 2003). The argument stating that 
creative individuals per se have a higher ability of recognising opportunities is questionable: 
Even if entrepreneurs are somehow creative or nonconformist, that is a positive correlation 
between creativity or a nonconformist attitude and the tendency to start a business exists, this 
does not necessarily mean that they have a superior capability of identifying entrepreneurial 
opportunities. This is because the decision to start a business is influenced by many factors; 
for instance, it could be argued that creative or nonconformist individuals attach a high value 
or utility to being self-employed instead of working in an organisation or hierarchy, thus, 
increasing the likelihood to start a business. This does by no means necessarily imply that 
they have a superior ability to recognise opportunities. This is again a problem that arises 
from referring to venture creation in investigating opportunity identification.  
Summarising this body of literature it can be stated that the two major categories identified to 
play a role in opportunity identification resemble to the two main cognitive categories that 
will be introduced in detail later in this work. Once again, this justifies the conjecture of a 
cognitive perspective on the phenomena as a general framework. However, rather implicitly 
the heterogeneity and controversy in this field of research can be to a huge extent attributed to 
different metaphysical or ontological foundations underlying the models. Some authors even 
claim that the fundamental controversy among scholars who study entrepreneurial and 
organisational environments has focussed on the question whether environments are best 
understood subjectively or objectively (Gartner and Shaver 2004). Therefore, the following 
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chapter will deal with ontological and epistemological foundations of social sciences and the 
implications the chosen stance of the present work has for modelling economic action.  
As should be evident by now a theory’s ontological foundation has significant influences on a 
model of economic action. The previous considerations should have made clear that it is 
particularly the human that is at the core of theorising in entrepreneurship research, and that 
the underlying philosophy in modelling such is of the highest importance: Some authors even 
claim that the fundamental controversy among scholars who study entrepreneurial and 
organisational environments has focussed on the question whether individuals and 
environments are best understood subjectively or objectively (Gartner and Shaver 2004).  
                                                 
i  A vivid example is given by a student who reported in the second questioning that he was relaxing in his 
room in the dormitory and all of a sudden a girl ran down the floor screaming that the space shuttle had 
exploded. In fact, one day after the incident he declared that he was sitting in the refectory, when he heard of 
it (Neisser and Harsch 1992). 
ii  Dominance demands that if prospect A is at least as good as prospect B in every respect and better that B in 
at least one respect, then A should be preferred to B by the decision-maker. Invariance requires that the 
preference order between prospects should not depend on the manner in which they are described. In 
particular, two versions of a choice problem that are recognised to be equivalent when shown together should 
elicit the same preference even when shown separately (Kahneman and Tversky 1984).  
iii  “The analysis of market processes is able to exploit the insight that participants do not merely react to given 
market data, but rather display entrepreneurial alertness to possible change in these data – an alertness which 
can be used to explain how such changes can occur in general.” (Kirzner 1973, p. 39) 
iv  “But closely as the element of knowledge is tied to the possibility of winning pure profits, the elusive notion 
of entrepreneurship is, as we have seen, not encapsulated in the mere possession of greater knowledge of 
market opportunities. The aspect of knowledge which is crucially relevant to entrepreneurship is not so much 
the substantive knowledge of market data as alertness, the ‘knowledge’ of where to find market data.” 
(Kirzner 1973, p. 67) 
v  He says that “[…] a true opportunity does not need boldness and leadership to shoulder the risks. If it does, 
then the entrepreneur has in fact not yet really discovered an available, attractive opportunity for innovation. 
If the entrepreneur has not seen that opportunity in so shining a light that it drives him to its implementation 
in spite of the jeering skepticism of other, and in spite of the possibility of is ultimate failure – then the 
entrepreneur has not really ‘seen’ that opportunity.” (Kirzner 1998, pp. 14-15) 
vi  “We need to remember only how much we have to learn in any occupation after we have completed our 
theoretical training, how big a part of our working life we spend learning particular jobs, and how valuable an 
asset in all walks of life is knowledge of people, of local conditions, and of special circumstances.” (Hayek 
1945, p. 322) 
vii  This holds true for the moment. At a later stage in this work it will become more apparent that, due to 
ontological reasons, the nexus is not seen between an individual and an opportunity, but between an 
individual and an economic situation, probably producing an entrepreneurial opportunity.  
viii  “The entrepreneur was not immediately interested in meters, cars, or vending machines as businesses to 
enter; rather, they represented his known set of potential uses of his technology solution. This strong 
interference process enabled the entrepreneur to know in advance most of the likely new application for his 
technology and where he ought to be looking for information channels in the future to know how to 
commercialise them.” (Fiet et al. 2004, p. 18) 
ix  “Actors do not behave or decide as atoms outside a social context, nor do they adhere slavishly to a script 
written for a particular intersection of social categories that they happen to occupy.” (Granovetter 1985, p. 
487) 
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 “It (Economics) has tried for a precision, certainty and reach of prediction whose 
basis is not there.” (Shackle 1972, p. 360) 
 
III. Human Thinking 
So far, the present work has outlined that the creative element of the human mind promises 
some explanatory power in explaining why some individuals detect entrepreneurial 
opportunities whereas others do not. In order to model and investigate such creative thinking 
three central issues are addressed in the following:  
To begin with, the scientific treatment of human thinking is briefly outlined in part A of this 
chapter. It starts by discussing central definitions of human thinking and cognitive 
psychology. Many research attempts in cognitive psychology conceive human thinking as 
solving a problem, an approach that is presented in the second section 2 of part A, which 
concludes with remarks on the dominating account of cognitive psychology, the information-
processing paradigm. 
Given this basic scaffolding, the human mind modelled as a problem-solving information 
processing system (IPS) is presented in the beginning of part B. The basic units on which 
reflected human behaviour, explained from a psychological perspective, is executed are 
meaningful knowledge structures that are introduced related to the general conceptualisation 
of human memory in the second part. An often discussed and cited approach to model such 
knowledge structures in the human mind is to view them as schemas or mental models of the 
external world, providing us with the topic of the final section of part B. 
It has been shown in the previous chapter II that the notion of opportunity recognition 
embraces the conception of novelty and newness: Hence, the final part of chapter III is 
dedicated to the treatment of creative thinking from a cognitive perspective. After defining 
and demarcating creativity’s meaning in the present work in section 1, cognitive processes 
that are attributed to be important in producing novel outcomes are sketched in section 2. As 
the final section of this part C will show, such research has revealed sets of individual and 
contextual variables that help in explaining individual differences in creative thinking; the 
former set, concerning individuals, contains the influential concept of cognitive styles that 
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will serve as distinctive feature for individuals in the present investigation on the ability of 
opportunity recognition. 
 
A. Human Thinking and Cognitive Psychology  
1. Defining Human Thinking and Cognition 
Thinking is a frequently used term that is used as much in everyday-life as in scientific 
discussions. Thus, it could be distinguished between a non-psychologists notion of thinking 
considering all intelligent cognitive activities, or an academic psychologist’s definition of 
thinking including only the most complex forms of cognitive activities, such as representation 
and categorisation, deduction, induction, problem-solving, creativity, wisdom, decision 
making, etc. (Ericsson and Hastie 1994). Given this somewhat general notions, a vast number 
of possible definitions and understandings of thinking could be mentioned, in particular 
highlighting these different notions of psychologists and laypersons. However, the probably 
most important difference for the purpose of a study like the present is the anti-empirical 
attitude of many people towards thinking or at least parts of it. They regard it as an ineffable 
spiritual aspect of our existence, in contrast to the mechanistic and material aspects of our 
physical environment.  
Many scholars have concluded that the nature and structure of thought could never be 
investigated with intersubjective (objective) methods or even described by general laws and 
mechanisms (see the discussion in chapter II.A.3). Notwithstanding, the behavioural sciences 
find such empirical results and it seems that at least a dim light can be shed on the human 
thought. Nevertheless, critics still object that the phenomenon studied in the laboratory 
produces artificial outcomes, in particular because frequently used methods as self-
observation and introspection lead to serious deficiencies (Ericsson and Hastie 1994). Indeed, 
in order to completely account for thinking in all its facets research must consider the 
complexity and diversity of adult thinking and must include the context of accumulated 
knowledge and skills acquired by an individual over a lengthy developmental experience. 
Consequently, the topics related to the term of thinking are almost innumerable and 
approaches to thinking are widely different (Garnham and Oakhill 1994).  
Therefore, it will only be given a broad preliminary definition of thinking, which will be 
elaborated on in the upcoming considerations: “Thinking is the systematic transformation of 
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mental representations of knowledge to characterise actual or possible states of the world, 
often in service of goals.” (Holyoak and Morrison 2005, p. 2) In the discipline of psychology, 
most contemporary scientific contributions to the issue are made from a cognitive perspective. 
This becomes evident in considering that cognition basically means simply knowing about 
something; thus, it is the act of knowing (Styles 2005); referring to the same phenomena as 
the preliminary definition of thinking given before. However, becoming more precisely, “[…] 
the problem of perception and cognition understands how the organism transforms, organises, 
stores, and uses information arising from the world in sense data or memory.” (Carterette and 
Friedman 1994, p. XV)  
Another very famous and often cited definition of cognition is given by Neisser (1967). He 
stated that “[…] cognition refers to all the processes by which the sensory input is 
transformed, reduced, elaborated, stored, recovered and used. It is concerned with these 
processes even when they operate in the absence of relevant stimulation, as in images and 
hallucination. Such terms as sensation, perception, retention, recall, problem-solving and 
thinking, among many others, refer to hypothetical stages or aspects of cognition.” (Neisser 
1967, p. 4) But even more important, Neisser goes on and says: “Given such a sweeping 
definition, it is apparent that cognition is involved in everything a human might possibly do; 
that every psychological phenomenon is a cognitive phenomenon. But although cognitive 
psychology is concerned wit all human activity rather than some fraction of it, the concern is 
from a particular point of view.” (Neisser 1967, p. 4)  
This statement refers to the twofold nature of cognition stating that, basically, two main kinds 
of cognitive elements are dealt with (Mumford et al. 1991): Firstly, knowledge in organised 
sets of facts and principles pertaining to the characteristics of objects lying in some domain 
(Chi et al. 1982; Fleishman and Mumford 1989), and, secondly, the cognitive processes 
contributing to effective application of extant knowledge structures in solution generation 
(Sternberg 1986a). Since it is uncontroversial that cognition features these two basic elements, 
the cognitive processes and the knowledge on which they operate, researchers intend to 
explain individual differences by focussing on (1) the amount, structure, and accessibility of 
task-relevant background knowledge, and (2) learned strategies or algorithms for utilising 
internal (from long-term memory) and external (sensory inputs from the task environment) 
information to generate new states from current states (see Figure 8).  
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 (1) Task-relevant knowledge (2) Learned strategies or algorithms 
 Amount Internal information  
 Structure External information 
 Accessibility  
Figure 8 Individual Differences in the Information Processing Paradigm. 
If, in general terms, cognition is the act of knowing, consequently cognitive psychology is the 
branch of psychology that deals with understanding how it is an individual came to know 
about things (Styles 2005). The task to trace the boundaries of cognitive psychology within 
the whole field of psychology is difficult since both, its content and its general approach, must 
be specified. The subject matter of cognitive psychology is quite evident as we consider the 
definitions given above: in the most general terms it is how the mind works. But in order to 
keep the subject matter comprehensible and manageable, most scientists clearly focus on 
higher mental process, including memory, perception, learning, thinking, reasoning, language, 
and understanding (Lachmann et al. 1979). Within such research on cognitive psychology it is 
possible to identify major research streams. For instance, Eysenck and Keane (2000) 
differentiate four such streams: (1) Experimental cognitive psychology that stays in the 
experimental tradition of cognitive psychology without computer modelling, (2) cognitive 
science, which is developing computational models in order to understand human cognition,x 
(3) cognitive neuropsychology that studies patterns of cognitive impartment shown by brain-
damaged patients to gain information about normal human cognition, and (4) cognitive 
neuroscience, which uses several techniques for studying brain functioning (e.g. brain scans) 
(Eysenck and Keane 2000).  
However, irrespective of the stream research on human thinking has the aim at explaining 
human behaviour in a given situation. Scholars had to find a way of conceptualising human 
thinking in particular situations: In this regard, a widespread thesis in cognitive psychology is 
that all cognitive processes can be principally understood as problem-solving process 
(Anderson 2001). The main argument presented states that human cognition is always 
purposeful, in the sense of reaching an end and removing obstacles, which stand in the 
human’s way (see Köhler’s (1917) famous experiments with the ape Sultan). In the present 
work, economic action, and in particular creative economic action named opportunity 
recognition, is modelled or thought of as a problem-solving process. In order to point out how 
such a perspective views human thinking and how this also holds true for economic settings, 
the general notion or perspective of problem-solving is introduced in the following 
paragraphs. 
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2. Problem-Solving  
Generally, whenever an individual generates a new idea that proves useful in addressing 
certain social (or economic) needs, it has constructed and implemented a course of action - 
one out of many potential alternatives - which has brought about the attainment of a certain 
goal state (Mumford et al. 1994). Since the beginnings of research on thinking as problem-
solving until know the broad notion or definition has not changed: It is the situation in which 
an organism has a goal but lacks a clear or well-learned route to its achievement 
(Dominowski and Bourne 1994). Accordingly, an individual or human being is regarded as a 
problem-solver. Typically, three characteristics are mentioned, which define a particular 
process or action as problem-solving: (1) The mentioned purposefulness of action, (2) the 
dissection into sub-ends and (3) the application of operators (Anderson 2001).  
However, many ideas relevant to problem-solving, e.g. that of sets, have also been found 
important in economic settings, referring to concepts such as framing (see chapter II.A.2). 
Since the present work deals with such an economic topic another differentiation might be 
important in order to delineate the present field of study: the difference between problem-
solving and decision making. Abundant literature in microeconomics deals with the decision 
making processes of economic agents (see for an overview Eisenführ and Weber 1999); 
however, these treatments are different from the present in the sense that problem-solving is 
understood as the process of designing appropriate courses of action and evaluating them. The 
subsequent choice between such available options is regarded as decision making (Sternberg 
et al. 1986). As Figure 9 points out problem-solving is a wider concept in a way including the 
steps of decision making, which are highlighted within the process. 
 
Design of
Appropriate
Courses
of Action
Evaluation of
Options
Choice of 
Option Action
Stimulus in 
External
World (Task)
Decision-MakingProblem-Solving
 
Figure 9 Problem-Solving vs. Decision-Making. 
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However, although there exist many different approaches to problem-solving in more recent 
cognitive psychology for understanding and assessing it (Bejar et al. 1991), they all share the 
conjecture that it makes sense to dissect the overall end in sub-ends, because in many stages 
of such a process operators are known to the acting individual, which enables it to complete 
sub-ends (Newell 1980). Here, the term operator denotes an action that transforms the present 
problem state into another state. The solution of the whole problem is a sequence of such 
known operators (Anderson 2001). In modelling such processes, some researchers examine 
the use of knowledge structures in problem-solving (e.g. Chi et al. 1989; Kulkarni and Simon 
1988), while others rather focus on the processes that operate on such knowledge (e.g. Hayes 
and Flower 1986; Sternberg and Lubart 1991). But again all these approaches to problem-
solving are based on a general notion of thinking as a process, which will be briefly outlined 
hereafter.  
Before outlining a general process of problem-solving some remarks should be given 
concerning many problem-solving models and their underlying ontology. Exemplary Herbert 
Simon and his influential works (e.g. Newell and Simon 1972; Simon 1979) on problem-
solving ought to be mentioned; his models adhere to formal-analytic principles and start with 
a space of potential possible actions. Therefore, such individuals are programmable and only 
restricted by their bounded rationality, which focus on satisfycing as central principle of 
behaviour. As shown in chapter II.A.2 such models exclude endogenous novelty and 
creativity introduced by humans. Consequently, the present work, while seeing human 
thinking as problem-solving, conceptually dissociates from such exact models of problem-
solving for investigating creative human thinking in economic settings. Supporting such an 
ontological stance, finally even Herbert Simon - probably the most famous pioneer in this 
field - had to admit that in such programmed models, active thinking has been done by the 
designer of the machine and by those who use it. Creative thinking is therefore not to be 
found in the machinery itself (Brillouin 1968). 
Coming back to the general idea of conceptualising problem-solving as a process within the 
theoretical boundaries of cognitive psychology is often attributed to Newell and Simon 
(1972), who were the first to introduce and specify specific problem-solving strategies. 
Similarly, the work is often regarded as path-breaking in terms of providing a basis for 
process-analytic models, including the importance of domain-specific expertise in process 
application (Mumford et al. 1991). Since then, a huge variety of process models has been 
developed that distinguish different phases; however, they all assume quite similar underlying 
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processes, also including the notion that on a sufficiently abstract level, the efforts necessary 
to solve a problem are most basically always the same.  
In an attempt to provide a general model, Wessells (1994) identified four successive steps, 
which are closely interacting throughout the whole process. The first step is the (1) definition 
of the problem, including a description of the starting situation or starting point and the target 
situation or end. Very often, this first step of problem finding is crucial to the success of the 
whole process; e.g. scientists spend a significant part of their time with formulating problems 
in order to design a well-formulated question (Klahr 2000). The second step involves the (2) 
setup of an adequate strategy, method, or plan. Apparently, individuals employ large numbers 
of different strategies, ranging from primitive methods, such as trial and error, to cleverly 
devised scientific methods. The third step, the (3) execution of the strategy is very often rather 
simple or trivial, as long as the problem solver is dealing with simple and well-defined 
problems. Poorly-defined problems often bear an inherent dynamic, hindering the use of fixed 
strategies and forcing individuals to deploy feedback loops. The fourth and last step consists 
in the (4) evaluation of the progress as to the target area or end. The decision has to be taken, 
whether the problem is solved or a progress has been achieved towards the target or not and, 
consequently, the current strategy should be retained or be adjusted. This is the most 
important loop position in the process, particularly in case of inappropriate strategies, which 
lead again to previous steps of the process (Wessells 1994).  
Terminologically, the whole thinking process outlined above will be called problem-solving 
in the broader sense, consisting of problem finding and problem-solving in the narrower 
sense. Evidently, the mental construction of a problem and the process of conceiving a 
solution to it - problem-solving in the narrower sense - are highly associated with each other 
and a lot of aspects can and should be mentioned in connection. Between problem finding and 
problem-solving a functional relationship exists and very often problem-solving efforts are 
dependent on problem finding efforts and vice versa. Furthermore, it has already been 
mentioned that in real terms there exists no clear-cut distinction between discrete stages, thus, 
neither for problem finding and problem-solving. In other words, it is difficult to establish a 
border between these two terms since they are highly interactive and share a lot of 
characteristics. Nevertheless, they are now briefly outlined independently, in order to provide 
the reader with a general notion of what is meant with the terms. 
The term of problem finding describes a family of behaviours and processes, among them 
problem construction, problem discovery, problem expression, problem posing, problem 
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definition, and problem identification, depending on the underlying notions of the particular 
model at hand (Runco 1994). Although there are many differences that could be thought of, 
they can all be seen as a process resulting in a problem to solve (Dillon 1982). Some authors 
remark that, according to the type of problem that is dealt with, it is not always appropriate to 
use the term of problem finding, for not only some solutions, but also problems in real-life are 
sometimes discovered serendipitously (Mednick 1962; Wolf and Larson 1981).  
However, most generally, problem finding involves recognising the problem existence, 
finding gaps, inconsistencies, or flaws with the current state. Arlin (1976) proposes three main 
elements that must be included in a definition of problem finding: (1) The existence of a 
problematic situation, (2) an opportunity for individuals to raise questions, and (3) a way of 
categorising the questions once they are raised. Sternberg (1985) devised a two level 
description of problem finding, starting with the discovery of a problem area or topic, which 
is followed by the structuring of the problem as preparation for solving efforts (Rossman 
1931; Sternberg 1985). Some authors suggest distinguishing problem finding, problem 
posing, and problem construction. Here, problem finding is the notice of something is not 
right, not good, or lacking; problem posing refers to the expression of such a situation; and 
finally, problem construction describes the development of a detailed problem representation 
(Lubart 2001). However, focussing on finding a problem, several experiments on syllogistic 
reasoning revealed that humans really base their behaviour rather on experiences and attitudes 
than on logical rules (see e.g. Frase 1968; Henle 1962). Even in the most extreme theoretical 
case, creation ex nihilo (creating something from nothing), the problem finding process does 
not arise in a vacuum, but rather operates on a kind of raw material: on knowledge.  
Accordingly, one option is to view this process as problem construction referring to a 
recursive memory search used to generate hypotheses that might account for, or structure the, 
available information. Subsequently, the adequacy of the problem construction is tested by the 
degree to which these hypotheses are consistent with available data (Mumford et al. 1991). In 
some way, problem constructions derive from knowledge obtained as part of prior problem-
solving efforts (which can be anything, not explicitly recognised as a problem-solving effort 
by the individual). Such a model clearly stresses the role of active, conscious information 
processing in problem-construction. Here, the terms of hypotheses and their testing suggest 
that problem constructions provide a plan or framework for solution generation and 
implementation (Mumford et al. 1994). Apparently, it should be easier to solve a problem if it 
is represented in such a way that the decisive operators can be deployed (Anderson 2001). 
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Expressed differently, some problem representations are better than others in the sense that 
they result in better or more rapid solutions (Hayes and Simon 1977).  
Research on the differences in efforts of experts and novices has revealed that one extremely 
important variable influencing the quality of available problem representations is expertise 
(see e.g. de Groot 1965; Kay 1994; Hayes and Simon 1977; Kotovsky et al. 1985; Simon and 
Hayes 1976). It is hypothesised that experts have more relevant representations available and 
their organisation is based on underlying principles, which seem to facilitate the selection of 
appropriate representations (Gick and Holoyak 1983). Irrespective of any qualitative aspect, it 
has already been hinted at the subjective nature of an individual’s knowledge; this is of 
particular importance in this regard since an individual subjectively constructs the problem at 
hand: Even in a presented problem situation people construct an idiosyncratic subjective view 
and do not all equally respond to the same stimulus (Kay 1994). In other words, the individual 
subjectively constructs his own problem space (his problem representation) offering him 
options from which he draws his actual behaviour (Newell and Simon 1972). At the latest by 
now, the reader should realise that this notion involves the subjective construction of reality, 
so controversially discussed in psychology and philosophy (see chapter II.A.1), and here 
named principle of cognitive creation.  
As already outlined in the basic model of human action in time, when an individual has come 
to a problem representation (through the process of cognitive creativity) his efforts are 
directed towards finding solutions; this is called problem-solving in the narrower sense. 
Research in that field of problem-solving (in the narrower sense) has identified a variety of 
possible strategies individuals apply to find a solution to the problem at hand. These could be 
defined as “[…] executive, higher-order processes that supervise other cognitive operations.” 
(Houtz 1994) Very often, strategies are attributed to experts who have specific ones since 
their application seems to be linked to expertise. Generally, the planning of an effective 
strategy requires the deployment of knowledge about task type or task environment and task 
difficulty, about probability of success, and about the characteristics of the problem solver 
(Wessells 1994). In this respect, it is important to distinguish between common strategies, 
which can be applied to all task environments, and specific strategies that only allow the 
problem solver to make progress in one or a limited number of specific task environments. 
However, due to the impressive number and variety of deployed strategies by adults in 
solving problems, only a few categories, which cannot be clearly distinguished and partially 
overlap, are identifiable.  
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A general classification, according to the degree of generality of the method of solution, could 
divide strategies in algorithms and heuristics: An algorithm is a method, which always solves 
one type of problems, even if the problem solver is not conscious of how the method 
functions. A correctly applied algorithm guarantees the correct answer. A heuristic resembles 
to a rule of thumb, which cannot ensure the correct solution of the problem. In games a good 
strategy never guarantees victory, the application can only increase the probability of a 
welcome outcome (Wessells 1994). Intuition already suggests that individuals rather apply 
heuristics in most real-world problem-solving.  
Being more specific, a huge number of problems, so called transformation problems (see 
Greeno 1978), consist of a starting or initial situation, a target, and a group of operations, 
which are used to arrive at the end starting from the initial situation. The heuristic of the 
means-ends analysis is then applied to identify the principal differences between the initial 
and the aspired situation as well as the actions or means, which reduce them. Such a 
differences-reducing strategy is very useful in solving ordinary problems, such as avoiding 
heat loss in the winter or the famous thinking task of the Tower of Hanoi (Newell and Simon 
1972). The means-ends analysis is only applicable if the problem has a clear defined end 
structure, which can e divided in sub-ends. Indeed, several studies suggest that subjects 
identify sub-ends and concentrate their resources on the gradual completion of those (see 
Egan and Greeno 1974; Simon 1979). It is assumed that one of the most significant 
advantages of such a strategy consists in reducing complexity: by defining sub-ends and by 
planning the means to complete them, an individual’s limited cognitive capacities can be 
considered and mistakes or inappropriate simplifications be avoided (Wessells 1994). 
However, searching activities have found to be the dominant aspect of problem-solving (in 
the narrower sense). For instance, in executing a means-ends analysis the individual searches 
for the optimal procedure in order to reduce the discrepancy between the current and the 
desired state (Wessells 1994). Searching and planning usually go along hand-in-hand, because 
planning includes a choice between options, which have been identified by a previous search 
for alternatives. Thus, a good method to improve planning and problem-solving capabilities is 
to learn, how to search explicitly and thoroughly.  
Again, it is quite apparent that there exists an almost innumerable variety of conceivable 
searching strategies. However, research on this topic has been able to identify some common 
searching strategies often used by subjects in laboratory thinking tasks, for example the 
strategy of generating and testing of solution, analogy thinking, or constructive search (see for 
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instance Anderson 2001; Eysenck and Keane 2000; Greeno 1978; Sternberg 1977; Wessels 
1994). The reader might have already realised that the conception of thinking as problem-
solving highly resembles to the model of human action in time. Figure 10 is supposed to 
underline this high degree of similarity.  
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Basis for Action
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Action
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Figure 10 Problem-Solving and Human Action in Time. 
The approaches differ in that problem-solving models are more precise in distinguishing 
between finding a problem and finding appropriate solutions or reactions to it. The model of 
human action in time embraces these aspects in the mental situation, containing the problem 
to solve and possible actions to be taken. However, drawing on the similarity it can be argued 
that the central topic of the present work can be seen in the cognitive processes leading to a 
problem representation and the respective solutions or options of actions. Therefore, the 
following paragraphs are dedicated to the nature of such problems and subjective 
representations. 
In relevant literature there is no agreement as to the nature of a problem: Some researchers 
regard it as an obstacle (Runco 1994) or just trouble (Hill 1988); again others see a problem 
equal to a challenge (Runco 1994). However, in the broadest terms, a problem is a gap, an 
inconsistency, or a flaw an individual recognises in the current state and wants to be 
transformed into a workable problem (Henle 1974; Runco and Dow 1999). In other words, 
“[t]he term problem is conceived broadly as any task that an individual seeks to accomplish. 
Thus, artists who seek to express their feelings, scientists who seek to understand a complex 
phenomenon, and people who seek to solve conflicts in their everyday lives are all considered 
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to be engaged in problem-solving.” (Styles 2005, p. 297; see also McClelland 1965) 
Assuming this broad view of problem-solving on thinking, the problem represents the 
interface between the two basic processes of problem finding and problem-solving: The 
output of the problem finding process is the problem, which serves as input for the subsequent 
problem-solving process.  
The question is now, which prerequisites must be fulfilled so that it can be said an individual 
faces a problem? What must be included in the constructed mental model or integrated set of 
hypotheses describing the problem, allowing individuals to structure ill-defined or novel 
situations finally leading to the generation of viable problem solutions? These specific mental 
models are called problem representations: To have a problem in this sense implies (at least) 
that crucial information about the situation is given to the problem solver; this means an 
individual comes to a subjective internal representation of this situation in the external world 
in mind. In other words, a problem representation is an ad hoc-category constructed to capture 
the central features of the present situation in comparison to prior problem-solving efforts 
(Holoyak 1984).  
In general, insights from research in cognitive psychology on other (general) knowledge 
structures can be (at least) partially transferred to problem representations (Hogarth 1980). 
Nevertheless, it is subject to discussion, which information must be included in such workable 
problem representations or mental situations, on which subsequent thinking efforts can be 
based. For instance, Newell and Simon (1972) assume in their path-breaking work on 
problem-solving that it comprehends (1) information about what is desired, (2) under which 
conditions, (3) by means of what tools and operations, (4) starting with what initial 
information, (5) and with access to what resources (Newell and Simon 1972). According to 
Holyoak (1984), these representations include information about (1) important diagnostic 
facts, (2) goals, (3) procedures used in problem-solving, and (4) constraints or restrictions on 
the problem solution. Similarly, Mumford et al. (1991) distinguish between (1) goals, (2) 
constraints, (3) outcomes, (4) key steps in solution, and (5) essential declarative information. 
However, it should be mentioned that individuals use these representational elements in a 
flexible, dynamic manner as they attempt to structure and solve novel, ill-defined problems 
(Novick 1990; Reeves and Weisburg 1994).  
Irrespective of a particular configuration of aspects that are necessary for a complete problem 
representation, two main issues should be underlined for the purpose of the present work: 
Firstly, researchers in the field of cognitive psychology focus on types of information and not 
Human Thinking 
 91
on particular information included, which avoids the ontological and epistemological 
problems in a constructivist paradigm by targeting general characteristic of situations that can 
be regarded invariant. Secondly, the term of problem is used in a wider sense than it might 
suggest in a first moment since it is a complete account including means and ends to achieve 
the former in a given situation.. 
While former efforts to explain problem representations hypothesised that an analogous 
problem representation from a previous situation is selected and then used to define the 
problem and to structure the ill-defined domain, recent, more realistic research argues that 
people may instead apply them in a more flexible manner focussing on different components 
of various extant problem representations. Thus, a subject might apply a representation based 
solely on similarity in key operations or procedures used in solving the problem, rather than 
overall analogical similarity involving key objects or information (Novick 1990). Thus, it 
seems to be more realistic to assume that individuals deal with a set of representations, which 
is pertinent to a given problem situation. This is what Newell and Simon (1972) called the 
problem space. These multiple problem representations are likely to be organised based on 
substantive similarity and associational networks. If it is assumed that problem 
representations are used flexibly this might also imply that stimuli activate multiple problem 
representations, even in new or unfamiliar domains.  
However, a more detailed discussion of the cognitive processes at work is presented in 
chapter IV.C.1 At this point, the processes to gain separate representations for specific cases 
of problems are ignored and rather archetypical taxonomies for larger classes of problems 
introduced. However, the problem finding or problem-construction process’ importance for 
the whole problem-solving effort is not similar in all situations an human being is facing; it 
rather depends on the type of situation the individual is confronted with in its task (or in real 
life). To distinguish between such situations, and also to clarify the impact of the problem-
construction effort, several taxonomies of problems or problem situations have been 
introduced.  
Most generally, different problems could be seen as different kinds of gaps identified by 
individuals, which lead to question raising, evidently fundamental questions. Such a 
classification could be done according to size, to their location within a realm of the 
unknown, or to attractiveness (Henle 1974). However, during the last years some agreement 
has arisen as to problem taxonomies accounting for typical differences in problem situations. 
Consequently, a lot of such taxonomies according to the complexity of the task have been 
Human Thinking 
 92 
introduced, which are quite similar, at least in their underlying notions: Sternberg (1982) 
introduced the terms of well-defined and ill-defined problem spaces, building on the notion of 
the problem space, the extrinsic task environment in which mental processes take place 
(Newell and Simon 1972). Accordingly, a broad classification of problems would distinguish 
between well-defined and ill- or poorly-defined problems. A well-defined problem has an 
identifiable starting point and an unambiguous end. Contrary, a poorly-defined problem has 
neither a clear starting point nor a target area. A good example for the latter kind of problems 
are all creative tasks, which cannot be measured by normed instruments and, thus, success in 
solving the problem is extraordinary difficult to evaluate (Wessells 1994).  
If the mentioned distinction is seen as a dichotomy put on a continuum, the two extremes 
would be a presented-problem situation in well-defined settings and a problem finding 
situation in ill-defined settings. This approach is based on Wertheimer (1945) and Getzels 
(1964), who distinguished between presented problem situations and discovered problem 
situations. In the former case, only a problem-solving thought process (in the narrower sense) 
is required. Furthermore, in this extreme case there already exists a recognised solution and a 
specific method to obtain it. This was also described by Wertheimer (1959), who understood a 
presented problem as a problem solved by recall or mechanical thinking, i.e. by standard 
procedures. In the latter case of problem finding situation, the formulation of a problem prior 
to actions has to be realised. There exists no known formulation and no consistent or 
recognised method of solution. This means that method and solution are highly shaped by the 
initial parameters set by the individual during the problem formulation (Sobotnik and Moore 
1988).  
These two extremes open a range in between numerous possibilities can exist. This distinction 
could be seen analogous to the distinction Hesse (1990) makes in his model between rather 
mechanical thinking efforts and conscious, reflective ones, which - from this perspective - are 
induced by the necessity to structure the problem situation at hand. However, Frederiksen 
(1984) recapitulated the dichotomy of well and ill-defined problem situations, describing the 
former as those, which are clearly formulated and having a known algorithm of solution, and 
criteria available for testing the solution, while the latter are assumed to miss all these 
variables. Yet another classification distinguishes between situations of problem identification 
and problem finding (Runco and Okuda 1988). The former term refers to ideational 
productivity in the process what is here called problem construction, but the problem 
definition is already presented to the individual. The latter case describes a situation, in which 
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both ideational productivity and the ability to define a workable task in subsequent problem-
solving efforts are necessary (Runco and Okuda 1988).  
In addition, Dillon (1982) identified three problem types or situations based on the problem 
discovering task and the materials used to elicit inquiry strategies: (1) potential problems 
raised by individuals from non-problematic materials, (2) implicit problems, embedded in 
problematic situations, and (3) evident problems presented to individuals (in particular by 
researchers to provoke a problematic response). The noteworthy aspect of his account is that 
Dillon suggests a dynamic notion, assuming that problems develop from unformed to formed 
along a continuum. The fully unformed problem must be found in order to be formed: All 
problem-solving efforts start from this point of formed condition (Dillon 1982). By now, it 
should be clear that the placement on such scales or dichotomies is highly subjective since 
individuals have different background knowledge and experience, similar to aspects such as 
knowledge.  
An often cited classification, which is presented here in some more detail since it accounts for 
most of the mentioned aspects, in particular the subjective nature of problem representations, 
has been developed by Getzels and Csikszentmihalyi (1976). In their approach it is 
emphasised that, while all problem situations are similar in that they involve the same 
elements (formulation of problem, adoption of a method of solution, and reaching of 
solution), they differ in the circumstance that the individual confronted with a problem has to 
discover or construct these structural elements, or simply adopt already available ones. In this 
concept, three types of problems can be defined: (1) presented problems, (2) discovered 
problems, and (3) created problems. A problem is considered to be presented if its salient 
characteristics are defined by others. It is referred to a discovered problem, if it is derived 
from information presented to an individual. Finally, if an individual generates a problem, 
where none has existed before and it defines the nature of the problem and pertinent 
information, it is called a created problem (Dillon 1982). Therefore, the additional aspect that 
the problem situation might be inter-subjectively new or only subjectively new to the 
individual at hand is included; it is important to note that this exactly corresponds to the 
subjective nature emphasised in chapter II.B.2.  
Consequently, regarding this subjective nature such approaches have in common that “[…] 
the creative process is seen as a response to a problematic situation. Therefore the main 
elements of creativity, as of other problem situations, are the formulation of a problem, the 
adoption of a method of solution, and the reaching of a solution. But while all problem 
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situations are similar in that these three structural elements are present, they differ from one 
another depending on whether the person confronted with the problem has to discover a 
formulation, a method, and a correct solution, or simply adopt already available formulation, 
method, and a correct solution, or simply adopt already available formulations, methods, and 
solutions.“ (Getzels and Csikszentmihalyi 1976, p. 79) 
 Problem Method of Solution Solution 
Problem 
Situation 
Others Individuals Others Individuals Others Individuals 
Cognitive 
Functions 
Primarily 
Engaged 
Type-case 1 + + + + + - Memory 
Type-case 2 + + + - + - Reason 
Type-case 3 - - - - - - Imagination 
Note: + known; - unknown      
Figure 11 Types of Problem Situations and Cognitive Functions (Getzels and Csikszentmihalyi (1976), p. 
80). 
The classification of Getzels and Csikszentmihalyi (1976) is depicted in Figure 11. On the 
one hand, at on extreme, there are presented problem situations in which the problem has a 
known formulation, a routine method of solution, and a recognised solution; individuals only 
need to follow established steps for reaching the solution in the situation (type-case 1). On the 
other hand, at the other extreme, there are discovered problem situations in which the problem 
does not yet has a known formulation, a routine method of solution, or a recognised solution; 
individuals must find the problem and the requirements for satisfying the situation’s 
requirements themselves (type-case 3). Individuals have no chance to find any hint from 
others; they must become problem finders before becoming a problem solver: They must pose 
the problem before directing attention to a way to solve it and thus, reaching the solution 
(Getzels and Csikszentmihalyi 1976). The interesting point about this latter situation is that 
the individual cannot know whether the solution is right or wrong since he himself formulated 
the problem; accordingly, assuming a constructivist position, the solution can only be 
accepted or rejected on the basis of a critical, relativistic analysis (Getzels and 
Csikszentmihalyi 1976). These two extremes mark the range in which a number of problem 
situations could be systematically assigned to, according to what is known and unknown. In-
between, type-case 2 differs from type-case 1 in that only the problem is given from an 
individual’s perspective: Although others are aware of all three aspects of the situation, the 
individual has to find a method of solution and the solution itself.  
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Further to these general considerations, the corresponding typical mental processes can be 
inferred for each situation, indicating the typical degree of creativity involved. The 
differentiation between the individual at hand and others is included in order to show, whether 
a particular individual in a particular problem situation is simply unaware of the problem, the 
solution, or the method that are known to others, or whether these generally do not exist yet.  
The outlined problem situations already point out that the extent, to which an individual must 
dedicate efforts to problem finding before starting problem-solving (in the narrower sense), 
highly depends on the type of problem situation and highly influences the degree of creativity 
involved in the task. Consequently, the notion of problem finding is directly linked to the 
problem situation at hand. Furthermore, a lot of researchers on creativity have adopted a 
problem-solving perspective on thinking and intended to explain creative outcomes of 
thinking through problem finding efforts. Some even draw on such taxonomies to distinguish 
between problem-solving situations (in the narrower sense) and situations in which creative 
thought is required. In the latter case the individual must necessarily set the parameters for the 
following problem-solving efforts on its own. As this research focussing on the role of 
problem finding in creative thinking suggests, irrespective of a specific classification problem 
finding becomes a more important determinant of performance as the degree of a priori 
structuring decreases: “In other words, problem construction has a particularly important 
influence on creative problem solving in ill-defined domains, where the pertinent goals, 
pertinent parameters, requisite information, and available solution strategies are unknown or 
poorly articulated.” (Mumford et al. 1994, pp. 8-9; see also Anderson 1985; Getzels and 
Csikszentmihalyi 1976; Okuda et al. 1991)  
It should be kept in mind that the problem situations mentioned so far are of rather conceptual 
nature. It has been found that there is only a low correlation between creative performance 
solving traditional (rather artificial) problems (e.g. the Tower of Hanoi problem) and real-
world problems (Okuda et al. 1991). Therefore, they should be seen as what they are: A 
means to structure the innumerable variety of possible situations in real word that require 
human reasoning; nothing more and nothing less.  
More scientific approaches, aiming at thoroughly investigating the two central cognitive 
elements, should not be content with a problem-solving perspective. Efforts to explain 
cognitive processing and knowledge representation have adopted a particular view on 
‘technically’ conceptualizing human cognition: human thinking as information processing. 
Hence, the following considerations are dedicated to a brief outline of this predominant 
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paradigm in contemporary research on cognitive psychology. It will provide the basic 
instruments for investigating opportunity recognition in the present work. Further to this, the 
author is convinced that a scientific work that assumes a constructivist approach, like the 
present, must clarify which perspective is taken, because there is more than just one accurate 
or correct way to look at a phenomenon even within one scientific discipline, respectively 
such perspective cannot even exist. This holds also true for psychology, a progressing science, 
in which many important questions not even have been asked so far, let alone been answered. 
In such a field, where there exist hardly ignored facts and agreed-upon theories it is important 
to consider the advantages as well as disadvantages of the perspective chosen. Therefore, and 
not surprisingly, in psychological research such different paradigms seem to exist (Lachmann 
et al. 1979). 
 
3. Information Processing  
The reason why the information processing paradigm (IPP) is chosen is quite simple and can 
be best expressed by a citation from the introduction of one of the most popular textbooks on 
cognition: “We have written this book from the point of view of one particular paradigm: 
information processing. We do not argue that it is the right way to understand and explain 
human mental processes, but we believe that it is at the present time the most comprehensive 
and comprehensible way.” (Lachmann et al. 1979, p. 33) In order to provide the reader with 
an overview on the IPP, it is hereafter briefly defined what a paradigm is. Then, developments 
in psychology and other disciplines towards an information processing paradigm (IPP) in 
cognitive psychology are presented along the typical dimensions of a paradigm, and, finally, 
the paradigm and its fundaments discussed. 
The way research is done by researchers can be described by looking at the rational and 
conventual rules guiding such research. Each scientific research effort follows certain 
procedures that only just qualify it as science. These rules are well known and publicised and 
constitute the scientific method that Popper called rules of the game (Popper 1935). The 
rational rules of science are commonly shared by most disciplines. But every scientist uses a 
second set of rules which is conventional in the sense that several or many scientists agree 
that they are appropriate. Every science has such conventional rules, but they are not the same 
and differ from one scientific discipline to another. Even scholars within a discipline may 
direct their scientific actions according to different conventional rules. From this point of 
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view, a scientific paradigm exists when a group of scientists share essentially the same 
conventional guidelines for formulating research questions and structuring experiments to 
answer them (Lachmann et al. 1979). The reason why this is presented here is that it has to be 
pointed out, which premises underlie the study of the phenomenon in question, the 
recognition of entrepreneurial opportunities, and that there exist not only different approaches 
from different disciplines to study it, but also within a cognitive psychological perspective.  
Generally, the question rational rules can answer is that of the distinction between science as 
an human institution making claims about human nature, and other such human institutions 
like religion, art, poetry, political ideology, etc. Basically, there exist at least two fundamental 
differences between scientific methods for the study of mankind and non-scientific methods: 
Science is the only institution whose ultimate objective is obtaining knowledge for its own 
sake. It is not prescribed what the truth is, while religion for example, claims a truth that is 
offered as foundation for prescribing moral rights and wrongs. Science’s rational component 
explicitly precludes the translation of any of its discoveries into prescriptions on the right 
thing to do. Secondly, whether a theory is to be verified or falsified, the rational component of 
science always demands that scientific beliefs at some point are tested against observable 
evidence. That means that in principle, science has no axioms that are sacred and invulnerable 
to observational test (Popper 1935; Rosenberg 2000).  
While rational rules have a more prescriptive character, some rules are more descriptive: 
conventional rules. This term was introduced by Popper, who regarded methodological rules 
of science as conventions (Popper 1935). For instance, the canonical, rule-governed 
component of scientific methods requires that hypothetical accounts of natural-system 
properties are tested by observation; however, empirical support is a complex and 
controversial subject. As indicated, the rational rules rather provide hints as to how observe 
than as to what to observe. The selection decision has to be based on other resources; very 
often it is the collective wisdom of other researchers in the field (Lachmann et al. 1979). This 
collective wisdom consists of previous findings and observations, but also, and equally 
important, on assumptions. Such assumptions might have been indirectly supported, and 
many scientists in the relevant field might be convinced of their validity, but they have never 
been validated empirically. In other words, they are rather intuitive commitments of scientists 
in the field that are not really open to empirical falsification (Flach and Bennett 1996). Even 
interpretations that are made of experimental data are also influenced by such collective 
wisdom. Very often interpretations are made without empirical justification:  
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In psychology for instance, for decades theories on complex human learning have invoked the 
data of rat experiments, without knowing whether both behaviours are subject to the same 
basic processes (Lachmann et al. 1979). The point is that in competing paradigmatic views 
not the data is subject to disagreement but its interpretation, respectively its meaning. 
Apparently, such paradigms are extremely important to understand research done since facts 
do usually not speak for themselves.xi One of the first who introduced a systematic treatment 
of developments in research and science was Thomas Kuhn (1962).  
Kuhn’s approach to the growth of scientific knowledge and the relation to the previously 
dominant conception of an accumulation model will not be discussed in detail. It seems more 
sensible to discuss his model of a paradigm: To him, a paradigm includes the intellectual 
commitments and beliefs of a community of like-minded scientists. It provides problems to 
the community and defines the domain of acceptable solutions, thereby representing the tacit 
commitments to a conception of reality that cannot be defended on rational or canonical 
grounds. His approach to scientific discovery challenged the previous notion of an absolutely 
rational, thoroughly cumulative and unequivocally objective process. Instead he emphasised 
the importance of consensual judgements in determining what appears to be rational, 
objective, and worth cumulating (Machamer 2002). Probably, a paradigm can be best defined 
by the original definition of Kuhn himself: “[A paradigm] functions by telling the scientist 
about the entities that nature does and does not contain and about the ways in which those 
entities behave. That information provides a map whose details are elucidated by mature 
scientific research. And since nature is too complex and varied to be explored at random, that 
map is as essential as observation and experiment to science's continuing development. [...] 
[Furthermore] paradigms provide scientists not only with a map but also with some of the 
directions essential for map making. In learning a paradigm the scientist acquires theory, 
methods, and standards together, usually in an inextricable mixture.” (Kuhn 1962, p. 109)  
Further, scientists communicate frequently and are aware of and cite on another’s research, 
further enhancing this process. However, a possible distinction between paradigms within a 
science proposed by Lachmann et al. (1979) might consider differences in (1) intellectual 
antecedents, (2) pretheoretical ideas, (3) subject matter, (4) concept and language of those 
who adhere to it, (5) preferred analogies, or (6) methods and procedures typically employed. 
It should be kept in mind that these aspects or dimensions are treated separately for analytical 
purposes; in fact, they are closely intertwined and each involves the others. However, 
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competing paradigms in a field differ in several ways, although it might be that they only 
differ in only two or three dimension. 
Kuhn’s model has been critiqued harshly, mainly by other philosophers of science (e.g. 
Lakatos 1970; Popper 1970). Further, the concept of paradigm has been rejected and other 
suggestions have been made, such as research programs (Lakatos 1970), disciplines (Toulmin 
1972) or domains (Shapere 1977). Nevertheless, the concept of paradigm will be used to 
signalise which basic conjectures are underlying the following chapters and empirical 
research done; this seems particularly important since the present work is about a 
phenomenon usually treated by economists, who are not necessarily familiar with the basics 
of cognitive psychology. In addition, the discipline of cognitive psychology, facing the 
challenging task of opening the black box of the human mind after a behaviourism-dominated 
era in its field, is still mainly occupied with the exploration of unknown fields, i.e. basic 
research. However, the following paragraph is dedicated to the information processing 
paradigm that is present along a paradigm’s dimensions as mentioned above.  
The nature of a science at any given point in time is comprehensible in the context of its 
intellectual antecedents.xii These antecedents, which shape a scientist’s beliefs about his work, 
can be historic or contemporary. They could be regarded as sources for the scientific work 
within a paradigm, and are often from another discipline. It is important to emphasise that this 
issue is a double-edged sword: Kuhn stressed the discontinuous character of revolutionary 
changes in a discipline (Kuhn 1962), while other philosophers of science highlighted the 
aspect of continuity (see for an overview Bechtel 1988; Machamer 2002). Generally speaking, 
a paradigmatic change has several phases and aspects (as can be seen in the distinction of the 
different dimensions) and does not always follow the same modus operandi. Like in almost 
any process of change a dichotomy with one end of gradual change and the other of radical or 
revolutionary change can be identified (Bechtel 1988). Sources of continuity are for instance 
methodological preferences that prevail within a discipline independent of the paradigm, the 
training of scientists, who might have shifted to the new approach but still have a fundamental 
interest on a particular topic, and, finally, some well-established facts, laws, and theories 
existing in a discipline that are commonly accepted and survive a paradigm shift (Lachmann 
et al. 1979).  
Several fields of psychology have contributed to the IPP’s fundaments, but it was foremost 
Neobehaviourism who shaped its form: Many methodological principles were adopted from 
this stream in the information processing account of cognitive psychology, e.g. the goal of 
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attaining nomothetic explanations, i.e. searching for universal theories, or empiricism as its 
method of proof. Simultaneously, the IPP does reject several fundaments of 
Neobehaviourism, in particular animal data as a source of basic principles, learning as the 
central psychological problem, and logical positivism (Lachmann et al. 1979). The stream of 
Verbal Learning shares many pre-theoretical ideals with Neobehaviourism. Nevertheless, it 
should be treated differently since it was functionalistic, i.e. comparing mental states to the 
functional or logical states of a computer (Putnam 1960), producing few major theories (see 
for an overview Cofer and Musgrave 1961).  
Already during World War II new views of the human being appeared, often related to the 
term of human engineering since the behaviouristic psychology was not really useful in 
organising military action. Instead, in military psychology the human was conceptualised as 
an information transmitter, moving the focus of attention to the problems of attention and 
perception (Chapanis et al. 1947; see for an overview Nemeth and Nemeth 2000). In human 
engineering, the theory of signal detection was developed to separate perceptual ability from 
decision making, a further emphasis of this stream, which is still popular in contemporary 
cognitive psychology (Craik and Lockhart 1972; Lockhart and Murdock 1970; Shettleworth 
1998). Hence, information processing in psychology transferred many aspects from human 
engineering to its field, amongst them the view of man as an information transmitter and 
decision maker, the idea that the capacity of information that can be transmitted is limited, the 
theory of signal detectability and an increased access to the concepts of the physical sciences 
(Lachmann et al. 1979). 
However, not only psychology-related fields contributed to the development of the IPP, others 
were influential as well; for instance, communications engineering, which has the aim at 
developing general principles applicable to any communication system. However, although 
these principles are principally designed to describe artefacts like telephones or the Internet, 
they can be transferred to humans if these are understood as ‘communication channels’. 
Exactly this metaphor was used by early cognitive psychologists (see Shannon 1948), thereby 
importing terms and concepts as coding, channel capacity, serial and parallel processing, 
efficiency, uncertainty, and information into psychology. Many psychologists recognised that 
information theory, originally developed in communications engineering (Manktelow 1999), 
provided rich insights into psychological questions, even though it was developed to explain 
man-made physical systems such as the Internet, rather than a biological system like man 
himself (Johnson and Proctor 2004; Pierce 1980).  
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The influence of linguistics is somewhat different from that of the other non-psychological 
disciplines since it deals with the same phenomenon like some psychologists: human 
language. However, it is subject to discussion whether or to what extent linguistics and 
psychology are epistemologically distinct (Antony 2003). In spite of that, linguistics strictly 
maintained that behaviouristic psychology underrated the novelty, productivity, and 
complexity of human language use, and that its structured nature is thereby totally ignored. 
Consequently, actual speech behaviour was deemphasised and instead the underlying 
competence of applying specific rules in mind emphasised; in fact, almost each pre-theoretical 
idea of behaviourism was challenged (Davitt 2003; Laurence 2003).  
The clash culminated in the influential review of Noam Chomsky (1959) on Skinner’s book 
‘Verbal Learning’ (1957). In this work, Skinner had attempted to turn a few simple principles 
of learning and reinforcement into a complete account of how people acquire and use 
language (Skinner 1957). Chomsky’s review was actually an attack on all stimulus-response 
accounts of language. Particularly, Skinner’s and general behaviourist’s believe in 
explanation by extrapolation of simple principles identified in the laboratory was attacked. It 
was argued that while such an approach appears scientific, these conceptualisations were 
more carelessly mentalistic than those of the traditional (linguistic) approach (Lachmann et al. 
1979). The dispute ended about ten years later with the emergence of a new field called 
psycholinguistics, which shares much with the information processing approach to cognitive 
psychology. Here, language is regarded as a product of the human mind as a rule-governed, 
abstract system that is investigated with the sentence as main unit of analysis (Field 2003).  
The intimate relationship between computer science and contemporary cognitive psychology 
justifies the treatment of computer science’s role, particularly since both are derived from 
seminal works in mathematics that occurred during the first half of the twentieth century. 
Further, both are centrally concerned with the nature of intelligent behaviour. The importance 
of computer science is still evident in the research stream of cognitive science, focussing on 
cognitive computing and artificial intelligence (Eysenck and Keane 2000). However, 
computer science itself cannot be considered a homogeneous field; it is rather a variety of 
loosely related subspecialties, such as algorithm theory, numerical methods, automata theory, 
programming languages, and artificial intelligence (Reilly 2004). Historically, in the 1960s 
researchers began to deal with intelligent behaviour beyond in terms of measurement; for 
instance, they suggested that humans use different strategies that can be conceptualised as 
plans (Miller et al. 1960). Already about 100 years ago, issues were raised in 
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metamathematics concerning the related problems of computability and proof (Kleene 1952). 
In order to solve these problems, mathematical systems, conceived as symbol-manipulating 
systems, were developed that were able to perform any fully specified logical or mathematical 
procedure with only very few properties and capabilities (Voss 1995). In this context the main 
intention of researchers in relation to the psychology was to develop such mathematics-based 
computer systems that imitate or simulate human behaviour and the underlying cognitive 
processes (Wessells 1994).  
Based on this notion, Newell and Simon were the first to express the critical insight that the 
mind might be considered as such a general symbol-manipulating system (Newell and Simon 
1972). According to this view, some mental processes can be described in the precise, 
concrete, and objective terms of mathematical logic rather than by intangible abstractions 
(Lachmann et al. 1979). This metatheoretic view has met with general approval. But 
psychologists differ in the degree to which the formal concepts of general-purpose symbol-
manipulating systems can be used as analogy to the human mind (see for a philosophical 
discussion Voss 1995 or chapter III.B.1). But notwithstanding that several aspects of the 
human mind, in particular creativity, cannot be kept with the formal-analytic approach, even 
those who work with a rather loose analogy between human information processors and 
computer programs note important similarities, like the generality of purpose, which means a 
computer can follow any instruction put in proper symbolic form (Lachmann et al. 1979). 
Often strongly shaped by these direct intellectual antecedents, scientists base their work on 
certain conjectures and tacit beliefs about the nature of the reality under investigation, which 
could be called pretheoretical ideas or a general axiomatic. These have a significant impact on 
research and aid in the formulation of experimental questions (Rosenberg 2000). In this 
regard, it is not of importance whether these ideas are verified later on since they always serve 
as a kind of guide to the researcher, as conventional. Often, pre-theoretical ideas also 
influence the definition of the subject matter by suggesting what are (and what are not), 
instances of the phenomena he intends to study. The set of beliefs in the IPP, what might be 
called an ideology, rests on the view that human beings in certain cognitive tasks act like an 
information processing system (IPS) (Valsiner and Leung 1994).  
This central conjecture in the IPP is an illuminating example for the observation that 
researchers, when beginning to pay attention to a phenomenon about which little is known, 
often tend to borrow principles from more advanced areas; these can guide their research and 
help to gain an overview of the ill-structured (new) domain (Bailer-Jones 2002). For example, 
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consider the influence Darwin’s evolutionary view had on a lot of other disciplines, such as 
philosophy of science or economics (see for an overview Oldroyd and Langham 1983). This 
dimension of analogies is closely related to pre-theoretical ideas but not necessarily the same. 
However, for the IPP, the computer analogy, quite palpable in the conception of the human 
mind as information processing system, is more than just a metaphor since the human 
properties that involve symbol manipulation can be regarded as instances of the same 
theoretical abstraction that is used as the conceptual prototype for computers (Parkin 2000).  
Nevertheless, some psychologists view their theorising as analogical rather than 
instantiational. However, research and theory are mainly guided by the computer analogy 
since the function of the mind is comparable to some function of computer programs 
(Lachmann et al. 1979). Accordingly, research in the IPP, as outlined sharing a basic set of 
assumptions (Beilin 1983), could be distinguished according to its relation to the computer 
analogy: rather structural theories adhere to its principles (for example Newell and Simon 
1972), while others are rather functional and merely influenced by this particular view. It 
should be apparent that the present work, accounting for the creative element of human 
subjective perception expressed by the principle of cognitive creation, ought to be counted to 
the latter kind,  
However, based on its central assumptions, the IPP approaches its subject matter, a term 
which refers to the questions for which answers are desired; i.e. could be called the “starting 
point” for studying something (Pronko 1952). Generally, within a paradigm those questions 
are asked, which seem to promise the most complete account of the system under study; 
nevertheless, researchers attribute different importance to a certain aspect: In psychology for 
instance, the natural system as object of investigation is the behaviour of living creatures 
(Lachmann et al. 1979). As to human beings, the subject matter of psychology could be 
regarded as, “[…] man qua man, his powers, operations, nature.” (Adler 1995, p. 82) 
However, some researchers believe that the most important aspect is their personality and 
prefer to study individual differences. Others might ignore individual differences and are 
interested in typical performance, for example those, who believe that learning is the most 
fundamental characteristic of livings. At the highest level of abstraction, the subject matter in 
the IPP of cognitive psychology is man’s mental processes. Its basic mental capabilities are 
attention, perception, abstraction, problem-solving, learning, memory, and language. 
Nevertheless, there is little agreement in the scientific community as to which of these are the 
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more basic processes and it has been concentrated in varying degrees on all of them 
(Lachmann et al. 1979). 
Having assumed a perspective on a phenomenon, scientists agree on a terminology that is 
often to a certain extent - similar to analogies transferred - borrowed from other disciplines. 
Indeed, there is an intersection between the new terms for concepts and data peculiar to a 
paradigm and others. In particular computer science has contributed a variety of expressions 
to the terminology of information processing psychology (Lachmann et al. 1979). Anyway, 
typically there also exists a unique set of terms of a paradigm. Nevertheless, it might be 
objected that such differences are only semantic. Notwithstanding, some central terms ought 
to be introduced in the different context of the IPP and its main predecessor behaviourism 
since their meaning has changed significantly as to the underlying beliefs and basic properties 
(Lachmann et al. 1979).  
In order to provide a brief overview, it seems to be most fruitful to name such terms, which 
are frequently used by other paradigms in psychology, but usually have a somewhat different 
meaning in the IPP: to begin with, stimulus and response - crucial terms in the behaviouristic 
paradigm - are here merely laboratory terms, defining laboratory operations. A stimulus is 
whatever is presented to a subject in an experiment, and its response is whatever is done that 
can be measured. In the IPP the terms of input and output are usually used for this purpose 
(see Parducci and Saris 1984). Another important term in behaviourism with another meaning 
is the ‘association’: The term had a restricted meaning in the sense that it was the init formed 
by conditioning, being an automatic process that requires contiguity between environmental 
events. In the IPP, ‘to associate’ means to know what objects or events have to do with one 
another and can occur totally within the mind of the thinker (Collins and Quillian 1972).  
Finally turning direction to the conventional rules in a discipline, this term refers too 
researchers’ preferences for particular experimental designs or dependent variables, etc. 
(Proctor and Vu 2003). This point is of particular interest in the IPP since behaviourists have 
never really neglected the importance of mental operations, but rather doubted the 
methodological aspect of investigating it. Along these lines, researchers in the IPP are 
indebted to develop and implement research methods that allow for explanations of mental 
computing and mental states of the human mind. Such inferences to underlying mental 
processing mechanisms in the IPP are generally made by designing and executing multiple 
experiments and by using convergent validation techniques (that provide information on the 
correspondence on measures designed to investigate the same construct) (Lachmann et al. 
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1979). This technique is applied if the phenomenon under investigation cannot be directly 
observed and instead only observations can be made that place constraint on the possible 
workings of the mind.xiii In this case, interlocking inferences permit construction of valid, 
factual statements about the unobservable properties. In other words, data of several different 
kinds converge on a conclusion (see for instance the seminal work of Garner et al. 1956). 
Furthermore, various techniques are employed to decouple cognitive processes from their 
natural system in order to assess their unique function since in the IPP the human mind is 
considered to be a complex system, which parts work in concert.  
However, the ambitious goal of cognitivism to overcome the ‘black box’ assumed by 
behaviourism has led to the application of sophisticated methodological devices within the 
IPP: For example, researcher distinguish separate segments of time between a stimulus and a 
response executing Sternberg’s additive factor method (Sternberg 1969) or Donder’s 
subtraction method backward masking, and mathematical models (Massaro and Cowan 1993). 
Nevertheless, others doubt this approach and conceptualise mental process more weakly as 
intervening variables. In this view, information processing is purely pragmatic in allowing 
descriptive and predescriptive accounts (Van der Heijden and Stebbins 1990). Consequently, 
according to their view, the only reasonable goal is to describe differences in an individual’s 
behaviour as a function of differences in external and/or internal conditions (Hatfield 1991).  
Even though many differences exist between cognitive and behaviourist methods, the latter’s 
experimental paradigm has been kept to a high extent (see also Massaro and Cowan 1993). 
Intuitively, this could be attributed to the difficulty of directly observing such information 
processing in the human mind at work. However, contemporary researchers in the IPP 
typically use behavioural or psychophysiological methods, emphasising chronometric 
measures (Proctor and Vu 2003). In a different approach, the model of verbalisation of 
thoughts claims that subjects express their thoughts as these enter attention under a concurrent 
verbalisation instruction, often called ‘think aloud’. Such dense records of the subject’s 
solution process - called ‘verbal protocols’ - provide information to investigate the contents of 
information accessed from long-term memory, which would not correspond to perceptually 
available information (Ericsson and Simon 1984). Studies have shown that there is a good 
correspondence between sequences of intermediates steps identified by the task analysis and 
steps inferred from verbal reports and eye fixations there is a good correspondence (Ericsson 
and Hastie 1994).  
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This should have made clear that within such a paradigm different streams have formed 
taking different assumptions or having different emphasis of their study. However, most 
contemporary empirical research on thinking tasks stands out that disagreements between 
models and theories only consist in competing claims about the sub-stage structure of the 
modal strategies, as well as about details of processing within stages or states, while the basic 
conjectures are almost universally accepted (Ericsson and Hastie 1994). Seizing this, two 
major streams can be identified: Firstly, the Newell and Simon School in which simulation of 
a wide range of mental activities by complex information processing models is emphasised 
(Massaro and Cowan 1993). Other researchers instead highlight “[…] fundamental operations 
that can be used to characterise the human mind.” (Posner and McLeod 1982, p. 478)  
In some more detail, Massaro and Cowan (1993) identify four main variations of the 
information processing framework: (1) Physical Symbol Systems (PSS), (2) Connectionism, 
(3) Modularity, and (4) Ecological Realism. The approach of physical symbol system refers to 
the already mentioned Newell and Simon School that focuses on symbolic architectures, in its 
fundaments relatively strong tied to computer sciences (see e.g. Newell and Simon 1972; 
Newell et al. 1989). Generally, the assumptions of the PSS framework are more restrictive 
than those of the general information processing approach, presented above. In particular, 
only arbitrary physical tokens are manipulated by explicit rules that are, themselves, 
composed of tokens. These manipulation-processes are exclusively based on the physical 
properties of the tokens, independently from their meaning (see also Hoffmann 1998). The 
variation of connectionism could be described by the features it includes. Within the approach 
it is assumed that a set of processing units is interconnected by connection weights. If input is 
given into the system, this causes activations that are modulated by these connection weights. 
Input to each unit is guided by an activation rule, adding the input to the current state, finally 
leading to an output. The system of processing units and connection weights itself underlies a 
dynamic process: learning rules in form of mathematical functions manipulate the connection 
weights, thus also altering the input and output processes (Bechtel 1991; Rumelhart and 
McClelland 1987).  
Another framework that has been offered - called modularity framework - assumes 
independent input systems, e.g. a system responsible for object perception, and more general 
cognitive processes that are called central systems. Each input system uses different 
information and processes, an aspect that could be regarded as domain-specificity. The most 
notable peculiarity of these input systems is their so called encapsulation: Processing is 
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exclusively influenced by information within the input module’s domain. For instance, this 
conjecture suggests that the speech module of the information processing system is solely 
shaped by speed input, and not by situational or linguistic context (Massaro and Cowan 
1993). Finally, ecological realism is best described in terms of what it rejects (Gibson 1979): 
It denies the notion that perception is a form of knowing because the idea of an ambiguous 
environment embellished by processes of the perceiver is rejected. Instead, the perceiver 
simply extracts invariants from the sensory flux. Nevertheless, processing occurs by picking 
up these invariant relations of the environment, thus excluding intermediating processes 
(Carello et al. 1984).  
Notwithstanding that many research streams have emerged and many arguments are quite 
convincing, cognitive psychology and the IPP still suffer from chronic problems that first and 
foremost philosophers object; besides the already touched issue of accounting for singularity 
and subjectivity, two main objections should be mentioned: The qualia-argument and the 
intentionality-argument. The former targets on the insufficient account of cognitive 
approaches of the feel or the phenomenal character of a mental stated. The latter rather argues 
against the disregard of propositional attitudes, such as intentions or wishes. It is criticised 
that such attitudes represent an actual or possible state of affaires, but cannot be explained by 
a hypothetic state of the IPS (Lycan 1999). In this regard the Brentano-question became quite 
well known, asking how any purely physical entity stated in an IPS could have the property of 
being about a nonexistent state of affairs or object; it is argued that physical objects cannot 
have this property (Lycan 1999). Concluding, resulting from the paradigm’s characteristics 
sketched here, several fundamental terms of the IPP can be defined in order to provide a clear-
cut framework and terminology used in the present work; this section is aimed at providing 
such definitions and further basic assumptions, necessary to understand the view of 
information processing in cognitive psychology assumed here. 
Starting with the central concept of information, the etymological provenience of the word 
can be found, according to the Oxford Dictionary of English (2004), in Latin; by adding the 
common ‘noun of action’ ending ‘-action’ (descended through French from Latin "-tio") to 
the earlier verb ‘to inform’. It was then used in the sense ‘to give form to the mind, to 
discipline, instruct, or teach’. The verb ‘inform’ itself stems from the Latin verb ‘informare’ 
(coming to English via French), ‘to give form to, to form an idea of’. However, Latin itself 
already contained the word ‘informatio’ meaning ‘concept’ or ‘idea', but the extent to which 
this may have influenced the development of the word information in English is rather 
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unclear. It should be noted that the notion of information in the IPP and in the present work - 
in accordance with the metaphysical stance alleged - is not identical to the classical 
information measure that is seen as the amount of information in a given message, positively 
correlated with how much the message reduces the number of possible outcomes (Shannon 
1948). Formally, this definition resembles the mathematical definition of entropy (Tribus and 
McIrvine 1964) and embraces many difficulties in understanding human communication 
(Blaseio 1986).  
Disregarding the formal difficulties to unambiguously define such information, in practice a 
precise definition is not crucial since in the present work it is dealt with types or categories of 
information, such as feature values, or category assignments that distinguish among potential 
stimuli or responses in a specific experimental situation (Neisser 1967). Instead, for IP models 
like the present it is far more important to distinguish between data or stimuli and 
information: Data or stimuli lie outside in the external environment, and information is 
located within the human receiver, influenced by many factors, in particular knowledge 
(Massaro and Cowan 1993).xiv Accordingly, in the present work the term information “[…] 
refers to representations derived by a person from environmental stimulation or from 
processing that influences selections among alternative choices for belief or action.” (Massaro 
and Cowan 1993, p. 384)  
Once again, the reader should pay attention to the constructivist and subjective conception of 
information in the present context: information is idiosyncrately built by human beings and 
cannot be described without referring to a particular situation and a particular human being at 
hand (Weizsäcker 1971). Once again, this contemporary notion of information from cognitive 
psychology strengthens the argument that the traditional view of incomplete or complete 
information is not useful and - in this terminology - simply makes no sense at all. Further to 
this, such a view on information provides another clue for a realistic view on creativity and 
novelty: information always involves both novelty and confirmation (Weizsäcker 1974). The 
idea behind this is that information only makes sense, respectively is pragmatic or useful for a 
human, if it has any relation to pre-existing information, thereby somehow confirming 
something. This excludes pure novelty since such information would have no value for the 
individual at hand. At the same time, pragmatic or useful information must also include 
novelty since pure confirmation adds no value to an individual.xv If information in the present 
understanding always involves novelty and conformation, structure and evolution, it becomes 
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clear that pure creativity unbound to any given structure (creatio ex nihilo) is simply 
impossible.  
Talking about information, it is a general truism that information and knowledge are not 
identical; and even though chapters III.B.2 and III.B.3 are exclusively dedicated to human 
knowledge and its representation in the human mind, it should be mentioned at this point that 
“[…] information can be considered as a flow of messages or meanings which might add to, 
restructure or modify knowledge. Information is thus a necessary and inseparable medium for 
establishing and formalising knowledge.“ (Muller 2001, p. 38) This refers to the central 
conjecture that, independent of the way knowledge is seen or modelled, it is a crucial aspect 
of approaches in the IPP to involve and explicate the background knowledge and relevant 
information considered by subjects in thinking processes. Therefore, an extremely important 
conclusion is that relevant knowledge in a domain is of particular importance (Simon and 
Chase 1973).  
Similarly to knowledge, it should be provisionally defined that in the IPP the second central 
cognitive element of mental computation, which is usually considered as thinking, is 
describable as a sequence of identifiable knowledge states or thoughts separated by some 
processing activity, determining the transition from one state to the next. Each state is 
describable by a limited number of activated working memory structures and thoughts that 
represent the primary input to the process or processes that produce the next state (Ericsson 
and Hastie 1994). Merging this with the notion of information alleged above, it is not a big 
step to come to a provisional definition of the mental computing or processing of such: 
“Information processing refers to how the information is modified so that it eventually has its 
observed influence.” (Massaro and Cowan 1993, p. 384) Thus, the basic notion is that one 
must trace the progression of information through the system at hand from stimuli to 
response.  
More detailed, Palmer and Kimchi (1986) identify five properties or principles of the 
information processing approach to thinking: The first principle that environment or external 
world and mental processing can be described in terms of the amount and types of 
information (informational description). Secondly, the concept of recursive decomposition (or 
hierarchical proposition) denotes the breaking of one stage into sub-stages. Further, the flow 
continuity principle states that information is transmitted forward in time and that all inputs 
necessary to complete one operation are available from the outputs that flow into it (Ericsson 
2003). Resulting from this, the flow dynamics principle implies that each stage or operation 
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consumes some time. Finally, the physical embodiment principle embraces the assumption 
that information processing occurs in a physical system - neurophysical in the human brain - 
and information is embedded in states of the system called representation and operations used 
to transform the representations are called processes. 
All these concepts presuppose that the human cognitive system can be best understood as 
information processing system since it operates a variety of processes (see e.g. Newell and 
Simon 1972; Styles 2005). Such an approach is by nature a nonphysiological theory, ignoring 
underlying mechanisms like electrical, chemical, or hormonal processes. Practically, a lot of 
important physiological processes cannot be observed and analysed appropriately to model 
complex human thinking tasks in an adequate way (Newell and Simon 1972). At the same 
time, such a theory is quite technical and precise, offering an array of advantages for 
modelling symbol manipulation by human cognitive processes (Dawson 1998). Nevertheless, 
coming along with new technological possibilities to make the unobservable action in the 
‘black box’ observable, physiological aspects become more and more an focus in the field of 
psychology, and therefore also within the IPP (Johnson and Proctor 2004).  
Whatever phenomenon is modelled within the paradigm, the concepts all share some common 
characteristics. This is obviously of interest in the context of the present work since a model 
of creative thinking is applied to economic settings in chapter IV. An axiomatic conjecture 
that models share is that information processing is assumed to occur efficiently. Such a 
cognitive efficiency in information processing cannot be defined unambiguously for all 
instances since the notion depends on the goal involved in the cognitive effort. However, with 
respect to absolute goals - the most important and most applied goal structure, particularly in 
problem-solving - cognitive efficiency simply means to achieve them with the smallest 
possible expenditure of whatever resource (time, processing capacity, etc.) (Sperber and 
Wilson 1995). Further, IP models are similar in that they “[...] are theoretical descriptions of a 
sequence of steps or stages through which the processing is accomplished.” (Massaro and 
Cowan 1993, p. 384) Therefore, the construction of an IP theory means, in a first instance, to 
postulate the stages of processing.  
Generally, such attempts start with mapping out a logically necessary sequence of processes 
that must, at least, include stimulus decoding and response selection stages. Although an IP 
model usually describes the mapping from one stage to another, it is mostly the case that 
several different stages can operate at once (Massaro and Cowan 1993). However, in support 
of this conjecture different studies were able to gather evidence that information processing 
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occurs in stages. For instance, Sanders (1990) identified seven strategies of processing, 
Massaro (1991) investigated perception-action relationships in a similar model, or Roberts 
(1987) provided evidence by food deprivation and reinforcement tests with animals (rats, 
pigeons, and goldfish) that can be best explained by assuming stages of information 
processing. As to humans, Theios and Amrhein (1989) did research on reading words and 
naming pictures underpinning these results. Since this is very important to the present work, 
subsequently, it will be briefly introduced, which general assumptions any information 
processing model has to make for characterising its stages of processing.  
Generally speaking, if any kind of stimulus is given, it can be distinguished between (1) input 
and output representations; as well as (2) transformation and transmission processes. 
Furthermore, each of these representations and processes can be characterised as (3) discrete 
or continuous (Miller 1988, 1990). In more realistic settings, multiple stimuli are at hand, 
which means that such models must allow multiple codes or information to co-exist in one 
stage, which either (4) can be processed in parallel or serially. Furthermore, (5) strategic and 
attentional effects can under certain circumstances modulate the character of information 
processing. It has already been indicated that each representation developed, transformation 
accomplished at a particular stage, and information transmitted to the next steps of processing 
either occurs in discrete steps or continuously.  
This differentiation of information processing models along the dimension of whether 
representation, transformation, and transmission are discrete or continuous was introduced by 
Miller (1988, 1990) (see for a brief overview Proctor and Vu 2003). This classification is of 
particular interest to psychological examinations that are based on subjects’ reaction times. 
Apparently, in such experiments it makes a huge difference how processes are actually 
executed by the information processing system under investigation. Researchers in the field 
are still debating whether models of discrete or continuous representations and processing are 
more accurate in explaining their results (see for an overview Massaro and Cowan 1993). As 
result, researchers came up with different types of models: discrete models, in which all the 
representations and processes are regarded to be of a (1) discrete nature; (2) asynchronous 
discrete models that are an intermediate between discrete and continuous models based on the 
assumption that successive stages can overlap in time, i.e. information can be transmitted to 
the next stage before the current stage is complete. However, the transmission of information 
about each separable code within the stimulus is discrete (Miller 1988). Finally, (3) 
continuous models predict that information along a single dimension is transformed and 
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transmitted continuously (Proctor and Vu 2003). The present work assumes discrete steps of 
processing and representation; therefore, it is more crucial to emphasise that in any case the 
idea of sequential stages in information processes is meaningful. The rather ‘technical’ 
research on the basics of information processing models does not contribute to the attainment 
of the present work’s objectives.  
While the distinction between discrete and continuous processing is built on focussing on the 
processing of a single stimulus, the issue of serial vs. parallel processing concerns the 
transmission or transformation of an array of stimuli at each stage. The major question in this 
regard is to find out whether a human executes a process serially, parallel, or probably even 
both simultaneously since the form of processing must be settled independently for each 
processing stage of the modes (Lachmann et al. 1979)? This aspect is even more important to 
more general (or realistic) models of human thought since, generally, IPS must deal with an 
entire stimulus field (Massaro and Cowan 1993). The terms - derived from communications 
engineering and information theory - are quite self-explanatory: Serial processing means that 
a stage can only handle one item at a time, while parallel processing refers to the handling of 
multiple items at the same time (Parkin 2000). Some authors argue that this traditional 
distinction of serial vs. parallel processing may not be ideal for capturing what is most 
important in this concern. Instead, a more detailed analysis would differentiate fully serial 
processing, several degrees of capacity-limited parallel processing in which multiple items 
can be processed at once, but only with some interference in-between take place, and, finally, 
capacity-unlimited parallel processing without any interference; thus, putting it on a 
continuum (Duncan and Humphrey 1989). The point is that this is not only a descriptive or 
formal question, but rather has implications on the processing of a system with a given 
number of stimuli, thereby significantly determining the processing’s efficiency.xvi The 
present work, in particular important to the process of information encoding, assumes that 
information is mainly processed serially.  
A related issued often addressed in literature on cognitive psychology is the differentiation 
between conscious and unconscious processing of information: But it is not subject to 
discussion whether unconscious processes of the human mind matter in creative problem-
solving, but rather how and to what extent this holds true (see generally Arieti 1976; Dudek 
and Verreault 1989; Kris 1952; Suler 1980). It seems that unconscious, unarticulated 
processes have a rather indirect, supporting influence, which should nevertheless not be 
underestimated. For example, they might provide new kinds of category combination and 
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reorganisation or bring new kinds of relationships among categories into the conscious mind 
of creative thinking (Mumford and Gustafson 1988). It could also been hypothesised that 
ongoing unconscious process operation lead to such insights (Mumford et al. 1991); thus, 
resembling to the notion of illumination in classical models (see chapter III.C.1). As already 
argued by assuming that cognitive capacity is limited, attention is important and has generally 
to do with limitations; in the IPP, these are seen as processing bottlenecks (see e.g. Duncan 
1980; Sorkin et al. 1973; Pashler 1989; Pashler 1990). Pashler (1990) distinguishes three of 
such bottlenecks in distinct stages of processing: (1) perceptual encoding of the stimulus, (2) 
response buffering in memory, and (3) response selection. Considering the relationship 
between attention and perception, it must be kept in mind that perception is highly influenced 
by attention. If, in an IP model, the stage called perception is decomposed into two sub-stages 
- e.g. featural encoding and featural combination - these are influenced by attentional aspects 
to a different extent. However, perception is also partially preattentive, which means cues are 
recognised by the individual but not attended to (Massaro and Cowan 1993). However, the 
present work will not deal explicitly with the difference between conscious and unconscious 
aspects of thinking since it will become evident that, assumingly, humans do not have any 
direct and conscious influence on their cognitive preferences anyway. 
Although probably quite evident, most research on thinking shares another methodological 
characteristic: The dominant research traditions in cognitive science have been at least 
implicitly individualistic (Wilson 2004). The term of “[I]ndividualism in psychology is the 
claim that psychological states are taxonomized without essential reference to the 
environment of the subject possessing them; in other words, they supervene on the subject’s 
intrinsic, physically specifiable, states.” (Egan 1994, p. 258) The main cognitive elements of 
representation and computation exhibit characteristics that induce scientists to select such a 
methodology. Doing so, cognitive sciences assume that the mind interacts with the world 
perceptually and behaviourally through internal mental representations of the external world. 
This implies that environmental influences are peripheral in the sense that they can only 
matter to cognition by altering the internal mental representations (Jackendoff 2001), an 
argument similarly alleged by Chomsky for the study of language (Chomsky 2000).xvii  
However, other psychologists and philosophers of science argue for the extreme social and 
physical importance of the external environment for human behaviour, thus, criticising the 
methodological individualism explicitly or implicitly inherent in many contemporary 
computational theories of the mind (McClamrock 1991, 1995). A variety of scholars 
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emphasises the importance of such an embedded view on psychological phenomena, often 
called situated cognition (Kirshner and Whitson 1997). Situated cognition theory has emerged 
from anthropology, sociology, and cognitive science and represents a major shift from 
traditional psychological views of learning as rather individualistic and mechanistic, and 
moves towards perspectives of learning as social and emergent (Brill 2001). The development 
of situated cognition or situated learning is often attributed to Brown et al. (1989). It is argued 
that essentially embedded states cannot and should not be fruitfully examined in isolation 
from their embedding context, i.e. that real-world problems impose constraints and 
restrictions, reason why they have to be taken into account (McClamrock 1991). However, it 
should not been forgotten that the human mind is here modelled to be able to proactively 
think with an intentionality. For the purpose of introducing a model of thinking processes 
involved in opportunity recognition the following paragraph introduces a basic way to depict 
cognitive processes in a more formal manner, based on the previous considerations 
concerning information processing models, providing a notation for the upcoming model of 
opportunity recognition.  
For all efforts to compute human thinking, usually denominated as artificial intelligence, it is 
aimed at finding a formal way to represent states and processes of the IPS. On a basic level - 
which should be sufficient for the purposes of the present work - the two basic cognitive 
elements of knowledge structures and information processes are represented in a form that can 
be computed (Sowa 2000). Since memory and the representation of knowledge stored is 
treated in more detail in chapter III.B2, the concrete and more formalised representation of 
knowledge structures in the present work is introduced following these considerations. 
However, at this stage it appears useful finding a way to model information processes in 
general and depict them graphically. For formalising procedures, processes, or even histories 
most often state-transition diagrams such as flow charts, finite-state machines, or Petri nets 
are used (Sowa 2000). All these graphical notations share the same basic principles; therefore, 
by merging the ideas of flow charts, originally designed by artificial intelligence pioneers 
Goldstine and von Neumann (1947) as well as finite-state machines, Petri nets offer a general 
and flexible base to represent any cause and effect, and in particular human information 
processing.  
Designed by Carl Adam Petri (1962) they represent states as circles, which are called places, 
and computational events as events that are called transitions. While each transition stands for 
a possible event, the input states of this transition represent its causes, and the output states 
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represent the effects. Further, conditions can be defined which are true and false, thereby 
determining which of two alternate paths are taken. 
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Figure 12 Example of A Petri Net (Sowa 2000). 
For example, consider the Petri net in Figure 12. The states are labelled p, q, r, s, and t; the 
events are labelled a, b, d, e, and f. In this example, state p is the precondition of the event, a 
and state q is its post-condition. In state r two possible paths can be gone: if condition c is true 
than follows event f, if it is false follows event d. On a basic level, applying this notation to 
the general model of human action in time could be depicted as shown Figure 13.  
Legend:
I – Basis for Action
II – Mental Situation
III – Action
P1 – Principle of Cognitive Creation
P2 – Principle of Rationality
I
II
III
P1
P2
 
Figure 13 Human Action Time as Petri Net. 
This Petri net includes the three major states of the model, say the basis for action I, the 
mental situation in the human mind II and the action chosen III; while the basis for action is 
transformed into the mental situation by the principle of cognitive creation P1, this mental 
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situation is transformed into an action guided by an event that is, in turn, guided by the 
principle of rationality P2. As already said, the concept of creative thinking that will be 
developed subsequently models the information processes involved in coming to novel, 
creative mental situations based on a given situation; this whole process is here only depicted 
on an aggregate level. However, it will be shown later that such information processes can be 
conceptualised on different levels of elaborateness. What will be modelled and depicted in 
chapter IV.C can, therefore, be seen as the result of a zoom in, focussing on the principle of 
creative cognition.  
Having introduced the way human thinking is modelled in the present work, still nothing has 
been said about the conceptualization of the human mind. Therefore, the human mind will be 
outlined now as an information processing system that operates the cognitive processes 
outlined above. Further, it will be shown how knowledge can is stored in human memory. 
Particular emphasis is put on the predominant way of devising conceptual knowledge 
structures: as mental models and schemas. 
 
B. The Human Mind  
1. Information Processing Systems 
As indicated, in contemporary cognitive psychology the human being is thought of as an 
active processor of information, which may arrive as sense data or is generated externally 
from stored knowledge (Styles 2005). None of these two concepts - information and 
processing - had been new, but rather the image that a digital computer can model man and 
his thinking processes was original about this idea (Newell and Simon 1972). The main 
change induced by the computer metaphor in cognitive psychology was to distinguish several 
components of the human mind: A component that analyses the input, one that stores 
information, another which executes particular subroutines depending on the input, and so 
forth (Styles 2005). This conception is based on the conviction that, even if computers and 
humans differ in their physical constitution, they both manipulate symbols and can carry out a 
particular action through the pursuit of logically similar steps and procedures.  
Based on this, during the last years and decades the two disciplines, cognitive psychology and 
computer science, were able to mutually enrich research on a variety of topics. For instance, 
psychological theories about schemes and propositional representation haven enormously 
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benefited from research in the computer science. Cognitive psychologists have attempted to 
design such computer simulations of the human mind for several reasons: Firstly, a theory 
that can be implemented and simulated on the computer can be measured through the correct 
problem solution at disposition. Secondly, psychologists are interested in define the terms of 
comprehension and representation as explicit as possible, because only explicit theories are 
testable. The third and probably most important reason consists in the advantage of such a 
genuinely psychological theory, which contributes to research and generates useful concepts 
(Wessells 1994). Nevertheless, it remains a metaphor with limitations: The human brain is 
animate, compared to inanimate computers, and humans can move around in the environment, 
and, vice versa, the environment can act upon persons. Furthermore, external stimuli are not 
only responded to but can also be modified (Styles 2005).  
However, in chapter III.A.3 it has already been mentioned that Broadbent (1958) is often 
named as the first one, who applied the notion of information processing system. Although 
the model he presented is frequently described as a model of attention, it also includes 
perception and memory. Thus, it can serve as a simple example of a general model of human 
information processing and, thereby, of the human mind as an information processing system. 
His model, shown in Figure 14, depicts human information processing in a flow chart, which 
is a sequence of interconnected boxes and arrows. Each box on the chart represents a 
component process or stage of the overall tasks, which must be completed before the next 
stage can be arrived (Styles 2005). 
 
Figure 14 Broadbent's Model of The Human Mind (Broadbent 1970). 
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The model is presented to provide a first impression of how the human mind could be 
conceived as an information processing system. It provides a sketchy idea of the processes 
that are executed by an IPS from the senses that select input for short-term memory store, 
which, in turn, filters information for the limited capacity channel that serves as link to long-
term stores or effectors. Apparently, the model is limited in its capability to show the complex 
and various interactions of the central human cognitive processes of attention, perception, and 
memory. Therefore, these are dealt with in some more detail hereafter.  
However, some conjectures have to be made before as to the human mind as an information 
processing system that are already adumbrated in Broadbent’s model: Firstly, the human 
mind’s information processing capacity is limited. Secondly, human beings seek to minimise 
cognitive efforts, reason why it is assumed that they often use various techniques (for instance 
heuristics) to achieve this. These two assumptions, amongst other reasons, imply that thinking 
is often less than totally rational characterised by cognitive biases and errors (Baron 1998). It 
is the psychological argumentation for a realistic view of human agency in economics, 
embracing such cognitive phenomena as inherently human and not as imperfection that can be 
removed theoretically (see chapter II.A.2). 
Before introducing store models of the human mind that explain the storage of information 
and corresponding processes, central terms are briefly outlined that belong to almost anyone’s 
vocabulary but are often attached different meanings to: attention and perception. Basically, 
perception determines how stimuli of the external world are transformed to information, the 
unit on which an IPS is assumed to work on. In turn, attention refers to the processes that 
select that information that are processed, accounting for limited processing capacity that 
impeded to process all information available. However, it should be noted that in more 
realistic terms attention, perception, and memory cannot be seen independently since they all 
highly determine each other. However, they can and will be presented as different cognitive 
activities. The following considerations shall rather briefly characterise them, so that in the 
present work, it can be unambiguously referred to the terms and the human mind as an 
information processing system (IPS).  
Beginning with attention, it can be said that many varieties exist, but in the most general 
terms it refers to the selection of a subset of information from the total set of information 
available for further processing by another part of the IPS since processing capacities are 
assumed to be limited (Stafford and Webb 2005; Styles 2005).xviii A very important function 
of attention in the context of the present work is the selection from a subset of sensory input 
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or sense data probably required for perceptual processing. This can be called ‘attention for 
perception’ and its necessity in many situations is underpinned by search experiments 
(Goldstein 2002). Another one would be the attention for action; this is the selection of one or 
another form of response (Johnson et al. 2004). Both functions show that the cognitive 
functions are indeed highly intertwined (Styles 2005). Focussing again on the input side of the 
IPS, attentional selection is considered necessary because the rest of the processing system, as 
defined above, cannot process all stimulus inputs (or on the other side all response outputs) 
simultaneously. Thus, attention could be conceded the role of an active agent that selects 
(Cavanagh 2004).  
An alternative explanation or modelling consists in describing it as a pool, or pools, of 
processing resources that can be allocated to perform cognitive tasks (Styles 1997). However, 
attention should not be only seen as an active agent selecting information for processing 
elsewhere in the system, this would be an underestimation of its impact on the whole system, 
because it also does processing on its own (Johnson and Proctor 2004). Yet another view does 
not deem attention as a cause but as an effect of processing. This approach is related to the 
subjective experience of what is being attended as the focus of conscious experience (see for 
the philosophical term Metzinger 1995). Then, attention can be conceived as the outcome of 
processing that allows an individual to know what it is doing (Styles 2005). The mentioned 
relation between attention and conscious experience leads to the distinction between 
processes that do or do not require attention. Most of processing in the human mind is not 
available to conscious inspection since it is unconscious and proceeds automatically, without 
necessarily the involvement of any attentional processes. Taking account of this, two distinct 
kinds of processes can be identified: (1) controlled processes, in which attention is involved in 
any form; and (2) automatic processes, without any form of attention involved (Styles 2005). 
This supports the distinction that has been introduced between reflexes and reflected action in 
the central model of human action in time from a psychological perspective. 
In turn, perception means basically sensory processing since the sense organs convert 
physical energy from the external world, which is encoded and subsequently delivered to the 
brain via sensory neurons for interpretations by the perceptual system. This is summarised in 
an often cited general definition of perception: “The term perception refers to the means by 
which information acquired via the sense organs is transformed into experience of objects, 
events, sounds, tastes, etc.” (Roth 1986, p. 81) In the perceptual system different forms exist, 
for instance auditory or visual perception (Eysenck and Keane 2000; Styles 2005). Returning 
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to the information processing paradigm, it can be stated that most early stages of perceptional 
processing are automatic and unconscious. Referring to more conscious processes, a more 
specific definition of perception would include an individual’s phenomenal experience of 
seeing, hearing, touching, etc., i.e. its senses. Consequently, the final output of perceptual 
processing is a perceptual experience, such as seeing a face or hearing a voice instead of 
perceiving a fragmented pattern of light or auditory waves (Eysenck and Keane 2000; Styles 
2005). In other words, “[…] the term of perception refers to the complex process through 
which we attempt to make sense out of the world around us by interpreting and integrating 
information brought to us by our sense with information and knowledge already store in 
cognitive systems.” (Baron 2004, p. 56) 
An example for an information processing approach to this is the fuzzy-logical model of 
perception (FLMP). Several studies support this three-stage approach tested in different 
contexts, for instance pattern recognition (Massaro and Friedman 1990; Massaro 1998), 
perception of facial effects (Ellison and Massaro 1997), and visual and auditory speech 
(Massaro 1998). The three stages of the process are depicted in Figure 15.  
ResponseEvaluation Integration DecisionAB
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Figure 15 FLMP - Fuzzy-Logical Model of Perception (Phillipson 2002). 
The first stage involves the decoding and evaluating of the relative sizes of the stimuli’s 
salient features, and the production of so called fuzzy-truth-values (FTV), which are a kind of 
currency of the FLMP (Phillipson 2002). The magnitudes of the FTV are not changed in the 
subsequent changes, thus determined exclusively in the evaluation stage. In Figure 15, 
stimulus A and B, the salient features in the external world, are converted into the FTVs a and 
b. From an information processing perspective, this conversion can be modelled by 
mathematical functions, e.g. an exponential decay function (Nosofsky 1986; Shepard 1987). 
Each FTV is aimed at expressing the external feature’s physical nature and a prototype’s 
scaling parameter, thus comparing it to stored knowledge. In the second stage the two FTVs 
are combined, using a multiplicative rule in order to produce a single value xK, which 
indicates the degree of support for a given alternative. In other words, it expresses to which 
extent it resembles to a stored prototype of an external object (e.g. a house). This value xK is 
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then passed to the decision stage where the single value is mapped onto a response alternative 
XK (see for the model also Ellison and Massaro 1997; Massaro and Friedman 1990). 
Once again, perception and attention can and should be seen as closely intertwined: Although 
the perceptual systems encode the environment around an individual, attention may be 
necessary for binding together an object’s individual perceptional properties, for instance 
another person’s face and voice. Additionally, attention might be of significance in perceptual 
processes since it selects the aspects, cues or data in terms of information processing on which 
perceptual processes act. If an individual can identify the information that represents the 
objects formed from perceptual data by attentional processing, this internal representation has 
contacted stored knowledge in the memory system. Indeed, studies in cognitive neuroscience 
on amnesia patients have shown that unless a stimulus is consciously perceived and attended 
to, it does not enter memory that can be explicitly retrieved. In turn, this does not imply that 
unattended stimuli do not unconsciously affect subsequent processing (Baddeley and 
Warrington 1970; Milner et al. 1968; Scoville and Milner 1957). This consideration leads us 
to another extremely important part of an IPS, the memory system (Eysenck and Keane 2000; 
Styles 2005).  
A simple definition of memory says that it is a store of information and it is a result of 
learning (Styles 2005). In the particular view of the IPP, memory could be seen as “[…] 
systems, representations, and processes in living organisms that are involved in the retention 
of information.” (Samuel 1999, p. 1) Anyway, psychologists have been capable to distinguish 
many varieties of memory, with different capacities. In this context, the term of capacity 
refers to the period of time information is stored and to different kinds of knowledge stored 
using different representations. Besides these two aspects, the storage also differs as to the 
way of recalling: Some memories can be recalled into consciousness, while others store 
knowledge that can only be demonstrated by the performance of actions. In addition to this 
static view on storage components, memory also involves processes or operations. The two 
most important are the encoding of information for memory and retrieving information from 
memory as and when required (Styles 2005). In the following it will be introduced a structural 
theory of memory and how information is assumed to be processed within this system. 
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2. Human Memory 
While studying the next considerations concerning multi-store models of human memory it is 
important to note the difference between memory and stores, in which memory is ‘deposited’ 
(Styles 2005).xix For that, it will be gone back to the influential model of human memory 
introduced by Atkinson and Shiffrin (1968) that distinguishes between a sensory register, also 
called buffer, short-term memory, and long-term memory (Engelkamp 1991; Styles 2005), 
and is depicted in Figure 16. 
 
Figure 16 Human Memory (Atkinson and Shiffrin 1968). 
Hereafter, it will be briefly presented how the components of the human mind differ and how 
the processes within the system are assumed to be directed by an executive control system 
that moves information between the stores; it is responsible for maintaining order in memory 
and for planning and decision making (Baddeley 1986, 1997; Norman and Shallice 1986).  
At first, all information enters the buffer or sensory store of memory. Here, brief duration 
sensory memories are stored that have high capacity and fast decay. The name derives from 
its function as a buffer from which information selected by attentional processes can be 
encoded into more durable forms (Seel 2000; Styles 2005). Broadbent (1958) proposed that 
memory for periods of more than a few seconds is handled by a combination of limited 
capacity system and buffer memory store, which held information for a very short period of 
time only. Information fed through to the limited capacity system could be fed back into the 
buffer and recycled indefinitely; this process is called rehearsal of information. Thus, 
rehearsal is responsible for transferring items from a very limited capacity system to a more 
durable store. In turn, if rehearsal is prevented, items are rapidly forgotten (Brown 1958; 
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Waugh and Norman 1965). However, starting with the typical situation that a stimulus first 
steps in the system, it enters its appropriate sensory register. Buffer and limited capacity 
system are important to the whole memory system since human senses are ceaselessly 
exposed to information inflow that cannot be all paid any attention to. Irrespective of the 
sense modality, information is shortly retained here after the end of the stimulation, in case 
attentional processes decide it is worth extracting it as a key aspect of further analysis 
(Eysenck 2004). 
In such a case, information is transferred to short-term or working memory, which stores 
information arriving from perceptual processing on the one hand (as in our example) and 
retrieves long-term memory stored on the other, while an individual is performing a task, for 
instance in solving a problem. In other words, short-term memory contains what we are 
currently thinking about (Styles 2005). The processing capacity is limited and remains 
conscious as long as it is attended to (Baron 1998); information still decays, but not as fast as 
in the sensory register since short term-memory is influenced by subject-controlled 
processes.xx The first to describe this limited capacity of short term memory was Broadbent 
(1958) in his Limited Capacity Filter Theory of Information Processing. Consequently, the 
main function of short-term memory could be seen in making information temporarily 
available, in order to create more endurable memory contents (Seel 2000). This, process of 
putting a stimulus from its sensory register (e.g. the visual sensory register) into short-term 
store is called information encoding (see chapter IV.C.2). 
Eventually, information is then put forward into the store that can host the most durable 
memory: long-term memory. In fact, it is assumed that the remainder of an individual’s 
knowledge - what is not located in sensory register or short-term memory - is stored in here. 
Theoretically, an individual can store unlimited knowledge in its long-term memory 
(Attkinson and Shiffrin 1968) and holds information from all the sensory modalities (visual, 
auditive, etc.). Independent of the validity of this statement, nobody would question that this 
store has to deal with an enormous amount of knowledge. Thus, it seems to make sense to 
look for more fine-grained conceptualisations of long-term memory, distinguishing between 
different parts. However, these parts of long-term memory are often assumed to be of a rather 
passive nature since they must be activated by short-term memory. However, this should not 
suggest a stable nature of long-term memory that it is not constant at all and rather subject to 
continuous changes of its contents (Seel 2000). 
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For instance, Tulving (1972) introduced the terms of semantic and episodic memory; the 
former term is referring to facts or general abstract knowledge, i.e., an individual’s knowledge 
about the world. The latter embraces factual information acquired at a particular point in time, 
i.e., personal experience (Baron 2004). Another distinction introduced in the 1980s (Seel 
2000), based on the differentiation between ‘knowing that’ und ‘knowing how’ (Ryle 1969), 
would classify both as belonging to declarative knowledge, which is memory an individual is 
able to tell someone else about its content. In other words, declarative knowledge categories 
are about objects and object properties in some domain. In turn, procedural knowledge is such 
memory that specifies how to do something, the principles for applying or acquiring 
declarative information. It is impossible to clearly explain them to other persons by words; 
they have to be demonstrated (Anderson 1990; Mumford et al. 1991; Seel 2000; Styles 
2005).xxi Therefore, declarative knowledge is accessible consciously, while this is mostly 
impossible for procedural knowledge (Eysenck 2004). However, both are created from past 
experience and systematically related to each other in associative networks (Langley and 
Jones 1988). Yet another distinction, actually resembling to that between declarative and 
procedural memory, can be made between implicit and explicit memory. They are quite 
similar since, again, an individual can learn and demonstrate knowledge implicitly, that is 
without knowing they have the knowledge (Eysenck and Keane 2000).  
The interplay between short-term memory and long-term memory can be modelled in some 
more detail: The former is responsible for transmitting information to the latter; additionally, 
it searches long-term memory for appropriate knowledge structures to create meaning in a 
particular situation. This is done by retrieving activated information from long-term memory, 
a process that will be called category search in the presented model of creative thinking (see 
chapter IV.C.2). If information or knowledge structures judged to be worth being stored in 
long-term memory, short-term memory stores it there, thus expanding the system’s 
knowledge (Seel 2000). These processes are depicted in Figure 17, which illustrates the 
hypothesised parts of long-term memory, distinguishing between declarative and procedural 
memory. 
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Figure 17 Interplay between Short-term and Long-term Memory. 
Still of most relevance to the aspect of limited processing capacity in short-term memory is 
today Miller’s work on chunks (Miller 1956). He investigated the number of chunks of 
information that could, on average, be remembered by an individual at one time. Thus, this 
represents the short term capacity for currently active information, and shows that there exists 
a limit of remembering information in short-term memory. Miller was able to show that 
capacity was limited not by the amount of information, but the number of chunks, meaning 
that humans can remember as many words as letters, because although each word is made up 
of several letters, these can be grouped into a meaningful chunk (Anderson 1990; Seel 2000). 
Conceptually, Miller’s limitation is located in the rehearsal buffer, where only a limited 
number of slots are available for information. Consequently, if an individual currently has 
more chunks to remember than slots, items will be lost (Styles 2005). His studies suggested 
that humans are able to deal with seven (plus/minus two) chunks at one time (Miller 1956).  
It should be kept in mind that the presented multi-store model is just one way to mould the 
human memory, and that there exists a variety of alternative conceptions and variations. For 
instance, some expanded the model by clearly distinguishing between working memory and 
short-term memory, in order to account for conscious information processing such as the 
construction of mental models (Seel 2000). Furthermore, regarding such rather static views 
like the multi-store model increasing, criticism has arisen since subsequent experimental and 
neuropsychological evidence have not produced sufficient evidence for such models. For 
instance, they were unable to account for learning without rehearsal, or the fact that rehearsed 
material may not be learned (Seel 2000; Styles 2005), or other shortcomings were found 
(Eysenck 2004). Along these lines, some scholars argue that memory is better thought of as 
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different processes instead of different stores, thus, introducing a single-store model of the 
human mind.  
This approach is related to the theoretical concept of neuronal networks, which was 
influenced by the findings in neurocomputing on concept learning and other fields (Anderson 
1995). For example, Craik and Lockhart (1973) modelled human memory as consisting of 
different levels of processing. They proposed “[…] that retention is a function of depth and 
various factors such as the amount of attention devoted to the stimulus, its compatibility with 
the analysing structures and the processing time available will determine the depth to which it 
is processed.” (Craik and Lockhart 1973, p. 676) In here lies the main cleavage between 
multi-store and single-store models of human memory: The limited information capacity of 
working memory in the single-store model is no longer seen as structural, that is recurring on 
the features of short-term memory, but instead seen as functional. This means that the degree 
to which information is recognised and memorised is dependent on the depth of processing 
(Jacoby and Craik 1979). If information is processed superficially, for instance sounds, it 
rapidly decays; in case the processed information is analysed more thoroughly, it is associated 
with more durable memory traces (Seel 2000). In summary, such models assume that only 
one memory system exists and that sensory register, working memory, and long-term memory 
are only temporary states or modes of activation of this system (Seel 2000). Again, this 
approach was also criticised by experimental psychologists since depth could only be 
measured in terms of memory (Styles 2005). 
However, disregarding the underlying nature, whether structural or functional, the concluding  
Feature Sensory Register Short-term Store Long-term Store 
Entry of information Preattentive Requires attention Rehearsal 
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information Not possible Continued attention Repetition 
Format of 
information 
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Organisation; largely semantic; 
some auditory and visual 
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Figure 18 shows the commonly accepted differences between the three parts or modes of 
human memory, in this case experimentally studied for the case of verbal learning. Once 
again, the figure emphasises the important relation between subject-controlled short-term 
memory and attention. 
However, the three concepts of the multi-store model are able to capture the most important 
distinctions between recalling in the long run and that of currently active information. 
Furthermore, they highlight the importance of attentional control and were quite influential 
for following research and - considering the low importance for the detailed processes in 
memory for the present work - should be sufficient to provide an overview on this topic. This 
chapter has briefly outlined how the human mind might be conceived; however, nothing has 
been said so far about the content of our memory, our actual knowledge. Hence, the following 
paragraphs will focus on meaning-based knowledge and the way it is stored in human 
memory; in particular conceptual knowledge and its prominent concept of schemas is 
introduced. The considerations conclude with a formal notation of conceptual knowledge 
which is necessary for modelling opportunity recognition in chapter V. 
Figure 18 Commonly Accepted Differences between the Three Stages of Verbal Memory (Craik and 
Lockhart 1972). 
If information has been perceived and entered the cognitive system it is processed, but it is 
also crucial how this information is represented in the system and builds up our knowledge. 
So far, it has only been said that information and knowledge are somehow ‘represented’ in an 
individual’s memory, and not explained in detail what is meant with this expression. 
Basically, it can be distinguished between perception-based and meaning-based 
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representations; the former preserve much of the original perceptual experience’s structure, 
while the latter are quite abstracted from the perceptual details and simply encode the 
experience’s meaning (Anderson 1995). Perception-based representations are assumed to take 
the form of mental images, which are representing an object's physical appearance and the 
configuration of objects and features in space. In turn, meaning-based knowledge 
representations aim at storing propositional knowledge about the semantic relations among 
objects, features, and events (Leary et al. 2003).  
In fact, the notion that there exist internal representations of knowledge is probably the most 
significant difference between behaviourism and cognitive psychology since it is 
hypothesised about states or contents of the black box. Most generally speaking, a 
representation is something that stands for something else since it is responsible for 
representing an object or situation in the human brain (Styles 2005). This broad definition 
simultaneously explains why representations are an important topic in other fields, in 
particular philosophy and computer science: Everything that is assumed to represent 
something in the external world has to be described in a formalised manner (see for an 
overview Sowa 2000). For the human mind, the majority of researchers supports the notion 
that there are separate internal representations for verbal and visual information (Eysenck 
2004), as, for instance, dual-coding theory: This model is based on research on human 
memory, where it is often found that memory’s pictorial material is superior to memory for 
verbal material. Consequently, the dual-coding hypothesis proposes that mental 
representations could be coded both visually and verbally, as shown in Figure 19 (see for 
instance Paivio 1975; Paivio 1986).  
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Figure 19 Pavio's Dual Coding Model (Pavio 1986). 
Accordingly, subjects given a sentence usually tend to superior memory if they develop a 
corresponding image of this sentence (see e.g. Anderson and Bower 1973; Roland and Friberg 
1985; Santa 1977). But since scientific insights about knowledge representation in the human 
mind is quite thin, there is still a vivid controversy going on within the community. For 
example, it is discussed whether knowledge representations have a visual form analogous to 
the objects they are referring to in the real world (analogous representation); however, such 
discussions are omitted here (see further Kosslyn 1980; Shephard and Metzler 1971).  
In the following considerations it will not be discussed in-depth, which processes could be 
involved in constructing representations, but only briefly referred to categorisation theory, 
which was proposed as an explanation of the cognitive process that underlie the formation of 
concepts for natural objects (Mervis and Rosch 1981; Rosch 1978; Rosch and Mervis 1975). 
Notwithstanding, this general theory can be applied to research in economic settings (see e.g. 
Dutton and Jackson 1987). However, it should be noticed that the principal reason for the 
interest in knowledge representation is that the way in which information is represented can 
affect the way it is processed. Nevertheless, for this purpose it is less interesting to discuss 
verbal or visual information representation or processing in detail. Rather, meaning-based 
knowledge representations will be focused here since models like Paivio’s make no statement 
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how associative structures of memory look like or, in other words, how knowledge is 
organised in the human mind. These representations extract what is significant to the 
individual about an event and discard many of the unimportant details. Generally, two types 
of meaning-based representations can be identified: (1) propositional structures that encode 
the significant information about a particular event, and (2) conceptual structures that 
represent categories of events and objects in terms of their typical properties. 
Very generally, the term of human (1) propositional knowledge embraces information if 
something is the case, i.e., meaning is given, which is highly person-relative (Moser 1989). 
For instance, empirical evidence shows that humans normally extract meaning from a 
linguistic message and do not remember its exact wording (see e.g. Wanner 1974). Of course, 
humans are able to memorise verbal information when they pay attention, but in any case 
memory for such information is poorer than memory for meaning. Further, research has 
shown that human memory capacity often seems much greater for visual than for verbal 
information. But even in such case, it appears to be some interpretation that is remembered 
and not the exact picture. Thus, it proves useful to distinguish between meaning of a picture 
and its physical picture (Anderson 1996); a number of experiments point to the utility of this 
distinction (see e.g. Bower et al. 1975; Mandler and Ritchey 1977). Beyond, there is evidence 
that subjects initially encode many of the perceptual details of a sentence or a picture but then 
tend to forget this information quickly. An example as to visual information is the (non-) 
retention of a picture’s left-right orientation (Gernsbacher 1985). Finally, only information 
about meaning or interpretation is retained; but how is such knowledge now assumed to be 
stored in the human mind? 
It is stored in form of propositions, a concept that is borrowed from logic and linguistics; it is 
the smallest unit of knowledge that can function as a separate assertion. In logic it is therefore 
the smallest unit about which it makes sense to make the judgment true or false (Anderson 
1995). Based on this general notion, propositional representations have become a common 
method of analysing meaningful information in cognitive psychology (see for instance 
Anderson and Bower 1973; Clark 1974; Frederiksen 1975; Kintsch 1974; Norman and 
Rumelhart 1975). Propositional analysis most clearly applies to linguistic information and is 
presented here in this context (building on the example of Anderson 1995).  
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Lincoln, who was president of the USA 
during a bitter war, freed the slaves.
 
Figure 20 An Example for a Proposition. 
The information of the sentence in Figure 20 might also be given by the following simpler 
sentences: (1) Lincoln was president of the USA during a war; (2) the war was bitter; and (3) 
Lincoln freed the slaves. If any of these simple sentences were false, the whole (more 
complex) sentence would not be true. Consequently, the complex sentence’s meaning is 
corresponding to the three propositions, which express a primitive unit of meaning each. 
However, it should be noted that persons do not remember simple sentences in their exact 
wording, but rather information is represented in memory in a way that preserves the 
primitive assertions’ meaning (see further examples in Bransford and Franks 1971; Kintsch 
1974).  
In cognitive psychology, propositions are often illustrated in form of networks, building up 
more complex forms (e.g. Anderson 1976). In such a propositional network, each proposition 
is represented by an ellipse, which is connected by labelled arrows to its relations and 
arguments. Propositions, relations, and arguments are called the network’s nodes, and arrows 
are called links, connecting the nodes. In turn, the links are labelled in order to indicate that it 
is pointing to the relation node. Reconsidering the example given above, a possible 
propositional network is given in Figure 21. 
Relation
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Object
Relation
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Agent
Relation
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Figure 21 Network Representation for a Proposition. 
The overlap clearly indicates that the networks are interconnected parts of a larger network; 
however, it should be noticed that the spatial location of elements is irrelevant to the 
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interpretation. One of the main advantages of such a network structure is that they are capable 
of showing hierarchical relationships where one proposition occurs as a unit within another 
proposition. Thus, such a figure can show that a proposition is caused by another; such 
constructs have been named connectionist representations (Anderson 1995).  
While propositional representations abstract by deleting many of the perceptual details and 
only retain the important relationships among the elements, there exist other abstractions like 
that from specific experiences to general categorisations of that class of experiences’ 
properties. Such abstracted processing of information is called (2) conceptual knowledge. 
There are many possibilities to represent such knowledge that stores predictable information 
about a category’s instances (Anderson 1995). However, the neurobiological concept of 
human memory as built up by auto-associative networks (see Kohonen 1984) and neural 
networks has had a strong impact on research on human knowledge structures: These are 
assumed to be permanently stored in memory traces that are simultaneously subject to change. 
In order to recognise and understand new information such content must be activated (Seel 
2000). This approach assumes that information represented is content addressable, i.e. which 
means it can be accessed by only a partial description of an item or object. Thereby, they 
provide a more flexible retrieval of stored knowledge. Imagine, for example, someone asking 
which German dictator caused World War II. The answer is Adolf Hitler. At the same time, 
the individual might know that he was born in Austria, fought in World War I, was 
imprisoned, etc. Any of these questions regarding the person allows the individual to access 
its knowledge about Adolf Hitler (Anderson 1995).  
Generally, categories are conceptual knowledge structures that store properties about a set of 
objects that exhibit a certain degree of similarity as to these properties. It is asserted that 
cognitive categories are built up by objects with similar perceived attributes and that they 
reflect objects (whatsoever) in the environment (Dutton and Jackson 1987). Categories are 
crucial to human interaction, in particular communication since information is summarised by 
a category name or label that is shared by the interacting agents (Cantor and Mischel 1979). 
For instance, if persons are talking about a house it can be assumed that they share the same 
prototype of what characterises a house, for instance having a roof. Furthermore, such 
categories reduce the complexity of incoming stimuli by organising objects into meaningful 
groups (Dutton and Jackson 1987). Thus, a category comprises of similar, non-identical 
members that share some common attributes, but are differentiated by dissimilarities among 
many other attributes: Humans dispose of prototypes that are made up of the shared features 
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or attributes (Rosch 1975, 1978). Again, it should be kept in mind that conceptual knowledge 
organisation affects the whole cognitive system by what has been called before cognitive 
constructivism:  
Various studies were able to provide evidence for the conjecture that category-consistent 
information is better recalled than category-inconsistent information. Even if it is still 
unknown whether this is caused by selective attention or forgetting, it has an important 
impact: Once an object in the external world is put into a category, the subsequent cognitive 
representation built is an inaccurate, simplified picture that matches the category prototype 
rather than did the original stimulus (Dutton and Jackson 1987). Similarly, it has been shown 
in experimental studies that individuals tend to a behaviour that is called ‘gap-filling’ 
(Johnson et al. 1973; Cantor and Mischel 1977). This names a constructive error occurring in 
situations in which a stimulus only offers incomplete information about an object. Then, 
individuals tend to fill the gap of missing information with category-consistent information. 
In other words, general information about a category is used to infer the presence of specific 
attributes typically associated with a particular member (Dutton and Jackson 1987). Similarly, 
the constructive error of distortion occurs in case available information is ambiguous. This 
phenomenon has been sufficiently studied to assume that individuals process incoming 
information according to the category they have judged the object in the external world to 
belong to (Carmichael et al. 1932). 
Another popular manner to represent conceptual knowledge is in form of networks, assuming 
that subjects store information about various categories; for instance, about animals the 
categories of canaries, robins, fish, mammals, etc. might be stored. The approach of semantic 
networks apparently refers to semantic knowledge, which is knowledge about facts (Tulving 
1972). In such hierarchical structures of categories facts can be represented. In other words, 
the semantic knowledge contains defined traces of attributes that are permanently attributed to 
objects (Prinz 1983). These can be - at least - subdivided into primary attributes that mark 
immediate characteristics of objects, for instance form, location, colour, size, etc., and 
secondary attributes that provide a secondary characterisation of such objects, for example 
nice, good, can be lifted, etc. (Seel 2000). In Figure 22 such a network is shown, representing 
information such as that a shark is a fish and a fish is an animal by linking nodes for the two 
relevant categories with so called isa links (Anderson 1995). 
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Figure 22 Memory Structure for a Three-level Hierarchy of Animals (Parkin 2000). 
Each level in Figure 22 corresponds to a category, exhibiting properties that apply to them. 
Properties true for higher-level categories are automatically regarded true for lower-level 
categories. It could be said that activation spreads from node to node within the hierarchical 
structure, called the concept of spreading activation. If, for instance, ‘canary’ and ‘can sing’ 
are activated, excitation spreads to other connected notes. A positive response is given, when 
these two sources of activation meet (Styles 2005). In more realistic terms, empirical research 
has shown that in case a fact about a concept is frequently encountered, it is stored with that 
concept directly, instead of inferring it from a more general concept. Furthermore, the more 
frequently encountered a fact about a concept is, the stronger it will be associated with the 
concept and the faster it is verified. In turn, verification of facts, which have to be inferred 
from a more super-ordinate concept, takes a relatively long time (Collins and Quillian 1969).  
A semantic network represents a rather economical way of representing knowledge as it 
removes the necessity to store all information about the properties of the concept at hand. 
More recently, it turned out that human knowledge’s representation about categories in form 
of semantic networks is not sufficient. For instance, the result of the false statement ‘a bird 
can swim’ is not given in such a representation since it should take a long time, or even might 
be impossible, for activation within the network from ‘canary’ to ‘can swim’ (Styles 2005; for 
further problems see Rosch 1973; Rosch and Mervis 1975). Joining to criticism on the 
organisation in nodes of semantic memory, it came to a development of theories that account 
for typicality effects and propose that category membership is rather computed by comparison 
of features (e.g. Smit et al. 1974). Other researchers distinguished representations in the 
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meaning of objects from operators, standing for cognitive operations that are stored for 
executing an operation of any kind (Dörner 1976). The encoding and retrieval of such 
procedural knowledge is seen analogous to the previously described processes. However, 
such knowledge structures of operators store how, under which conditions, and with which 
consequences will be intervened in a real life situation. Therefore, encoding of an operation 
contains exact constructions to execute an operator in case specific conditions are met (Seel 
2000). Nevertheless, any model assuming that knowledge about objects or concepts is stored 
in terms of attributes has problems in determining which features are necessary and sufficient 
for category membership (Styles 2005). In fact, knowledge is more sophisticated, flexible, 
and interdependent than it is captured by the models introduced so far; therefore, other, more 
sophisticated category representations have been conceived in recent years, especially schema 
theory became more and more prominent. 
 
3. Schemas and Mental Models 
Philosophically, already Kant used the term of schema in a provocative but rather unclear 
manner (Rumelhart et al. 1986). In a psychological context the notion of schema was first 
used by Bartlett (1932) and Piaget (1952) who both described data structures in memory 
representing knowledge about concepts (Dutton and Jackson 1987). Barlett already proposed 
that knowledge is held in structures called schema. He alleged that individuals remember and 
interpret new information in terms of such extant knowledge structures, underlining the 
conjecture that cognitive processes do not operate in isolation, but instead are embedded in 
the individual’s environment, thereby reducing ambiguity in situations by applying 
knowledge in schema (Styles 2005). Bartlett investigated this processes by showing subjects 
ambiguous drawings resembling two different types of objects. Afterwards, subjects were 
asked to draw what they saw. Depending on their classification of the object seen, they drew 
one or another view: This suggests that individuals do not remember a picture itself, but rather 
its interpretation.  
However, Bartlett’s concept has long been criticised for its vagueness and Piaget’s (1952) use 
of the term schema was difficult to interpret consistently (Rumelhart et al. 1986). Building on 
this argumentation the notion of the schema has been rejected and shunned by mainstream 
experimental psychologists until the mid-1970s. Since then, the concept has been revived by 
several attempts to offer a more unambiguous interpretation in terms of explicitly specified 
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computer implementation or, similarly, formally specified implementation of the concept 
(Rumelhart et al. 1986) Such formal, scientific approaches were, for instance, the concept of 
the frame postulated by Minsky (1975), the concept of the script introduced by Schank and 
Abelson (1977), and more explicit notions of the schema, developed by Bobrow and Norman 
(1975) and Rumelhart (1975). All these scholars agreed on the conviction that activities of the 
human mind can only be explained if conceptualised larger and more structured than so far.  
The answer is seen in higher-level conceptual structures that represent complex relations 
implicit in our knowledge base. The underlying idea is that a schema is a data structure for 
representing the generic concepts, which are stored in memory (Minsky 1975). There exist 
schemas for generalised concepts underlying objects, situations, events, actions, and 
sequences of action. Put briefly, schemas could be seen as models of the outside world. They 
guide information processing by determining, which of these models stored in memory best 
fits incoming information. In the end, consistent configurations of schemas are identified that, 
jointly, offer the best account for input perceived in the IPS, i.e. the best-fitting-categories are 
specified. This idiosyncratic configuration of schemas constitutes the input’s interpretation. 
Consequently, considering the main function of a category - to store predictable information 
about instances of that category - it is not enough just to list the common properties (like in 
semantic networks) since such lists ignore the interrelational structure. A schema takes this 
circumstance into account by assuming that a concept (like the bird) is defined by a 
configuration of features. Each of these features involves specifying a value the object has on 
some attribute; for instance, birds may vary as to their size from (estimated) 3-4 cm to 3-4 m; 
hence, each bird recognised can be specified by a value within this range of the attribute of 
size.  
Nevertheless, the idea was not dealt with until the 1970s, when several authors presented 
slightly different interpretations of schema (Abelson 1975; Minsky 1975; Rumelhart 1975; 
Schank 1975). Actually, these models all share a number of common features; in particular 
they all regard a schema as a generalised concept that underlies objects, situations, events, 
sequences of events, actions, and sequences of actions (Rumelhart and Norman 1985). Some 
researchers even claim that an individual’s entire knowledge is organised in schema (for 
example Neisser 1979). However, all scholars doing research on schemas are confronted with 
a dilemma: They are the mind’s structure, but they are simultaneously very flexible since they 
must be sufficiently malleable to fit around almost everything (Rumelhart et al. 1986), which 
raises the following question: “How can we get a highly structured schema which is 
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sufficiently rich to capture the regularities of a situation and to support the kinds of inferences 
that schemas are supposed to support and at the same time is sufficiently pliable to adapt to 
new situations and new configurations of events.” (Rumelhart et al. 1986, p. 20) The answer 
simply is that there is nothing like a representational object of a schema stored in human 
memory. Rather it is just a momentary configuration of a network of a large number of much 
simpler elements which are interacting, as is described in the concept of mental models.  
In this sense the emergence of another type of knowledge representation, mental models of 
the world and their relation to schema can be explained (Johnson-Laird 1983). For this the 
cognitive system executing cognitive processes could be divided into two parts or sets of 
processing units. The first part, the interpretation network responsible for processing 
information from the external world, receives inputs and transmits them to knots of the 
remaining network. These knots contain specifications of an appropriate action or reaction, 
which effect and alter the input. The second part of the system is the mental model of the 
world, in which an individual acts. This part itself is seen as a network and its input is a 
specification of the action an individual considers to take. Its product is an interpretation of 
what might happen if we execute this action (Rumelhart et al. 1986). Thus, the main function 
of a mental model is to mentally execute an action, evaluate the consequences, interpret these, 
and derive conclusions, i.e. allowing a mental simulation (Seel 2000). See for an illustration 
of the hypothesised relation between mental models, the interpretation network, as well as 
inputs and outputs Figure 23. According to this model, it can be assumed that schemas are 
created through actions of the interpretation network and provide the fundament and the 
interpretative framework for the construction of mental models (Seel 1991). In other words, 
mental models are here regarded as parts of the interpretation network, helping the human 
mind to make sense of information coming from the external world. 
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Figure 23 The Interpretative Network and Mental Models (Rumelhart et al. 1986, p. 43). 
Defining schemas as knowledge structures serving the human mind in different 
circumstances, general functions can be identified (Mandl et al. 1988): First of all, schemas 
(1) control an individual’s attention in the sense that they influence the distribution of 
attentional resources on schema-related or non-related information. Secondly, they have an 
(2) integrative function since they provide a framework for the integration of new information 
to be processed. This framework creates coherence and comprehension for making sense of 
such new information. Thirdly, it can be stated that schemas have a generic character since 
they possess variables; this means they have an (3) inference function leading to sense-
making and meaningful inferences or conclusions. This inference function can be deducted 
from the notion that a schema provides a plan for solving a task by directing thinking 
processes und building specific expectations about potential supplements to incomplete 
updates of schemas. Thereby, schemas facilitate controlled thinking processes since the 
solution to a problem is not found through undirected associations, but rather through 
searching and finding information that can be put in a schema meaningfully in order to 
complete or update it (Seel 2000). This partially corresponds to the integrative function and 
attention control function mentioned before. The former function implies that new 
information is better understood and retained if it can be integrated into a blank space of a 
schema, thus, serving as a comprehension- and coherence-making framework. At the same 
time, this means that attention is directed to information that is somehow related to such 
schemas (Mandl et al. 1988). 
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It is argued that schemas represent an individual’s generalisable and abstract knowledge 
accumulated in various single experiences of objects, persons, situations, and actions (Seel 
2000). This definition implies that schema are acquired and constructed through a process of 
internalisation: Traces of memory are created through a proceeding concretion of concrete 
single experiences’ common attributes, thereby aggregating its contents to comprehensive, 
and simultaneously more abstract, interpretation networks (Aebli 1980). Such schemas tend to 
be activated as a kind of information bundle, whenever attributes of a new experience ‘fit’ to 
the ones contained in a trace of memory. Finally, this process of aggregation to abstract 
attributes leads to the emergence of abstract knowledge structures, whose variables can be 
filled in by concrete information from different domains (Seel 2000). The process underlying 
this concept of knowledge structuring in the human mind has been modelled from an 
information processing perspective by Rumelhart et al. (1986).  
The process starts with input coming into the system from the external world, activating a set 
of units. These are interconnected with each other, forming a kind of (constraint-satisfaction) 
network in the interpretation network (see top left-hand side in Figure 23). The starting state 
of the system is determined by theses inputs, which also determines how good the fit of the 
internal representation with the input is perceived (goodness-of-fit-landscape). Afterwards, 
the system moves towards one of the goodness maxima, i.e., has specified one representation 
that best fits the input. It is further assumed that the system is relatively stable, when such a 
state is reached; that means there is little tendency for the system to migrate towards another 
state.  
The notion of a state needs some more consideration: States of such a system are product of 
an interaction among many groups of units. Such groups tend to act in concert and to activate 
each other. When activated, they are assumed to inhibit the same units. Such a stable pattern 
of units could be seen as a particular configuration of a number of overlapping patterns. It is 
determined in its configuration by the dynamic equilibrium of all activated sub-patterns that 
interact with each other and the inputs. These states of maxima in goodness-of-fit space are 
interpretations of the input or configurations of instantiated schemas. In other words, they are 
those states that maximise a particular set of constraints active at that moment in time.  
The human mind is furthermore assumed to hold a goodness-of-fit function for different 
configurations. Thus, depending on context and input, the system will initially be at one point 
in this function and find the closest maximum. The degree of structure depends on the 
tightness or strength of the coupling among the coalitions of units, which correspond to the 
Human Thinking 
 140
schema at hand. In this particular notion a coalition of units that tend to work together closely 
resembles to a schema in the conventional (stationary) view, while rather loosely 
interconnected knowledge structures are more fluid and less schema-like. Hence, if the former 
case holds true for a rather large subset of units, a schema provides a very useful and accurate 
description. This also implies that the memory is not built up by schemas that are stored, but 
by a set of connection strengths, which, when activated, might generate stable states that 
correspond to instantiated schemas (Rumelhart et al. 1986). This general process is applied to 
all kinds of situations. Depending on situations and knowledge involved, different types of 
schema can be identified: These might be so called ‘scripts” for objects and occurrences or 
operations, ‘frames’ for situations, ‘plans’ for actions, up to ‘grammars’ that represent regular 
structures of stories and tales (Schank and Abelson 1977). But again, all these concepts share 
some central characteristics that are discussed hereafter. 
Firstly, as already mentioned, schemas exhibit attributes for which they adopt different 
values. As result of the internalisation process, individuals possess default values for each 
attribute. In situations of incomplete information this allows inferring about attributes of the 
schema for which individuals do not have information in this particular case, a process called 
default reasoning (Cheng and Holyoak 1985). For example, almost everyone will recognise a 
human face in comic, even if there is some ‘information’, for instance ears, not given. Again, 
this notion is apparently based on a relativist ontological stance; it should be evident that in a 
constructivist perspective this process would have to be conceptualised somehow different 
and, more importantly, default reasoning becomes a central issue modelling the external 
world’s subjective perception. 
Further, an individual’s schemas are hierarchically organised according to different degrees of 
generalisation and abstractness. Thus, it can be said that schemas embed each other in such 
structures. Schemas have a core of relatively fixed and further variable features. While the 
former are features that must inevitably be present for recognising a schema, the latter depend 
on the instance at hand (Rumelhart et al. 1986). For example, such core features for ‘going 
out to eat in a restaurant’ would be, for instance, ‘sitting at a table and eating food’; in turn, it 
is variable whether it is ‘self-service’, or ‘waiters serving’. This also applies to the type of 
food eaten (e.g. lamb), which may be contained by another schema (e.g. Indian or Greek 
food) (Rumelhart and Norton 1985; Schank and Abelson 1977). In such a hierarchy of 
schemas, the lower end is made up by rather simple schemas, in the sense that they aggregate 
elementary attributes and concrete items that cannot be further decomposed in more 
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elementary units in a given context (Newell and Simon 1972). The higher in the hierarchy, the 
more complex becomes the schemas' level of abstractness. In this context local schemas are 
discriminable from global schemas, differing in the degree to which they aggregate 
information for schemas of different contexts. The former represent limited knowledge, 
involving a small number of schemas, while global schemas, are of a rather abstract nature 
and include more such concepts. Global schemas can be updated by single experiences, but 
lose details of local schemas included with an increasing degree of abstractness (Rumelhart et 
al. 1986).  
In making sense of incoming information, schema are active in recognition working top-down 
the hierarchy to interpret and make sense of scenes, situations, stories, or social institutions 
(Seel 2000); also called conceptually-driven processing (Bobrow and Norman 1975). More 
operationally seen, schemas are category systems that can be structured along a vertical and a 
horizontal dimension (Rosch 1978). As described above, in the vertical dimension each higher 
level is inclusive of the levels below. This dimension could be divided into three levels: The 
highest, most abstract or inclusive level is the superordinate one, containing the basic level, 
which, in turn, comprises subordinate categories (Dutton and Jackson 1987). The 
superordinate category of ‘organisations’ might serve as example that could be hypothesised 
to comprise the basic level categories of ‘profit’ and ‘non-profit’. Subordinate categories 
could be insurances or internet providers for the former, and hospitals or funds for the latter. 
In this example, ‘profit’ and ‘non-profit’ are among the different horizontal categories at the 
basic level (Dutton and Jackson 1987).  
Summarizing this, schemas can represent knowledge at all levels of abstraction; they do not 
only apply to concrete meaning-based examples, but also to more abstract constructions like 
democracy or justice that rather represent knowledge than concepts (Rumelhart et al. 1986; 
Seel 2000). It is assumed that higher-level, more general, and more abstract schemas within 
this hierarchy impose constraints on subordinate schemas, regarding their scope and valid 
transformations. Simultaneously, attributes are handed down from higher to lower levels (Seel 
2000). Consequently, an individual does not incorporate a definition of abstract terms such as 
democracy, but what it knows about them (Styles 2005).  
It should be noted that schema are not passive cognitive structures that are stored in memory 
and can be retrieved if a situation requires it (Hermann and Hoppe-Graff 1988). They should 
be rather seen as active processes that result from the activation of linkages within complex 
interpretation network (Arbib and Hesse 1986); thus, they are specific configurations of such 
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network structures, which could be seen as updated schemas (Rumelhart et al. 1986). Another 
important characteristic of schemas is that they are a means for insight, which target on an 
evaluation of their ability to adapt to the information that is processed. This assumption 
implies that schemas vary as to their flexibility, which results from the cohesiveness and 
rigidity between the constitutive units. The closer and more rigid the linkage, the stronger 
activate the constitutive elements each other and the more rigid is the schema’s structure. The 
weaker the linkages, the more fluent and variable is the structure, and the easier it is for it to 
run through the cognitive system (Rumelhart et al. 1986).  
Schemas... 
• ... are an individual’s generalisable and abstract knowledge accumulated in various single 
experiences of objects, persons, situations, and actions. 
• ... have attributes, for which they can adopt different values and hold default values. 
• ... are embedded and build up a hierarchical structure from local (specific) to global (more 
general) schemas, different as to their degree of generalisation. 
• ... interpret incoming information top-down in the hierarchical structure, resulting in 
conceptually-driven processing. 
• ... represent knowledge on all levels of abstractness. 
• ... are seen as active processes since they are understood as an activation of linkages within 
complex interpretation networks. 
• ... differ regarding their degree of flexibility, which is a function of the cohesiveness and 
rigidity of the constitutive units. The stronger and inflexible the linkages between them, the 
less fluent and flexible is the structure. 
Figure 24 The Central Characteristics of Schemas. 
The main characteristics marking the concept of schemas are summarised in Figure 24. 
However, notwithstanding the strong influence schema theory had for information processing 
approaches, it is criticised for several reasons, e.g. for not providing testable predictions such 
as how it is specified what knowledge is included in a schema or how a schema can act top-
down to interpret situations (Styles 2005). Further, advocates of connectionist representations 
argue that knowledge is distributed among knots and connections (among a network) and no 
memory directly corresponds to a schema (Seel 2000). However, these two views are not 
mutually exclusive since schemas can be understood as characteristics of complex networks 
(Rumelhart et al. 1986). In summary, it can be stated that schema are aimed at discharging the 
information processing system by guiding it through systematic searches for schema-related 
information (Seel 2000). Therefore, in this context information processing means to 
determine which model best fits the incoming information (Rumelhart and Norman 1985), 
thus, resembling to the view that individuals interpret the world in terms of what is known 
and expected, emphasising the importance of memory on perception (Styles 2005). In the 
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following it is often referred to knowledge structures or concepts; if so, the reader should have 
a schema in his mind’s eye since providing a general and widely accepted concept for further 
use in theorising. However, in order to operationalise knowledge structures for a cognitive 
model of opportunity recognition in chapter IV the following considerations deal with the 
issue how knowledge structures can be represented. 
As already said, it was Minsky (1975) who introduced the concept of frames for representing 
knowledge based on the idea of schemas. Many other possibilities exist to do so, but this 
approach puts a particular emphasis on structuring and organising knowledge structures 
(Sowa 2000). This characteristic and the fact that it is a relatively simple, general, and popular 
manner to represent knowledge, virtually suggest its use for the present work. Frames are 
used in artificial intelligence and intended to facilitate computing of information processes. 
Therefore, it is apparently a formal approach based on the fundament of logics. As argued in 
chapter II.A.1 such formal approaches are principally incapable of accounting for singularity 
and endogenous change. However, it is one of the main arguments alleged in the present work 
that singular events in economic systems do not alter the general structure of the underlying 
knowledge structures on a non-textual level. In the terminology of frames, creative humans 
are assumed to change the values of knowledge representations to come the novel means-ends 
frameworks and not the categories themselves. By introducing the concept of frames and the 
adjustments that must be made for a subjectivist interpretation, this differentiation should 
become clearer.  
In any database theory categories must exist that determine what can be considered by the 
system using the knowledge stored; such categories might be called domains, types, classes or 
sorts but all define an object as such. In such approaches it is assumed that 'being' means to be 
the value of a quantified variable (Quine 1992). Many different frame systems have been 
developed since Minsky introduced the general concept: The present work selects a general 
and flexible system for developing its model, the Generic Frame Protocol (GFP) (Karp et al. 
1995). However, in developing a frame the first step is to identify which variables 
characterise an object as such, i.e. which ontological statements are of relevance for an 
individual to recognise and use an object as such (Sowa 2000). Each relevant variable gets a 
slot in the frame, which are in turn restricted by a facet that defines the types of variables 
storable in a slot. Thus, the relevant variables and their corresponding types define a general 
template for an object. For introducing the general idea and the notation used an example 
about the knowledge representation about a truck taken from Sowa (2000) is given in the 
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following, which resembles to another rule-based language called CLIPS (see Coppin 2004). 
Figure 25 depicts the template frame for trucks in general.  
(defineType Truck 
 (supertype Vehicle) 
 (unloadedWt (type WtMeasure) ) 
 (maxGrossWt (type WtMeasure) ) 
 (cargoCapacity (type VolMeasure) ) 
 (numberOfWheels (type Integer) ) 
Figure 25 Template Frame of Truck. 
The second line or slot of the frame defines a truck to be a member of the superordinated set 
of vehicles; by introducing a supertype it is therefore possible to implement hierarchical 
network structures. A truck in this particular knowledge structure is defined by its unloaded 
weight (unloadedWt), it maximum gross weight (maxGrossWt), its cargo capacity 
(cargoCapacity), and its number of wheels (numberOfWheels), which are all shown 
on the left-hand side in Figure 25. On the right-hand side, each slot exhibits a facet that shows 
which values are vaild for each variable. By allowing a hierarchical structure the GFP allows 
to define the facets more precisely. The maximum valid number of wheels could be limited to 
18 for example. Put differently, the left-hand side defines the types of representational 
elements necessary, and the right-hand side the representational elements acutally included. 
However, generally such templates define the set of possible states that an instance of the 
class of trucks can have. The representation f of a specific truck, say the only fire truck of a 
small village, could for instance look like shown in Figure 26. 
(defineInstance FireTruckBornheim 
 (supertype Truck) 
 (unloadedWt (2 tons) ) 
 (maxGrossWt (5 tons) ) 
 (cargoCapacity (4000 litres) ) 
 (numberOfWheels (8) ) 
Figure 26 Instance Frame of Fire Truck in Bornheim, Germany. 
Apparently, another template for fire trucks in general (defineType FireTruck) could 
be defined, but these two examples for a template and a instance should serve well enough to 
introduce the central terms of templates, instances, variables, types of variables, and values. 
However, it should be noted that the general nature of frames allows to describe anything 
storable formally; this implies that not only states but also events in cognitive processes can 
be described by such a notion.  
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Further, and once again, it must be underlined that such frames in the way they are used in 
artificial intelligence cannot account for creativity since they are strictly based on logic in the 
sense explained in chapter II.A.1 and, therefore, define a finite set of potential states for every 
system, object, or whatsoever can be represented. However, it has been pointed out that the 
human mind is fundamentally different to such a conception and can endogenously alter such 
knowledge representations. It is argued here that knowledge representations and the central 
variables are not changed on a general level; nevertheless alterations are possible. However, 
the main variation of variables and facets, i.e. of variables’ valid values, takes place on 
hierarchical knowledge structure’s lower levels. It is assumed that on a sufficiently general 
level the relevant variables are given. On the contrary, the creative element is not only 
considered by changing values of a knowledge representation, but also by the expansion of 
facets, i.e. the set of permitted values of a variable, thereby altering the set of possible states 
in an ex-ante unconceivable way. Consequently, the present work aims at identifying general 
values of economic situations that are themselves not subject to change and allow a scientific 
approach in the sense of axiomatically independent networks of theories (Herrmann-Pillath 
2001).  
The frames developed here can be easily integrated into the way of modelling cognitive 
processes in terms of Petri nets as briefly introduced in chapter III.A.3, serving as a way to 
model states in such a graphical notation. The particular importance of the problem 
representation or the mental situation for economic decisions and, thus, action has been 
emphasised throughout the foregoing chapter II.A. Research in the field of cognitive 
psychology has also proven the role of such concepts in human decision processes, although 
most research as to the categorisation of information has focused on physical objects that 
occur in the natural world instead of social problems (Medin and Smith 1984). However, 
there were also important works on social objects, situations and events, corroborating the 
stance of the present work (Cantor et al. 1982; Tversky and Hemenway 1983). Consequently, 
building on this, a template frame of economic problems can be developed, which is dealt 
with in chapter IV.B.2 depicted in Figure 33. The probably most difficult task about 
conceiving such a template of economic problems is to decide, which slots or variables 
necessarily must be included. The central question is, which slots are relevant to 
distinguishing significantly different types.  
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C. Creative Thinking 
1. Defining Creativity  
Even though in the course of the previous chapters on human thinking implicitly several 
attributes of creativity have been mentioned, it is not quite clear if - and if so how - the 
creative thinking process is different from the non-creative thinking process. Explaining such 
differences between general human thinking and creative thinking is quite essential since the 
term creativity is often used in everyday life and scientific discussions, but mostly remains a 
fuzzy concept. Therefore, in the following some main theoretical considerations and empirical 
evidence are provided that delineate the phenomenon, and the way it can be modelled in the 
chosen paradigms or views of information processing and problem-solving.  
Several theoretical views could be identified as to how the relation between the creative and 
the non-creative process could be seen. Lubart (2001) distinguishes three different angles 
from which it can be approached: The (1) dichotomy view states that the processes are indeed 
different, therefore justifying the establishment of a dichotomy. This implies a need to 
develop different models for both processes. The main question arising here is how it can be 
accounted for different levels of creativity. Alternatively, the (2) continuum view assumes 
that there is no dichotomy between the creative and the non-creative process. If so, both could 
be placed on a continuum with several parameters that account for the output’s creativity. 
Implicitly, this would also provide a formal explanation for different degrees of creativity. In 
another concept, the (3) input view, differences regarding creativity of a process outcome are 
attributed to the information that functions as input to the process. This view implies that the 
same sequence of thoughts and actions can lead - depending on the input - to different degrees 
of creativity. It resembles to a formula, linking the outcome directly to the input of the 
process. Anyway, this is a rather theoretical question since all mentioned process models can 
be constructed, respectively explained, from all three viewpoints. Nevertheless, this general 
aspect is fundamental for the present work since a model shall be presented that accounts for 
different degrees of ‘creativity’ in the recognition or construction of entrepreneurial 
opportunities. 
Supporting the theoretically motivated distinction, empirical results concerning the creative 
processes’ specific nature have also been collected in the last decades. Based on previous 
studies, Mumford et al. (1991) identified four ways, in which creative problem-solving 
basically differs from other kinds of problem-solving efforts: (1) Creative thinking typically 
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occurs in ill-defined situations, i.e. the goals, information, and resources to be used are not 
clearly specified. Instead, this has to be done by the individual at hand, forcing him to engage 
in problem finding or problem construction (Frederiksen 1984; Getzels and Csikszentmihalyi 
1976; Mumford et al. 1991). (2) Standard problem-solving usually involves the application of 
previously acquired solutions (Nutt 1984); for instance, the satisfycing theory of Cyert and 
March (1963) points out that individuals often satisfice applying the first available solution 
they identify. However, since creativity or creative problem-solving requires a novel solution 
that is supposed to solve the problem at hand, an existing one (often the first available) 
typically not leads to creative outcomes (Mumford et al. 1991). Rather the generation and 
exploration of novel, alternative problem solutions, often called divergent thinking is required 
(Guilford 1950). Subsequently, it is necessary to evaluate the generated alternatives according 
to their potential utility in yielding viable solutions; this evaluation is called convergent 
thinking. Divergent and convergent thinking are applied in an integrative action; 
consequently, evaluation does not preclude the generation and application of potentially 
viable alternatives (Isaksen and Parnes 1985).  
(3) Further, individuals are likely to cycle through multiple stages of divergent and 
convergent thinking in creative problem-solving-efforts, while non-creative problem-solving 
often proceeds in an additive fashion, using simple activation, generation, and application 
mechanisms (Langley and Jones 1988). This is because initial solutions are refused and/or 
extended, thus, demanding more attention or resource demands and requiring more active and 
flexible controlled processing (Ackerman 1986). (4) Finally, as mentioned before, thinking is 
based on existing knowledge since it is assumed that information is stored, recalled, and 
understood through the application of categorical knowledge, e.g. schema (see chapter 
III.A.1). These extant categories were built up by prior learning, albeit they are applied in a 
totally new situation and, thus, unlikely to trigger off new, alternative problem solutions. 
Instead, it seems as if in creative thinking efforts new solutions are derived from the 
systematic combination and reorganisation of extant knowledge structures (Hausman 1988; 
Hodder 1988; Mumford and Gustafson 1988; Mumford and Mobley 1989; Rothenberg 1988). 
This assumption is hardened by further empirical evidence (Rothenberg 1986; Rothenberg 
and Sobel 1980; Sobel and Rothenberg 1980) and theoretical considerations, supporting the 
idea that these processes contribute to creativity (Koestler 1964; Kuhn 1970).  
Further, Goor and Sommerfeld (1975) investigated differences in the sub-processes by 
creative and non-creative students using a think-aloud methodology. They observed that 
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highly creative students spent more time on generating new information or hypotheses, 
working on these hypotheses, and self-reference or self-criticism. Alternatively, Lubart 
(1994b) examined the role of idea evaluation during the creative process. The results showed 
that relatively early auto-evaluations of the creative process in progress lead to higher 
creativity than evaluations executed at later stages. This suggests that the timing of the sub-
process of evaluation may have an effect on the outcome’s creativity. The importance of this 
aspect - the process of combination and reorganisation of category information - is especially 
highlighted as the main difference between creative and standard thought. Accordingly, the 
variance in the degree of the process outcome’s creativity results partially from skill or 
quantity with which each of the involved sub-processes is executed. However, instead of 
enumerating further studies on this issue it is more important to summarise that creative and 
non-creative thinking can be captured with similar or the same models and processes but, 
nevertheless, differ to the values or parameters within. However, it still remains the task to 
define what is meant with creative thinking in the present work? 
If, as in the present work, it is assumed that general models can be developed accounting for 
any thinking process, such a model is based on the continuum view. Consequently, the 
differences, for instance in the degree of creativity, are attributed to different parameter-
values of the processes involved in thinking. However, on a sufficiently general level the ones 
required for creative thinking may not be different from of those needed in non-creative 
thinking efforts (Bailin 1984; Simonton 1988a, Sternberg 1988a; Weisberg 1988). Supporting 
this view, Weisberg (1986, 1993) collected introspective reports, laboratory experiments, and 
case studies of artists and found out that creative productions can be explained by drawing on 
relatively ordinary cognitive processes. Hence, the main characteristic of creativity is not that 
it is a somehow divine gift given to a limited number of individuals, but rather the output of 
ubiquitous cognitive processes. Thus, most generally speaking, the creative process is “[…] 
the sequence of thoughts and actions that lead to a novel, adaptive production.” (Lubart 2001, 
p. 295) It is important to underline that it is an adaptive phenomenon, because this implies 
that creativity involves an individual’s capacity to generate solutions in response to novel, ill-
defined problems (Lumsden and Findlay 1988; Mumford et al. 1997), a stance strongly 
influenced by the ideas of evolutionary psychology (e.g. Plotkin 2004; Shettleworth 1998). 
Influential and frequently cited definitions of creativity insinuate that it can be seen as a 
thinking process that involves problem finding and problem-solving in the narrower sense.  
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Once again, it should be noticed that such a notion of creativity is different from the one often 
associated with the concept: Often the terms ‘creative’ or ‘creativity’ are associated with the 
unexpressed potential for producing such novel outcomes (Hayes 1990). Here, creativity is 
exactly not seen as a unitary psychological attribute of an individual, but rather as a generic 
term to capture the complex set of processes involved in the generation of creative outcomes 
(Crutchfield 1973; Mumford et al. 1991). Its meaning is therefore restricted to creative 
productivity, i.e. to the actual production or outcome of creative acts, (Ghiselin 1963), such as 
a scientific discovery, a painting, a new idea for effective social organisation, etc. (Crutchfield 
1973). In this sense, creativity could be seen as an activity, which entails tackling problems or 
generating problem solutions that go beyond extant knowledge (Mumford et al. 1991). For 
instance, Torrance defined it as “[…] the process of sensing gaps or disturbing missing 
elements; forming ideas or hypotheses concerning them; testing these hypotheses; and 
communicating the results, possibly modifying and retesting the hypotheses.” (Torrance 1962, 
p. 16)  
The relation between the terms of problem-solving and the creative act becomes palpable by 
comparing selected definitions of the terms: For example, Scandura (1977) defines problem-
solving as the generation and selection of discretionary actions to bring about a desired end 
state. Similarly, the creative act could be seen as the formulation of a new idea that proves 
useful in addressing some social need through generation and implementation of a novel 
course of action that brought about a valued end-state (Mumford et al. 1991). Both definitions 
deal with the attainment of a goal or need by certain actions; they mainly differ only in that 
the definition of a creative act only requires some degree novelty in doing so. Concluding, 
integrating creative thinking into the notion of problem-solving and adhering to the 
continuum view on creative thinking, it can be modelled as a situation in which an individual 
encounters a problematic situation, it finds or constructs a problem, and subsequently attempts 
to find a solution to this situation or problem, which goes beyond existing knowledge; it is a 
process of creative problem solving. 
Historically, the creative process became a subject of scientific investigation beginning with 
the mid-19th century, when researcher such as Galton (1870) carried out empirical studies on 
creative individuals (Subotnik and Moore 1988). Even though a variety of different paths to 
explain creativity are followed (Dudek and Cote 1994), traditionally two broad psychological 
explanations for creative thinking have been given: The first places emphasis on rationality, 
thus leaning on the fundaments of logic; the second approach is called classical 
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associationism and regards thinking as a chain of ideas, or more accurately as a chain of 
stimulus-response connections (Getzels and Jackson 1962; Wertheimer 1945). These are only 
two of various further explanations for the creative act, such as those of psychoanalysists (see 
Getzels and Jacksons 1962) or attempts highlighting different aspects like the need for 
excitement, sensory variation, or the challenge of the problematic, all unified in assuming that 
the individual seeks to increase stimulation as well as to decrease it (Piaget 1958, 1959; 
Schachtel 1959).  
Early as 1950, Guilford noticed considerable agreement that the creative act involved four 
major steps, often named (a) preparation, (b) incubation, (c) illumination, and (d) verification 
(Guilford 1950). Although, as will be soon discussed, stage models are nowadays seen as 
insufficient for scientific investigations on creative acts, they are the fundament on which all 
further efforts to gain insights are more or less based. Therefore, the popular and often cited 
classical model of Wallas (1926) is presented as an agreed-upon example of various 
approaches that are quite similar and, therefore, only briefly touched afterwards. Apparently, 
these process models are of particular interest for the present work since a process view is 
assumed for opportunity recognition later on. It should become apparent how the scientific 
notion has evolved during the last decades from models identifying discrete steps, to more 
complex approaches, considering multiple sub-processes and including contextual aspects, 
like the one called on in the present work for modelling creative thinking in economic settings 
in chapter IV. 
Research on creativity has started early, and was then - as today and according to the 
continuum view - closely intertwined with general research on human thought. This notion of 
the creative thought as a particular case of thought that could be explained within the 
boundaries of such models had already been underpinned by early studies. These showed that 
the phases of human thought are equal, whether creativity is involved or not (see e.g. Patrick 
1937). In attempts to explain the sequence of thoughts and actions that leads to a novel, 
adaptive production, basic elements were evoked early in some introspective accounts of the 
creative act (Lubart 2001). Particularly, famous scientists reported on their way to deal with a 
problem, for instance Hermann von Helmholtz or Jules Henri Poincaré (Ochse 1990; Lubart 
2001). Such introspective reports of creative thoughts were formalised by Wallas (1926), who 
identified four ideal-type stages of the creative process, already stated by Guilford (1950): 
preparation, incubation, illumination, and verification (e.g. also mentioned and described as a 
milestone by Subotnik and Moore 1988).  
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The phase of (1) preparation refers to preliminary analysis of a problem, which is defined and 
set up. This is done consciously and draws on an individual’s education, analytical skills, and 
problem-relevant knowledge. In the course of the following stage, called (2) incubation, no 
conscious mental work on the problem is done; this may not apply to conscious working on 
other problems, but can also involve relaxing or taking a break from the problem. Meanwhile, 
the mind is supposed to work unconsciously on the problem, forming trains of association. It 
is assumed that many associations or idea combinations occur during incubation. Most of 
them are - still unconsciously - rejected as useless, but eventually a promising idea is found. 
The term of (3) illumination is aimed at describing the third stage, or better, to describe the 
enlightening moment when the idea unconsciously conceived enters the conscious mind, 
which is sometimes called aha-experience (e.g. Lumpkin et al. 2001). Wallas (1926) was 
convinced that this moment is often preceded by an intuitive feeling that an idea is coming up; 
a process he called intimation (Wallas 1926). This phase is believed to be somewhat delicate 
in the sense that it is easily interrupted by outside interferences or by trying to rush the idea. 
In the last stage of (4) verification the - now conscious - idea is evaluated, and developed. 
Although such rather discrete stages were proposed, Wallas himself already admitted that an 
individual could return to earlier stages in the process, for instance if an idea proves to be 
failed during the verification phase, forcing the individual to incubate on how to resolve the 
difficulty. This insight is still important in modelling economic agents' behaviour, for instance 
considering learning processes in evolutionary economics (Braun 2006). Furthermore, he 
added that the phases could co-occur if an individual was, for example, engaged in 
preparation for a particular aspect of the problem at hand and already had an enlightening idea 
for another aspect of the same problem.  
Indeed, some early empirical research on the creative process corroborated the four-stage 
model: Often cited is a series of studies on poets, visual artists, scientists, and laypersons 
executed by Patrick (1935, 1937, 1938); however, there were also others (e.g. Hadamard 
1945; Rossman 1931). This research revealed that the aspects alleged by Wallas were crucial 
for understanding creative processes and new models were conceived on this fundament. The 
results were not concluded from introspections, but verbal protocols recorded while subjects 
were doing their creative task (Lubart 2001). In addition to verifying Wallas’ model, some 
overlap between the stages was noted (Calwelti et al. 1992) and found that experts and 
novices - which were also compared - apply the same basic processes, thus independent of 
expertise and task domain (Lubart 2001). These research efforts also emphasised the role of 
the two middle stages - incubation and illumination - serving as base for subsequent research 
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(Poincare 1952; Gordon 1973; Vinacke 1974; Landau 1978; Rubenzer 1979; Moriarty and 
Vandenberg 1984). Remarkably, Patrick’s methodology is still used to examine the classical 
four-stage model (see e.g. Moriarty and Vandenbergh 1984; Gustafson and Norlander 1994; 
Norlander and Gustafson 1998, 1997, 1998), expressing the strong influence of these classical 
studies on contemporary research in this field. 
Yet other authors aimed at modifying the classical model by adding other aspects, thereby 
triggering off the development towards more recent models of creative thinking. Many efforts 
intended to elaborate on the elementary steps, in particular the renunciation from the rather 
mystic and fuzzy notion of illumination by refining the concept is worth being mentioned 
(Osborn 1953). Further, researchers emphasised the cyclical and the directed, goal-oriented 
nature of creative thought (Guilford 1967; Kepner and Tregoe 1965; Merrifield et al. 1962): 
However, already Dewey (1910) reminded that affective or emotional elements must be 
included in explaining creative thinking. Along these lines, frustration, for example, was 
assumed to occur after the preparatory stage, because the analytical mind reaches its limits in 
dealing with the problem (Sapp 1992), some authors even assume that such frustration may 
provoke incubation (Goleman et al. 1992; Hutchinson 1949). However, starting in the 1960s, 
scholars’ models were more and more applied in organisations in order to improve the 
creative problem-solving capabilities (Baer 1988; Covington 1987; Kepner and Tregoe 1965 
Reese et al. 1976), resulting in new models, such as the Creative Problem-Solving (CPS) 
approaches, which are dealt with in the next chapter III.C.2. Actually already Guilford (1950) 
sharply criticised a notion of creative thinking in discrete steps, objecting that: “[s]uch an 
analysis is very superficial from the psychological point of view. It is more dramatic than it is 
suggestive of testable hypotheses. It tells us almost nothing about the mental operations that 
actually occur.” (Guilford 1950, p. 451) Rather, he continued, these processes are shaped by 
certain abilities of creative individuals, including for example sensitivity to problems, a 
capacity to produce many ideas (called fluency), an ability to recognise, an ability to deal with 
complexity, and an ability to evaluate (Lubart 2001). The apparent shortcomings of discrete 
stage models to explain empirical evidence on the creative process had led to even more 
criticism. For instance, Eindhoven and Vinacke (1952) stated that such models failed to 
explain their observations on creative processes. Instead they proposed a notion of the 
creative process as a dynamic blend of processes that co-occur in a recursive way throughout 
the course of the creative act, paving the way for contemporary process models. Others 
criticised Patrick’s studies, which were supposed to provide evidence for Wallas’ model on 
several points (Bailin 1988; Eindhoven and Vinacke 1952; Vinacke 1952; Weisberg 1986).  
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Many more attempts could be mentioned to explain the phenomenon. However, it seems more 
sensible to highlight that motivation to be creative is somewhat different according to the 
domain it is observed in. Therefore, here it is assumed that motivation for creative thoughts in 
economic settings is somewhat different from that in art or music, the domains most studies 
mentioned are based on. Consequently, it will be only focussed on findings found to be 
relevant to all settings, in particular to the development of general process models of 
creativity and human thought. 
Such general research on creative thinking, analogously to research on cognition, identifies 
two main elements, which play a crucial role: knowledge and cognitive processes. However, 
although knowledge seems to be necessary and important to creative problem-solving 
(Frederiksen 1984; Khandwalla 1993; Sternberg 1986a), it is still open to question, whether 
knowledge per se provides a fully adequate basis for idea generation and problem-solving; for 
example, in a novel domain the value of high-specialised domain-specific expertise is not 
quite clear (Anderson 2001; Gentner and Block 1983). This insufficiency of knowledge to 
account for creative problem-solving outcomes has led to an emphasis on the role of cognitive 
processes and a focus on so called process-analytic approaches (Mumford et al. 1991).  
This shall not suggest that these were the only perspectives chosen for doing research on the 
topic, but attempts to identify individual temperamental or personality characteristics 
(MacKinnon 1962) or research on tolerance for ambiguity, openness to experience, and 
cognitive complexity influencing the willingness to seek out and apply multiple categories 
(McCrae 1987) were not sufficiently successful in explaining novel output of thinking. 
Therefore, hereafter a general overview on research that modelled creativity as a thinking 
process will be presented by making a general distinction: Firstly, the historic development of 
classic process models will be briefly described; secondly, characteristics of the processes and 
skills embraced in contemporary accounts of creative thinking are reviewed and, thereby, 
problem finding as account of creativity is introduced separately because it resembles to the 
notion of cognitive creativity alleged in the model of human action in time.  
Generally speaking, nowadays researchers tend to reject superficial stage-based descriptions 
(Goldschmidt 1991; Doyle 1998; Israeli 1962, 1981). All this criticism on the classical notion 
of discrete stage-models and new approaches can be seen in a general research movement - 
starting the latest with Guilford (1950) - focussing on key processes involved in creative 
thinking (Lubart 2001). It had been realised that discrete stages are an inadequate construct to 
explain creative processes, for instance admitting that “[i]t is not incubation itself that we find 
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of great interest. It is the nature of the processes that occur during the latent period of 
incubation, as well as before it and after it.” (Guilford 1950, p.451) In turn, scholars were 
claiming for an integrative approach (Lubart 2001) particularly stressing several features and 
sub-processes of the creative process.  
 
2. Cognitive Processes in Creative Thinking 
The re-orientation of cognitive psychology on more fine-grained process involved in creative 
thinking must be seen in the general context of research development. Basically, process-
analytic models were introduced in order to investigate thinking processes and, in doing so, 
emphasising the role of knowledge in process application (Mumford et al. 1991). Along these 
lines, a large number of studies on the nature of sub-processes involved in creativity have 
been carried out, each focussing on one aspect of the phenomenon, being crucial to creative 
problem-solving (Lubart 1994a; Ochse 1990; Sternberg 1999; Sternberg and Lubart 1995). 
Just to mention some important streams, there were scholars focussing on problem finding, 
problem formulation, and problem redefinition processes (Getzels and Csikszentmihalyi 
1976; Jay and Perkins 1997; Mumford et al. 1996b; Reiter-Palmon et al. 1997; Runco 1994; 
Smilansky 1984); studies on processes of synthesis or combination of information, such as 
bisociation (Koestler 1964), Janusian thinking (Rothenberg 1979, 1996), homospatial thinking 
(Rothenberg 1979, 1986), articulation (Rothenberg 1979), analogy and metaphor (Ward et al. 
1997; Weisberg 1993), remote association (Mednick 1962), emotional resonance (Lubart and 
Getz 1997), and feature mapping (Baughman and Mumford 1995; Boden 1992; Mumford et 
al. 1997). Further, studies were done on forming idea combinations through random or 
chance-based processes (Campbell 1960; Simonton 1988b) or on reorganising information as 
a part of creative thinking, with special attention to processes involved in insight (Baughman 
and Mumford 1995; Sternberg and Davidson 1995). Again others intended to explain the role 
of analytic-evaluative processes (Basadur 1995; Houtz et al. 1979; Lubart 1994b; Mumford et 
al. 1996c; Osborn 1958; Perking 1983), of perception and information-encoding (Mumford et 
al. 1996a; Smith and Carlson 1990), and applying heuristics (Langley et al. 1987); even the 
process of forgetting was targeted since it might be of significance in the individual’s 
approach to a problem and the overcoming of initial mental blocks (Smith and Dodds 1999).  
Since the capacity to generate new associational linkages has been regarded as the most 
important in producing creative problem solutions (Mumford et al. 1991) and is often 
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mentioned in the context of opportunity recognition (see chapter IV.C.3), the basic idea of 
approaches emphasising associational process in creative thinking is mentioned in some 
detail. It is typical for such models that creative solutions to a problem are attributed to useful 
new element linkages of extant knowledge as result of associational thinking efforts. 
Typically, these new linkages are assumed to emphasise stimulus activation, association of 
activated elements, and subsequent trial-and-error evaluation (Mumford et al. 1991). The 
approaches within the stream range from concepts for remote association (Mednick and 
Mednick 1967) to more recent accounts of node linkages in knowledge structures (see e.g. 
Lumsden and Findlay 1988; Simonton 1988). For example, Mednick (1962) introduced the 
terms of bisociation and association in order to distinguish between different modes of 
thinking. Although terminologically perhaps confusing, bisociation denotes the process in 
which two knowledge concepts interact; they become bisociated. This means in other words 
that previously unconnected matrices of experience are connected (Koestler 1964). It is seen 
as the actual creative act since it creates novelty based on interrelated knowledge structures 
brought into contact (Ko 2004). This means that an individual with a high bisociative thinking 
ability is likely to produce novel and original ideas. In comparison, association or associative 
thinking refers in this concept to rather non-creative thinking that operates among members of 
one single pre-existing knowledge structure.  
Although such approaches offer a potential for utility (Langley and Jones 1988) it has turned 
out that they are incapable of accounting for several observable phenomena in creative 
problem-solving and, therefore, appear inappropriate as a general framework (Mumford and 
Mobley 1989). Among the aspects of creative problem-solving discrediting it as a general 
framework, were the active, effortful nature of creative thinking (Howe 1982), the internal 
direction that occurs in creative problem-solving (Getzels and Csikszentmihalyi 1976), the 
restrictions on prior categorisation places on possible linkages (Perkins 1983), and the 
apparent importance of discrepancies (Kuhn 1970). Evidently, this does not imply that 
associational mechanisms, if combined with the selection, generation, and application of 
decision rules for applying the new linkages, may not be crucial in certain, rather divergent 
core processes, such as problem construction and category combination and reorganisation 
(Redmond 1990; Reiter-Palmon 1990). Instead, associational linkages are here seen on a 
lower analytical level, working together with other processes, not being the one and only 
crucial process in producing novel outcomes. In this way, most of the studies mentioned 
above have not been criticised for the predictive value of their results or the processes 
observed, but rather for their insufficiency to explain the phenomena of creative thinking as a 
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whole. Therefore, models were desired that organise the sub-processes involved in the 
creative thought, thus proposing an integrated view, not simply focussing on one aspect of the 
creative thought, but rather on general, cross-domain factors contributing to the generation of 
new problem solutions (Covington 1987).  
Once again, it is neither feasible nor desirable to introduce all recent process models that have 
been developed in a general effort to account for creative thinking. Only the most influential 
approaches most frequently referred to in the literature are touched here: For instance, 
Mumford et al. (1991) developed an approach that proposes, generally speaking, a specified 
set of core processes for creativity that is assumed to operate on information organised in 
categorical structures. It is a dynamic model, which allows for cycling between different 
processes as considered necessary during all problem-solving efforts. Each of the core 
processes is itself complex and involves more specific sub-processes. Particular emphasis is 
put on the process of problem construction. The model was examined in a series of studies, 
which suggest that it is capable of explaining variance in creative performance on problem-
solving tasks regarding the domains of advertising, management, or public policy issues (e.g. 
Baughman and Mumford 1995; Mobley et al. 1994; Mumford et al. 1991, 1996a, 1997). This 
model and its basic conjectures will be used in the subsequent study and therefore introduced 
in more detail in chapter IV.B. 
Another influential approach is the Geneplore Model conceived by Finke et al. (1992), 
distinguishing between two sets of creative processes, which are named generative and 
exploratory processes. Generative processes concern the construction of loosely formulated 
ideas that are called pre-inventive structures. This comprises the processes of knowledge 
retrieval, idea association, synthesis, transformation, and analogical transfer. The exploratory 
processes concern the examination, elaboration, and testing of the pre-inventive structures, 
involving interpretation of pre-inventive structures, hypotheses testing, and searching for 
limitations. These two sets of processes are highly intertwined and therefore modelled in 
cyclical sequences, finally leading to creative products. Along these lines, Phillipson (2002) 
introduced an information processing model of creativity resembling the Geneplore model in 
that it also emphasises the role of associative processes in creativity. In a sense, these research 
efforts were all based on the notion that creativity can be mainly regarded as the process of 
“[…] sensing difficulties, problems, gaps of information, missing elements something askew 
[…].” (Torrance 1988, p. 47; see also Koestler 1964)  
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Alternatively, the approach of Creative Problem-solving (CPS) is quite often mentioned as a 
general framework for modelling creative thinking. Initially, this approach had a stage-based 
view but has been revised reflecting more emphasis on sub-processes (Isaksen and Treffinger 
1985; Parnes 1967). Now, instead of a fixed series of stages, three sets of processes are 
assumed to be most important in the creative act: (1) understanding the problem, which refers 
to processes of mess finding, data finding, and problem finding, (2) generalising ideas, that is 
idea finding through divergent thinking, elaboration of ideas, and convergent thinking with 
evaluation of ideas, and, finally, (3) planning for action, involving the development and 
implementation of ideas through solution finding (evaluating, selecting, and refining options) 
and acceptance finding (promoting an idea, selling support, noting resistance). Further to this, 
several idea-evaluation approaches have been brought up as variation of the creative process 
in terms of idea generation and idea evaluation (Hitt 1965; Basadur 1995).  
For example, Basadur (1995) has developed a creative problem-solving process in terms of 
such ideation-evaluation cycles, which vary in their frequency according to the nature of the 
problem to be solved and the phase in the process of problem-solving. Runco and Chand 
(1995) emphasised the role of ideation and evaluation together with problem finding in the 
creative process. Basically, these approaches resemble to the psychodynamic approach to 
creativity, in which primary and secondary approaches are supposed to interact (Kris 1952; 
Kubie 1958; Suler 1980). The primary process operates on unstructured, illogical, subjective 
thoughts and produces ideational material. This serves as ‘raw material’ for the subsequent 
reality-based, controlled, evaluative secondary process. Again other authors proposed an 
evolutionary perspective on the creative process: They presumed a process of idea formation, 
shaped by random variations and combinations, preceding a process of evaluations leading to 
selective retention of the best ideas (Campbell 1960; Simonton 1988c).  
All the above mentioned models have in common that they focus on the cognitive aspect 
solely. However, contextual variables are undoubtedly crucial to explain the phenomenon as 
well. Precisely this is argued by so called facet models, approaches that emphasise the 
influence on cognitive process application’s efficiency by a host of factors such as 
personality, conditioning available information, skill utilisation, and problem definition 
(Mumford and Gustafson 1988). Thus, they could be seen as more comprehensive approaches 
trying to include several perspectives on the psychological phenomenon at hand. In a way, 
they are quite similar to cognitive models but typically emphasise the selective nature of 
process application in relation to real-world constraints, along with the existence of multiple, 
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complex interactions between these processes and other features of the individual’s life 
(Amabile 1983; Busse and Mansfield 1980; Sternberg 1986a 1986b 1988a 1989).  
For instance, Busse and Mansfield (1980) added a motivational or attentional component to 
the cognitive processes since the latter are executed in a dynamic, selective manner bound by 
real-world constraints. Then again, Amabile (1983) hypothesised that the generation of 
creative solutions to problems is likely to be conditioned by three categories of variables that 
mould active cognitive processes: (1) the domain-relevant skills, or the response possibilities, 
factual knowledge, and technical skills available to the individual at hand; (2) creativity-
relevant skills, including cognitive style, working style, and heuristic cognitive processes; and 
(3) task motivation. Finally, the Three-Facet Model of Creativity was conceived by Sternberg 
(1988a) and is composed of personality, stylistic, and intellectual constructs (see also 
Sternberg 1986a, 1986b). The facets are held to dynamically interact to condition the nature 
and the content of creative problem solutions. However, the intellectual function is assumed 
to guide the processing of an individual in a metacognitive manner.  
In conclusion, it can be stated that all general approaches (classical models, process models, 
and facet models), despite of different terminology, share an eminent base in their notions of 
the creative process. Most generally speaking, they all assume a rather exploratory phase, 
which ends with a problem to solve or a situation to change; followed by a phase which is 
dedicated to the more concrete solution within the restrictions found. The approaches mainly 
differ in sub-processes and contextual aspects considered. Although some approaches are 
basically different from others, it must be kept in mind that they are only different constructs 
of researchers to explain the same phenomenon (Keating and Babbitt 1978; Keating et al. 
1985; Lansman et al. 1982). It turns out that the research stream that intends to account for 
creativity in thinking through problem finding is no exception in this context. However, due 
to the importance of the problem-solving notion of thinking in contemporary research it is 
outlined in some detail in the following. 
In the 1950s and 1960s, a lot of publications in this area have succeeded in turning the 
investigation of creativity back to the concept of divergent thinking (for example Bachelor 
and Michael 1991; Guilford 1967; Khandwalla 1993; Merrifield et al. 1962; Runco 1991). In 
this concept it is assumed that successful creative activity can only be achieved, if the 
components of divergent thinking (consisting of fluency, flexibility, originality, and 
elaboration) and convergent thinking cooperate. However, while both components are partly 
innate and partly developed, particular emphasis is put on the role of personality (Dudek and 
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Cote 1994). The construct of divergent thinking was introduced by Guilford (1950) as a trait 
approach, which means in this context defining creativity in terms of individual differences on 
some set of tasks (Fleishman and Quaintance 1984). Its basic idea is that “[…] certain trade-
offs at the margin ought to increase the probability of hitting on a creative, that is, 
synthesised, and therefore possibly original solution: redefinition or restructuring the problem 
(or some elements of the problem) rather than merely analysing it, listing potential leads 
rather than merely scanning memory for solutions, elaborating on ideas rather than merely 
evaluating them, and expressing frustration rather than repressing it.” (Khandwalla 1993, p. 
36) Many problems were associated with the notion of divergent thinking, for instance the 
fact that many skills developed by adult individuals, such as expertise or eminence, cannot be 
covered (Nicholls 1972). Nevertheless, the basic idea of locating creativity in the stages 
dedicated to find a problem, as expressed in Khandwalla’s statement, is still quite popular 
with many researchers. Somehow, these approaches are building on the classical models of 
creativity that still serve as the fundament for understanding the creative process (Busse and 
Mansfield 1980; Cagle 1985; Goswami 1996; Ochse 1990; Osborn 1953; Stein 1974; Taylor 
1959; Taylor et al. 1974). Based on these discrete stage models, efforts were made to explain 
creative acts of individuals from a problem-solving-perspective.  
The main idea behind an problem solving account (in the broader sense) of creative thinking 
was that the manner in which we represent a problem state has crucial influences on the whole 
thinking process, consequently also on the creativity of the outcome (Anderson 2001). Thus, 
the underlying notion of creative thinking as a particular thought process allows a framing of 
the process in problem-solving terms. Based on such a notion of a creative problem-solving 
process, Wallas’ four-stage model has been extended and enhanced by distinguishing problem 
finding or problem-formulation from the preparatory phase, in which relevant information is 
gathered, and preliminary ideas are advanced (Lubart 2001): It is assumed that the factors 
influencing creative outputs can be mainly found in the phase of problem finding. Basically, 
this phase is similar to all the explanatory phases in the models presented in the previous 
chapter. This is particularly worth being mentioned since it is similar to the idea of creativity 
in the model of human action introduced in chapter II.B.2: The inherent creativity of human 
thinking can be found in the processes of representing a problem, the cognitive creation of a 
mental situation. 
However, research attempts highlighting problem finding’s importance for creative acts, often 
quote famous scientists, who have pointed to the significance of asking questions in thinking 
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efforts. For instance, Paul Souriau has stated: “It is said that a question well posed is half-
answered. If so, the true invention consists in the posing of questions. There is something 
mechanical, so to speak, in the art of finding solution. The truly original mind is that which 
discovers problems.” (Paul Souriau (1881) cited in Campbell 1960) Several famous people 
have made similar statements for the field of science. For example Albert Einstein was 
convinced that “[T]he formulation of a problem is often more essential than its solution, 
which may be merely a matter of mathematical or experimental skill. To raise new questions, 
a new problem, to regard old problems from a new angle, requires creative imagination and 
marks real advance in science.” (Einstein and Infeld 1938, p. 92) Similarly, Max Wertheimer 
said: “The function of thinking is not just solving an actual problem but discovering, 
envisaging, going into deeper questions. Often in great discovery the most important thing is 
that a certain question is found. Envisaging, putting the productive question is often more 
important than the solution of a set question.” (Wertheimer 1945, p. 123)  
In a general context, it has already been said the problem finding and problem-solving cannot 
be distinguished explicitly; this holds particularly true for creative thinking processes. Getzels 
and Csikszentmihalyi (1976) point out that in a creative process the stages of problem finding 
and problem-solving do not even need to be compartmentalised. Quite the contrary, problem 
finding continues throughout the whole creative process (Getzels and Csikszentmihalyi 1976; 
Michael 1977). In fact, research has not yet fully revealed the underlying structures of these 
thinking processes. Having said that, the application of divergent thinking in problem-solving 
implies that even in presented problem situations, creative skills might be necessary. This 
suggests that in dealing with creative thinking, it is crucial to carefully describe the processes 
that initiate problem-solving: It must be clearly defined what processes or skills is talked 
about, rather than simply referring to problem finding as anything that precedes problem-
solving efforts. 
In more fine-grained attempts, some scholars intended to identify the processes involved in 
problem finding, and the way they are linked together, conceiving process models. Based on 
Mackworth (1965) and Guilford’s (1967) structure of the intellect model, Arlin (1976) 
investigated problem finding, trying to identify cognitive processes in the course of problem 
finding. The basic conjecture underlying her model is that a successful individual consistently 
employs a complex schema in the organisation of several dimensions. Such individuals 
combine a number of strategies and rules in information processing, are fluent in their 
thinking and expression, are flexible and able to elaborate on the given, are divergent 
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thinkers, and are effectively using formal operations. Based on this notion a cognitive process 
model of problem finding is conceived, which leads to the output or outcome of a so called 
general question, the tentative or preliminary problem definition.  
The main line of processing in Arlin's model is built up by four main operations and starts 
with external stimuli that initiate the problem finding process. Then, the individual 
discriminates among the stimuli perceived. The discriminated stimuli are subsequently 
differentiated that means they are ordered along a number of dimensions. If the individual 
does not only identify the classes the processed information belong to and instead integrates 
them, the appropriate formal operator(s) are selected to be applied to the integrated pattern of 
information. Furthermore, systems are identified that emerge from the application of the 
relevant operator(s). This is the end of the process, if the individual does not transform the 
pattern or generates logical implications from it. Finally, this leads to the mentioned output of 
a general question. The main cognitive variables that were together capable of explaining half 
of the variance in problem finding performance in this study are fluency and flexibility in 
discriminating and differentiating stimuli, as well as elaboration, which leads from the 
integration to selection, respectively application, of the formal operator(s) (Arlin 1976). Here, 
fluency refers to the ability of making interesting associations, and flexibility to the ability to 
rearrange the stimuli across a number of dimensions. Actually, these variables were already 
suggested to be crucial in previous studies on creativity (see e.g. Guilford 1956, 1959, 1967, 
1971; Torrance 1962, 1964; Wallach and Wing 1969) and on problem finding (Getzels and 
Csikszentmihalyi 1965, 1970, 1971).  
Others, for instance Michael (1977), studied the relationship between Guilford’s structure of 
the intellect model and various steps of creative problem-solving. Nevertheless, the study 
already assumes that classical discrete models are too linear to describe the continuous 
feedback loops within each step of the creative process. As already insinuated in discussing 
different types of problems, Dillon (1985) investigated problem finding and solving by 
varying the degree of complexity of the problem finding task. That is some tasks only 
involved noticing problems arranged and manipulated by the experimenter, while others 
forced the subject to discover discrepancies or contradictions independently within given data 
or materials. The most complex tasks consisted in seeking provocative problems without any 
predetermined boundaries given by the experimenter. The study was aimed at revealing the 
relationships between different kinds of problem finding (according to the level of complexity 
and independence) and the related problem-solving efforts. Dillon found out that the 
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relationships grew weaker as the level of complexity and independence increased. 
Correspondingly, he suggested that individuals could be differentiated on the basis of their 
preference for problem finding rather than problem solving, and more precisely, on the basis 
of their preference for particular levels of problem finding and solving (Dillon 1985).  
By taking a closer look at the phenomena, empirical studies substantiated the argument that 
problem finding as a construct can contribute to gain insights on the creative act. The first 
systematic research on problem finding coming to such results was done by Getzels and 
Csikszentmihalyi (1976). They aimed at shedding light on the role that problem finding and 
the underlying cognitive processes play in creative processes. More specifically, they wanted 
to find the degree to which problem finding activity was associated with quality of the final 
product (Dudek and Cote 1994). Their studies and subsequent experiments confirmed the 
positive correlation between discovery-oriented behaviours and the originality of the artwork 
(e.g. Csikszenmihalyi 1990). For instance, studies were executed finding a positive 
correlation between problem finding scores and several indicators of creative potential 
(Wakefield 1985). Other studies indicated that an individual finds more original solutions to a 
problem discovered on its own than for a problem that is presented to him (Runco and Okuda 
1988). Yet other research suggested that measures of an individual’s problem finding skills 
have predictive power for its creative achievement (Getzels and Smilansky 1983; Hoover and 
Feldhusen 1990; Redmond et al. 1993; Smilansky 1984); mostly even higher than that of 
verbal reasoning and divergent thinking tests (Mumford et al. 1996b). Methodologically, very 
often the time spent on information manipulation before solving a problem is measured. 
Another popular method is to investigate the number of explored problem elements before the 
proposition of an initial idea; or simply question-asking behaviours of subjects in 
experimental situations (see e.g. Getzels and Csikszentmihalyi 1976; Glover 1979; Jay and 
Perkins 1997; Kay 1991; Rostan 1994).  
In summary, the previous considerations contained different cognitive approaches to model 
human thought and creative thought, and outlined their connection with each other. However, 
it should be kept in mind that cognition and information processing are only a particular view 
on the phenomenon of creative human thinking, focussing on cognitive processes and the 
knowledge it is operated on. It can be thought of a mass of variables that influence the nature 
and ontogeny of the creative act (Mumford and Gustafson 1988). Therefore, concluding this 
foundational chapter, a classification of contextual variables influencing the cognitive 
processes is introduced, mainly placed in the interplay of personal motivation and socio-
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cultural factors (Sternberg and Lubart 1999). This is an important aspect for the 
argumentation of the present work since it is assumed that cognitive patterns a relatively 
stable and stored as schemas guiding an individual’s information processing. 
 
3. Creativity, Context, and Cognitive Styles  
Most generally, and according to the general approach here, two categories of variables can 
be differentiated that interact with cognitive processes in creative thinking: Individual 
(personal) and situational (contextual) variables (Crutchfield 1973). While aspects such as 
knowledge, basic cognitive processes, aptitudes and abilities, personality characteristics, and 
environmental perceptions would be attached to personal variables, environmental structure, 
cultural characteristics, and economic or evaluative considerations would be assigned to the 
latter category. Hereafter, various personal and contextual factors are briefly presented and it 
is outlined, how they are assumed to influence an individual’s processing efforts in creative 
thinking. Considering the enormous variety of factors that could be mentioned for general 
thought processes, the following chapter will focus on the creative thought.  
However, theoretic explanations to systematise individual or contextual differences of 
creativity are rather seldom, and those existing all draw a rather similar picture that will be 
briefly sketched here (Lubart 2001): In creativity literature most authors identify five 
aggregates of influencing variables, conditioning the creative outcome of any thinking process 
(Mumford et al. 1991; Mumford and Gustafson 1988). While the first set is the one which is 
mainly dealt with in this work and has been presented in some detail - the (a) cognitive 
processes contributing to the individual’s capacity of generating novel problem solutions – 
being rather a part of an individual's personality, the second set is derived form the (b) 
situation persons are situated in (Mumford et al. 1991). The inclusion of situative elements 
augments the perspective on the phenomenon from a micro-approach, dissecting cognition 
from other aspects, to a rather embedded view as in approaches of situated cognition 
(Salthouse and Craik 2000). Nevertheless, it should be kept in mind that methodological 
individualism requires to cast contextual or situational aspects from the perspective of the 
individual.  
As to the (a) personal variables shaping information processing, Amabile (1996) emphasised 
individual differences for the level of creative productions; in particular task motivation, 
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domain-relevant knowledge and skills, as well as the application of creativity-relevant 
processes are mentioned. The corresponding empirical results suggest that these model 
variables could account for differences in creative, rather than in analytical algebraic tasks. 
However, before focussing on a general framework for personal variables influencing creative 
thinking, it should be kept in mind that there exist strong relationships between such abilities 
or personal variables and cognitive processes, justifying to start with the individual in 
assessing creative thinking (Jensen 1987; Keating and Babbitt 1978; Lansman et al. 1982). At 
this point, it could be reasoned that both approaches are only different constructs of 
researchers to understand an observable phenomenon: This view implies that cognitive 
processes represent component operations underlying more basic abilities. Consequently, it 
might be argued that processing skills do not contribute to superior measurement of creative 
thinking (Mumford et al. 1997a).  
However, contradictory findings indicating an unique contribution of certain cognitive 
processes to the solution of creative problems (e.g. Mumford et. 1996a; Mumford et al. 
1996b; Okuda et al. 1990; Smilansky 1984), suggest that processing capacities represent 
procedures or general strategies on their own, which are also subject to certain developmental 
influences (Finke et al. 1992). Consequently, Hoover (1990) developed a more general 
theoretical framework of aggregated components that influence the creative thought of any 
individual, based upon a review of both, the general psychological and gifted education, 
literatures on problem finding and -solving. The four components presented were (1) memory 
organisation and facilitation, (2) specific and general problem-solving skills, (3) 
metacognitive skills, and (4) extra-cognitive or cognitive style attributes and are depicted in 
Figure 27 with their corresponding subcategories. 
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Figure 27 Components of Problem-Finding and Problem-Solving (Hoover and Feldhusen 1994). 
Many insights on individual problem-solving capabilities, which could be tagged as the way 
an individual processes information and are summarised hereafter, were derived from 
comparisons of the differences between experts and novices, observing what makes up good 
or effective, respectively creative problem solvers from poor performers (Hoover and 
Feldhusen 1994; Mumford et al. 1991). The first component, memory organisation and 
facilitation, refers to the context of a specified domain or knowledge base, while the aspect of 
specific and general skills or heuristics involves the acquisition of knowledge or information 
to be integrated within the existing knowledge base. The term of metacognitive or executive 
strategies embraces such processing strategies that direct, control, monitor, and evaluate the 
processes of information. Further, the extra-cognitive functions provide interest and 
motivation in the problem, and establish an orientation on the part of the individual towards 
the discovery and elucidation of significant problems. It is important to notice that these 
components are interacting, which is crucial in elucidating gaps in the knowledge base that 
are of significance. For instance, metacognitive strategies provide the necessary monitoring 
functions during the whole process, thus play a role for all aspects. Thus, the aggregation is 
apparently more of a theoretical nature and the components, respectively aspects within, are 
strongly interrelated. Nevertheless, each of the components represents a dimension, to which 
individuals differ providing a basis for distinguishing them, which is briefly done in the 
following. 
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Concerning (1) memory organisation and facilitation it can be argued that in any real thinking 
process an individual interacts with the content or knowledge within a domain, strategies are 
employed to organise information and allow for effective access as problems are encountered. 
In finding a problem, for example, a superior individual disposes of an effective knowledge 
base and, therefore, is capable of recognising when new information does not fit into the 
existing cognitive structures (Hoover and Feldhusen 1994). In any given situation, individuals 
exhibit differences as to this absorptive capacity; it seems that effective problem-solvers' 
memory organisation and facilitation differ qualitatively and quantitatively from that of less 
effective individuals. Quantitatively, their memory contains more specific procedural 
knowledge for solving particular types of problems and, additionally, more specific 
information about particular problem domains. Furthermore, they tend to access information 
through a scheme that contains both information about a class of problems as well as 
procedures useful in solving them (Chi et al. 1981; Sweller et al. 1983). Qualitatively, good 
problem solvers tend to organise information about the basic or underlying principles of a 
domain (Chi et al. 1981; Sweller et al. 1983; Gick and Holoyak 1983). This organisation is 
made in a hierarchical set with superordinate categories based on abstract concepts and 
subordinate categories on more concrete representations (Chi and Koeske 1983). As a result 
or implication of this superior access to appropriate procedural and declarative knowledge-
based schemas, superior problem solvers reduce their short-term memory load and make 
additional processing capacity available (Hoover and Feldhusen 1994; Sternberg 1985). This 
additional processing capacity allows such individuals going beyond simple acquisition of 
information and instead accessing their extant knowledge base.  
Additionally, it seems as if good problem solvers posses a strong general base of knowledge 
to a particular class of problem (Chase and Simon 1973; de Groot 1965; Mulholland et al. 
1980; Holzman et al. 1983; Chi et al.1981; Larkin and Reif 1979; Smith and Good 1984). 
Very often such knowledge is acquired through many years of intense involvement in a 
domain or field of study by which specific and general problem-solving skills are developed 
(Greeno 1978); i.e. experienced problem solvers have accumulated knowledge about a 
specific domain that is indeed coupled with an appropriate organisation of the knowledge in 
memory. This particularly enables them to construct useful problem representations (Larkin 
and Reif 1979). In this regard it seems sensible differentiating clearly between experience and 
expertise (Neale and Northcraft 1990). While experience is only seen as simple feedback, 
expertise means that the individual has a conceptual understanding of how a rational decision 
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processes looks like and is aware of the biases that limit the rationality of such decisions in 
general and in its own case (Ucbasaran 2004).  
However, before new or novel information enters the cognitive system, it is first dealt with by 
(2) specific, domain-relevant problem-solving skills. If the individual fails to adequately 
integrate either new information or results of the operations performed by its specific skills on 
new information, more general problem-solving skills are employed, which are far less 
directly tied to a specific content domain. Thus, in this particular view, problem finding could 
be regarded as result from an effort of the individual to utilise both specific and general 
problem-solving procedures as an attempt is made to integrate new data, experiences, or 
information into an organised memory structure. Put differently, superior problem-solvers 
simply seem to know what is useful and effective in a specific problem domain (Hoover and 
Feldhusen 1994). These procedures are often called heuristics; generally, this term refers to 
“[…] simplifying strategies that individuals use to make strategic use […], especially in 
complex situations where less complete information is available.” (Ucbasaran 2004, p. 79)  
However, it should be kept in mind that several studies underpin the assumption that a point 
of decreasing creativity exists, as an individual disposes of exuberant knowledge; the reasons 
are seen in an automated and unchecked, rather automated responding to problems (Hoover 
and Feldhusen 1994). In fact, this might lead to a tunnel vision and stereotyped problem-
solving efforts (Basadur 1994). If an individual’s creativity is therefore really endangered by 
putting too much faith in past experience (Runco 1994), there must consequently exist an 
optimal level of expertise in order to maximise creativity (Rubenson and Runco 1991). 
Therefore, it seems necessary to retain flexibility and sensitivity in creative problem-solving 
tasks. Even in other task environments a strategy might be effective in a particular domain or 
situation, but turns out to be ineffective in another. Generally speaking, the only strategies 
that will allow continued creativity are those open to modification. In conclusion, the 
importance of strategies is often exaggerated since they do not guarantee creative success. 
Strategy reflects know-how or procedural knowledge, but in fact also know-what or 
declarative knowledge are crucial and dependent on the individual’s cognition, e.g. its 
attention or perception (Hoover and Feldhusen 1994).  
Further to this, humans are able to step back from the situation at hand and to reflect about the 
information processes applied. These capabilities are named (3) metacognitive or processing 
skills, which refer to higher order thinking that involves an individual’s active control over 
the cognitive processes (Livingston 1997). For instance, within a class of similar problems, 
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good problem solvers spend more time on solving the initial tasks of representation (and of 
conceptualisation) of the problem domain. Conversely, less time is spent on later stages of the 
solution. A main reason for this could be that such individuals have a higher awareness of 
time needed for planning and understanding of a problem (Greeno 1978; Mulholland et al. 
1980). In other words, such individuals reflect on the cognitive processes, for instance 
heuristics, they apply in a given situation. Furthermore, good problem solvers show an 
increase in processing speed and an automatisation of processing (Sternberg 1985). This 
enables them to shift available processing capacity to more effective process strategies (in 
order to overcome limitations in short-term memory), and to monitor their own progress and 
spend more time on such self-checking, respectively execute a more effective and continuous 
monitoring (Mulholland et al. 1980; Smith and Good 1984). Summarising the last argument, 
it can be said that whatever term is used in this context, they all emphasise the role of 
executive processes in the overseeing and regulation of cognitive processes (Livingston 
1997). 
In addition to these aspects, which can be rather easily integrated in an information processing 
account of human thinking, (4) extra-cognitive or affective psychological factors apparently 
influence the information processing in an individual’s problem-solving effort as well, but 
cannot be directly related to cognitive process. Frequently, the role of rather rational cognitive 
aspects in thinking is overemphasised: “Cognition is too often defined as distinct from affect, 
attitude, and even metacognition. Definitions emphasising cognition may be used as 
conveniences, but clearly they are as unrealistic […]. Thinking is not entirely rational. 
Emotions direct lines of thought and are responsible for the motivation and effort needed to 
process information.” (Runco 1994, p. 278) So far, research on creative thinking has not 
thoroughly explored this component in comparison to other aspects, in particular little has 
been done within the information processing paradigm (Gardner 1988; Hoover and Feldhusen 
1994). One of only few exceptions is the study of Dudek and Cote (1994) who found out that 
the originality of an art product is highly correlated with an individual’s motivation or 
emotional involvement.xxii  
However, the decisive point in an information processing account of creative thinking is not 
merely emotional involvement, but rather the transformation of involvement into symbolic 
meaning relevant to cognitive processing (Dudek and Cote 1994). Components that equally 
belong in this category - critical to deal with from an information processing perspective - are 
extra-cognitive aspects such as tolerance for ambiguity, field dependence or independence, 
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reflectivity or impulsivity, or interest and motivation; i.e. an individual’s level of 
perseverance or intrinsic motivation (Lubart 2001). Aspects such as feeling (Dudek and Cote 
1994), purpose (Kay 1994), complacency (Moore 1994), interest (Houtz 1994), anxiety 
(Smith and Carlsson 1983; Smith et al. 1990) or empathy (Wakefield 1995) are of crucial 
influence for information processing. To put it simple: If there is no interest, there is no 
problem (Runco 1994).xxiii Therefore, scholars have recently spent more time on investigating 
interactions between cognition and affect (Lazarus 1991; Runco 1994b; Zajonc 1980; see for 
a general overview Phelps 2005). Indeed, affect might be of increased interest particularly if 
the notion of the present work is accepted that problems are not inherent in the situation but 
rather constructed by individuals (Runco 1994). 
In this context, the term of cognitive style is frequently used; basically, it is the way in which 
individuals think and order their environments, order their sensory preferences, and formulate 
and communicate their ideas; i.e. it refers to an individual’s typical way of processing 
information (Martinsen and Kaufmann 2000). The issue seems particularly interesting to the 
present work since many scholars are convinced that such individual differences are most 
important in novel and ill-defined situations (Fritz et al. 2002). However, the concept of 
cognitive style is not a pure cognitive concept since affective aspects such as interest and 
attitudes do play an important role, thus being a linking element between cognition and 
personality (Fritz et al. 2002): It is a person’s rather stable, characteristic style of acquiring 
and using information and, therefore, used as an expression of psychological differentiation 
within characteristic modes of information processing. This assertion transforms an adult’s 
cognitive style into a highly automatic and consistent as well as integrated and intricate 
behavioural mode that is quite consistent across task situations (Fritz et al. 2002; Witkin and 
Goodenough 1981). Regarding stability, the present work assumes that the term of cognitive 
preferences refers to less robust ways of information processing, which are more malleable 
than and not as rigid in time as cognitive styles are. 
As said, this rigidity that characterises cognitive styles somehow transforms them into 
distinguishing features of an individual’s personal nature. Given this statement, cognitive 
styles might be considered as personality traits. However, in using this term caution is advised 
since trait theory in psychology deals with quite heterogeneous concepts: While all traits 
share some common features the term embraces as well easily changeable as broad and 
possibly genetically based characteristics of human personality. It is asserted here that a 
cognitive style is not a genetically inherited feature of an organism, i.e. no phenotype. Rather, 
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cognitive styles are developed in early childhood highly shaped by family environments 
(Witkin and Goodenough 1981). This developmental characteristic implies that an individual 
exhibits a certain degree of consistency in processing information (Cornet 1983; Claxton and 
Ralston 1978), but by no means that it cannot be changed and influenced by appropriate 
learning measures. Since, it is a distinctive characteristic of trait theory to neglect such 
developmental aspects and individual behaviour in specific situations (Heffner 2002), traits 
are here considered as being different from cognitive style. The former terms is here 
understood as referring to far more rigid patterns of behaviour, resting deeper in a person’s 
personality.  
However, several theories of cognitive style haven been developed, intending to categorise 
such according to one ore more dimensions. Quite prominent among these is field-
dependence cognitive style theory distinguishing between field-dependent and field-
independent styles. Individuals exhibiting the former cognitive style are assumed to have 
interest in social contacts and other people as well as good interpersonal and communication 
skills. In turn, field-independent cognitive style includes individual and analytic interests and 
problem-solving skills (Witkin and Goodenough 1981). However, various cognitive styles 
have been identified, measured, and shown to affect the manner in which individuals perceive 
their environments distinguishing individuals as to one ore more aspects of their information 
processing behaviour. In addition to field dependence or field independence, individuals' 
styles are assumed to differ concerning type of scanning, breadth of categorisation, way of 
conceptualising, cognitive complexity or simplicity, degree of reflectiveness or impulsivity, 
degree of levelling or sharpening, flexibility of control, as well as tolerance for incongruous 
or unrealistic experiences, just to mention a few (Hoover and Feldhusen 1994).  
Cognitive Styles... 
• ...are an individual’s way of thinking and ordering its environments, ordering its sensory 
preferences, and formulating and communicating its ideas. 
• ...are highly automatic as well as integrated and intricate behavioural modes. 
• …are temporally robust. 
• …are quite consistent across task situations. 
• ...a way of psychologically differentiating individuals. 
• ...unfold their strongest impact in novel and ill-defined situations. 
Figure 28 Central Characteristics of Cognitive Styles. 
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Summarizing what has been said, Figure 28 lists the central characteristics of cognitive styles. 
In fact, many terms and concepts have been introduced to distinguish individuals as to one ore 
more of these aspects of their information processing behaviour. Basically, it is dealt with an 
individual’s strategy, a term that refers here “[...] to a pattern of decisions in the acquisition, 
retention, and utilisation of information that serves to meet certain objectives, i.e., to ensure 
certain forms of outcome and to insure against certain others.” (Bruner et al. 1956, p. 54)  
Another, similar but rather cognitive concept of explaining such typical person-bound 
information processing emphasises other aspects and explicitly refers to the conjecture that 
such ways of information processing are stored in human memory as knowledge structures 
and guide current processing efforts. It has been deal with the concept of schemas; however, 
here it is important to state that there exist so called habitual or chronic schemas that are 
habitually activated by an individual in response to a specific stimulus. Thereby, the 
individual skips the assessment of appropriateness to the situation at hand and reacts rather 
meachanistic (Gaglio and Katz 2001).xxiv These schemas can be consciously activated and 
used by an individual, but their influence is so pervasive and constant that individuals are 
seldom aware they are activated (Gaglio and Katz 2001). Put differently, the idea of chronic 
schema is that they, mostly unconsciously, guide almost all individual’s perceptions and 
interpretations, thereby automating information processing since attentional or intentional 
control are not necessarily involved (Norman and Shallice 1986). Many studies indicate that 
individuals possess quite temporally robust cognitive patterns and preferences; for instance 
regarding their so called regulatory focus (e.g. Higgins 1998; Higgins and Silberman 1998). 
In summary, it could be said that individuals show a certain degree of chronic styles and 
preferences (Baron 2004). 
It has already been argued that, notwithstanding methodological individualism, the situations 
the cognitive operations are executed in are of significant importance. This seems particularly 
palpable considering the social-constructivist approach alleged here. The intruding question is 
rather which aspects, and in which way, influence human information processing. A virtually 
infinite number of situational variables such as culture or society could be mentioned that 
might shape an individual’s cognitive processing (see e.g. Amabile 1983, 1996; Kirshner and 
Whitson 1997). However, the probably most evident aspect, which can be assumed to 
influence human cognition, is the domain an individual is situated in while processing 
information. Quite surprisingly, the traditional experimental tasks with which thinking mainly 
was, and still is, investigated, were not capable of shedding significant light on the influence 
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of the particular domain on cognition (Brown and Walter 1983; Hadamard 1945; Spitz and 
Borys 1984). Consequently the question arises whether scientists, artists, or economic agents 
are dealing with fundamentally different problems? And if so, to what extent are they similar 
and how do they differ? It seems that differences are not only of terminological nature but 
also significant distinctions within the processes can be observed (Dudek and Cote 1994).  
However, even if the continuum view of creativity is adopted, it could be asked whether a 
general creative thinking-process model can be conceived sufficiently general to account for 
all, or at least a high number of, different settings, or if there are significantly different 
processes at work in creative thoughts, e. g. in arts, sciences, or economics (Lubart 2001). 
This question is of particular interest in the context of the present work since it is intended to 
transfer insights from other domains to the entrepreneurial field. And indeed, several authors 
have developed models of the creative process for a particular task environment. 
Nevertheless, it should be kept in mind that a huge part of the overall work on creative 
processes has sought the generic process or the general model independent of a domain or 
setting (Lubart 2001). Similarly, the present work assumes the position that, due to domain-
invariant mechanisms, it is not only principally possible but also sensible to develop a general 
model of creative thinking. Notwithstanding, in adopting findings from other domains than 
economics caution must be exercised.  
For example, many studies on creativity and problem finding have been done by investigating 
artists. Artists are rather looking for a symbolic equivalent as solution that is emotionally 
releasing and original to them; such problems are neither original nor resolvable. In other 
words, artists do not deal with matter; they deal through matter to come to terms with internal 
human problems (Dudek and Cote 1994). Just to mention a few, Ghiselin (1952) investigated 
problem finding in dancing and writing. Moore (1985) replicated the study of Getzels and 
Csikszentmihalyi (1976) with student writers that showed a strong correlation between 
creative outcome’s quality and a high tolerance for chance in the finished product. More 
recently, Sapp (1995) conceived a process model for artistic creativity based on general 
creative problem-solving models and Nemiro (1997) proposed a process model for actors, by 
linking general preparation, rehearsal, and performance activities to the stages described in 
Amabile’s (1996) model. These examples already allow the conjecture of a different meaning 
of emotional involvement or motivation between arts and other tasks. It can be assumed that 
emotions play a significantly more critical role in arts than in economics. 
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However, the concept of problem finding originated in the field of science, already mentioned 
by the quotations of famous persons in the previous chapter that finding the right scientific 
problem is regarded as probably more important as finding the correct solution to it (Dudek 
and Cote 1994). The commonly accepted understanding of the science process as resolving 
inconsistencies within existing paradigms facing inconsistent data implies that a considerable 
problem finding activity is involved that is aimed at discovering ways of reformulating 
concepts in such a way that gaps and anomalies can be patched up to confirm the explanatory 
adequacy of the existing paradigm. Different studies have been done on the problem finding 
processes of creative scientists (see for example Barron 1963; Bruner 1963; Roe 1953; 
Beveridge 1957; Klahr 2000).  
In 1980, Busse and Mansfield proposed a model for scientific creativity consisting of five 
stages: (1) selection of a problem to solve among several possible problems, (2) engagement 
in efforts to solve the problem, (3) setting of constrains on the problem solution, (4) change of 
the constraints and restructuring the problem, and (5) verification and elaboration of the 
proposed solution. Other studies were more interested in particular aspects of problem finding 
and -solving in the domain of science: For instance, the fact that the main informational input 
for problem finding seems to be the tacit knowledge of the researcher’s mentor, e.g. his PhD 
supervisor (Subotnik and Steiner 1994); or alternatively, that it is important to involve the 
audience, the scientific community, in problem finding, i.e., identifying problems worthwhile 
to investigate (Overington 1977; Zuckerman 1977). It could be argued that creative thinking 
in sciences is typically characterised by lower emotional involvement than in economic 
situations. Concluding, it seems likely that information processing leading to creative output 
varies between domains and, therefore, findings in other domains cannot be adopted 
unconsidered to economic situations.  
                                                 
x  “Cognitive science can also be defined as, roughly, the intersection of the disciplines of computer science 
(especially artificial intelligence), linguistics, philosophy, psychology, cognitive anthropology, and the 
cognitive neurosciences.” (Reilly, 2004, p.110) 
xi  As Polanyi puts it: “For, as human beings, we must inevitably see the universe from a centre lying with 
ourselves and speak about it in terms of a human language shaped by the exigencies of human intercourse. 
Any attempt rigorously to eliminate our human perspective from our picture of the world must lead to 
absurdity.” (Polanyi 1962). 
 
xiii  Lachmann et al. bring a vivid analogy for the fundamental problem: “In this regard we see an appropriate 
parallel between our science and that of the cell endocrinologist who likened his work to that of an industrial 
spy. Sitting on a hillside above a factory with field glasses, he watches railroad cars arrive with raw 
materials. They are taken into one end of the factory, while at the other end trucks pick up completed 
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product. The spy’s job is to figure out what transpires in the factory. Every once in a while he can send in a 
car of materials he has selected, and later he can see what comes out; but he cannot take a trip through the 
factory.” (Lachmann et al. (1979), p. 123) 
xiv  An illustrative example is the following telegram, supposed to come from France: “PLEASE SEND ME 
FIFTY DOLLARS AMERICAN EXPRESS NICE LETTER OF EXPLANATION FOLLOWS LOVE 
YOU“. It depends on the geographical knowledge of the reader, whether he expects to receive a nice letter 
off explanation, or is supposed to send the money to the town of Nice in France. (Massaro and Cowan 1993). 
xv Please note that information confirming previous information involves novelty in the sense that the insight of 
confirmation is new 
xvi  An illuminating analogy it the situation of pedestrians crossing a bridge. It is more important t estimate the 
delay in one pedestrian’s passage as a function. Of the number of others hoping to cross simultaneously, than 
to determine whether the pedestrians cross on abreast or several abreast.  
xvii  “Although it is a modern truism to say that we live in culturally constructed worlds, the thin surface of 
cultural construction is dwarfed by (and made possible by) the deep underlying strata of evolved species-
typical cognitive construction.” (Cosmides and Tooby, 1995, p. xi) 
xviii  It might not be scientifically sophisticated but William James has a good point in stating that “Everyone 
knows what attention is. It is the taking possession by the mind in clear and vivid form, of one out of what 
seem several simultaneously possible objects or trains of thought.[…]. It implies withdrawal from some 
things in order to deal effectively with others."” (James 1890, p.  
xix  Please note that the store is the “receptable” how Styles (2005) calls it, not the memory itself. 
xx  The limited processing capacity can be experienced by, for instance, multiplying two large numbers. While 
operating the multiplication, an individual has to store sub-products for further calculations. Soon, this leads 
to memory overload.  
xxi  Imagine showing a child to ride a bicycle. Obviously, instructions can be given but actually it must be shown 
by action.  
xxii  “What gives colour, vitality, life, and in short, originality to the final product is the intense involvement in 
the task […], the great eagerness and desire to ‘make it original’, fresh and new, to stick at it until it reads 
that way to them.” (Dudek and Cote 1994, p. 138) 
xxiii  “All problems have an affective component. If they do not, they would no be perceived as problematic (and 
worth one’s effort). Problems by definition have goals – usually referred to as solutions – and these are 
presumably what incites or motivates individuals. Even with the simple definition of a problem as anything 
which is between an individual and a goal, there is an assumption that the goal is of interest or in some way 
needed. Interest and need both reflect affective states; ergo the concept of problem assumes an affective 
condition.” (Runco 1994, p. 278) 
xxiv  This should not be seen as an argument supporting a mechanistic view on the human mind (see the 
ontological discussion in chapter II.A.1). 
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“Why can’t entrepreneurship scholars see useful theory and methods for exploring 
opportunity that already exist in intellectual spaces so closely related to what they 
are studying?” (Gartner and Shaver 2004, p. 42) 
 
IV. A Cognitive Model of Opportunity Recognition 
This central chapter starts with reviewing research efforts on entrepreneurial cognition, in 
particular such dealing with the role of the two central cognitive elements, information 
processing and knowledge, in entrepreneurial behaviour. Delineating the field allows 
conceiving opportunity recognition as creative thinking in part B of chapter IV; these 
considerations are aimed at pointing out the particular stance for modelling the phenomenon. 
This seems necessary since heterogeneity prevails in research on entrepreneurial cognition. 
Therefore, basic assertions, summarising important issues introduced in previous chapters, are 
given in part 2 and taken as granted afterwards. After the third section of part B has presented 
a general framework of creative thinking as reference model, the last part C, finally, 
introduces cognitive processes executed in opportunity recognition in some more detail. For 
each of these processes, several cognitive styles as preferences for types of information are 
discussed. Opportunity recognition is here dissected in three major steps, representing the 
section of the chapter’s final part: the conception of an initial problem representation, its 
updating by information encoding from the external world and activation of knowledge 
categories from memory, and the combination and reorganisation of such categories, probably 
producing creative outcomes of the thinking process.  
 
A. Opportunity Recognition, Entrepreneurship, and Cognition 
1. Entrepreneurial Cognition Research 
Against the background of the arguments given in chapter II and III it is not surprising that 
during the last decades many scholars tried to explain the phenomena of entrepreneurship as a 
function of the types of people engaged in entrepreneurial activity; however, this perspective 
resulted in a neglect of the role of opportunities (Eckhardt and Shane 2003). In 1960s and 
1970s a variety of studies (e.g. McClelland 1965) intended to shed light on personalities, 
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backgrounds, early experiences, and traits reported by entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs 
(Baron 1998; Ucbasaran 2004). However, the rationally inferred conviction “[…] that these 
people were somehow distinct […].“ (Mitchell et al. 2002, p. 95) could not be corroborated 
empirically with these studies since they showed weak, disconfirming, or non-significant 
results (Low and MacMillan 1988; Mitchell et al. 2002; White et al. 2003; see for an 
overview Pendergast 2003). Not even one unique set of personality traits could be reported by 
these research efforts (Mitchell et al. 2002). It is argued that the main weakness of such a 
person-centric perspective lies in the assumption of stable differences among economic 
agents’ personalities and economic situations; considering that entrepreneurial activity is 
episodic, it is unlikely to find rigid personal attributes with a high explanatory power 
explaining why some economic agents engage in entrepreneurial activity and others do not 
(Eckhardt and Shane 2003).  
However since then there has been a shift in the focus of research in the field of 
entrepreneurship from the former attempts to identify individuals in society exhibiting certain 
entrepreneurial characteristics towards an understanding of the nexus of such enterprising 
individuals and valuable opportunities (Eckhardt and Shane 2003; Shane 2000; Shane 2003; 
Venkatamaran 1997). This research shift can be attributed to several insights that economists 
have gained, thoroughly changing their perspective on the process in which entrepreneurs 
introduce novelty and change into economic systems.  
Although research on entrepreneurship and opportunity identification seems to be quite 
heterogeneous, offering explanations and theories from a wide range of perspectives and 
fields, there seems to be a focus on economic and psychological aspects of opportunity 
recognition, which can be justified by pointing out that “[…] the entrepreneur faces two 
distinct, but interrelated problems: an economic problem and a cognitive problem.“ (Suchman 
et al. 2001) Some scholars even think that a cognitive perspective can not only contribute to 
opportunity identification’s understanding, but also function as a general theoretical 
framework (Baron 2004a). The central assumption on which such a view is based is that 
entrepreneurship concerns itself with distinctive ways of thinking and behaving (Mitchell et 
al. 2007). It is assumed that entrepreneurs are different by modifying the categories of their 
framework (Lane et al. 1996) or sometimes even by adding a new category (Yu 2001): they 
are somehow creative. “Creative activity thus involves the shifting together of different sets of 
reference frames that would usually be ordered differently and be seen incompatible - until 
something clicks into place as a new way of looking at how things fit together.” (Yu 2001, p. 
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54) In other words, by making such a discovery, the entrepreneur escapes from the extant 
patterns of interpretation and reorganises ideas into new sequences (deBono 1992; Thayer 
1988).  
Accordingly, “[…] entrepreneurs are those who incubate new ideas, start enterprises based on 
those ideas […].” (Holt 1992, p. 11) Such a definition points out that these economic agents 
are characterised by a certain aptitude that enables them to derive new ideas. Viewed from 
this perspective, another important question, would be how market environments are 
represented and interpreted in the mind of the entrepreneur so that opportunity identification 
occurs? Further, it should be clarified if and, in case the answer is yes, these representations 
and interpretations differ from those of other economic agents? (Shaver and Scott 1991) This 
is exactly what will be examined in the present work. 
Such a framework could not solely serve as a fundament for further research, but also for 
entrepreneurship education.xxv Indeed, there exists a variety of studies on entrepreneurial 
cognitive processes and knowledge (see e.g. Mitchell et al. 2002, 2007). Among such 
attempts, it appears to be rather evident to fall back on extant psychological research, given 
the emphasis on the human dimension of thinking in research on entrepreneurship in general 
and in research on the identification of entrepreneurial opportunities in particular (Forbes 
1999).  
A cognitive perspective has added greatly to the understanding of virtually every aspect of 
human behaviour - particularly economic actions taken and decisions made (Hesse 1990; 
Ucbasaran 2004) - to which it has been applied, so why not to the domain of entrepreneurship 
(Baron 1998)? Therefore, in order to overcome incomplete understanding, it seems necessary 
to investigate the behaviour of economic agents from a cognitive perspective; in the context 
of the present work particularly the entrepreneur (Hitt and Tyler 1991). In general, such 
research could be named cognitive entrepreneurship research (Mitchell et al. 2004). Defining 
the field that is comprehended by the term it could be said: “[E]ntrepreneurial cognitions are 
the knowledge structures that people use to make assessments, judgements, or decisions 
involving opportunity evaluation, venture creation, and growth. In other words, research in 
entrepreneurial cognition is about understanding how entrepreneurs use simplifying mental 
models to piece together previously unconnected information […].” (Mitchell et al. 2002, p. 
97) Leaning more on the two basic cognitive elements, “[…] entrepreneurial cognition can 
therefore be defined as a set of cognitive processes and knowledge structures that explain how 
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entrepreneurs think, perceive, process information, and learn in relation to the identification 
and exploitation of opportunities.” (Ucbasaran 2004, p. 76) 
Touching briefly the history of entrepreneurial cognition research it can be said that the terms 
of entrepreneurs’ cognitions and entrepreneurial cognition were introduced in the early to 
mid-1990s (Busenitz and Lau 1996; Mitchell et al. 2002). This research was an effort aiming 
at overcoming the palpable failure of trait theory (Hindle 2004). Indeed, in contrast to 
unsuccessful attempts focussing on personality, the body of research addressing 
entrepreneurial questions from a cognitive perspective pointed to the conclusion that 
entrepreneurs differ from other individuals with respect to some cognitive processes (Baron 
1998). First research in this field that received major attention was done in the areas of 
cognitive biases and heuristics in strategic decision making, as well as feasibility and 
desirability perception, planned behaviour and self-efficacy (Mitchell et al. 2002). After 
further studies on risk-taking (see Palich and Bagby 1995) and cognition-based 
entrepreneurship education, Baron (1998) came up with ideas concerning the role of several 
cognitive mechanisms like counterfactual thinking, affect infusion, attributional styles, 
planning fallacy, and escalation of commitment. Then, other scholars focussed on cognitive 
errors and models explaining heuristic-based logic of entrepreneurs (Mitchell et al. 2002). 
This research can be seen in a naturalistic tradition that accepts the practicality of heuristics 
not regarded as sources of errors but as effective decision means in ill-defined and dynamic 
situations (Bryant 2007).  
Such approaches are all based on the central conjecture that there exist cognitive 
characteristics underlying entrepreneurial action that can help to explain why some 
individuals are able to do such actions, while others are not, respectively only limited in their 
capability to do so (Baron 1998, 2004). Most generally, a cognitive perspective can contribute 
to an understanding of the attributes (prior knowledge, cognitive mechanisms, heuristics, or 
creative abilities) a potential entrepreneur is supposed to have. However, it should be noted 
that this does not directly refer to the process of acquiring such attributes; this rather belongs 
to the domain of entrepreneurial learning (Corbett 2005). Saying this, an important 
terminological distinction must be made between knowledge, cognition, and learning; while 
knowledge is a static concept, which is highly intertwined with cognitive processes, learning 
is the process of knowledge creation by transforming experience. These processes of learning 
are doubtless significant for entrepreneurship and opportunity recognition but are not 
addressed here in the present work since they are inherently different from cognitive 
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processes and, thus, a treatment would go beyond the scope of a work like the present (see 
instead e.g. Corbett 2005; Minniti and Bygrave 2001). 
However, in hope to find more satisfying explanations for the assertion of a specific 
entrepreneurial cognition, more recently many scholars have used a cognitive approach to 
investigate the entrepreneurial process. They aim at finding out, how entrepreneurs think and 
make their strategic decisions (Krueger 2003; McGee 1995), focussing on such different 
aspects as risk perceptions (Simon et al. 2000), cognitive biases in different entrepreneurial 
decision contexts (Simon and Houghton 2002), decision making biases and heuristics 
(Busenitz and Barney 1997) (see for more examples of more general studies Baron 1998; 
Forbes 1999). All these approaches share the basic conjecture that entrepreneurs have a 
unique mindset (Alvarez and Busenitz 2001) and could be seen as similar to the attempts of 
scholars in Austrian economics to refine or elaborate the role of subjectivism in this regard 
(see e.g. Yu 2001).  
Reviewing the relevant literature, Mitchell et al. (2004, 2007) have identified some questions 
and issues that are specific to the entrepreneurial cognition domain and might serve to 
delineate the field with which research on entrepreneurial cognition mainly deals. These refer 
to individuals’ decision to become an entrepreneur, the recognition and exploitation of 
opportunities, strategic decision making and its impact on the venture, general thinking 
processes of entrepreneurs compared to other individuals, and the measurement of cognitive 
concepts in non-laboratory settings, summarised in Figure 29. 
Questions and Issues Specific to the Entrepreneurial Cognition Domain 
Why do some people and not others choose to become entrepreneurs? (Simon et al. 2000) 
Why do some persons but not others recognise opportunities for new products or services that can be 
profitably exploited? (Gaglio and Katz 2001) 
How do entrepreneurs think and make strategic decisions? How do these differences lead to competitive 
advantages and disadvantages? (Busenitz and Barney 1997; Mitchell et al. 2000, 2002, 2007). How do these 
differences lead to competitive advantages & disadvantages? (Alvarez and Busenitz 2001) 
Do entrepreneurs think differently than other, business people? (Busenitz and Barney 1997; Gaglio and Katz 
2001; Mitchell et al. 2002; Mitchell 2003) 
Measurement of cognitive concepts in non-laboratory settings. (Mitchell 1994; Mitchell et al. 2000) 
Figure 29 Question and Issues Specific to the Entrepreneurial Cognition Domain (Mitchell et al. 2004, p. 
508). 
Methodologically, the popular approach to base studies on the differences between experts 
and novices has been adopted in the field of entrepreneurial cognition, distinguishing between 
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habitual and novice entrepreneurs (e.g. Birley and Westhead 1993; Ucbasaran 2004; 
Westhead and Wright 1998). Such research intends to find cognitive differences between 
habitual entrepreneurs, who own or have owned at least two businesses, and novice 
entrepreneurs, who only own one business and do not dispose of further experience 
(Ucbasaran 2004). From a cognitive perspective these studies assume that habitual 
entrepreneurs possess something like an entrepreneurial mindset, but corroborating findings 
were not obtained (Ucbasaran 2004). Besides the argument regarding drawing a suitable 
sample already described in chapter II.B.2, scholars have suggested that such studies have not 
considered cognitive heterogeneity among each of these groups. It is argued that the 
inaccurate distinction between habitual and novice entrepreneurs doe not account for 
interpersonal differences regarding cognitive processes and knowledge structures (Ucbasaran 
2004).  
Summarising what has been said about this research in this field, already many aspects of 
entrepreneurial activity have been targeted from this perspective, reason why a detailed 
discussion would fill whole chapters of its own that would only marginally contribute to the 
purpose of the present work, particularly considering that it is still a rather young research 
stream on the move (Mitchell et al. 2007). Nevertheless, it is striking that many models have 
been transferred from the field of cognitive psychology to entrepreneurship, nevertheless 
arguing that entrepreneurs might exhibit different decision making patterns than non-
entrepreneurs, based on concepts like signal-detection theory or regulatory-focus theory 
(Baron 2004a). It should become clear that entrepreneurs are tested as to their difference in 
already existing psychological dimensions. This orientation towards existing research has the 
methodological advantage that the articulation of a theoretically rigorous and empirically 
testable approach is possible, which might allow to systematically explain the role of the 
individual in the entrepreneurial process (Mitchell et al 2002). However, in accordance with 
general research on cognition, all scholars in the field of entrepreneurial cognition highlight 
the role of the two basic cognitive elements: knowledge and cognitive processes (Mitchell et 
al. 2002; Shane 2003). Thus, the present work focuses on basic cognitive processes and 
knowledge structures rather than on psychological concepts; therefore, more has to be said 
about findings as to these more elementary aspects of the entrepreneurial mind in general and 
in recognising entrepreneurial opportunities.  
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2. Cognitive Processes  
Generally, cognitive processes of entrepreneurs have been found being distinct from other 
economic agents, in particular of managers in most, or probably even all, categories of 
personal variables (e.g. Busenitz and Barney 1997; Wright et al. 2000). Usually it is argued 
that entrepreneurs are more often than other individuals situated in situations of cognitive 
overload, which matters since human information processing capacity is limited; such 
situations usually involve a high degree of uncertainty for which no appropriate knowledge 
structures exist. Further, entrepreneurs are typically assumed to be more frequently exposed to 
situations in which emotions run high, leading to more cognitive biases and errors. Such 
situations seem to be typical for entrepreneurs since it seems that they often face new, 
unpredictable, complex and ill-defined situations (Baron 1998; Katz 1992; Busenitz and Lau 
1996; Busenitz and Barney 1997; Baron 1998; Simon et al. 1999). Such typical 
entrepreneurial situations normally impose particular conditions on entrepreneurs, such as 
high uncertainty, novelty, time pressure, and stress (Corbett 2005). The emphasis that is put 
on a cognitive view on individuals in particular situations already calls for social-cognitive 
approaches for investigating entrepreneurial behaviour (Mitchell et al. 2007).  
It is often emphasised that entrepreneurs, situated in such ill-defined situations, are subject to 
many cognitive biases, such as a self-serving bias for instance (Baron 1998; Busenitz and 
Barney 1997; Corbett 2005; Mitchell et al. 2002; Simon and Houghton 2002). However, this 
has been found to result in an entrepreneurial thinking approach seeming to use heuristics and 
cognitive-based reasoning more extensively than managers (Baron 1998; Baron and Ward 
2004; Busenitz and Barney 1997; Corbett 2005; Mitchell et al. 2007; Simon et al. 1999). The 
term of cognitive-based processing means that individuals process all information carefully 
and thoroughly (Kullik and Perry 1994); while the former type of entrepreneurial processing 
implies that individuals may faster come to results of their processing, thereby attaching less 
value to thoroughness and carefulness.  
However, in creative thinking it is generally assumed that individuals apply decision 
heuristics, instead of executing algorithm-like processes, often because no specific methods 
for solving the problem are known (Mitchell et al. 2007). Shaver and Scott (1991) name three 
more cognitive heuristics that particularly seem to bias entrepreneurs and are presented by 
giving an example concerning the question of whether a restaurant will fail in its first year of 
operation. (1) An individual that has recently heard about a restaurant closing down will be 
most likely subject to the availability heuristic that it will give a higher estimate of failure 
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than a person without having heard about unsuccessful restaurants in a long time. (2) An 
individual that regards the restaurant at hand as a prototype of a successful enterprise will 
give a lower probability of failure than a person for whom the restaurant resembles 
unsuccessful ones (the representativeness heuristic). (3) Thirdly, the concept of anchoring 
heuristic refers to the situation that an individual knowing that three local restaurants have 
failed will give a lower estimate of failure than one that has hear of 10.000 unsuccessful 
restaurants nationwide.  
Besides applying heuristics and being subject to biases, it seems that the involvement of 
personal beliefs and fast decision making characterises entrepreneurial cognition. In turn, 
managerial cognition is assumed to be more accurate and optimal, rather methodical and 
factual-based, therefore more resembling to a systematic information processing approach 
(Ucbasaran 2004). It seems that without heuristic-based logic, the recognition and 
exploitation of entrepreneurial opportunities would become to overwhelming and costly, 
demanding to much cognitive capacity since situations entrepreneurs are typically confronted 
with situations that require the application of quicker rules of thumb, instead of rather 
exhaustive or algorithmic solutions (Pech and Cameron 2006).  
Similar to heuristic-based processing, Ucbasaran (2004) argues that this affinity of 
entrepreneurs can be seen as similar to the forward-looking form of intelligence (Gavetti and 
Levinthal 2000). Most generally, this means that an individual’s beliefs or expectations about 
the linkages between its choices of actions may influence subsequent actions and outcomes. 
Such intelligence allows any individual to evaluate information and alternative choices of 
action, without actually doing them; therefore this could be called off-line evaluation. In turn, 
the term on-line evaluation refers to such efforts which require at least partial implementation 
of an alternative, if the efficacy is supposed to be evaluated (Gavetti and Levinthal 2000; 
Ucbasaran 2004).  
It can be concluded that economic agents apply timely rather stable patterns of information 
processes to a given situation, which are stored as a schema, e.g. as a script, in the agent’s 
memory. Expressed differently, economic agents exhibit a personal way, a style or preference 
configuration, as how information is processed in a problem situation. In fact, first studies 
were already capable of generating supporting evidence for the assumption that particular 
cognitive styles serve better to recognise entrepreneurial opportunities than others. Corbett 
(2002) found that an individual's processing style of a rather intuitive manner seem to identify 
more opportunities than those exhibiting a rather analytical style. In the present work it is 
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assumed that such cognitive styles are indeed rather inflexible over time and can, thus, be 
considered a personal characteristic along an entrepreneurial process (Corbett 2005).  
Such a conceptualisation, resembling to a cognitive style for which it is often stated that 
entrepreneurs differ compared to managers, is the strategic focus, style of self-regulation, or 
regulatory focus; terms which all refer to the same idea that individuals do have different 
ways of setting goals to which they adjust their behaviour (Crowe and Higgins 1997; Higgins 
1998; Higgins and Silverman 1998; Werth 2004). Approaches choosing such a perspective 
seem promising for entrepreneurship research because they not only consider an individual's 
cognitive processes, but also its motivation to act in a specific manner (Mitchell et al. 2007). 
However since this concept will be introduced in some more detail in chapter IV.C.1, it 
should be enough to say at this point that managers seem to dispose of chronic schemas that 
guide their thinking and behaviour mainly by issues such as protection, safety, and 
responsibility, which is called a prevention focus. In turn, entrepreneurs seem to engage in a 
promotion focus that makes them think of advancement, growth, and accomplishment as well 
as directing attention on potential gains and approaching success, while focusing less on 
potential losses and avoiding failure (Brockner et al. 2004; Bryant 2007; Corbett and 
Hmieleski 2007; McMullen and Shepherd 2002).  
Related to this, studies exist suggesting that entrepreneurs are optimistic and generally believe 
that things will turn out better than rational considerations suggest (Krueger 2003). Put 
differently, it seems that entrepreneurs are relatively high in self-efficacy, which means that 
they believe that they can successfully accomplish whatever they plan to accomplish (Bryant 
2007; Chen et al. 1998). Altogether, it might be stated that entrepreneurs do have a distinctive 
pattern of self-regulation that might be termed Entrepreneurial Regulatory Framework and is 
dominated by a chronic promotion focus (Bryant 2006).  
Yet another cognitive aspect in which entrepreneurs might differ from other economic agents 
is their way of learning; it is hypothesised that they learn differently from experiences and 
that this particularly affects their future problem-solving efforts (in the wider sense) (Daft and 
Weick 1984; Ucbasaran 2004). Regarding this issue, it can be differentiated between higher-
level and lower-level learning. The former is based on the formation and the use of heuristics 
to generate new insights into solving ambiguous problems (Lei et al. 1996) and usually 
attributed to entrepreneurs (Ucbasaran 2004). In turn, the latter term is associated with rather 
routinised learning and repetitious observations, which is only temporary and rather imitable 
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since the underlying policies or values are rarely changed (Fiol and Lyles 1985; Ucbasaran 
2004).  
Concluding, entrepreneurial cognitions are typically assumed to be heuristic-based, off-line, 
forward looking, and guided by higher-level learning (Ucbasaran 2004). Further 
psychological mechanisms that are assumed to differentiate the entrepreneur from other 
economic agents include know-how, memory and filtering devices, intelligence, and 
enjoyment levels (Pech and Cameron 2006). However, such generalised characteristics should 
not mislead to assume that entrepreneurs are homogeneous as to their cognitive processes. 
Rather, studies indicate that they show quite heterogeneous processing patterns (Westhead 
and Wright 1998; Woo et al. 1991). This might be because such dichotomies entice to 
generalise cognitive behaviour, which, consequently, calls for models that dig deeper into 
entrepreneurial cognition, as the present study aims at doing for opportunity recognition by 
focussing on information-processes. However, as already underlined in general, also cognitive 
approaches to entrepreneurship should clearly distinguish between explanations of the main 
stages of the entrepreneurial process: opportunity recognition and exploitation. While the 
outcome of opportunity exploitation is the creation of a new venture, the result of the process 
of opportunity recognition from a cognitive perspective is defined as the conscious, 
verbalisable idea in the mind of one or a group of persons that they have recognised an 
entrepreneurial opportunity (Baron 2004a). Accordingly, scholars in entrepreneurship 
emphasise that recognition should be separated form the detailed evaluation both potential 
value and feasibility of the opportunity at hand, which is rather considered as belonging to the 
exploitation stage in the entrepreneurial process (Ardichvili et al. 2003; Baron 2004a).  
Without digging to deep into the characteristics of entrepreneurial information processing in 
the process of opportunity recognition, some general statements are given before information 
processing is tackled more thoroughly. Generally, research on opportunity recognition from a 
cognitive perspective is based on the conjecture that individual differences in knowledge and 
information processing are capable of explaining the capability to recognise entrepreneurial 
opportunities to a high degree (Baron 2004a; Corbett 2005; Shane 2000; Shaver and Scott 
1991; Ward 2004); i.e. to explain individual differences in the relative assessment of the 
market event or situation (Kirzner 1979). It is usually hypothesised that the cognitive 
processes underlying opportunity recognition are much the same across all individuals; basic 
cognitive processes enable specific persons to perceive, and know that they perceive, the 
potential for something economically new and valuable (Baron 2004a).  
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As pointed out, it is generally assumed that entrepreneurs proceed with heuristic-based logic 
in such cognitive processes. This is also argued for the discovery of entrepreneurial 
opportunities since they can rarely be derived by factual-based and linear cognitive process 
(Ucbasaran 2004). On the contrary, entrepreneurs are able to significant thinking leaps, 
leading to innovative ideas, which are often not linear or factually based (Alvarez and 
Busenitz 2001). Some scholars argue that this is because in such dynamic environments rather 
rational models of decision making are not ideal (Kahnemann and Tversky 1974; Krabaunrat 
and Phelps 1998). Indeed, comparisons between alert and non-alert economic agents suggest 
that the former possess “[…] a distinctive set of perceptual and reasoning behaviours that may 
not necessarily depend upon information gathering efforts nor upon cues inherent in the 
information.” (Gaglio and Katz 2001) Accordingly, “[…] opportunity recognition refers to the 
active, cognitive process (or processes) through which individuals conclude that they have 
identified the potential to create something new […].” (Baron 2004a, p. 52) Despite such 
findings (e.g. Gaglio and Katz 2001; Ko and Butler 2003), many scholars still criticise the 
lack of empirical support for this statement (see e.g. Ward 2004). 
Various scholars in the field of opportunity identification were inspired by Kirzner’s concept 
of alertness and intended to approach the notion from a cognitive perspective since the 
concept was seen by Kirzner (1979) himself as a distinctive set of perceptual and processing 
skills (Gaglio and Katz 2001; Yu 2001). Some of these emphasise the role of the self-interest 
motive that triggers of alertness and is called selective entrepreneurial attention (Gifford 
1992). Others argue that self-competition motivates individuals to be alert to entrepreneurial 
opportunities (Yu 2001); i.e. referring to individuals that aim at realising things and test their 
self-ability (Gilad et al. 1988; Khalil 1997). Based on the general fundament laid by Kirzner, 
the central assumption is that the potential for opportunities emerges from complex patterns 
of changing conditions in economic systems. Ontologically, this presupposes that 
opportunities exist in the external world in the sense of a pattern of events or stimuli that can 
be perceived by individuals.  
Hence, Baron (2004a) argues that opportunity recognition can be modelled as pattern 
recognition. Assuming that opportunities exist in the external world as complex patterns of 
observable stimuli, he names several processes of pattern recognition, developed in the field 
of cognitive psychology, which might help to explain, why some individuals can accurately 
perceive such opportunities. Put briefly in the context of the present work, these models of 
pattern recognition might explain, why some individuals recognise an entrepreneurial 
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opportunity in a specific situation, while others do not. An individual’s available knowledge 
structures are of particular importance since incoming stimuli are compared to what is stored 
there (Baron 2004a; Baron 2004b; Baron and Ensley 2003). This perceptual approach 
definitely contributes to the understanding of thinking process involved in opportunity 
recognition. Concerning this view, it can be criticised that the assumptions necessary for this 
approach are not realistic: Is there really a prototype or exemplar individuals have in mind, 
how an opportunity looks like? Such models rather apply to the recognition of given objects 
in the external world, like houses or birds. Admittedly, every instance of these objects is 
unique, but to a largely lesser extent than entrepreneurial opportunities. Therefore, the author 
argues that such perceptual approaches could be used to understand certain types of 
entrepreneurial opportunities, such as arbitrary or adaptive ones, which include less novelty 
than others. 
However, entrepreneurial alertness can also be conceptualised as a general schema, a script, 
guiding information processing (Gaglio and Katz 2001). The most popular of these ‘cognitive 
alertness’ approaches contends that individuals raise alertness when they encounter a 
problematic situation, which is consequently called the problem-solving argument (Yu 2001; 
Choi 1993, 1999), referring to problem-solving in the narrower sense. The study of Gaglio 
and Katz (2001) points to the existence of specific kinds of schemas that can be very helpful 
in recognising entrepreneurial opportunities. Based on a refined conceptualisation of 
Kirzner’s approach they call such type of schema entrepreneurial alertness. Such a cognitive 
framework is assumed to assist individuals in searching for and noticing change and market 
disequilibria in economic structures. Further, it assists in responding to information that does 
not fit into their current schemas, and, finally, in adjusting this extant schemas on the basis of 
such non-fitting information.  
Their research suggests that individuals with this specific schema tend to be objectively 
accurate and disposing of more complex information regarding the nature of change, i.e. they 
have more accurate mental models of the world. In conclusion, their work indicates that some 
individuals have a superior entrepreneurial alertness since they have more complex and 
adaptive mental frameworks. This means that “[…] the alert individual or entrepreneur must 
perceive the market environment correctly (veridical perception); identify the true driving 
forces and critical factors; and infer the real relational dynamics among these elements 
(veridical interpretation).” (Gaglio and Katz 2001, p. 97) Based on the fundamental concept 
of entrepreneurial alertness it could be hypothesised that the central characteristic a schema 
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guiding cognitive processes of alert economic agents must exhibit is to direct attention 
towards the novel, unusual or contrary in a situation and guiding the information processing 
towards the integration of the unusual event (Gaglio and Katz 2001). Gaglio and Katz (2001) 
briefly model the cognitive processes involved in opportunity recognition, emphasising 
differences between non-alert and alert individuals or economic agents.  
As depicted in Figure 30, initially, the latter do not accept information perceived from the 
external world as given, but may simply have the habit of looking for change. Eventually, this 
habit might result in the challenge of the current understanding of an economic situation. In 
this case the agent has two options: ignoring respectively discounting the new possibilities or 
assessing their impact on the existing relevant mental model of the external world. 
 
Figure 30 Cognitive Underpinnings of Alertness and Opportunity Recognition (Gaglio and Katz 2001). 
Coming to the latter conclusion an economic agent executes cognitive processes (in this 
particular model counterfactual thinking and mental simulation) leading to a radical alteration 
of the existing means-ends framework’ contents or relational dynamics, named an innovative 
opportunity (Gaglio and Katz 2001). Based on previous research on entrepreneurship and 
cognition, Gaglio and Katz (2001) derive a set of hypotheses based on this general notion of 
alertness and opportunity identification. Although their hypotheses should not be adopted 
unreservedly and assume a Kirznerian stance, the aspects discussed are of some importance. 
These hypotheses are depicted in Figure 31. 
 
H1: In any given market situation, alert individuals are more sensitive to signals of market 
disequilibrium than non-alert individuals. 
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H2: Alert individuals will change their schema to accommodate non-matching information; 
non-alert individuals will change the information. 
H3: In any given market situation, alert individuals will be impervious to framing effects 
will non-alert individuals will succumb. 
H4: Non-alert individuals will satisfice; alert individuals will seek objective accuracy. 
H5: Alert individuals will have more complex schema about change in the market 
environment than the non-alert. 
H6: Alert individuals will have more complex schema about their industry or social 
environment or market process or any combination thereof. 
H7: Alert people engage in counterfactual thinking that undoes causal sequences; non-alert 
people engage in counterfactual thinking that undoes the unusual cause only. 
H8: Alert individuals are more likely to break the existing means-ends framework than non-
alert individuals. 
H9: Alert individuals are more sensitive to the profit potential of ideas and events than non-
alert individuals. 
H10: Individuals can be categorised as demonstrating one of four outlooks: assessing (the 
fully alert individual), discounting (the marginally alert individual), dismissing (the 
uselessly alert individual) or uninterested (the non-alert individual). 
H11: Non-alert individuals will activate a schema from the set of schema already existing and 
defined by the market. 
Figure 31 Hypotheses Regarding Alert Economic Agents (Gaglio and Katz 2001). 
Picking only some of the most interesting hypotheses to the present work, economic agents 
disposing of an alertness schema have a higher sensitivity to the signals emitted by sources of 
entrepreneurial opportunities. However, it is not said that non-alert individuals do not 
recognise such signals, but are assumed to accommodate new information, that is to make 
sense of this signals leading to the conclusion that the existing means-ends framework is still 
the best. In general terms, only those economic agents are alert who attempt to integrate the 
perceived anomalies or inconsistencies into a pattern and subsequently form hypotheses that 
the status quo (the current means-ends framework) may not be the best in that particular 
situation.  
Another interesting question arises considering the case that external stimuli are perceived 
that do not fit into a stored schema. Individuals could tend to integrate new information within 
existing knowledge structures by creating new subcategories or causal links that increase the 
differentiation and complexity of their schema. In turn, an individual could adhere to the 
schema memorised and reinterpret the incoming information in order to maintain the structure 
and dynamics of the existing knowledge structures. Similarly, economic agents could 
succumb framing effects, which impede that they identify entrepreneurial opportunities. 
Already, Kirzner (1985) suggested that non-alert individuals may inaccurately process 
information, tending to uncritically accept and use information in its original form, 
respectively adopt the initial frame of reference (Kahnemann and Tversky 1986). This could 
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mean they fail to recognise that conjectures were never or no longer are appropriate; that they 
ignore new resources available, i.e., they are too optimistic or pessimistic about resource 
availability or regarding probable outcomes of actions or decisions (Gaglio and Katz 2001). It 
could be inferred that some economic agents do not succumb these cognitive errors, thus, 
possessing a superior capability of identifying entrepreneurial opportunities.  
Further to this, Gaglio and Katz (2001) addressed the question whether an optimal effort 
invested in information processing exists in a given situation. They hypothesise that alert 
individuals do not satisfice that is apply the first available solution they identify. This 
corresponds to the view that such a processing strategy usually does not lead to novel 
outcomes of the thinking process (see chapter III.C.1). Instead it is assumed that entrepreneurs 
seek for a certain degree of objective accuracy, i.e. put more effort in coming to a more 
accurate analysis of a situation. However, this hypothesis is rather questionable since, as 
already said, other studies have indicated that entrepreneurs tend to apply more heuristic-
based processing than managers. This could be seen as a weak point or, in turn, as another 
hint that entrepreneurs do not necessarily equal to alert individuals. Similarly, it could be 
argued in the present work that based on the denial of objectivity in dealing with information, 
the hypothesis simply makes no sense at all. Further, it is assumed that alert individuals have 
a superior ability to link schemas, for instance schemas about industries, social environments 
or market processes (Gaglio and Katz 2001). As will be pointed out, this could be seen as an 
ability to combine and reorganise knowledge structures as modelled in the present work. 
In summary, although the study of Gaglio and Katz (2001) has brought many important 
questions to the fore, it is basically different from the present study’s approach; their model is 
based on a realistic stance, in which superior cognition is seen in the degree of correctness, 
i.e. how veridical it is. It has been argued here that in a constructivist perspective such 
differentiation makes no sense. However, focussing on psychological aspects, their study 
remains vague concerning the basic information processes involved in breaking the existing 
means-ends framework by only including counterfactual thinking and mental simulation. 
Furthermore, they have a different view on changing a means-ends framework than alleged in 
the present work, when assuming that imitative and incremental opportunities do not change 
the prevalent means-ends framework. This is surely correct from a macro-perspective since 
from this general view nothing significant changes if an imitative opportunity is introduced 
into a new segment or region of the same market (by what is called a marginally alert 
individual that could also be called a discounter). Anyway, assuming an individualistic 
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perspective implies that the economic agent at hand does alter the means-ends framework, 
independently of the extent to which he does it.  
Additionally, Gaglio and Katz (2001) do not distinguish between schema of alertness in 
different economic situations, therefore neglecting the nexus between opportunity and 
individual. For instance they categorise individuals in groups according to their alertness. 
Considering the variety of economic situations in real life this point cannot be supported: 
instead, such a categorisation should include, at least, the second dimension of type of 
situation with which an economic agent is confronted with. A viable way to account for such 
aspects seems to consist in modelling opportunity recognition as a ‘normal’ creative thinking 
process, trying to extract the basic parameters that distinguish among alert and non-alert 
individuals (Fiet et al. 2004a). 
 
3. Knowledge 
As already pointed out, in reality the two basic cognitive elements cannot be separated from 
each other since cognitive processes lead to the emergence of an individual’s knowledge 
structures, which, in turn, significantly guide information processing. However, already the 
early works of the Austrian school have emphasised the role of knowledge in 
entrepreneurship, as chapter II.C.1 has outlined. Now, instead of repeating these 
considerations, it is first briefly mentioned to which dimensions of knowledge entrepreneurs 
are generally assumed to differ from other economic agents. In the general context of 
entrepreneurship the importance of knowledge via experience has been received high 
attention (Chandler and Jansen 1993; Cooper et al. 1995; Stuart and Abetti 1990). Such 
relevant idiosyncratic knowledge in any given situation usually originates from prior non-
systematic efforts in from of personal background job experience of simply knowledge in a 
particular domain, just to mention a few (Bygrave 1997; Lumpkin et al. 2001; Shane 2000). 
Consequently, the assumed cognitive heterogeneity among economic agents and among 
entrepreneurs also applies to their knowledge structures (Machlup 1983).  
Regarding this issue the literature on entrepreneurial cognition distinguishes at least three 
aspects, to which individuals can differ: factual knowledge, episodic or experiential 
knowledge, and metacognitive knowledge. In the general context of entrepreneurship 
differences relating factual knowledge are particularly likely as to the field of business 
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ownership (Ucbasaran 2004). Such knowledge can be acquired through educational measures 
or indirect exposure to entrepreneurial activities through various role models (Birley et al. 
1999; Krueger 1993). Episodic knowledge is accumulated through personal experiences and 
could be a result of business ownership experience (Ucbasaran 2004), which might differ as 
to its magnitude and nature (Stuart and Abetti 1990). Furthermore, it is hypothesised that 
metacognitive knowledge might be of importance in this context as well since allowing an 
entrepreneur to avoid cognitive biases in decision-taking, which are likely to be present if 
heuristics are applied (Bazerman 1990).  
In some more detail, metacognitive knowledge should increase an individual’s level of 
awareness as to how to process information and where to locate processing resources to come 
to a new business idea. Consequently, it is hypothesised that metacognitive knowledge leads 
to a higher search investment of successful entrepreneurs for additional information in 
discovering entrepreneurial opportunities (Ucbasaran 2004). Episodic knowledge might have 
an impact on opportunity recognition as well, in particular if it is related to a particular market 
and the opportunities in this market or field (Shane 2000). Such knowledge acquired during 
prior efforts in opportunity recognition may also enable individuals to identify and utilise 
useful and appropriate sources of information for future opportunity recognition efforts (Fiet 
et al. 2004b; Ucbasaran 2004). Such specific knowledge is seen as “[…] an understanding of 
information about people, places, timing, special circumstances, and technology.” (Fiet et al. 
2004b, p. 4) In a way, specific knowledge is simply ubiquitous given the imperfection of 
markets, in this case unevenly or asymmetrically distributed information about venture ideas 
(Bygrave 1997; Kirchhoff 1991).  
Basically, it is often suggested that the greater the amount of information available to an 
individual, the better is its ability to identify entrepreneurial opportunities; and indeed 
empirical studies showed that knowledge of a domain or business context was significantly 
positively related to the identification of opportunities in that field (Shane 2000; Shepherd and 
DeTienne 2001). Models of opportunity recognition consequently tend to include prior 
knowledge as one of the crucial dimensions in opportunity identification (e.g. Ardichvili et al. 
2003: Shane 2003), considering the idiosyncratic cognitive structures reflecting an 
individual’s previous life experience (Baron 2004a).  
However, as has been said in general an individual’s knowledge structures and cognitive 
processes are closely interrelated. This also holds true for the fields of entrepreneurship and 
opportunity recognition: Such idiosyncratic knowledge structures matter depending on the 
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economic situation and the ‘fit’ or relevance of this structures in this situation (Baron 2004a); 
a central argument why it is important to refer to the nexus between individual and 
opportunity instead of one aspect solely. Reversely, and supporting this argument, it has been 
shown that prior knowledge in a certain domain might lead to hubris and overconfidence, that 
is to entrepreneurs trying to replicate their success in a particular domain into another where it 
is not applicable (Wright et al. 1997). Similarly, it can be argued that relevant knowledge is 
sufficient to but not necessary leads to opportunity recognition since an individual’s 
propensity to store information about experiences in its knowledge structures can provide a 
bridge to the development of new ideas, but also become a fence in doing this by becoming 
established schemas (Minniti and Bygrave 2001; Ward 2004). These might result in mental 
inertia impeding the recognition of entrepreneurial opportunities (Yu 2001). For example, this 
can happen if information is perceived that is inconsistent with extant knowledge; such 
schemas can be mental blinders that prevent individuals from perceiving opportunities (Baron 
2004a). In this view “[…] lack of entrepreneurship means that actor’s thinking is locked up in 
old interpretation structures, old concepts and old institutions.” (Yu 2001, p. 57)  
Given that time, respectively quickness, is crucial, then economising the acquisition of 
specific knowledge is one way to improve competitiveness or in other words: to discover 
entrepreneurial opportunities. Studies suggest that successful entrepreneurs seem to search 
systematically for such information in known information channels (Fiet et al. 2004b). These 
channels are frequent, low-cost sources of specific knowledge about possible discoveries and 
called consideration sets, which represent an opportunity to reduce the searching space or - 
from a more economic perspective - searching costs (Fiet and Migliore 2001). Such 
information channels can be customer relations (Hippel 1986), tradeshows or networks; 
however, providing economic agents with exclusive information about markets. On the 
contrary, general knowledge has less value for starting up a business, because it can be 
codified into rules and procedures, which makes it widely available. For this reason, the 
possessor cannot expect that it yield above average profits (Fiet et al. 2004b). 
However, it should be generally noted that dealing with knowledge as a crucial issue in a 
cognitive account of entrepreneurship does not refer to the simple production of knowledge, 
but rather to an appropriate transformation into marketable products or services; i.e. the 
appropriate organisation of knowledge in the entrepreneurial mind. This particularly implies 
that research and development are not entrepreneurship (Holcombe 1998). Although it might 
appear to be self-evident if stated so plainly, most new classical models of economic growth 
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underline the role of human capital and the production of technological advances per se in 
their growth models (Holcombe 2003; see e.g. Lucas 1988; Romer 1990).  
The importance of habitual or chronic schemas, with which individuals make sense of the 
external world guiding thinking, stored in human memory for entrepreneurship was already 
illustrated in Schumpeter's (1934) seminal work: “All knowledge and habit once acquired 
become as firmly rooted in ourselves as a railway embankment in the earth. It does not 
require to be continually reserved and consciously reproduced, but sinks into the strata of 
subconsciousness. It is normally transmitted almost without friction by inheritance, teaching, 
upbringing, pressure of the environment. Everything we think, feel or do often enough 
becomes automatic and our conscious life is unburdened of it.” (Schumpeter 1934, p. 84) It is 
important to note that such schemas are not subject to frequent self-assessment, but rather 
work unnoticed by economic agents; such so called ‚routine perception tracks’ provide a 
robust framework for the interpretation of incoming information (Yu 2001). In general, 
chronic schemas might lead to varying assessments of a given economic situations among 
market actors. Schemas activated might vary as to content and quality, i.e., the degree to 
which they represent more realistic schema superiorly projecting the future and guiding future 
problem solutions and actions in this specific expectation of future states (Gaglio and Katz 
2001).  
When dealing with knowledge structures in opportunity recognition, an important distinction 
ought to be underlined: The interpretation network of the human mind and stored prototypes 
of entrepreneurial opportunities can not be treated as equal. While the former refers to the 
ability to recognise or find opportunities, i.e. schemas of alertness, the latter is a static concept 
of how an entrepreneurial opportunity looks like. However, it has already been said that 
knowledge in human memory is highly organised, the nature or manner of organisation 
depending on the type of knowledge at hand (see chapter III.B.2). In sum, this research states 
that the richer and more interconnected an individual’s cognitive systems are, the more 
effectively it can perform a wide range of tasks.  
This should also hold true for opportunity recognition, which means that analogously 
individuals, who possess richer - that is more complex and better-developed mental 
frameworks for organising and interpreting information related to a domain - are more likely 
to recognise opportunities. It facilitates the task to notice relevant incoming information and 
to integrate it with existing knowledge structures (Baron 2004a) as well as providing 
appropriate searching strategies (Craig and Lindsay 2001). It could be hypothesised that such 
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a schema can explain why some individuals discover entrepreneurial opportunities and others 
do not (Gaglio and Katz 2001). For a conception of entrepreneurial or alert individuals this 
would mean that entrepreneurs dispose of more effective mental models, which improve their 
ability to recognise or interpret a given economic setting or problem situation. In other words, 
it might be hypothesised that individuals with a high ability to recognise entrepreneurial 
opportunities possess better developed and clearer prototypes of opportunities (Butler and 
Ensley 2003) or richer scores of exemplars (Baron 2004a).  
Figure 32 summarises central cognitive characteristics individuals exhibit and seem to 
discriminate the entrepreneurial mind from the non-entrepreneurial according to the 
dimensions that were introduced in chapter III.C.3. 
Among other Aspects, Entrepreneurial Minds Mainly seem to Differ in that… 
(1) Memory Organisation and Facilitation Skills 
• …episodic knowledge is accumulated through personal experiences, often as result of business 
ownership experience. 
• …they include more prior knowledge. 
• …they possess richer, that is more complex and better-developed mental frameworks for organising 
and interpreting information related to a domain. 
• …they possess better developed and clearer prototypes of opportunities or richer scores of exemplars. 
(2) Specific and General Problem Solving Skills 
• …they use heuristics and cognitive-based reasoning more extensively than others. 
• …they are subject to many cognitive biases. 
• …they apply decision heuristics, instead of executing algorithm-like processes. 
• …higher-level learning is executed more often. 
• …they dispose of superior veridical perception and interpretation. 
• …they search systematically for relevant information in known information channels. 
(3) Metacognitive Skills 
• …apply off-line evaluation. 
• …dispose of superior metacognitive knowledge for overcoming cognitive biases in decision-taking. 
• …they raise a higher search investment of successful entrepreneurs for additional information in 
discovering entrepreneurial opportunities. 
(4) Extra-Cognitive and Affective Skills 
• …they are characterised by a forward-looking form of intelligence. 
• …high involvement of personal beliefs can be found. 
• …a promotion focus in self-regulation is dominant. 
• …they are optimistic and generally believe that things will turn out better than rational considerations 
suggest. 
• …self-interest and self-competition motive are triggering alertness (selective entrepreneurial 
attention). 
Figure 32 Some Central Characteristics of Entrepreneurial Thinking. 
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B. Opportunity Recognition as Creative Thinking 
1. Preliminary Thoughts 
Opportunity recognition in the present work is seen from a decision making-perspective, 
which leads to the central question how certain economic actors in certain economic 
situations do mentally conceive new options of action, they expect to yield a profit and, 
thereby, introduce novelty to markets and economic systems? In answering this question it is 
not a new idea to turn to cognitive psychology on creative thinking. As indicated by 
reviewing entrepreneurial cognition research it has been shown that already others have 
suggested the creative cognitive approach as a general theoretical framework for 
understanding the thought processes involved, thereby helping in finding measures to increase 
the ability to recognise entrepreneurial opportunities (Ward 2004). As Baron (2004) puts it, 
“[…] recognition of opportunities depends, in part, on existing cognitive structures possessed 
by specific individuals that are the result of previous experience and learning. These 
structures (e.g., schemas, prototypes, concepts, memories) serve as frameworks or templates 
that enable specific persons to perceive links between previously unconnected changes, 
knowledge, or event […].” (Baron 2004a, p. 54)  
Although many studies have been already done on the topic, only very few - if any - attempts 
have been made to develop a general information processing model of opportunity 
recognition (amongst them Gaglio and Katz 2001; Pech and Cameron 2006).xxvi Therefore, 
one of the main profits the present study promises to yield is to provide a general framework 
for a cognitive view on opportunity recognition; consequently, the model proposed shortly 
incorporates many of the highly valuable insights that have been gained on single cognitive 
processes in previous studies. The main idea consists in bringing together a general model of 
economic action in time with a general model of human information processing, both 
principally capable to account for creative outcomes. The contribution to the discipline could 
be seen in drawing on a rather modern general framework of creative thinking, while other 
such attempts use outdated models or focus on only one aspect, e.g. one information process.  
With this aim, to investigate economic agents’ thinking processes, it seems sensible to take a 
look what literature on human thinking can say about the creation of novelty (see e.g. Gilad 
1984; Whiting 1988). Thus, it was searched for models and theories that can be drawn on in 
investigating what thinking processes underlie the creative activity of the entrepreneur, who 
introduces novelty and innovation into economic systems. Such a proceeding is based on the 
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fundamental conjecture that “[…] the work of managers, of scientists, of engineers, of 
lawyers--the work that steers the course of society and its economic and governmental 
organisations--is largely work of making decisions and solving problems. It is work of 
choosing issues that require attention, setting goals, finding or designing suitable courses of 
action, and evaluating and choosing among alternative actions.” (Simon et al. 1986, p. 19) 
However, it has been shown that each situation, an individual is confronted with, can be 
regarded as a problem that has to be solved. This can also be applied to economic situations 
and different kinds of entrepreneurship. Again, this argument underlines the comprehensive 
view of the present work that in each single opportunity recognition process all the basic 
information-processes in the model of creative thinking are involved theoretically. 
Consequently, any human thinking that is done by an economic agent, which might break an 
existing means-end framework providing a somehow novel option of action, however slight 
this break might be, is principally regarded as entrepreneurial thinking. Apparently, the logic 
consequence is that not persons or individuals themselves are this study’s primary object, but 
human cognitive processes that are assumed to be open to any individual.  
Hence, the present approach of modelling opportunity recognition as creative thinking stands 
in the subjectivist tradition; it is seen as a discovery and learning process in the tradition of 
Popper’s theory concerning growth of knowledge (Harper 1999).xxvii The reader should be 
aware of such a constructivist ontological stance’s consequences, outlined in chapters II.A.2 
and II.A.3. Further, this notion already implies that, if referring to the concept of problem-
solving, the present approach is dealing with it in the broader sense and not in the narrower 
sense as alleged by other scholars (e.g. Shane 2003). Based on this, an entrepreneur is here 
defined as a person that executes such entrepreneurial thinking, or problem-solving or 
information processing, to a certain degree, exceeding a certain mark. Consequently, it is a 
certain kind of information processing that delineates entrepreneurial from non-
entrepreneurial individuals; hence, the question might be asked if this is a stable state in time, 
or if such thinking is only a momentary phenomenon?  
Another central point that must be considered is the nexus between an individual and an 
opportunity. From the cognitive perspective of the present work, a certain economic situation 
might allow an individual to find a novel problem solution that equal to an entrepreneurial 
opportunity. However, this is just one specific situation out of an infinite number of 
situations; exactly the same cognitive processing patterns might not function in another 
economic situation, in the sense that no novel problem solution can be found by the same 
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individual. In summary, there are three main dimensions to which entrepreneurial information 
processing differs; it is executed by different (1) individuals with different cognitive styles 
that are confronted with different (2) situations at different (3) points in time. 
Thus, the present approach to model the recognition of entrepreneurial opportunities is based 
on a general model of human action in time that is able to account for these central 
dimensions. It has been said that the principle of cognitive creativity leads to an idiosyncratic 
representation of the external world including the options of action available to an economic 
agent in a given situation at a given moment in time. If economic action is regarded from such 
a decision making perspective and the development of a general framework is intended, the 
concept of entrepreneurship must be integrated. Generally, entrepreneurs are such economic 
agents that decide to pursue a somehow novel option of action. The thinking processes that 
lead to such specific options of action might be called opportunity recognition. If the 
economic agent decides to act upon such, it exploits the entrepreneurial opportunity perceived 
in such behaviour. Therefore, entrepreneurial opportunities are principally similar to any other 
action that might be chosen by an economic agent.  
This view is quite similar to Kirzner’s (1979) general view that economic agents assess each 
market event or situation and alert or entrepreneurial actors do this relatively superior. 
Entrepreneurs have a better grip on reality because they can perceive it more accurately and 
have a superior ability to infer the likely implications and consequences: veridical perception 
and veridical interpretation (Gaglio and Katz 2001). This means that certain perceptual and 
interpretational styles enable some individual to discern when the existing way of solving 
economic problems (services, goods, or the way these are produced or supplied) is not the 
best available, thus inferring if a situation offers a commercial potential. Vice versa, non-alert 
individuals fail to identify or create entrepreneurial opportunities since the market 
environment and the kind of behaviour demanded by the economic situation at that point in 
time is misjudged (Gaglio and Katz 2001). 
However, the explicitly comprehensive approach to entrepreneurial opportunities and their 
recognition or construction implies that neither only Schumpeterian or Kirznerian 
entrepreneurship is modelled, but both can be captured. The difference becomes apparent in 
two aspects: Firstly, in the degree of novelty the thinking process’s output exhibits and, 
secondly, in the different processes’ relative importance within the general model. The former 
point is quite self-explaining since Schumpeterian opportunities are assumed to be more 
radical and innovative than Kirznerian opportunities. The latter argument is more difficult to 
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explain; basically, in Schumpeterian entrepreneurship the process of category combination 
and reorganisation seems to be more important than the other information processes involved 
since this process is seen as actual source for real novel outcome.  
In turn, Kirznerian entrepreneurship can be assumed to be based more on the process of 
category selection. Individuals with a high ability in processing such information are superior 
in recognising a situation as something actually already known, as being more alert. In such 
situations, in which stimulus recognition is most important, the process of category selection 
is most important; individuals activate knowledge or information they have stored, related to 
what they perceive in a situation. Other processes, like the novelty-producing concept 
recombination process, are less important probably not even active (i.e., assuming the 
parameter value of zero in arbitrary entrepreneurial activity).  
However, the vast variety of research on entrepreneurial cognition and human thinking 
outlined in previous chapters seems to impose the necessity to underline some central 
‘technical’ assertions of the present work, in order to model opportunity recognition as 
information processing. These are assertions or assumptions are not questioned anymore in 
the following considerations; thus, they somehow resemble to axiomatic principles. 
 
2. Basic Assumptions 
For purposes of methodological clarity the mentioned central entrepreneurial processes of 
opportunity discovery or recognition and exploitation are strictly dissected in the present 
work. While the former ends with a somehow novel option of action, the latter concludes with 
the creation of a venture. In the present work it is exclusively dealt with the discovery of such 
opportunities and not with the decision to select and efforts to realise this option  
Assertion: The work only treats the recognition of entrepreneurial opportunities, letting 
the decision to exploit and the exploitation untouched. 
Before discussing what distinguishes the particular type of options that are regarded as 
entrepreneurial opportunities from non-entrepreneurial ones, it has to be introduced how such 
options are generally modelled. As pointed out earlier, an option of action is part of a 
idiosyncratic mental situation or problem-situation that has been developed by the individual 
at the present point in time in a given situation. It has been said that these internal 
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representations can be generally conceived as a template frame that consists of several slots, 
in which an economic situation’s features and characteristics are stored. The approach alleged 
here presupposes that an individual’s knowledge is reflected in the information applied to 
these operations (Mumford et al. 1991). This also implies that knowledge is not simply 
information; rather, information is stored and interpreted in categorical structures, viewed as 
an organised interrelated set of discrete pieces of information, in which organisation is 
derived from the central features of the category (Barsalou 1982, 1983). The considerations 
on categorical knowledge in chapter III.B.2 and III.B.3 should have made clear that other 
conjectures in this matter are regarded as a matter of course (Barsalou 1982).  
There are many ways such systems of slots may be conceived or discussed which must be 
necessarily included to sufficiently account for different problem situations. However, in the 
present work it is argued that a general framework based on cognitive literature can best serve 
for the purposed of investigating opportunity recognition. The main reason standing behind 
this lies in the ontological stance of the present work. It is principally agreed on the objection 
that ex-ante predictions about the occurrence of novel outcomes are impossible. However, it 
is intended to find invariant characteristics of thinking processes leading to such. Therefore, 
the relevant level of considering representations, i.e. the set of variables included to describe 
the situation must be as precise as possible, in order to describe economic situations as best as 
possible, but sufficiently general to account for all possible types including such in which 
entrepreneurial opportunities occur. This characteristic of generality guarantees that no finite 
set of states is presupposed that can only be described with these variables, but endogenous 
novelty is allowed for.  
However, the variables considered must still have some explanatory power in describing 
economic situations. The variables or slots included for the present work have been found 
significant in humans' attempts to come to problem representations, in particular in coming to 
creative outcomes. The crucial types of information TI that are needed for obtaining a 
sufficient overview on the situation at hand have been identified in literature on creative 
thinking and are presented in more detail while discussing the cognitive processes included in 
the model presented in chapter IV.C.  
Generally, a template frame of an economic situation ES, as depicted in Figure 33, is assumed 
to include information concerning the inherent goals TIG, constraints TIC, general principles 
TIP, action plans TIA, and factual data TII. Each single slot in the frame is filled with different 
statements or information belonging to the respective type of information. In fact, each slot is 
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therefore described by a set of information; for instance, an individual has a set of goals TIG = 
I1, I2,…, Im and so forth. It is argued that such frames are capable of sufficiently describing a 
whole mental situation as demanded by general research on problem representations.  
(defineType EconomicSituation ES  
 (supertype ProblemSituation)  
 (Goal (type statement) ) GTI  
 (Constraint (type statement) ) CTI  
 (GeneralPrinciple (type statement) ) PTI  
 (ActionPlans/Options 
of Action (type statement) ) 
ATI  
 (Information (type statement) ) ITI  
Figure 33 Template Frame of Economic Situation. 
Whatever source is used to come to such information, an economic agent is assumed to 
possess information regarding these types; i.e., having values available for the variables of the 
situation. It should be apparent that such a frame is part of a huge network of knowledge 
categories; for instance the goals TIjG = I1, I2,…, Im could be modelled in a separate frame, for 
instance distinguishing better an individual's long-term or short-term goals.  
Assertion: Knowledge and information about the external world are stored in idiosyncratic 
conceptual representations of economic agents.  
By saying that endogenous creativity is allowed within the model, it has been implicitly made 
clear that time does matter and is explicitly considered. All sets of possible and included 
information might change from one point in time to the next. Apparently, creativity in 
economic thinking is accounted for in the present model by assuming that economic agents 
are able to alter the possible space of events within its ES. However, time as factor does not 
directly relate to any sequence or length of the cognitive processes introduced hereafter. It is 
only mentioned to point out that opportunities and their sources are subject to change in time 
(i.e., there only exist windows of opportunity). Since only few things can be said about the 
sequence of processing in the human mind, it is assumed that the processes are executed in 
such a short time that they can be regarded as simultaneous for an economic perspective of 
the phenomena. Consequently, the factor t only refers to economic situations and larger 
discrete steps in time, in which the sets of information describing a situation can be genuinely 
altered.  
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Assertion: Endogenous creativity is allowed for by altering the set of valid values in the 
mental representation of an economic situation, implying the necessity to include historical 
time. 
Since it has been shown that information and knowledge are inherently subjective concepts, it 
is here formally differentiated between different economic agents by denoting them with j, 
meaning that the population of economic agents is made up by n - information processing 
systems EAj=1, EAj=2,…EAj=n. It is no coincidence that this concept resembles to the term of a 
means-ends framework. In a way a concept of an economic situation is a description that 
contains ends that are intended to be achieved (goals) or constraints, which are not supposed 
to happen. The underlying structure or general laws at work of the present situation stored in 
the slot of general principles determine which actions are principally possible and how factual 
data incoming is perceived. These actions can be considered as the means to achieve the goals 
set in the situation. However, it should be noted that such a notion of means-ends-
relationships is highly critical since it is of a highly subjective nature as well since constructed 
by the individual itself (Mitchell et al. 2007). 
Although such representations’ subjectivity is one of the present work’s main arguments, it is 
nevertheless argued that independent of any subjects different kinds of external situations can 
be differentiated. For instance, markets an economic agent is acting in can be in relative 
calmness, while others are in a steady turmoil of change. Alike, no one would seriously doubt 
that problem representations in different industries say biotechnology or handcraft, are not 
significantly different across all individuals. Without being more specific at this point since 
there can be thought of literally myriads of dimensions to which situations differ, a specific 
type of situation an individual is confronted with is denoted by k. Since each individual is still 
considered independently, the subjective nature of knowledge and reality is still taken into 
account, while also the nexus between an opportunity, via the situation or context in the 
external world, and the individual is included (Mitchell et al. 2007).  
So far, it has only been explained how a general representation in economic situations is seen 
and nothing has been said about what characterises an entrepreneurial opportunity in such a 
framework and how these differ to other non-entrepreneurial options of action. It has been 
said that entrepreneurial opportunities can be seen as new means-ends frameworks. This term 
has to be refined since in Kirzner’s sense, allocating scarce resources in order to maximise 
return is not breaking the prevailing framework (Gaglio and Katz 2001; Kirzner 1985). This 
has to be seen separated from entrepreneurs that identified new ends to strive for and made 
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new means available. While this would mean in cognitive terms that an extreme or important 
instance of an existing schema is changed by such individuals (Gaglio and Katz 2001), the 
present work proposes that each change in an instance of a schema (which equals a 
recombination or reorganisation) could be principally regarded as opportunity recognition; the 
degree of change would then determine the opportunity’s location on a dichotomy, such as 
Gaglio’s entrepreneurial opportunity scale. This means that a mental alteration of means and 
ends included in the framework produces a novel combination. Put in more economic terms, it 
can be said that a new resource combination has been conceived. This new framework must 
meet the criteria set for entrepreneurial opportunities in chapter II.C.1.  
Most generally, an opportunity can be here defined as a desirable future state that is different 
from the current one and that is deemed feasible to achieve (Stevenson and Jarillo 1990). 
However, in such a decision-based model the crucial and observable aspect are the actions 
taken to realise this, implying that an entrepreneurial opportunity’s relevant characteristics 
must evolve in, or through, an option of action available to the economic agent. Consider for 
instance a simple situation in which an economic agent recognises an opportunity to realise an 
arbitrage-profit. In such a situation, the respective frame includes information about two 
different prices for the same product. This information leads, possibly, to the available option 
of action or action plan that is aimed at exploring this situation: The opportunity is expressed 
via the action that can be taken.  
Assertion: Entrepreneurial opportunities are options of actions within such 
representations of economic problems. 
This central assertion of regarding the cognitive nature of entrepreneurial opportunities 
directly implies that the mental conception of such options of actions is here seen as central 
cognitive issue in recognizing entrepreneurial opportunities. 
Assertion: Opportunity recognition is the alteration of the current economic situation’s 
representation expressed via a new option of action. 
The example of an arbitrageur also serves to point out that in such an individualistic, 
cognitive approach it is not immediately relevant, whether there has been a change in the 
external world; that is here prices have changed recently. It might be similarly likely that this 
price asymmetry has existed long before, but no one has ever made the connection, i.e. 
recognised the opportunity, before. Put generally, a direct stimulus is not a necessary 
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prerequisite for opportunity recognition. Nevertheless, it could be argued that there is a higher 
probability to be the first if the situation leading to the opportunity has not existed long 
before. This highly subjective nature of the mental representation automatically implies that 
the concept of novelty is of such nature as well since an information perceived to be new, 
stored in any of the slots of the mental situation by economic agent EA1, might be already 
known to other individuals, say EA2, as has been pointed out by the problem classification of 
Getzels and Csikszentmihalyi (1976) in chapter III.A.2.  
However, considering that a certain degree of novelty is considered as inherent characteristic, 
concluding, opportunities must exhibit both, novelty and usefulness (Ward 2004). This can be 
seen analogously to von Weizsäcker's concept of information alleged in chapter II.A.2 that 
novelty and confirmation both inherently belong to valuable information. Other economic 
agents, i.e. customers, can only cope with a certain degree of novelty that allows them to 
understand a new solution as superior to already existing ones. For thinking processes it can 
be inferred that opportunities must be subjectively logical in hindsight since they are 
constructed with a logical link back to previous experiences (Yu 2001). For instance, 
O’Driscoll and Rizzo state that “[…] entrepreneurial success depends on the capacity of 
seeing things in a way which afterwards proves to be true, even though it cannot be 
established at the moment.” (O’Driscoll and Rizzo 1986, p. 67)  
For the present work it will be talked about an entrepreneurial opportunity's originality, which 
can be understood as the right balance between novelty and familiarity (Ward 2004). 
Therefore, the individual capability to produce entrepreneurial opportunities that is intended 
to be explained in the present work can be operationalised by measures of the quality and 
originality contingent on the cognitive process employed and the way in which existing 
knowledge is accessed (Ward 2004). Following Mumford et al. (1996), high quality in 
problem-solving is generally regarded as an appropriate reaction to the problem at hand, with 
a high probability of leading to a logical and practicable solution. In turn, high originality is 
considered as an option of action that goes beyond the obvious and given in the situation, 
likely to lead into an unusual, yet feasible, problem-solution.  
Along these lines, a central conjecture of many efforts to investigate creative behaviour is that 
it is reflected in its outcome, in a novel, socially-valued product (Mumford and Gustafson 
1988; Briskman 1980; Busse and Mansfield 1980; Ghiselin 1963; Hocevar 1981). The main 
implication is that creativity, respectively the ability to produce novel solutions in economic 
settings, is not a unitary psychological attribute, but rather outcome of a dynamic interplay of 
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individual and situational variables (Amabile 1983; Taylor 1972). Hence, it is assumed that an 
entrepreneurial opportunity is a solution to a problem, which is recognised by individuals in 
certain environmental situations that meets the specific criteria and is expressed via an option 
of action stored in the entrepreneur's mental situation. This outcome-oriented perspective is 
very important to the methodological proceeding in the present work. Mainly, it allows 
engaging in analysing causal relationships among different information processes that are 
linked to the output, i.e. the dependent variable, the opportunity recognised.  
Assertion: The capability to recognise entrepreneurial opportunities is reflected in its 
outcome, in a novel, socially-valued service or good.  
This leads to another central conjecture underlying the idea to draw upon a general 
information processing model of thinking; it is that “[…] opportunities themselves are unique, 
but the basic processes that play a role in their recognition are the same in all cases.” (Baron 
2004a, p. 55) 
Assertion: Opportunities themselves are unique, but on a sufficiently general level the 
basic processes that play a role in their recognition are the same in all cases. 
Nevertheless, the efficiency and appropriateness of this application of operations may differ 
among individuals (Sternberg 1986a, 1988a). From a psychological perspective, the present 
model is situated in the information processing paradigm and creative thinking is conceived 
as has been outlined. This means, it is assumed that successful problem-solving efforts require 
information upon which they are based. Working on information as fundament, a process is 
defined as an “[…] organised set of operations performed on some information set resulting in 
one or more outcomes required for eventual solution generation” (Mumford et al. 1991, p. 
100). This processing is tied with extant categorical knowledge structures, which implies, 
among other things, that the nature and the quality of creation problem solutions may vary 
with the kind of information considered in this approach. For instance, the application of 
declarative knowledge and procedural knowledge may result in significantly different types of 
rules and creative products (Mumford et al. 1991). It follows that, as has already been 
mentioned several times, an individual cannot produce something from nothing; i.e. ex nihilo 
nihil fit (Ward 2004). According to the present model, new understanding providing a basis 
for novel problem solutions is derived from either the combination or reorganisation of 
categorical knowledge available; therefore, based on already available knowledge structures.  
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Assertion: The combination and reorganisation of extant knowledge structures is the 
central element in recognizing entrepreneurial opportunities.  
In fact, the whole model was originally an attempt to merge previous insights of cognitive 
psychology about several processes that have contributed significantly to the understanding of 
creative thinking (Mumford and Connelly 1993) with the relevant literature on extant 
knowledge structures (Mumford et al. 1997). However, more specifically, an individual might 
generate a novel or new approach to a problem by applying extant categories to a type of 
problem; or applying them in a different sequence (Mumford 1991). The processes executed 
to combine or reorganise extant knowledge structure are therefore assumed to be of particular 
significance in opportunity recognition since it is always linked to a certain degree of novelty.  
In addition, three further implications are related to the emphasis of linkages between 
knowledge and processing in the approach: (1) Firstly, quality and organisation of categorical 
structure may have a marked impact on creativity. This means that poorly defined or 
inarticulate categories may well impede an effective application of these processes; vice 
versa, highly articulated, well-differentiated structures can, thereby, give rise to a curvilinear 
relationship between expertise and creativity (Simonton 1984). (2) Secondly, information 
encoding and applied search heuristics to detect relevant information warrant more attention 
of researchers than so far. And, thirdly, (3) the importance of categorical information 
structures suggests that particular strategies for organising information seem to be more likely 
in helping an individual to execute search, construction, and combination processes 
(Mumford et al. 1991).  
This notion allows a general research approach that aims at explaining interactions between 
information organisation and process operation. This means more specifically that domain-
specific, knowledge-based approaches for creative thinking are not necessarily incompatible 
with process-based models. Instead, they can be seen as interactive systems, such that 
divergent thinking may represent a domain-specific capacity and a generalisable characteristic 
of individuals. This central point of the approach can be illustrated by considering some of the 
ways an understanding of information structures might be used to facilitate the application of 
cognitive core processes, for instance the combination and reorganisation process. Firstly, 
novel combinations can be hypothesised to be achieved or facilitated by restrictions 
prohibiting the application of simple hierarchical combination strategies (Mobley 1990). 
Secondly, an explicit emphasis is put on the need to incorporate discrepant observations or 
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diverse categories (Kuhn 1970). Thirdly, activation of a typical category example or 
exemplars of associated multiple categories (Doares 1990).  
The encouragement of individuals to consider similarities in goals, constraints, and strategies 
used in prior problem-solving efforts, as well as content similarities, might possibly facilitate 
the construction of novel problem constructs and potentially viable new solutions (Reiter-
Palmon 1990). In a similar way, events contributing to the application of multiple, extended 
search strategies might also contribute to the generation of novel problem solutions through 
more effective application of the category search process. These considerations point to the 
argument that individuals apply certain decision heuristics or strategies respectively have 
preferences or styles that guide their information processing and, therefore, have a strong 
impact on the thinking process’ outcome.  
This draws the researcher's attention towards an individual's personal style or preferences in 
processing information. Consequently, it is here assumed that such metacognitive skills or 
decision rules, guiding process application, are of particular interest in understanding 
individual differences in the thinking process’ outcome. Effective preferences could be stored 
in the entrepreneurial mind as a knowledge structure, a script, guiding the cognitive processes, 
which could be called in the context of the present work an effective schema of 
entrepreneurial alertness or opportunity recognition. There are many ways, how such 
preferences can differ among individuals; in the present work, the particular characteristics 
are presented for each cognitive process. However, they are all based on preferences for 
processing types of information that are included in the frames representing knowledge 
structures. Consequently, the present work focuses cognitive style and not capacity where 
possible; it is principally not measured how many information is processed or encoded, or 
how fast the economic agent is in doing so. It is about his style, about his preferences, 
expressed through the weights given to particular information in the respective cognitive 
process.  
Further, it is assumed hereafter that the individual preferences dealt with in the present work 
are of a rather chronic, i.e. stable, nature that can be treated as a kind of personal characteristic 
of economic agents; this implies terminologically that preferences and styles are treated as 
synonymously hereafter. This metacognitive aspect has two main implications as well: On the 
one hand, if an individual’s errors in cognitive problem-solving could been detected and 
analysed along with the location of these errors, it might help in elucidating processing rules 
and the potential on effective process operation in various domains. On the other hand since 
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an individual’s resources are inherently limited, and controlled processing may pose strong 
resource demands (Ackerman 1986), task motivation may play a crucial role in the 
effectiveness of process application. Although the role of motivation in thinking processes 
appears somewhat trivial, it once again shows that aggregation over processes might be risky 
in terms of overseeing relevant interpersonal differences (Mumford et al. 1991). 
Assertion: For a given level of motivation, the individual preferences for certain types of 
information in information processing, stored in form of rather robust cognitive styles, 
strongly influence the output of the opportunity recognition process. 
An exception is made for the process of category combination and reorganisation; so far, as 
will be shown in its detailed discussion in chapter IV.C.3, not enough is known about 
preferences or styles in this process. Thus, it will be drawn on other ways to assess individual 
differences concerning this cognitive process.  
 
3. Reference Model of Creative Thinking 
The main intention of the scholars conceiving this general model was to overcome the 
qualified criticism on discrete thinking models mentioned in chapter III.C.1 (Mumford et al., 
1997b). Nevertheless, it should be kept in mind that these basic processes are a construct to 
understand a human mind’s actions. This particularly implies that they rather represent 
primary processes on an aggregate level, which are built up by secondary processes. 
Presenting them this way should not distract from the complex and integrated nature of 
creative thinking as already pointed out in detail. The model in Figure 34 is supposed to 
highlight the hypothesised process relationships, which are assumed to be dynamic and 
cyclical in all complex and creative problem situations.  
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Figure 34 Reference Process Model of Creative Thinking (Mumford et al. 1991). 
Basically, the whole thinking process, depicted as a petri net in Figure 35, starts with the 
initial construction of a tentative problem representation in t = i; when stimuli from the 
external world E hit the human mind of an economic agent EAn, it tries to makes sense of 
what is perceived. This initial picture of the external world TR1 is then updated by encoding 
additional information; this might be considered as an information search in the external 
world. This updated problem representation TR2 is then, in turn, fundament for a search for 
extant knowledge categories in memory that seem to be relevant for the situation perceived. 
Once a set of such knowledge categories is activated the next process specifies the best-fitting 
instances out of these, resulting in another problem representation PR. In case of non-creative 
thinking (TE~), an available option of action A is selected from this problem representation.  
However, in case (TE) the individual executes the process of category combination and 
reorganisation (CC), the actual production of novelty derives from the combination and 
reorganisation of these activated and specified knowledge categories that are merged into 
novel ones, into new ideas or an new problem representation (NPR). Then, another set of 
options of action might be at the individual’s disposal to select an action. The triggering 
events that induce categorical combination and reorganisation are not well known yet, reason 
why they are not treated in the present work (Mumford et al., 1997b). 
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Figure 35 Reference Model of Creative Thinking as Petri Net. 
It should be noted that this model of creative thinking highly resembles to the basic model of 
human action in time; in fact, it seems to allow modelling the principle of cognitive creation: 
It is represented by the whole thinking process until an individual reached a problem 
representation or mental situation (PR or NPR) from which an option of action is chosen. 
Hence, the sources for novelty can conceptually be found in the perception of the situation 
(problem construction, information encoding, and category selection) and the mental 
alteration of means-ends frameworks (category combination and reorganisation), marked 
brown in Figure 36. 
E
TR1
TR2
PC
IE
PR
CS
CC
NPR
AS
TE
A
AS
~TE
Legend:
I – Basis for Action
II – Mental Situation
III – Action
I
II
III
P1
P2
P1 - Principle of 
Cognitive Creation
P2 - Principle of 
Rationality
 
Figure 36 The Principle of Cognitive Creation as Creative Thinking. 
The basic processes of problem construction, information encoding, category selection, and 
category combination and reorganisation and their role in creative thinking were all 
A Cognitive Model of Opportunity Recognition 
 210
experimentally surveyed in an extensive study, which underpinned the assertion that they are 
effective predictors of performance on creative problem-solving tasks (e.g. Mumford et al. 
1997a). However, despite their separate treatment in the reference model’s detailed analysis, it 
is commonly accepted in contemporary approaches that there is no predetermined, but rather 
selective process application, depending on the individual and the situation it is situated in. 
Given this high interdependency between the information-processes included, the core 
processes hypothesised to play a role in creative thinking are not introduced in detail before 
the relationships amongst them are underlined now.  
If, at any stage, an unsatisfactory outcome is detected, individuals may return to an earlier 
stage; to which depends on the nature of the identified deficiency. Given the adoption of the 
principle of cognitive efficiency, subjects are assumed to cycle back to the previous process 
(Howe 1982; Koestler 1964; Rothenberg 1986). Considering that individuals have already 
applied such processes in previous situations, this conjecture also suggests how integration 
occurs and why certain phenomena arise, for instance the impact of available categorical 
structures and prior life history in information search (Gruber 1983; Siegler and Richards 
1982).  
The processes in Figure 36 are sequentially arranged. This implies that a successful 
application of processes at a later stage is dependent on previous processing efforts. Due to 
this serial dependency, creative efforts are often difficult and time consuming. Furthermore, 
relationships may turn out to be hard to track down because of the operation of interviewing 
steps and mediating mechanisms in the experimental situation (Mumford et al. 1991). 
Although sequential dependency is given in all situations, this does not mean that the 
processes are of equal importance in each problem situation. For instance, reconsidering the 
different problem-solving situations presented in chapter III.A.2, a problem may already be 
defined, thus, reducing the individual’s necessary efforts in the process of problem 
construction.  
In turn, the relative relevance of the processes will vary across problem domains, with 
creative thought being least difficult if the problem domain emphasises application of the 
latter processes (Mumford et al. 1991). The relationships in the model also underscore the 
importance of both convergent and divergent thinking processes (Mumford et al. 1991; Runco 
1994) or, only terminologically different, ideation and evaluation (Basadur 1994; Getzels and 
Smilansky 1983). This is particularly evident in the relationships between category search and 
specification of best-fitting categories, as well as between category combination and 
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reorganisation and idea evaluation: While the former processes of search and combination are 
rather divergent, the latter two of specification and evaluation refer to convergent thinking.  
Generally, the model presented is highly interactive, complex, and recursive. As emphasised 
in chapter III.C.2, recent developments in research on human thought and creativity have 
abandoned the process view that prescribes a fixed number or sequence of discrete steps and 
strategies that must be applied in a fixed, predetermined sequence (Israeli 1962, 1981; Lubart 
2001; Runco 1994). Instead, the process requires the execution of several strategies at 
different stages (Treffinger et al. 1994). For example, problem solvers might evaluate a 
problem first and then subsequently evaluate alternative problem representations, tentative 
solutions, or even probable success of a solution. Thus, a difference exists between 
evaluations of processes (which is monitoring) and evaluation of solutions.  
Further to interactivity, it could be argued that the interactions between operations and skills 
in creative thinking described above are of a serial dependency and could be seen as dynamic, 
cyclical interrelationships (Mumford et al. 1991). This notion has been proved by clinical 
judgements which revealed that complex functions - complex in the sense that they use 
interaction and exponential terms - were most accurately in describing subjects’ judgements. 
Unfortunately, these equations were highly idiosyncratic so the most predictive model for a 
specific individual simultaneously possessed the lowest generality (Wiggins 1981). This 
implies that thinking or creativity models that intend to be of a general character have to find 
the balance between accuracy and applicability (Runco 1994); this is particularly important to 
real-life problems (MacKinnon 1962; Okuda et al. 1991). The processes’ interactions may not 
only be complex, but also recursive in a forward and backward manner. In other words, the 
whole process exhibits numerous feedback loops (Bachelor and Michael 1991; Eindhoven 
and Vinacke 1952; Mumford et al. 1991; Subotnik and Moore 1988). Some authors suggest 
the main reason for this might be attributed to the ongoing evaluation of information or 
knowledge processed (Runco 1994; Jausovec 1994). As illuminating example might serve the 
sub-process of problem construction that can occur at the beginning of an individual’s 
creative work and recurs in the middle of the whole effort when inconsistencies in the 
problem representation prevent further progress (Dudek and Cote 1994; Jay and Perkins 1997; 
Simon 1988). Nevertheless, for methodological purposes it seems to be appropriate to break 
these processes down into discrete steps and elucidate the rules underlying their application in 
various domains (see for instance Baer 1988).  
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The assumption that there is not a predetermined, but rather selective process application has 
further implications. First and foremost, it once again underlines that there exists a need to 
attend to decision heuristics. If there is no predetermined sequence of processes, an individual 
must apply certain rules for allocating its limited information processing resources; the 
importance in creative thinking is shown by findings on satisfycing strategies (Cyert and 
March 1963; Nutt 1984), the influence of instructions (Harrington 1980), and the potential 
impact of premature convergence (Basadur et al. 1990). 
Such cognitive styles in information processing are now presented in the context of 
opportunity recognition. The treatment starts with the construction of the initial problem 
representation in part 1 of this chapter’s last section. Then, this mental model is updated by 
searching for information in the external world and activating relevant knowledge categories 
in memory. These processes are dealt with in the second part, followed by the third, 
concerned with the combination and reorganisation of activated representations and their 
evaluation. To begin with, each of the five processes and corresponding cognitive styles 
considered in the present study are introduced generally and then put into the entrepreneurial 
context. Each treatment includes the hypotheses to be studied empirically and ends with some 
remarks concerning formal issues for the present study. It should be noted that the selection of 
cognitive styles included in the study was based on the literature review of creative thinking 
and opportunity recognition as outlined before.  
 
C. Cognitive Processes and Styles in Opportunity Recognition 
1. The Initial Problem Representation 
Apparently, the process of problem construction is related to the cognitive operations 
dedicated to find an initial problem representation. The efforts are all aimed at defining the 
aspects of a problem representation in ill-defined domains, where a complete problem 
definition is not given. This first ‘sense-making’ or ‘impression’ of the situation is assumed to 
have a high influence on all subsequent processes since it sets the initial cognitive framework. 
The efforts necessary and the complexity of the task vary with the degree of prior structuring 
(Dillon 1982). Thus, the more novel and ill-defined the economic problem situation is, the 
more is the initial problem representation formed by ad-hoc categories, using outcomes of 
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prior problem-solving efforts; they seem to be of particular importance in real-world settings 
since there can be found a minimised level of a-priori structure (Okuda et al. 1991).  
However, from a researcher’s perspective it is difficult to specify rules and operations which 
are employed, given the subjective or idiosyncratic nature of such processes 
(Csikszentmihalyi 1988) and the question must be asked how individuals go about 
constructing problems (Moore and Murdock 1991). Therefore, it must be referred to certain 
hypotheses for which empirical results exist.  
For instance, Gick and Holyoak (1980, 1983) found in a series of studies that subjects 
provided with an example of how to structure and solve a problem in a certain context (in 
these studies a military problem) used elements from this task to structure and solve a task in 
a totally different setting (in Duncker’s (1945) cancer irradiation problem). Based on these 
findings, it could be assumed that individuals in novel, ill-defined problem situations form ad-
hoc categories, using outcomes of prior problem-solving efforts (Holyoak 1984). More 
formally, the present work assumes that contextual stimuli in the external world trigger 
certain problem schemas that will be screened by the individual in order to identify 
commonalities in relevant features. At this point, one is facing the classical problem in 
psychology of defining the effective stimulus. A subjectivist approach should however 
underline that the triggering event for certain thinking processes must not be necessarily lie in 
the external world directly; further, a significant time lag can lie between perception of an 
external event, as stimuli, and the internal interpretation as unexpected prompting subsequent 
thinking processes (Gaglio 2004).  
However, this fundamental question will be omitted totally and attention direct towards active 
rules and operations employed. In the present conception of problem construction, shown in 
Figure 37, it is assumed that an event is perceived and attention directed towards several cues 
of this event. These cues activate a set of extant problem representations (1). The less of this 
information he gets from the external world by perceiving the situation, the more he has to fill 
in by extant knowledge structures he already possesses from prior economic situations, he has 
been confronted with (one reason why expertise plays a role, more appropriate extant 
economic problems faced to make sense of this situation).  
Each of these knowledge structures reflects an integrated set of representational elements 
about (a) initial goals, (b) actions, (c) salient information, and (d) significant constraints; i.e. 
several slots in these representations are filled with these types of information. Then, these 
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representations are screened, in order to identify commonalities in the relevant features, and 
elements selected and reorganized according to diverse strategies and criteria (2). It is 
assumed hereafter that the most highly activated schemas from the set of available knowledge 
categories in an economic agent’s mind provide a basis for problem definition, resulting in an 
initial problem representation (3). Indeed, many scholars in cognitive literature argue that 
individuals have indeed different styles or preferences directed by chronic schemas for 
processing information, approaching a task, or making sense of a situation.  
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Figure 37 Process Model of Problem Construction. 
One of such strategic concepts is called self-regulation (Crowe and Higgins 1997; Higgins 
2000; Werth 2004). It is based on the hedonistic principle that individuals approach pleasure 
and that the avoid pain; however, this can be achieved by pursuing the intention to move 
towards desired end-states or the intention to move away from undesired end-states (Higgins 
2000). These two fundamentally different approaches to a situation are assumed to be 
manifested in two different styles of self-regulation, promotion- and prevention-style that 
differ along several dimensions (Higgins 1998; Higgins and Silverman 1998): the underlying 
motives individuals are trying to satisfy, the nature of the goals or standards they are trying to 
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attain, the types of outcomes that are salient to individuals (Brockner et al. 2004), and the 
means undertaken to achieve this (Higgins 2000).  
In this concept, promotion-focus agents are motivated by trying to bring themselves into 
alignment with their goals or aspirations, i.e., are concerned with advancement, growth, and 
accomplishment; reason why it is also called an accomplishment orientation. In turn, 
prevention-focussed individuals tend to focus on security, safety, and responsibility in order 
to avoid negative outcomes; thus, also called responsibility orientation (Brockner et al. 2004). 
Such motivational preferences are assumed to be developed in early childhood, largely 
influenced by the parents' regulative style, either developing strong ideals in a promotion style 
and strong oughts in a prevention style (Higgins 2000; Witkin and Goodenough 1981). 
Derived from this fundamental motives in a promotion style individuals aim at achieving a 
self-congruency to ideals and discrepancies to these are regarded as negative outcome of a 
decision or action; consequently, an emphasis is put on ensuring the presence of positive 
outcomes and ensuring against the absence of positive outcomes; hopes, wishes, and 
aspirations represent maximal goals which are pursuit. In turn, individuals in a prevention 
style set minimal goals that are considered as duties, obligations or responsibilities that must 
be attained. Self-congruencies to oughts, then, represent the absence of negative outcomes 
and discrepancies the presence of negative outcomes (Higgins 1998, 2000). In the present 
concept of problem construction these different styles become manifest in preferences for 
goals in a promotion focus, respectively constraints in a prevention focus.  
However, regulatory focus theory generally also distinguishes between different means in 
pursuing goals: there exist eagerness means and vigilance means. While the former term 
refers to actions that involve ensuring hits and against errors of omission called misses, the 
latter term, in turn, involves ensuring correct rejections and against errors of commission 
called false alarms. This implies that a promotion style involves more risky behaviour than a 
prevention style, which is assumed to be more risk-avers in actions taken (Friedman and 
Förster 2001). Further, it is postulated that a promotion focus naturally fits to the use of 
eagerness means, while a prevention focus, similarly, fits to the use of vigilance means 
(Crowe and Higgins 1997; Higgins 1998, 2000).  
The general idea of regulatory focus theory might be illuminated by a simple example given 
by Higgins (2000): Consider a group of students in a course all working to attain the best 
grade possible, say A; some of them are oriented towards this grade as an accomplishment, 
whereas others as a responsibility. Assuming another perspective on the same group of 
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student, some of them might read extra material beyond what was assigned by the lecturer, 
whereas others are careful in fulfilling all course requirements. While the former 
differentiation refers to the dimension of regulatory orientation, the latter to the means used to 
pursuit goals: however, for these two dimensions exists a so called regulatory fit: for instance, 
reading additional material fits an accomplishment orientation better than a responsibility 
orientation, while for fulfilling course requirements the opposite argumentation can be made 
(Higgins 2000). The main differences between promotion and prevention style are 
summarised in Figure 38, which is also supposed to express that the two styles in their ‘pure’ 
form represent endpoints of a dichotomy on which each individual’s regulatory focus can be 
located.  
Vigilance MeansEagerness Means Means
Attaining Correct Rejections and avoiding 
False AlarmsAttaining Hits and Avoiding MissesSalient Outcomes
Minimal Goals: Duties, Obligations Maximal Goals: Hopes, Wishes, and Ideals 
Goals or 
Standards
Security, safety, and responsibilityAdvancement, Growth, and Accomplishment
Underlying 
Motives 
Prevention StylePromotion Style
 
Figure 38 Regulatory Focus Theory: Promotion vs. Prevention Style. 
As said before, such a focus guides the initial constructing of a situation in a rather implicit 
and chronic manner, but might be adjusted by individuals to specific situations. In order to 
account for these differences, complementary self-regulatory constructs have been developed: 
for instance, it could be differentiated between regulatory pride and self-efficacy (Bryant 
2007).  
While the term of regulatory pride refers to the chronic form of an individual’s regulatory 
focus as has been outlined before, self-efficacy describes an individual’s belief in its ability to 
be efficacious in certain task domains (Bandura 1997). Thus, it does not target on strategic 
goals and they way they can be achieved, but rather on an individual’s level of confidence and 
commitment to pursue such goals (Bryant 2007). Apparently, the concepts are related to each 
other and research suggests that strong promotion pride is typically accompanied by high self-
esteem and optimism (Grant and Higgins 2003). However, in the following, staying at a more 
general level leaned on preferences for goals or constraints and, hence, the concept of 
regulatory pride, it will be simply referred to as an individual’s regulatory focus. 
A Cognitive Model of Opportunity Recognition 
 217
Nevertheless, studies have revealed possibilities to influence such preferences. Manipulations 
in context, which might be called framing, can induce the activation of either promotion or 
prevention focus independent of an individual's chronic regulatory focus (Brendl et al. 1995; 
Crowe and Higgins 1997). Thus, it can be argued that contextual aspects do not only 
influence the development of chronic schema but also play a role in which schemas become 
activated in a particular situation (Corbett and Hmieleski 2007).  
Regarding its role in creative thinking, intuition suggests that a situation’s initial 
representations are quite idiosyncratic in ill-defined problem situations, given the incredible 
number of possibilities in such unstructured settings (Mumford et al. 1991). This postulate is 
supported by experimental findings suggesting that the type of representational elements 
preferred by individuals in structuring novel ill-defined problem situations contributes to the 
problem-solving efforts’ creative outcome (Mumford et al. 1996a). In particular promotion-
focussed individuals seem to be more creative than prevention-focussed people (Friedman 
and Forster 2001). This corresponds to assertions made in research on entrepreneurial 
cognition suggesting that a promotion focus enhances entrepreneurial behaviour opposed to 
a prevention focus (see chapter IV.A.2). Accordingly, in recognising entrepreneurial 
opportunities it might be argued that individuals showing a promotion-focus have an 
advantage for doing so because they are more inventive by generating more alternatives for 
making sense of incoming information and are more open to change than prevention-
focussed economic agents (Brockner et al. 2004; Crowe and Higgins 1997). Irrespective of 
any qualitative aspects, individuals in different regulatory focus styles should exhibit a 
different approach to opportunity recognition. While economic agents in a promotion style 
could be assumed to recognise true opportunities, which equal to hits, and avoid failing to 
recognise such, economic agents in a prevention style aim at recognising an opportunity as 
false and to avoid recognising an opportunity as true, which is actually false (Corbett and 
Hmieleski 2007).  
Since it is a facet model the question is also asked, which further variables could be 
hypothesised to influence the creative outcome of this process? A variety of other aspects 
could be considered to play a role in this matter. As to the individual values could be 
mentioned, expressed by the salience of various goals or the individual’s knowledge, skills, 
and abilities that have an influence through the available set of problem representations 
(Howe 1982). Regarding relevant context variables it is surely significant, how much 
resources are available to the individual for processing efforts in problem construction. This 
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explains a certain degree of importance of time and attentional variables. Furthermore, other 
contextual aspects might be the salience of cues indicating desirability of certain goals, the 
importance of particular constraints, the degree of acceptable risk or the nature of other 
currently activated categorical structures (Mumford et al. 1991).  
Concerning its role in entrepreneurship, initial problem formulation is often mentioned as a 
very important factor in innovative activity since economic actors or potential entrepreneurs 
often face complex and ill-defined problem situations, which have to be subjectively 
perceived and represented before they can be solved (Ward 2004). How important it 
practically is, how a problem-situation is approached right from the beginning might become 
quite clear in an illuminating example given by Ward (2004), referring to Barker (1993). In 
the mid-1970s, Sony nearly missed an important and valuable opportunity since they stopped 
working on developing music CDs. The reason behind was that they took the format of vinyl 
LP record albums, which is 12 inch diameter circles, and realised that their new CDs could 
carry 18 hours of music. In a first instance, it was judged to be too much music before they 
came up with the idea to produce smaller discs.  
This is a good example for initial assumptions made in solving a problem that were taken as 
given (here the size of the disc), which significantly influenced subsequent efforts. Once the 
limitation or restriction of size was removed, different and more feasible solutions were 
available; i.e. the CD in its present form was developed (Ward 2004). Putting this example in 
general terms, two kinds of constraints in economic settings could be distinguished: Besides 
external constraints for finding solutions or developing entrepreneurial opportunities (for 
instance, technological requirements or market and consumer demands), also internal, 
cognitive constraints exist related to categorical knowledge’s structure and the way it is 
accessed.  
Like in the Sony-example it leads to the tendency that individuals base new ideas on specific 
instances of a given category (such as size of CD). Particularly instances of more general 
concepts - that is higher-level ones in hierarchical knowledge structures - seem do dominate 
subordinate instances since most individuals appear to conceptualise a given object on more 
general concepts (Ward 2004). In a more formal manner this has been developed in the path-
of-least-resistance model by Ward and colleagues (Ward 1994, 1995). It assumes that 
individuals approaching the task of developing a new idea for a particular domain tend to 
retrieve rather basic level instances from that domain. Based on these, they select one or more 
of retrieved instances as starting point for their own ideas. Many of the stored properties of 
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those retrieved instances are then projected onto the new idea they are working on. In this 
case it is very likely that the new idea or creation, i.e. the entrepreneurial opportunity, 
strongly resembles the old exemplar (Ward 2004).  
However, as already touched in discussion the general nature of information, it is often 
difficult to find the right balance between novelty and familiarity since extant knowledge 
plays a paradoxical role (Ward 2004). An opportunity must be novel enough to be superior to 
existing solutions, but simultaneously familiar in order to be accepted by external 
requirements of the market (e.g. technology features) and internal, cognitive requirements of 
the consumers to be accepted. This resembles to the cognitive aspect of paths or trajectories 
often discussed in literature on innovation and institutional economics, for instance in the 
context of routines (e.g. Lundvall 1992). It is argued that since these routines and learning 
processes are rooted in the current economic structure, innovation and new ideas are similarly 
based in such a prevailing setting (Hodgson 1988). It follows that innovations are mostly 
gradual and cumulative (Lundvall 1992; Muller 2001). 
In summary, it is hypothesised here that an individual’s focus on types of representational 
elements included in the initial problem representation influences the outcome of the thinking 
process. Research has indicated that such representations typically include four main types of 
representational elements as to how a problematic situation has to be approached: (1) initial 
goals, (2) actions, (3) salient information, and (4) significant constraints. Consequently, it 
could be stated that the preferences for applying representational elements about initial goals 
TIG, actions TIP, salient information TII, or significant constraints TIC in problem construction 
of an agent j in situation k might be significantly correlated with the quality and originality of 
the options of action in the final problem representation PR.  
Each of the sets of representational elements available to an economic actor in an economic 
situation at a point in time could be defined by the set of information of this type in this 
particular situation (e.g. ( )1 2 3, . , , , , , ,, ,...,C C C Ct j k t j k t j k t j kTI I I I= ).xxviii However, the following term is 
supposed to describe the relative importance of each type of representational element; PCt,j,k 
could be therefore interpreted as the preference structure for types of information of agent j in 
situation k in t. 
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PC G PC A PC I PC C
t j k t j k t j k t j k t j kPC g TI a TI i TI c TI= ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ . 
with: 
, ,
PC
t j kg = Preference for goals in problem construction 
 
, ,
PC
t j ka = Preference for actions in problem construction 
 
, ,
PC
t j ki = Preference for salient information in problem construction 
 
, ,
PC
t j kc = Preference for constraints/restrictions in problem construction 
 
The term above is supposed to highlight that the initial economic problem representation is 
built up by representational elements of four different types. The factors gPC, aPC, iPC to cPC 
sum up to one and shall express the significance of each type of representational elements for 
this economic agent in this economic situation.  
Altogether, these results and considerations suggest the following four hypotheses concerning 
regulatory focus styles:  
H1: A promotion style of regulatory focus facilitates the recognition of entrepreneurial 
opportunities. 
H2: A prevention style of regulatory focus inhibits the recognition of entrepreneurial 
opportunities. 
H3: An action style in constructing problems facilitates the recognition of entrepreneurial 
opportunities. 
H4: An information style in constructing problems facilitates the recognition of 
entrepreneurial opportunities. 
However, it should be noticed that most likely, the initial understandings of the problem 
situation provided by the problem construction process in novel-ill-defined problem situations 
are not sufficient for subsequent problem-solving efforts and are used in a flexible and 
dynamic way (Novick 1990; Reeves and Weisburg 1994).  
 
A Cognitive Model of Opportunity Recognition 
 221
2. Updating by Information Encoding and Category Activation 
Rather the problem construction will - in a rather preliminary manner - serve as a kind of 
guideline for the retrieval of pertinent information from long-term memory and new, apparently 
necessary information in subsequent processes (Amabile 1983; Mobley et al. 1992; Sternberg 
1986a, b); this subsequent updating of the initial problem construction (1) is depicted in Figure 
39. It is hypothesized that the individual searches the external world for additional information 
of different types (2). Based on this updated new mental model of the world (3), extant 
categories are searched for in long-term memory (4). From this kind of long list, those best 
fitting are specified (5) and reorganised into another version of the problem representation (6). 
These processes and cognitive styles possibly active are now discussed in some more detail.  
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Figure 39 Information Encoding, Category Search, and Category Selection. 
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Individuals cannot solve complex, novel problems without considering pertinent information; 
thus, giving reason to regard information encoding as important in creative thinking (Mumford 
et al. 1996b). Indeed, empirical evidence suggests that novel or/and creative responses are 
induced by appropriate information search and application (Weisberg 1988). In the present 
model the conjecture is made that the process of information encoding is strongly influenced by 
activated extant procedural and declarative knowledge structures that guide information search 
and retrieval, where activation is engendered by prior problem construction, associative 
networks, and stimulus cues (Norman 1980; Reif and Heller 1982). In case new information or 
new knowledge structures have to be acquired, information encoding is assumed to be 
prolonged and will involve intense, active processing drawing out elaborations and implications 
of this knowledge (Schmeck and Grove 1979; Snow and Lohman 1984; Thompson 1985). 
Therefore, according to the present terminology it could be stated that after a tentative 
representation TR1t,j,k has been built about the situation or problem an individual is confronted 
with, it then searches for information in the external world in order to update and improve the 
initial representation leading to an updated representation TR2t,j,k. It is assumed that this search 
for information to be included in TR2t,j,k is strongly based on TR1t,j,k.  
The first to explicitly show the impact of effective information encoding on problem-solving 
and creativity was Sternberg (1986a). In this matter, a huge amount of studies exist that focus 
on information retrieval from long-term memory, i.e. category search (Siegler and Richards 
1982). On the contrary, rather scanty knowledge is available as to the acquisition of new 
knowledge; even though studies were able to show that creative achievement may be generally 
related to information encoding and the associated search strategies (Perkins 1992) and, more 
specifically, may be related to the use of systematic and more extensive search strategies during 
information encoding (Kulkarni and Simon 1988; Qin and Simon 1990). However, if 
systematic or not, individuals starting to work on creative problems seem to differ according to 
the kind of information they look for and the search strategies they apply to acquire this 
information (Perkins 1992; Sternberg 1986b); in other words, individuals selectively encode 
information. A study of Davidson and Sternberg (1984) provides evidence for the importance 
of such selective encoding in creative problem-solving since they found out that creative 
individuals seem to be adept at identifying key relevant facts and tend to ignore irrelevant, 
distracting information (see also Davidson 1995). Further empirical evidence suggests that 
individuals display some general strategic differences in the type of information they encode 
and search for in case they are confronted with novel problem situations: More interestingly, 
such studies indicate that these preferences have an influence on the creative outcome of the 
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process (Mumford et al. 1996b; see also Mumford and Gustafson 1988; Qin and Simon 1990; 
Sternberg 1988a; Sternberg and Lubart 1991). 
This assertion is also made in the entrepreneurship literature: It is argued that this process, and 
that of category search, is particularly crucial since economic situations are mostly ambiguous 
or information is incomplete (Alvarez 2005; Pendergast 2003); it is therefore often mentioned 
that the search for information plays a crucial role in the opportunity recognition process (Fiet 
et al. 2000). Further it is suggested that opportunities are recognised resulting of an individuals 
efforts to search for information cues and questioning what others do not recognise. 
Information the entrepreneurial mind searches for is than processed in a meaningful manner, 
leading to the discovery of entrepreneurial opportunities (Pech and Cameron 2006). In this 
context, Ucbasaran (2004) states that “[…] entrepreneurial cognitive processes can enable an 
individual to build on specific information to make new leaps in the identification of 
opportunities.” (Ucbasaran 2004, p. 85) This is exactly what the present cognitive model of 
creative thinking aims at describing: The crucial process of recombination of knowledge 
structures is closely linked - among others - to an individual’s information encoding efforts. 
However, the question what information entrepreneurial minds look for and how they search 
for it, can hardly been answered. Neoclassical economics’ information search theory and 
Kirznerian unintentional search have both only limited value in this regard: Scholars 
subscribing to the latter criticise the former for advocating a mechanical optimisation process 
that arbitrarily constrains thinking, whereas followers of the neoclassical approach criticise the 
latter for having nothing practical to teach to entrepreneurs (Fiet et al. 2000). Another way 
might be the one presented here, assuming a cognitive view on how entrepreneurs search 
information based on their prior knowledge, which seems to promise more pedagogical value 
(Fiet et al. 2000, 2004b). Many of such research efforts on information search behaviour 
focussed on the source of the business idea (Long and Graham 1988; Peterson 1988), on 
serendipity or deliberate search (Koller 1988; Peterson 1988), or on search strategies and the 
amount of search effort (Busenitz 1996; Gilad et al. 1988; Kaish and Gilad 1991). Again 
others aimed at shedding light on the amount and the type of information, which a potential 
entrepreneur searches, depending on the extent to which it relies on entrepreneurial cognitive 
processes and the level of episodic knowledge (Kaish and Gilad 1991; Long and McMullan 
1984). 
However, along these lines it could be assumed that individuals differ regarding the quantity 
and quality of information they need to make a given discovery of an entrepreneurial 
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opportunity (Ucbasaran 2004). The detailed study on information search behaviour of new 
venture founders by Kaish and Gilad (1991) has only weakly suggested that entrepreneurs 
spend more time on searching for information, but, more important to the present work, that 
they use certain unconventional sources of information. These findings comply with those on 
general creative thinking and the principal philosophical view of the present work: It seems 
rather important which kind of information is attended to by entrepreneurial individuals and 
which sources are used to acquire such. Indeed, studies suggest that entrepreneurs pay more 
attention to other cues in a given situation than non-entrepreneurs (Kaish and Gilad 1991).  
The close linkage between information processing and knowledge structures, emphasised 
repeatedly, already suggests that information encoding behaviour is influenced by an 
individual’s idiosyncratic level and nature knowledge. Findings by Cooper et al. (1995) 
indicate that inexperienced, novice entrepreneurs generally search for more information than 
experienced, habitual entrepreneurs. This corresponds to the point made by Fiet et al. (2000) 
that habitual entrepreneurs do not engage in extensive search, but rather concentrate on 
searching within a more specific domain, which they know well (see also McGrath and 
MacMillan 2000). It could be hypothesised that a habitual entrepreneur’s episodic knowledge 
superiorly directs attention, expectations, and interpretations of market stimuli (Gaglio 1997); 
a statement that leads back to an individual’s cognitive style in information encoding: 
Even though, it is not clear whether individuals display stable strategic preferences in 
information search and encoding (Mumford et al. 1996b), it is assumed here that specific 
strategic preferences in form of cognitive styles can contribute to creative performance; but 
how they could look like? Concerning this issue, studies on scientific work might offer some 
potential answers: Kuhn (1970) revealed that creative achievement in sciences was often 
based on the identification of discrepant information and a subsequent attempt to resolve this 
discrepancy. Similarly, Dunbar (1995) found that a focus on discrepant information and 
information inconsistent with initial expectations is related to creative performance in 
microbiology laboratories. Such inconsistencies might encourage individuals to identify and 
use multiple alternative concepts, thus enhancing upcoming combination and reorganisation 
efforts (Baughman and Mumford 1995). 
H5: The preference for searching for additional factual information that was inconsistent 
with the initial factual data facilitates the recognition of entrepreneurial opportunities. 
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Another fruitful strategy might consist in attending to a wider range of information, 
independent of the fact if some information might appear apparently irrelevant in the first 
instance (Alissa 1972). This is consistent with the notion that extended search, that means in 
this context producing a wider range of information available for upcoming combination and 
reorganisation processes, may significantly contribute to creative thinking (Finke et al. 1992; 
Mumford and Gustafson 1988; Perkins 1992). 
H6: The preference for searching for information irrelevant to the problem facilitates the 
recognition of entrepreneurial opportunities. 
Furthermore, the application of the appropriate information search strategies in a problem-
situation seems to be positively correlated with expertise (Sweller 1989). More specifically, it 
appears that experience facilitates rapid and accurate encoding of relevant information 
through the principle-based knowledge structures that arise in building expertise (Halff et al. 
1986). Such rather convergent search strategies are of importance in this regard since 
information must be organised and placed in a broader context, particularly in complex and 
novel problem situations (Mumford et al. 1996b). Broadly speaking, experts dispose of more 
extensive and diverse knowledge structures, organise information into categorical systems 
based on underlying principles, and have more efficient strategies for organising information 
in memory via chunking (Chi et al. 1982, 1987; De Groot 1960; Medin 1989). Therefore, the 
rather convergent effort to search for information bearing on relevant principles might as well 
be positively contribute to creative achievement (Perkins 1995).  
Being more precise about why it seems that accessing domain information at more abstract 
levels, i.e. accessing underlying principles, leads to more original products may lie in the 
nature of the stored information. Information stored about a specific instance is by definition 
more specific and therefore may be more constraining than more abstract information 
concerning the same types of properties (Ward 2004). Put differently, experts search for such 
information that facilitates the appropriate subsequent information processing in a general 
manner. Additionally, expertise seems to have rather subtle effects on the efficacy of 
information acquisition and solution monitoring (Siegler and Richards 1982). Again, it is also 
important to distinguish between general and domain-specific knowledge. Theoretically, the 
latter is important in gaining creative results through the identification of discrepant facts and 
the subsequent reorganisation of extant knowledge structures to take them into account 
(Koestler 1964; Kuhn 1970; Mumford and Gustafson 1988).  
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H7: The preference for searching for information regarding underlying principles that 
might be useful in solving the problem facilitates the recognition of entrepreneurial 
opportunities. 
Following a similar argumentation, the attention to search cues regarding goals and 
restrictions might have an influence on the output of the thinking process as well. It has been 
said that focussing on relevant principles can reduce complexity in searching for relevant 
information in the external world. Directing attention towards goals or restrictions might be 
another strategy to limit the space to search information in (Isaak and Just 1995). Again, it can 
be assumed that a regulatory focus of prevention- or prevention-style guides an individual's 
information search (de Lange and van Knippenberg 2007), as has been outlined for the 
process of problem construction. The overall process model in Figure 34 already indicated by 
the arrows on the right-hand side between problem construction and information encoding 
that these two processes are highly intertwined. Therefore, it is assumed that individuals who 
have a preference on goals in problem construction also have a preference for this type of 
information in searching for information; analogue, this applies to restrictions or constraints.  
H: The preference for searching for information regarding goals that need to be addressed 
in solving the problem facilitates the recognition of entrepreneurial opportunities. 
H: ‘The preference for searching for information regarding restrictions or constraints that 
have to be posed on the problem solution facilitates the recognition of entrepreneurial 
opportunities. 
Nevertheless, these hypotheses are not tested directly since, as will be outlined later, the 
preferences for goals and constraints in problem construction and information encoding will 
be treated as indicator for the constructs of problem and prevention style of regulatory focus.  
In order to investigate if the search for different types of information has an impact on the 
outcome of the opportunity recognition process, a sample is drawn in which the individuals 
are assumed to have more or less similar knowledge about entrepreneurship and the domain, 
which the economic situation will be set in. The experimental control of this aspect - or these 
variables - allows making some statements on the cognitive process of information encoding 
itself, independent of relevant knowledge structures guiding it. However, integrating this into 
the general thinking model, it can be said that based on TR1t,j,k the economic agent engages in 
search efforts that are aimed at finding additional information in the external world that 
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improve the quality or accuracy of the initial problem representation; i.e. allow an update of 
the initial representation resulting in TR2t,j,k. This process of knowledge acquisition is guided 
by information search strategies an economic agent applies in a given economic situation.  
However, economic agents are assumed to differ according to the kind of information they 
look for and the search strategies they apply to acquire this information. More importantly, 
these general information-search strategic differences in the type of information they encode 
and search for in case they are confronted with novel economic problem situations might that 
have an influence on the outcome of the opportunity recognition process. It has been outlined 
that research on creative thinking in other domains suggests that creative economic agents 
mainly concentrate their search on information for filling the slots of either (1) factual 
information inconsistent or contradictory with the initial factual data in the problem 
representation (TICI), (2) information that seems to be irrelevant to the problem situation 
(TIII), (3) underlying principles assumed to drive this particular economic situation (TIP), (4) 
goals to be addressed in that economic situation (TIG), or (5) restrictions or constraints posed 
on the problem solution (TIC).  
This does not mean that economic agents are presumed to exclusively concentrate on one of 
these categories in searching information. In fact, they might have a preference for searching 
for all these information, or for some more than others. Again, these preferences of agent j in 
situation k at this point in time t are expressed by factors ciIS to cIS. Thus, the preference 
structure for acquiring additional information AIt,j,k in the information search and encoding 
process could be described as a set consisting of information of the types mentioned above: 
, , , , , , , , , , , ,
IS CI IS II IS P IS G IS C
t j k t j k t j k t j k t j k t j kAI ci TI ii TI p TI g TI c TI= ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ . 
with: 
, ,
IS
t j kci = Preference for contradictory information in information 
search. 
 
, ,
IS
t j kii = Preference for information hypothesised to be in information 
search. 
 
, ,
IS
t j kp = Preference for underlying principles in information search. 
 
, ,
IS
t j kg = Preference for goals in information search. 
 
, ,
IS
t j kc = Preference for constraints/restrictions in information search. 
It has been emphasised several times in rather general terms that information processing is 
schema-driven (e.g. Jackson and Dutton 1988); this will be specified in some more detail, 
while discussing the two cognitive processes of category search and identifying the best-
fitting category: Once the individual has encoded some information it considers relevant to 
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the problem at hand and holds an updated tentative representation TR2, it continues to make 
sense of this new context by selecting a set of categories or concepts that serve to organise 
available information and provide a basis for upcoming efforts, in particular combination and 
reorganisation (Hayek 1967; Mumford et al. 1996c). This process is called the search for 
categories, containing the specification of relevant schema or knowledge structures for 
understanding factual information pertinent to the problem (acquired during the information 
encoding process), as well as rules for applying, i.e. acquiring, organising, and retaining, this 
information (Siegler and Richards 1982). In other words, the individual defines a set of 
categories that will allow pertinent procedural and declarative information to be organised and 
interpreted (Mumford et al. 1991). This aspect of creative thinking is directly linked to an 
individual’s ability to organise and facilitate its memory. The importance of category search 
for creative outcomes has been shown in numerous older studies (Alissa 1972; Gough 1976; 
Harrington 1980; Kogan et al. 1980; Mednick and Mednick 1967; Poze 1983; Runco 1986) 
and even more recently (Carlson and Gorman 1992; Ippolito and Tweney 1995; Mumford et 
al. 1996c).  
However, for the present study it is crucial to know, which categories or concepts individuals 
should retain in order to generate useful, new ideas? Are there actually certain types of 
categories that are - in a particular situation - related to an individual’s ability to acquire and 
organise information and combine and reorganise it later on (Mumford et al. 1996c)? A 
variety of mechanisms can be presumed to guide category search. Martinsen (1993) showed 
for instance that conceptual knowledge available to an individual might have a strong impact 
on creative thinking in that it limits the search for alternative problem-solutions. More 
specifically, research indicates that experts tend to use concepts based on underlying 
principles. Consequently, it might be argued that the tendency to select such knowledge 
structures might increase the probability of a creative outcome of the thinking process 
(Mumford et al. 1996c); this seems to particularly apply if these underlying principles provide 
the linkages among different pieces of information needed in subsequent reorganisation and 
combination processes (Ward et al. 1990). Even though, this conjecture could not be verified 
in all settings, and it seems that abstract principles may be of little value unless the individual 
links them to application in the respective problem situation (Mumford et al. 1996c), it is here 
hypothesised that there might be a facilitating effect in recognizing entrepreneurial 
opportunities.  
A Cognitive Model of Opportunity Recognition 
 229
H8: Category search based on underlying or general principles facilitates the recognition 
of entrepreneurial opportunities. 
Equally, conceptual knowledge organised on the basis of higher-order goals - that means 
broad, long-term goals - seem to contribute to creativity. They include a number of discrete 
events and, simultaneously, facilitate the construction of the linkages necessary for creative 
combination and reorganisation (Carlson and Gorman 1992; Crouch 1992). Furthermore, it 
seems as if they provide a flexible, rich and rather broad organising structure for 
organising and recalling an individual’s prior life experiences in the current problem 
situation (Barsalou 1991). Based on the broad structure, goal-based concepts may allow an 
individual to organise and integrate a diverse set of activities, thus, again, facilitating 
creative performance (Csikszentmihalyi and Sawyer 1995). Unfortunately, there still exists 
rather vague knowledge on the exact mechanisms by which long-term goal-based concepts 
contribute to creative outcome of problem-solving efforts (Mumford et al. 1996c). 
Notwithstanding, it is here suggested that it might play a role in opportunity recognition.  
H9: Category search based on underlying long-term, higher-order goals facilitates the 
recognition of entrepreneurial opportunities. 
Again regarding this hypothesis it is argued that an individual characterised by a promotion-
style regulatory focus in problem construction and information encoding also has a preference 
for selecting existing knowledge categories based on the goals found in a situation. However, 
it must be thoroughly investigated if such a hypothesised focus really exists at all, if so, 
whether independently for each information process or a positive correlated between two or 
all of these processes can be found. It might be asked at this point why a potential preference 
for restrictions, a prevention-style regulatory focus, is not assessed for the process of category 
selection. As has already been said in the introduction to this chapter, only such types of 
preference are included as potential influences of opportunity recognition that are considered 
relevant in literature on creative thinking or opportunity recognition; to the authors knowledge 
this is not the case and, therefore, an assessment is abstained from in order to keep the 
complexity of the model manageable.  
Some scholars argue that the activation of categorical knowledge focussing on the evaluation 
of one’s own or other’s performance might inhibit creative thinking (Amabile 1983). 
However, an experiment has shown that individuals seem to have a tendency to use such 
social evaluation concepts, comparing themselves to peer groups, and this only marginally 
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impedes creative thinking (Mumford et al. 1996c); however, again it will be assumed that 
such a significant relationship exists.  
H10: Category search based on social evaluation (social peering) inhibits the recognition 
of entrepreneurial opportunities. 
Another type of categories that might impede creative thinking are those reflecting fixed 
action plans or scripts because they impose some rigidity on an individual’s solution 
strategies on the one hand, and have some difficulties in organising events in terms of 
discrete actions (Reiser et al. 1985).  
H11: Category search based on specific action plans might inhibits the recognition of 
entrepreneurial opportunities. 
Besides treating them rather independently, information encoding and category search are 
likely to appear in tandem in complex problem-solving efforts (Mumford et al. 1991). 
Intuition suggests that initial information will activate certain categories, which then influence 
subsequent encoding, while serving to activate still other categories through new information 
and category relationships. In case there is no need to acquire new information, they, 
however, may be executed in a rather discrete manner.  
This close interplay of the two processes gives reasons for identifying common individual and 
situational factors, aside from problem or information type. As to the individual aspect, 
expertise conditions the amount and nature of information encoded, along with other 
differentiated extra-cognitive variables, for instance energy levelsxxix, problem sensitivity, 
tolerance for ambiguity, interests, and mastery motives (Barron and Harrington 1981; Dweck 
1986). Regarding contextual variables, they should have an impact on information encoding 
and category search through attentional resources and information access (Langley et al. 
1987). Resulting, it is likely and often hypothesised that search processes will lead to a set of 
categorical structures to be included into the problem representations. Simultaneously, this 
implies that certain constraints have to be imposed on the number and nature of the categories 
applied, i.e. the best-fitting categories must be specified (Mumford et al. 1991). 
The categorisation of incoming information, respectively the activation of a limited number of 
categories, is necessary because it reduces the complexity of the external stimulus by 
organising objects into meaningful groups (Dutton and Jackson 1987); the fact that such 
incoming information’s categorisation is not symmetric or mechanistic is one of the main 
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sources of new ideas and creativity (de Bono 1992). However, apparently, not all extant 
categorical knowledge structures available to an individual in a given situation are equally 
likely to be included in the problem space. Instead, there should exist some mechanisms 
guiding this decision. Lots of operations could be thought of playing a role in this process. 
Generally, it is assumed that the identification or recognition of the specific instance under 
consideration depends on the degree of overlap between the issue characteristics associated 
with the cognitive schema and the salient characteristics of the specific instance (Tversky 
1977).  
For instance, research suggests that individuals tend to retain those categories showing the 
best fit in terms of ideal, frequent, or typical exemplars with previously encoded information 
(Barsalou 1983). Furthermore, it seems that categories associated with significant constraints 
and inappropriate goals are likely to be eliminated (Mumford et al. 1991), while categories 
closely linked to each other through prior association and effective use are often retained, 
particularly in case of associated procedural and declarative categories in an integrated set 
(Krietler and Krietler 1987a,b). Again, some variables that exert influence on this systematic 
evaluative process have been identified. It seems that both, an individual’s expertise and 
intelligence, are positively correlated with the process operation’s efficiency. Additionally, 
cognitive complexity, flexibility, and openness shape the evaluation criteria’s nature and, 
thereby, process operation’s outcomes (Mumford et al. 1991). Further to this, the external 
environment imposes performance pressure and stressors on the individual at hand (Fiedler 
and Garcia 1987), for example leading to social pressure by influencing perceptions of 
category appropriateness (Mumford et al. 1991).  
As laid out above, besides an individual’s efforts to search for additional information 
externally, it internally selects a set of schemas that serve to organise available information 
and provide a basis for upcoming cognitive efforts. More formally, this process of searching 
appropriate knowledge categories is based on TR2t,j,k and the additional information AIt,j,k 
resulting from the processes of problem construction as well as information search and 
encoding. The category search process in the economic agent’s memory specifies a set of 
categories from extant knowledge (EKt,j,k) that will allow pertinent procedural and declarative 
information to be organised and interpreted. In other words, the economic agent tries to make 
sense of the situation, and, thereby, to refine the problem representation by searching his 
memory for available schemas, which were built by prior situations.  
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In the context of entrepreneurial opportunities the question arises, which set of schemas 
economic agents should retain or activate in order to generate useful, new opportunities in a 
specific economic situation at a point in time? As outlined before, research in other domains 
indicates that the preference for a type of categories might have an impact on the outcome of 
the whole thinking process. In the present model, the concepts of schemas are varying as to 
the content pertinent to the economic situation at hand. The schemas activated are either based 
on similarity with the previously activated representation (TR2t,j,k) regarding (1) underlying or 
general principles (TIP), (2) underlying long-term, high-order goals (TIG), (3) social 
evaluation of third persons (TIS), or (4) specific action plans (scripts) (TIA).  
Once again, this preference for activating certain schema based on types of information is 
expressed by the factors pCS to aCS. Thus, the set of knowledge structures activated EKt,j,k from 
memory in category search and specification processes could be described as a set consisting 
of information of the types mentioned above as follows: 
, , , , , , , , , ,
CS P CS G CS S CS A
t j k t j k t j k t j k t j kEK p TI g TI s TI a TI= ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅  
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t j kp = Preference for general principles in category search. 
 
, ,
CS
t j kg = Preference for long-term goals in category search. 
 
, ,
CS
t j ks = Preference for social-peering in category search. 
 
, ,
CS
t j ka = Preference for action plans in category search. 
If an economic actor has activated a specific set of pertinent schemas, a subsequent process is 
responsible for selecting or specifying only a few out of this set of schemas for following 
thinking processes. An economic agent is assumed to specify these categorical knowledge 
structures that best explain the information encoded so far. This means the economic agent 
finally builds up the relevant problem space or means-ends framework MEt,j,k for this 
economic problem. Based on findings in other domains, there must be one mechanism 
assumed to be active in selecting the categories. For instance, it could be hypothesised that 
economic agents tend to retain the categories with the best fit in terms of ideal, frequent, or 
typical exemplars with previously encoded information.  
Alternatively, they might select categories associated with significant constraints and 
eliminate inappropriate goals are. It could also be that categories closely linked to each other 
through prior association and effective use are retained. Anyway, it can be said that these 
remaining schemas are selected from set EKt,j,k. Since the terms shown only represent a 
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relative view on the composition of the representation, the ft,j,k are simply depicting the type of 
schemas activated and not a specific set, principally a similar term describes the composition, 
only with different preference factors: 
, , , , , , , , , ,
SC P SC G SC S SC A
t j k t j k t j k t j k t j kR p TI g TI s TI a TI= ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅  
with: 
, ,
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t j kp = Preference for general principles in category search. 
 
, ,
SC
t j kg = Preference for long-term goals in category search. 
 
, ,
SC
t j ks = Preference for social-peering in category search. 
 
, ,
SC
t j ka = Preference for action plans in category search. 
Admittedly, when the best fitting categories have been selected, there is not much novelty in 
such thinking yet; it is rather created on the basis of this ‘raw material’ (Bejar et al. 1991). 
Now that the economic agent has come to a mental representation of the economic situation, it 
might be the case that he selects an option of action out of the already available set for this 
slot. However, it has been argued that opportunity recognition is here seen in altering this set 
of actions. How can be accounted for this in a general model like the present? 
 
3. Category Combination and Reorganisation 
Most researchers - and even laypersons would intuitively - agree that something cannot be 
created from nothing (Mumford et al. 1997b). Individuals rather work on existing knowledge 
that is combined and reorganised in order to come to a new idea or understanding (Mobley 
1992; Finke et al. 1992; Mumford and Gustafson 1988; Rothenberg 1986; Simonton 1990; 
Weber 1992). Several empirical studies suggest the high importance of this process for 
creative thinking (Mumford and Gustafson 1988; Owens 1969; Rothenberg 1986). The main 
aim of this process it to bring about the generation of an interrelated sequence of actions 
likely to cause the achievement of the goals inherent in the problem-solving effort. In other 
words, it is the process of linking procedural and declarative categories within themselves and 
with each other in order to generate a novel action plan, altering an economic agent’s set of 
available options of action.  
Further to providing an information base for generating new problem solutions from earlier 
learning, combination and reorganisation of existing categories lead to other aspects of the 
creative act, which are also of some significance. For instance, processes range from creation 
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of totally new information categories for use in problem-solving to a relatively simple 
rearrangement of the linkages among existing categories and category elements, leading to 
different degrees of output novelty (Barsalou 1983; Ward 2004). In addition, new 
arrangements may bring new features to the forefront (Finke et al. 1992). These new features, 
often referred to as emergent features (Ward 2004), might be accompanied by implications 
that represent significant extensions of the concepts used as input for the combination and 
reorganisation process. In fact, empirical results suggest that such emergent features, together 
with further exploration and elaboration, really seem to provide an important basis for 
creative thinking by providing ideas substantially different form the merged ones (Mumford 
et al. 1997b; Rothenberg 1979; Ward 2004). 
These assumptions are based on substantial evidence for the importance of this process in 
creative thinking. Historical studies of artists and scientists suggest that creative outcome 
was often achieved by the linkage of previously unrelated concepts (Koestler 1964; Kuhn 
1970; Rothenberg 1986; Weber 1992). Other studies of a similar type revealed that the 
combination and reorganisation of extant knowledge structures led to important advances in 
the fields of electromagnetic theory and powered flight (Crouch 1992; Tweney 1992). Based 
on the findings of experimental studies (Rothenberg 1973, 1986; Rothenberg and Sobel 
1980; Maier and Burke 1970; Maier and Thurber 1970), more recent attempts aim at 
identifying the specific cognitive operations involved in the process, i.e. the processes of 
secondary (see e.g. Baughman and Mumford 1995; Finke et al. 1992). In a more specific 
study, Mumford et al. (1997b) assumed that an individual’s ability to combine and 
reorganise categories could be best measured by the principal constituents of concepts (the 
category exemplars and features).  
Information included in such newly built categories, as well as the new linkages between 
existing categories, depend on the characteristics of the individual at hand, the categories 
available to him, and the history or path of the problem-solving effort. Therefore, content and 
implications of this restructuring may be somewhat idiosyncratic and only loosely linked to 
consensual, culturally-defined knowledge structures (Mumford and Mobley 1989; Scott et al. 
2005). Their nature implies some degree of domain specificity of the creative thought, just as 
dependence on these categories and basic operating processes allow for some generality 
(Mumford et al. 1991). Four processes of secondary order can be conceived to be in operation 
in category combination and reorganisation (see Figure 40): (1) the identification of central 
properties or key features of category members, (2) the mapping of the identified features or 
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properties for one category onto the features of other categories, (3) the use of shared features 
to construct a new category, and (4) the identification of additional feature or properties of 
category members through elaboration (Bejar et al. 1991; Baughman and Mumford 1995; 
Mumford et al. 1997b). These processes result in a novel problem representation NPR. 
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Figure 40 Outline of the Combination and Recombination Process. 
Although some results suggest that in this case metaphors or broader analogical implications 
of these features substitute isolated and concrete features (Tourangeau and Rips 1991; 
Tourangeau and Sternberg 1982), the exact mechanisms for the case of diverse categories are 
still rather unknown (Mumford et al. 1991; Mumford et al. 1997b), intuitive variables must 
serve as basis for designing potential factors of influence. Intuition suggests that the overlaps 
in organising principles and category exemplars as well as commonalities in elemental or 
procedural steps are essential in guiding the process. The same seems to apply to the available 
analogical models an individual disposes of and its divergent thinking skills (Holyoak 1984; 
Medin and Ross 1989; Owens 1969; Runco and Albert 1985). Furthermore, it is likely that 
reasoning capacity and concerted active processing are positively correlated with creative 
category combination and reorganisation (Mumford et al. 1991).  
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In addition, further research indicates the efficiency of process operation across individuals 
might vary contingent on differential variables, such as self-esteem, organisation, 
independence, flexibility, openness (Feldhusen and Hobson 1981; Houtz et al. 1989; McCrae 
1987). Similarly, so called climatic variables are assumed to influence an individual’s 
category combination and reorganisation efforts. These are aspects such as communication, 
peer reports, norms stressing the value of alternative ways of looking at things, etc. (Abbey 
and Dickson 1983; Knapp 1963). In the end, independent of heuristics or knowledge 
structures an individual applies (Scott et al. 2005) the whole process should produce a 
potential problem solution (or a set of problem solutions), which has to be evaluated, whether 
is satisfies the relevant requirements. There is also reason to hypothesise that active directed 
search for relations between categories has an influence on an individual’s performance 
(Mumford et al. 1997b). 
However, related to the field of entrepreneurship, several transformational concepts are 
discussed that are all based on the recombination of extant knowledge structures since such 
conceptual combination might be of high relevance in the search for new means-ends 
frameworks in economic settings (Ward 2004), thereby breaking the existing framework 
(Gaglio and Katz 2001). More practically, mentally combining apparently unrelated or even 
opposed concepts, called Janusian thinking, might be useful for generating new products or 
services (Rothenberg 1979; Ward 2004). For example, reasoning about opposing consumer 
wants might contribute to find gaps in product spaces or reaching a target audience by 
marketing measures (Ward 2004).  
Further, it might be argued that novelty in economic settings often results from combinations 
that represent specialisations, going down the hierarchical network; for instance, running 
shoes are a specialisation of athletic shoes in general (Ward 2004). For instance the process of 
bisociation is assumed to be the essential process in bringing knowledge together; this 
approach starts with the general subjectivist conjecture of schema theory that the perceptions 
and interpretations of the marketplace, respectively an industry or branch, possibly vary 
among individuals. It is argued that they differ due to differences in the schema content and 
complexity, which are built or activated in response to an identical stimulus (Gaglio 1997). 
This implies that the human mind executes an association process, which links the perceived 
elements. Based on this notion that the creative process is the formation of associative 
elements of different concepts into new combinations, i.e. new concepts, through bisociation 
(Mednick 1962), it is argued that bisociation is the thinking mode mainly applied in 
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opportunity recognition (Ko 2004; Ko and Butler 2003, 2004). It is seen as the process of 
combining knowledge structures, which finally allows an economic agent to recognise an 
opportunity (Smith and Di Gregorio 2002).  
Ko (2004) developed an entrepreneurial identification framework that is built up by several 
stages, which include divergent as well as convergent thinking. Although the approach is 
nothing more than an idea that intends to consider the concept of recombination in the context 
of opportunity identification (Ko 2004), it seems reasonable to emphasise its role in the 
present work due to several reasons: (1) it directs attention to the cognitive ability to process 
information, (2) considers the importance of different industries, already pointing to the nexus 
of individual and opportunity, and (3) assumes that such cognitive abilities can be learned 
separated from relevant knowledge. 
A further process that could be subsumed in this chapter is the potential role of analogical 
reasoning in recognising or constructing entrepreneurial opportunities (Gaglio and Katz 
2001). The term refers to the application or projection of an individual’s familiar domain to a 
novel or less familiar one (Ward 2004). In the present work it is seen as one way (or manner) 
to reorganise extant knowledge structures, although it is sometimes mentioned as an 
independent process in other process models (see e.g. Finke et al. 1992; Ward 2004). In the 
context of analogies underlying principles might be of particular importance since these can 
help to transfer ideas from one domain to another. Being more precisely, it is often argued 
that creative advances are obtained in close conceptual domains (Ward 2004). Entrepreneurs 
might profit from analogies on two different levels. Firstly, several transfers from underlying 
principles in one area to others yielded a profit, in particular as variations for special target 
groups of customers. Secondly, such analogies seem to be relevant in selling a novel idea to 
customers; this refers to the dual nature of information that always includes some degree of 
familiarity.  
Such familiarity is the dominant aspect in the concept of mental simulations that can be seen 
as rather imitative cognitive constructions representing an event or a whole series of such 
based on a causal sequence of successive interdependent actions (Gaglio 2004; Gaglio and 
Katz 2001). Put more informally, the term describes the ubiquitous thought everyone knows 
reasoning about what is going to happen in a given situation. Mental simulations seem to have 
two functions, of which one is of more affective nature, providing an individual the 
opportunity to re-experience and process emotions. Such aspects are not as important in the 
stance of the present work as it is the second function of preparation. By mentally simulating 
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a situation or event, individuals can anticipate the environments and conceive strategies or 
tactics in order to achieve the pertinent goals: By doing so, individuals seem to estimate 
probabilities and causality using it as a heuristic for evaluating options of actions (Gaglio 
2004).  
The actual value of this heuristic seems to be derived from changing, altering, or mutating 
something in the mental simulation. Such changes can consist in (1) changing the amount or 
degree of some element of the representation, i.e. a slot of the frame, (2) deleting it altogether, 
(3) substituting something else entirely different, or (4) leaving original elements but adding 
some, etc. (Gaglio 2004). One specific type of mental simulations is called counterfactual 
thinking and is characterised by thinking in a way that is contrary to existing situations 
(Gaglio 2004; Gaglio and Katz 2001) or what might have been if things went different (Baron 
2000). However, it could now be argued in which way mental simulation and counterfactual 
thinking of alert individuals differ from that of less-alert ones?  
While earlier studies alleged that entrepreneurs engage in less counterfactual thinking (Baron 
2000), refined works later on indicated, among other aspects, the they might engage earlier in 
such thinking, more intensive, more elaborated than subconsciously, thereby generating 
counterfactuals that maintain the novelty. Another preference of entrepreneurial economic 
agents in this regard might lie in that they work forward in conceiving the mental situation, 
i.e. begin by a starting point changing the outcomes of the situation instead of working 
backward, which means they presume a desired outcome and change potential causes leading 
to this (Gaglio 2004). However, more generally, all these processes describe a combination or 
reorganisation of knowledge categories, reason why they can all be subsumed here.  
Modelling this formally, it can be said that the set of specified schemas included in PR 
provides the base on which economic agents combine and reorganise knowledge in order to 
come to a new idea or understanding of the economic situation. The main aim of these 
processing efforts is the generation of an interrelated sequence of actions likely to cause the 
achievement of the goals inherent in the economic problem-solving effort. Since the 
mechanisms guiding category recombination are still rather unknown is seems not feasible to 
investigate on individual preferences in this process. Therefore, the assessment must be 
restricted to a general level by attributing a general ability to do this cognitive process, 
varying between economic agents. Thus, statements about specific preferences or strategies 
are not made; more basic research in psychology must be awaited, helping to structure such 
an observation in the context of entrepreneurship. In other words, the process of category 
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combination and reorganisation results in procedural and declarative categories that are linked 
within themselves and with each other in order to generate new problem solutions. The 
outcome of such processes ranges from creation of totally new means-end framework NPRt,j,k 
for use in solving economic problems to a relatively simple rearrangement of the linkages 
among existing categories and category elements. Subsequently, it assumed that an economic 
agent’s ability of combining knowledge categories is compellingly positively correlated with 
high novel outcome of the economic problem-solving effort (Mumford et al. 1997b). 
H12: An individual’s high ability to combine and reorganise categories facilitates the 
recognition of entrepreneurial opportunities. 
Again, it should be emphasised that information included in such newly built categories, or 
also the new linkages between existing categories, depend on the characteristics of the 
individual at hand j, the categories available to him, and the history or path of the problem-
solving effort k at that point in time i. However, this subject nature again implies that the 
outcome of the thinking process is not necessarily creative or a new solution to a problem. It 
is only assumed that the economic agent tries to find the best solution to an economic 
problem; this has to be evaluated afterwards: 
The main function of the process of ideal evaluation in creative thinking is to evaluate the 
potential utility of the problem solution, respectively option of action, resulting from previous 
processing efforts considering the pertinent goals in the situation. The task had occupied a 
prominent role in the early literature on creative thinking, already included in early works on 
creativity (Dewey 1910; Osborn 1953; Wallas 1926), but was mostly ignored in subsequent 
research efforts (Mumford et al. 1991). However, there is evidence suggesting a significant 
role of this process in real-world creative thinking produced by research on the predictive 
value of frequency-controlled, high-quality divergent thinking scores (Cronbach 1968; 
Harrington et al. 1983; Runco and Albert 1985).  
Generally speaking, it is the process of evaluating the ability of a proposed problem solution 
to satisfy the goals set in the process in an efficient manner within the constraints set in the 
initial problem construction phase. Apparently, projected contingencies and expected pay-offs 
from the solution implementation are taken into consideration by the individual (Hogarth 
1980; Rubenson and Runco 1991; Torrance 1965). Such contingencies might be of climatic, 
motivational, and environmental nature. These can be role models, reinforcement 
contingencies, and concrete intellectual functions: In particular, variables conditioning 
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decisions biases and decision making operations (Einhorn and Hogarth 1981; Hogarth 1980; 
Kahnemann and Tversky 1972).  
In connection with that recent work arguing that intra- or interpersonal locus of evaluation is 
related to creativity could be mentioned (Runco 1992; Runco and Vega 1990). Further 
variables might be differential constructs, such as risk-taking, curiosity, and self-esteem 
influencing the willingness to pursue untried, new ideas (Mumford et al. 1991). Although the 
general importance of evaluative skills in creative thinking is undisputed, timing seems to 
play a crucial role since there is also evidence in the literature suggesting that evaluation tends 
to inhibit it (Amabile 1983; Finke 1995). For instance, in the process of category selection it 
might overly limit the individual’s thinking. 
While many general models of creative thinking suggest including idea evaluation as one of 
the main processes, scholars in the field of entrepreneurship suggest that the evaluation of 
opportunities should not be included in models of opportunity recognition since it principally 
belongs to the exploitation phase of the entrepreneurial process (e.g. Shane 2003; Ward 
2004). The author is convinced that the superficial conflict can be resolved by taking a closer 
look at what the scholars in the different fields mean by their terms. Entrepreneurship scholars 
refer to a full evaluation of the opportunity and its subsequent detailed development to 
transform it into a real marketable product, service, etc. (Ardichvili et al. 2003; Baron 2004a) 
The crucial point is that from a cognitive perspective an individual has already decided on an 
opportunity’s general configuration. This is not the case in the models of creative thinking; 
they assume that convergent thinking efforts produce rough potential problem solutions, 
which have to be evaluated in convergent thinking efforts in order to find the most 
appropriate one. The further elaboration of this selection chosen could be cognitively seen as 
detailed evaluation in the sense of entrepreneurship scholars. Consequently, there is no 
contradiction between the two fields since entrepreneurship researchers do not exclude 
general, initial assessments in the meaning of convergent thinking from opportunity 
recognition (Baron 2004a; Craig and Lindsay 2001). As Baron (2004) puts it: “It is important, 
however, to distinguish this initial relatively automatic check of feasibility from the much 
more extensive and effortful (i.e., analytic) assessments of feasibility or potential profitability 
that follow.” (Baron 2004a, p. 52)  
Most approaches to opportunity recognition account for this distinction; for instance Gaglio 
and Katz (2001) call the former a sensitivity to profit potential, which means that alert 
individuals have a superior ability to initially evaluate the profit potential of ideas and events. 
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However, they also emphasise the importance of distinguishing analytically between 
opportunity identification and evaluation. In summary, the present work regards idea 
evaluation and such studies (e.g. Crawford 1980; Keh et al. 2002; Long and McMullan 1984) 
as belonging rather to opportunity exploitation. It resembles to an economic agent's decision 
for one available option of action since the convergent thinking efforts that are here regarded 
as evaluation are part of any divergent thinking effort, as has been outlined before; i.e. it is 
rather a question of a somehow rational decision making process. Consequently, this process 
is not considered being a central part of the process of cognitive creation and, therefore, not 
investigated empirically
                                                 
xxv  “In sum, a cognitive perspective suggests that individuals can improve their ability to recognise 
opportunities through the use of strategies suggested by theories of perception and cognition. Given that 
many entrepreneurs waste their own – and others’ – time, energy, and resources on ‘false alarms’, training 
individuals to be more effective at opportunity recognition would appear to be highly worthwhile.” (Baron, 
2004a, p. 69) 
xxvi Pech and Cameron (2006) have published a study along these lines, which is not presented in detail since this 
model is a very general mapping of a broad information processing architecture and seems to be 
methodologically rather weak since only based on one interview with a successful entrepreneur. The 
particular setting of the business and, therefore, the nexus between individual and opportunity is not 
considered. However, the psychological assumption underlying this work that fundamental attributes of 
individuals, rather than information about opportunities, determines the recognition of entrepreneurial 
opportunities is supported in the present work; thereby justifying the concentration on cognitive processes 
(Pech and Cameron, 2006). 
xxvii  “The Popperian approach sees entrepreneurship as a kind of scientific process of discovery and learning in 
which entrepreneurs form conjectures, select which ones to test and make judgements about revising them in 
the light of evidence form testing their plans in the market.” Harper (1999), S. 2; vgl. zu den Grundzügen 
Popper’s Theorie des Wachstums von Wissen Harper (1999), S. 8 ff. oder grundlegend Popper (1959). 
xxviii  Please note that the structures build by representational elements are also knowledge concepts in the 
sense of ft,j,k. However, they are named differently in order to point out the difference to other concepts in 
subsequent processes. 
xxix  This notion originates from the Energy Paradigm in Psychology, based on the main assumption of Einstein’s 
dictum that energy and matter are interconvertible aspects of the same reality (Gallo, 2005 p.10). The term  
itself refers to the Motivation for Action (Eysenck and Keane, 2000).. 
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“Moreover, all of these possibilities can be readily investigated in future studies 
employing well-established methods research developed in the field of cognitive 
science.” (Baron 2004, p. 67) 
 
V. Assessing Cognitive Styles and Opportunity Recognition 
The general research process can be divided in several steps, stages, or phases; a clear 
structuring should not only help the scholar in pursuing the goal of highly qualitative 
research, but also help the audience to comprehend the researcher's thoughts, ideas, and 
intentions. Stage-models depicting the research process in social sciences are, apart from 
terminological issues, quite similar (e.g. Alemann 1977; Baker 1988; Hartman and Hedblom 
1979): In a way, all the previous parts of the present work could be seen as efforts of (1) 
defining and delineating the research problem related to relevant theory in different scientific 
fields; i.e., a theory or model has been developed, which ought to be tested empirically. 
Sometimes, this phase is referred to as classification, which means that the scholar stays 
descriptive in dealing with the topic (Hartman and Hedblom 1979).  
Based on the purpose of study (see chapter I.B), the (2) hypotheses are formulated and (3) 
data collected that is appropriate to test or analyse the hypotheses. Afterwards, the (4) results 
are interpreted, generalised, or inferred; if necessary - e.g. if data does not support the 
prediction made or extends beyond present limitations - the (5) underlying theory is recasted 
or modified. The following chapter adheres to such a proceeding: The first part A deals with 
the general survey design, the formulation of measurable hypotheses as well as a discussion 
of the sample drawn, and the items or measures developed to assess cognitive styles and 
opportunity recognition. Part B of this chapter provides the reader with a brief introduction to 
the basics of causal analysis and structural equation models; these allow thoroughly analysing 
the constructs used and relationships hypothesised in the final part C of this chapter. 
However, recalling the central purpose of study intended to be obtained in the present work, it 
is intended to give some answers to the central question why some people and not others are 
able to discover particular entrepreneurial opportunities, approaching the question from a 
cognitive perspective? In other words it could be asked, if individuals that discover particular 
entrepreneurial opportunities apply different thinking processes than those who do not?  
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A. Preparing the Study 
1. Survey Design 
In chapter III.C it has been said that cognitive research on the creation of novelty in any 
setting is often based on the retrospection of individuals, also in research on entrepreneurship, 
for instance in by doing surveys or in-depth interviews that request the recall of pre-launch or 
start-up activity (for instance Busenitz 1996; Kaish and Gilad 1991; Pech and Cameron 2006). 
Such a proceeding of asking subjects how they recall the processes involved is critical and 
bears many problems. The main problem lies in the fact that creation of novelty is assessed 
ex-post. Consequently it is argued that such data collection methods cannot capture the 
phenomena of opportunity identification.  
In fact, other data collection methods must be developed allowing the subjects to submit their 
thoughts at this moment of time instead of solely reporting on what their perceptions and 
thinking processes were in the past (Gaglio and Katz 2001); how biased such memories 
should have become apparent during the presentation of the Challenger study (Neisser and 
Harsch 1992) in chapter II.A.1. Such more appropriate methods could be seen in concurrent 
verbalisations (Ericsson and Simon 1984) or the confrontation of individuals with scenarios 
that include appropriate stimuli as often done in behavioural decision making research (e.g. 
Elliott and Archibald 1989; Highhouse and Yuce 1996; Mumford et al. 1996).  
Such studies must be capable of reliably and validly capturing cognitive processes. This 
requires that investigators executing such studies must find the difficult balance between 
constructing scenarios ruling out alternative explanations of decisions, but are simultaneously 
not so rigidly structured that they preordain the decisions through a demand characteristic 
inherent to the scenario. Furthermore, the environment of such scenarios must be controlled 
so that no distractions activate other schemas; however, not few scholars argue that in general 
experimental, quasi-experimental, or laboratory approaches seem promising for investigating 
cognitive aspects of opportunity identification that can be modelled as vignettes and 
simulations like framing effects, changing schema, or recombinational process such as 
counterfactual thinking (Demmert and Klein 2003; Gaglio 2004; Gaglio and Katz 2001; 
Gaglio 1997; Shane 2000). 
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In the present work it was intended to find first insights on causal relations between 
information-processing and opportunity recognition. The general idea of how to assess an 
individual’s preferences is based on the measurement of attitudes in controlled settings. In a 
very general manner “[A]n attitude may be defined as a presumably learned predisposition to 
react in some characteristic manner with respect to a particular stimulus. The stimulus might 
be virtually anything […].” (Cohen et al. 1988, p. 564) Attitudes are assumed to be quite solid 
and stable over time compared to the concepts of beliefs and opinions, which seem to vary 
more over time. Therefore, it could be argued that attitudes can be seen as schemas or rather 
stabile individual preferences, i.e. general cognitive structures like cognitive styles that serve 
an individual to construct its world based on previous experiences (Eagly and Chaiken 1993). 
Hence, general methodological instruments for measuring attitudes might be transferred to the 
field of general information processing preferences (see for a general treatment of attitudes in 
the IPP Eagly and Chaiken 1993, pp. 257-303).  
Thus, it appears not very surprising that the method chosen in the present work strongly 
resembles to studies that are considered as classics for studying attitudes. For instance, in the 
study of Thurstone and Chave (1929) a small panel or group of people developed a list of 
statements concerning their options about the church. This pool of statements was then 
presented in a second step to another panel of 300 judges, asking them whether they felt a 
statement to be favourable or unfavourable towards the church on a scale of 11 possible 
ratings. By this proceeding an inter-subjective scale value of each statement could be derived 
by taking the average of rating; further, such a method allows calculating a level of ambiguity 
or, i.e., an indicator of agreement on the statement’s nature. In a third and final step, such 
statements were selected that clearly reflected a particular attitude towards the church; by 
asking another sample of individuals it was possible to assess their attitudes towards the 
church by asking them to check each statement that expressed their own sentiments (see also 
Thurstone 1928). 
As will be shown in the following, the proceeding of the present work is quite similar to that 
of this classical study of constructing an attitude scale (Henerson et al. 1988). This particular 
type of attitude scale construction is referred to as ‘stimulus, then person scaling’ or 
‘Thurstone-technique’. In this two-step process, stimuli, i.e. statements describing beliefs, 
affects, or behaviours, are judged and scaled to determine the location of each stimulus on a 
dimension. If each statement included in an item has a scale value, it is possible to locate 
subjects of the study on the same dimension by their answer behaviour, e.g. their endorsement 
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of one or more of the scaled statements (Eagly and Chaiken 1993). The construction of scales 
for preferences in the present work is done quite similarly, replacing the dimension of 
favourability by preferences for a kind of information, as will be laid out in some more detail 
for each information process. However, all the scale values for each individual are construed 
on an interval scale, which allows ascertaining the exact size of the differences between the 
objects, representing individual preferences in the present work. In fact, variables scaled on an 
interval (parametric) are necessary to compute any averages, standard devices, variances, 
covariances or correlations, and, finally, to execute representational measurements on an 
interval level, i.e. to deduce relationships that exist empirically between the objects on the 
dimension scaled (Eagly and Chaiken 1993). 
Based on this, the concept of the general cross-sectional survey design, collecting data at a 
single point in time (Fink 2006) has been adopted from a previous psychometric study, in 
which process-based measures of creative thinking were investigated in general settings 
(Mumford et al. 1996a, b, c, 1997). Thus, in a way the present study could be seen as a vague 
reproduction in the specific context of creative thinking in economic situations. Subjects 
participating in the survey were asked to work through as set of computer-administered 
measures that were organised in six blocks, whose development is summarised in Figure 41. 
However, in the actual survey working through this battery of tasks took them only about 45-
60 minutes. While the first block was dedicated to assess some reference measures and to 
control for a homogenous sample, the second, third, fourth, and fifth block were supposed to 
investigate the information processes of problem construction, information encoding, 
category selection, as well as category combination and reorganisation. The sixth and last 
block included two tasks, which ought to measure the ability to recognise entrepreneurial 
opportunities.  
The survey was done and data was therefore collected computer-based; this was necessary 
since, as will be explained later, measures for the process of information encoding could not 
be collected in a paper-based survey. In order to ensure the quality of this survey, its whole 
design was done according to the International Guidelines on Computer-Based and Internet 
Delivered Testing (Association of Test Publishers 2000). Throughout the whole survey it was 
not explicitly controlled for, but ensured that, affective states and task enjoyment stayed 
constant across all tasks and the whole population since there exists a great deal of evidence 
that positive mood and emotions states facilitate creativity and, thus, the quality and 
originality of answers given by participants (Friedman and Förster 2001).  
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Figure 41 General Research Concept. 
Practically, the survey as a program was developed on basis of Wextor©, a software provided 
online to conceive web-based experiments (see for details Reips and Neuhaus 2002). This 
procedure significantly reduces the programming effort of a computer-based survey, which, in 
turn, allows to process data electronically right from the beginning of the research procedure. 
However, it should be noted that the survey was not web-based in its original sense, that is 
subjects were not allowed to participate from any place they could enter the internet, but were 
all invited to the same computer-equipped class room in the university. Another major 
advantage of such a computer-based proceeding was that subjects' answers and further 
measures were instantly written into and recorded in the log file of the hosting server. Thus, 
the data matrix showing relevant data for each subject, was finally obtained by analyzing the 
log file of the web server with another software called Scientific LogAnalyzer©, particularly 
designed for such a purpose (see for details Reips and Stieger 2004). Although study and 
results are presented in English, the entire questionnaire was presented in German, the 
subjects' mother tongue, in order to avoid any linguistic bias. Even though some of the 
participants grew up with another first language, they all do their studies in German; reason 
why a sufficient proficiency in this language can be assumed to rule out biases in 
comprehension.  
Intuitively, some might argue that the assessment of opportunity recognition in an artificial 
laboratory setting does not provide results that allow inferring to the real-life phenomenon. 
Indeed, the ultimate goal of scientific studies of thinking is undoubtedly to provide an 
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understanding of the nature and structure of all types of thinking; that is, if possible, the 
description in terms of general laws. Unfortunately, thinking occurs in everyday life activities, 
and, therefore, it is tempting to attain insights by observing thinking in everyday life as it 
occurs spontaneously. Apparently such observations in natural contexts are relatively 
demanding to manage for a lot of thinking processes (Ericsson and Hastie 1994). This also 
applies to phenomena that happen spontaneously or over a longer period; in any case it seems 
to hold true for opportunity recognition.  
Currently, as kind of preliminary solution, most researchers share the conviction that 
observation and analysis in the natural context has to be combined with some type of 
systematic study, usually experiments, in order to study thinking (Ericsson and Hastie 1994). 
In general terms, two experimental routes or strategies in the study of general laws of thought 
can be distinguished: (1) Beginning in the laboratory with experimental designs that, although 
artificially, try to reveal the most general and fundamental thought processes. The assumption 
is that once the basics are established, everyday phenomena can be explained by a method of 
reduction. (2) Alternatively, informative, naturally occurring phenomena are examined in 
their natural context and then experiments in the laboratory are executed in order to reproduce 
the phenomena under controlled conditions. This permits analysis and eventually supports 
extrapolation back to the natural context (Ericsson and Hastie 1994).  
The former approach turned out to be more popular among scholars in recent years; many 
have focused on uncovering general laws of thinking and cognitive processes by identifying 
the most simple and best controlled situations, in which reproducible phenomena obey 
general laws. These, if they are truly general, should operate in simple as well as complex 
tasks, which is the reason why the former ones are preferred for investigation. The idea to 
identify general laws under controlled conditions moving subsequently to analysing more 
complex tasks goes along with one of the main conjectures of information processing theory: 
The same basic processes determine simple as well as complex phenomena (Ericsson and 
Hastie 1994). Notwithstanding the significant advantage such an approach offers by 
permitting the researcher to isolate effects so that statements about causal effects are possible 
(see the brief remarks concerning causality in chapter V.B.2; it remains highly questionable to 
which extent these insights can be transferred to the actual phenomena in the real world 
(Neisser 1976; Haber 1983). 
First of all it must be conceded that the examination of a phenomenon in the laboratory is 
always different from the examination in real life and indeed empirical evidence for the 
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(positive) correlation between laboratory and everyday life performance has not been found 
so far; therefore, Ericsson and Hastie (1994) have to be supported when saying: “We are in 
agreement with the critics that one must be cautious in generalising from theories based only 
on laboratory tasks to everyday situation where much greater amounts of experience and 
knowledge are available to the thinker.” (Ericsson and Hastie 1994, p. 52) These two scholars 
already name the most striking difficulty in doing research on thinking processes: the role of 
knowledge. Hence, it seems that a researcher planning a study on information processes faces 
the task to dissect these from a subject's knowledge, which is, as already underlined, literally 
impossible. And even if possible to a large extent in some domains, how could such artificial 
tasks and the resulting insights attained in the laboratory be generalised to everyday life? 
Apparently, implications of results can only be drawn by taking account of the restrictions 
imposed by methodology.  
A middle course between these two general research approaches might consist in identifying 
phenomena in everyday life and, then, trying to reproduce them under controlled condition in 
the laboratory to study them systematically. This tactic is quite popular in natural sciences but 
also some cognitive phenomena have been transferred successfully into controlled laboratory 
settings (Ericsson and Hastie 1994). Such a processing could be named a phenomena-based 
approach. It ideally requires that highly reproducible results can be identified, usually in form 
of large differences between two conditions or two groups of subjects. Additionally, it is 
necessary that the differences are stable and thus reproducible. In several domains 
performance can be directly measured and studied in the laboratory, for instance by reading or 
text comprehension, etc. (Ericsson and Hastie 1994). But also in other domains in which 
performance is more interactive and extends over long periods of time, controlled research 
under this complex conditions is possible, e.g. in chess (Charness 1991; de Groot 1965; 
Simon and Newell 1972). The named requirement of significant and robust differences in 
performance for such research is one of the main reasons why the comparison between 
experts and novices in a given domain is so popular in experimental studies.  
However, the important conjecture of the information processing paradigm that acquired 
knowledge and skill is a major variable of individual differences in performance, in particular 
characterising experts, in a given task has already been mentioned. Since both methodological 
approaches presented above are based on this paradigm, the statement is generally accepted. 
Nevertheless, this assumption has different methodological impacts: The traditional 
laboratory-based approach intends to minimise the influence of previously acquired 
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knowledge and skills to study the basic process more effectively. The phenomena-based 
approach, in particular the study of expert performance, emphasises the results of maximal 
influence of experience, respectively knowledge and skills.  
It is this importance of knowledge and skill for performance in most tasks, which is the 
fundamental obstacle to infer everyday life performance from basic processes identified in the 
laboratory: The amount of domain-specific knowledge is, besides cognitive processing, the 
most predictable difference between novice and expert performance (Ericsson and Hastie 
1994). It should be apparent that in a domain like the one dealt with in this work the duration 
of acquiring relevant knowledge and skills corresponds to month and years. Therefore, it is 
practically impossible to monitor all relevant activity. Besides these general disadvantages of 
such a phenomena-based approach it cannot be applied in this work because 'experts' in the 
field of entrepreneurial cognition are difficult to identify, as has been discussed in chapter 
II.B.3; it is not clear if cognitive characteristics have made an individual to become an 
entrepreneur and, thus, difficult to identify individuals that ought to be included in a study 
investigating entrepreneurial cognition.  
A methodological solution to this problem consists in the use of well-defined tasks that 
dramatically restrict the relevant knowledge. The argument behind this is that even in a 
domain with large amount of knowledge, only a small fraction of that knowledge will be 
relevant to solve the particular problem at hand. More generally, it can be concluded that one 
important dimension as to the generalisability of results is definitely the complexity of task-
relevant knowledge, which is relatively low in laboratory research on basic processes since 
this research intentionally minimises the influence of relevant experience and complex 
knowledge. Extremely high complexity of knowledge and experience is involved in expert 
performance in a specific domain that is within a constrained set of objects and activities. 
Between these two extremes, the diverse category of everyday thinking can be placed, 
corresponding to an intermediate complexity level of experience and knowledge. In Figure 42 
the tree types of phenomena are visualised along the hypothetical dimension introduced 
above. 
Performance in 
Unfamiliar
Laboratory Tasks
Everyday Life 
Activities
Expert
Performance
Complexity of Knowledge and Experience
 
Figure 42 Hypothetical Task Dimension of Relevant Knowledge Complexity. 
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In order to control the availability and accessibility of task-relevant knowledge and strategies 
in laboratory settings, tasks ought to be well-defined and have explicit goals and measurable 
performance. Such settings provide strong cues for the participating subjects and constrain the 
retrieval of relevant information for a successful solution. Similarly, no pre-experimental 
experience is included in such settings, not allowing subjects to retrieve solutions or answers 
from memory (Ericsson and Hastie 1994).  
 
2. Hypotheses Formulation and Sample 
“For the purpose of this work, a hypothesis is defined as a tentative statement of the 
relationship between two concepts expressed as a probable statement of supposed fact. It is 
capable of being tested and verified by the data gathered to test it.” (Hartman and Hedblom 
1979, p. 64-65) This general definition points out that a hypothesis is a special way of 
expressing a statement, making it testable based on available data. Hereafter, it will be very 
briefly outlined how hypotheses are generally conceived, starting with available theory and, 
then, presented which hypotheses are supposed to be tested in the present work, concerning 
the recognition of entrepreneurial opportunities.  
Generally speaking, the process of developing appropriate hypotheses starts with relating 
concepts that have been developed before into propositions at a highly abstract level. A 
proposition consists of at least two concepts and a statement that describes the relationship 
between them; a proposition, therefore, describes a state-of-affair, which has to be clearly 
defined in order to reduce its ambiguity (Schlick 1990). As has already been said about 
concepts in the general context of knowledge in chapter III.B.2, they are an abstraction or 
symbol that represents similarities or common characteristics in a phenomenon. A theory 
could therefore be seen as a way of organising concepts and propositions in systematic ways; 
similarly, a concept could also be called a construct (Fortune and Reid 1999). A statement can 
be relatively abstract and may be likewise referred to as abstract, conceptual, or theoretical 
hypothesis. Subsequently, the level of abstraction is reduced, which means that in the end 
concepts and variables are identified as well as operationalised, resulting in the application of 
appropriate measures, judged to be relevant in answering the research question (Hartman and 
Hedblom 1979). 
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The process of operationalisation starts at a highly abstract level with so called general 
hypotheses (GH), which equal to general statements that are supposed to apply to the largest 
number of widest possible explanation schemes, statements are brought to the test. This may 
require a number of subhypotheses (SH) that describe the logically derived assumptions as to 
the relation between the aspect to be explained and the operational measures of the explaining 
construct. From this, the process of operationalisation develops operational hypotheses (OH), 
i.e. brings general hypotheses to a lower level of abstraction, so that operational hypotheses 
are linkable to the measurable world (Walliman 2004). Put differently, it can be distinguished 
between concepts or constructs and indicators or operational characteristics with which the 
former can be measured. Such indicators measure a particular construct, taking the role of so 
called operational measures or indicators only if so designated by the researcher. If conceptual 
subhypotheses have been developed, these are similarly transformed into operational 
subhypotheses. The third and last step in hypotheses reduction leads to the null hypotheses 
H0, which always states that there is no relationship or association between operational 
variables.  
This principle is based on the premise of falsification, that is it is impossible to prove a case 
by examining each and every of such cases possible in the universe; hence, researchers are not 
searching for approving evidence, but rather aim at finding exceptions to a statement that 
invalidate it (Popper 1935). The detection of a single exception leads to the rejection of the 
null hypothesis as not being valid (Hartman and Hedblom 1979). In a way, such a network of 
hypotheses resembles the way knowledge is often represented: Hierarchical networks, moving 
from higher-level, abstract concepts to measurable concepts down the network (see chapter 
III.B.2). However, criteria for judging testable or operational hypotheses have been 
conceived, which, principally, have not changed during the last decades and have been kept in 
mind in developing those used in the present work: Hypotheses should (1) be conceptually 
clear, i.e. the operationalisation of concepts ought to be based on generally accepted 
definitions in the literature, (2) have empirical referents, which allows for intra-subjective 
testability excluding value judgements, (3) be specific and clear by relating or contrasting 
single concepts, instead of including to many elements into a single hypothesis, (4) be related 
to available measurement techniques, and (5) be related to a body of theory (Goode and Hatt 
1952).  
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In Figure 43 the general hypotheses tested regarding opportunity recognition in the present 
work are summarised; the corresponding operational hypotheses, depicted as well, are then 
further developed in discussing the measurement of constructs and statements.  
Problem Construction and Information Encoding 
GH1: A promotion style of regulatory focus facilitates the recognition of entrepreneurial opportunities.  
OH1: ‘The preference for applying representational elements about initial goals in problem construction and 
the preference for searching for information regarding goals that need to be addressed in solving the problem 
are positively correlated with the quality and originality in finding entrepreneurial opportunities.  
GH2: A prevention style of regulatory focus might inhibit the recognition of entrepreneurial opportunities. 
OH2: ‘The preference for applying representational elements about significant constraints in problem 
construction and the preference for searching for information regarding restrictions or constraints that have 
to be posed on the problem solution are negatively correlated with the quality and originality in finding 
entrepreneurial opportunities.  
Problem Construction 
GH3: An action style in constructing problems facilitates the recognition of entrepreneurial opportunities. 
OH3: ‘The preference for applying representational elements about actions in problem construction is 
positively correlated with the quality and originality in finding entrepreneurial opportunities. 
GH4: An information style in constructing problems facilitates the recognition of entrepreneurial opportunities. 
OH4: ‘The preference for applying representational elements about salient information in problem 
construction is positively correlated with the quality and originality in finding entrepreneurial opportunities. 
Information Encoding 
GH5: An inconsistent information search style facilitates the recognition of entrepreneurial opportunities.  
OH5: The preference for additional factual information that was inconsistent with the initial factual data is 
positively correlated with the quality and originality in finding entrepreneurial opportunities. 
GH6: An irrelevant information search style facilitates the recognition of entrepreneurial opportunities 
OH6: The preference for searching for information irrelevant is positively correlated with the quality and 
originality in finding entrepreneurial opportunities. 
GH7: A principle search style facilitates the recognition of entrepreneurial opportunities. 
OH7: The preference for searching for information regarding underlying principles is positively correlated 
with the quality and originality in finding entrepreneurial opportunities. 
Category Selection 
GH8: A principle style in category search facilitates the recognition of entrepreneurial opportunities. 
OH8: Category search based on underlying or general principles are positively correlated with the quality and 
originality in finding entrepreneurial opportunities. 
GH9: A goal style in category search facilitates the recognition of entrepreneurial opportunities. 
OH9: Category search based on underlying long-term, higher-order goals are positively correlated with the 
quality and originality in finding entrepreneurial opportunities. 
GH10: A peering style in category search might impede the recognition of entrepreneurial opportunities. 
OH10: Category search based on social evaluation (social peering) are negatively correlated with the quality 
and originality in finding entrepreneurial opportunities. 
GH11: An action style in category search might impede the recognition of entrepreneurial opportunities. 
OH11: Category search based on specific action plans are negatively correlated with the quality and 
originality in finding entrepreneurial opportunities. 
Category Combination and Reorganisation 
GH12: An individual’s ability to combine and reorganise categories is related to its ability to recognise 
entrepreneurial opportunities. 
OH12: The quality and originality of an individual’s combination and reorganisation of categories are 
negatively correlated with the quality and originality in finding entrepreneurial opportunities. 
Figure 43 Summary of Hypotheses Regarding Opportunity Recognition.xxx 
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The proceeding that concepts and hypotheses are developed, apparently calls for an analytical 
research design that allows addressing questions of association or causality. Therefore, data 
must be collected to test these hypotheses empirically; in order to keep complexity of a study 
manageable, data collection should be limited to providing data to test relevant problems of 
the study (Hartman and Hedblom 1979). In reality, the operationalisation of concepts and 
theories into measurable terms, which has been outlined above, bears many problems scholars 
have to solve; this particularly applies to a discipline like entrepreneurship research and those 
efforts to investigate entrepreneurial opportunities and their recognition. Such disconnections 
between theory and measurement constitute a serious menace to advancing knowledge about 
the opportunity identification process.  
The following statement of a scholar doing research on opportunity identification summarises 
this arguments very well: “While we have collected numerous compelling anecdotes and case 
histories suggesting or illustrating unique qualities, these stories do not always hold up to 
scrutiny when subjected to systematic study. However, it is argued that the primary reason for 
this perceived failure is that our methodological choices do not always capture the kinds of 
people, firms, events or situation found in our stories. Developing sound and rigorous 
operational measures of entrepreneurial opportunities can be a direct path to locating the 
archetypical phenomena in order to examine whether uniqueness exists and if so, in what 
ways.” (Gaglio 2004, p. 130)  
As has been pointed out explicitly and implicitly in chapter IV.A.1, scholars in 
entrepreneurial cognition research claim that entrepreneurs are different, but at the same time 
have significant problems to find evidence to that conjecture. If this axiom is taken as given, it 
might be possible that the failure to find empirical evidence of a distinctive mind or 
psychology is a result of flawed research methods (Carsrud and Johnson 1989; Shaver and 
Scott 1991). Put simple, it might be that the operational measures and samples used are not 
helpful to get valid results and, therefore, theoretical conceptualisations about entrepreneurs 
are simply not really tested (Gaglio 2004). Together with the argument already mentioned that 
entrepreneurship must achieve to demarcate its actual object of investigation, it is most 
pressuring that research on opportunity identification overcomes such shortcomings, if the 
discipline wants to corroborate its claim of distinctiveness. To achieve this, rigorous 
theoretical concepts and valid as well as reliable operational measures are needed that capture 
the essential meaning of these concepts. 
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Although some scholars object that the discipline is too premature to exhibit such rigor (see 
literature given in Gaglio 2004), the author is deeply convinced of the necessity for 
attempting such empirical research, if entrepreneurship research shall not be perceived as a 
mere research setting or even teaching application (Shane and Venkatamaran 2000). An 
extensive literature review by Gaglio (2004) has revealed that, regardless of the theoretical 
conceptualisations of an entrepreneurial opportunity underlying research, almost all 
entrepreneurship scholars use venture founders as the sampling frame. This means they are 
measuring entrepreneurial opportunities and their identification as venture creation. But the 
question is if this really is the necessary and sufficient dimension?  
Considering the distinction explicitly made in this work between opportunity identification 
and exploitation such studies do not operationally capture opportunity identification. Bearing 
in mind that most studies are based on such a notion of entrepreneurial opportunities as 
venture creation, this has important consequences: The main advantage is that it is easy to 
measure, reliable, and intuitively appealing; in turn, the main disadvantage is the apparent 
inconsistency with the existing theories about entrepreneurship. Furthermore, this implies that 
most studies treat starting a hair salon or freelancing with radical innovations like Napster as 
equal. Evoking the assumption made that entrepreneurial opportunities are a heterogeneous 
group, such a methodology may significantly weaken research efforts. This might be another 
reason why many studies are not capable of finding significant differences, in this case often 
leading to type II error of accepting the null hypotheses of no differences (Gaglio 2004). 
Another, and probably the most concerning, aspect about using venture creation as 
operational measure for entrepreneurship is that the decision to start a venture can be quite 
convincingly explained by maximum utility theory, which gives rise to discussions as to the 
right to exist of entrepreneurship research (Gaglio 2004). This approach of classical economic 
theory regards venture creation simply as one option of action to be evaluated (Douglas and 
Shepherd 2000; Levesque et al. 2002). Yet another inconsistency between theoretical 
conceptions and research consists in that research discusses an opportunity in terms of new 
products, services or processes, or even new ways of organising the marketplace. But the 
operational measure used as opportunity actually includes two different kinds of opportunity: 
The opportunity to start a business and the market opportunity (equal to the theoretical one), 
which might or might not be novel. The ignorance of this distinction entails further shortfalls 
of what such studies can tell about opportunities and their identification. 
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In summary, all these arguments underline the necessity to clearly distinguish between 
creating a venture and finding an opportunity in form of a product, service, etc. (Gaglio 
2004). Hence, it is a major task for the discipline of entrepreneurship to develop operational 
measures as well as appropriate research designs and samples to investigate entrepreneurial 
opportunities. In fact, all scholars doing research on opportunity identification face the 
problem of developing an effective sampling frame (Gaglio and Katz 2001), as has been 
outlined more explicitly in chapter II.B.3. In particular a view like the one offered in the 
present work is accompanied by such problems since, principally, opportunity identification 
as everyday life-phenomena can principally occur everywhere at any time The typical 
approach to sample those individuals who are assumed to have already demonstrated 
entrepreneurial characteristics is a post-hoc identification of relevant subjects; in 
psychological contexts very often experts and novices, i.e. entrepreneurs and non-
entrepreneurs are compared. 
However, this rather narrow approach to regard venture creation as entrepreneurship holds 
problems already mentioned: First and foremost it leads to a mix-up between different types 
of entrepreneurs belonging to different populations. This might lead to a false inclusion of 
individuals that have actually never identified an opportunity but only created a new venture. 
Further to this, this sampling method is often combined with retrospective data collection 
techniques, inducing the same insufficiencies already named before (Gaglio and Katz 2001). 
Alternatively, scholars could follow a prospective sampling strategy. The problematic aspect 
of this method is that individuals must be identified that have a position, which should place 
them in close proximity to entrepreneurial alertness and opportunity identification (Gaglio 
and Katz 2001). Such a sampling method has already been used in empirical studies on the 
phenomena (see Busenitz 1996; Kaish and Gilad 1991). Another alternative consists in using 
a population approach. This can be done if the scholars assume that the capability of 
recognising entrepreneurial opportunities is not a rare phenomenon, i.e. normally distributed 
in the entire population; then, samples can be taken from the general population (Gaglio and 
Katz 2001).  
Indeed, the present work assumes that the ability to recognise entrepreneurial opportunities is 
normally distributed in the population, like many other talents, such as creativity or 
intelligence, as well. However, business students might be interesting as sample population 
since they represent a sufficiently large enough group of people actively engaged in 
opportunity identification (Gaglio 2004). Students taking major courses in entrepreneurship in 
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the latter years of their studies could be seen as having a propensity to opportunity 
recognition. Of course it has to be admitted that they will initially not develop radical or 
revolutionary innovations or entrepreneurial opportunities. However, the most important, 
advantage of using business students as a sample is that such a study cannot confound 
opportunity identification and exploitation since students are yet considering starting a 
business, as yet not really doing it (Gaglio 2004).  
In conclusion "[…] future research could even use samples of MBA entrepreneurship students 
to produce reliable results about the cognitive processes of this theoretically narrow topic." 
(Gaglio and Katz 2001, p. 108) The sample or the subset of the population under study 
(Grinnell and Williams 1990) in the present work indeed consisted of postgraduate students at 
a German university, doing studies in business administration, majoring in entrepreneurship. 
The sample included 115 individuals of which 54 were male and 57 female, while 4 did not 
report their gender. The average age in the group was at the time of the survey approximately 
24 years. Of these students 16% (19 individuals) had already started a business on their own 
and 46% (54 individuals) had at least one family member (parents or brothers and sisters), 
who had already started a business.  
 
3. Measures and Items 
Generally, any survey item was designed according to six basic principles that are assumed to 
keep it as simple as possible for participants while guaranteeing a sufficiently elaborate level 
to ensure methodologically acceptable results (Converse and Presser 1986). The first aspect to 
consider is (1) the use of a common tongue with frequently used terms and words, e.g. by 
finding synonyms for technical terms and Latin constructions; the scholar must remember that 
comprehension is more important than lingual conventions. Similarly, (2) common concepts 
should be included that can be understood by non-experts and less-educated people, e.g. 
avoiding that participants must calculate proportions or percentages. (3) Such ought to be put 
into short questions that are only as long as necessary for triggering an expected response: e.g. 
a more detailed question if a more detailed answer is desired for a highly important item.  
Fourthly, (4) confusions should be avoided that might be caused by several types of aspects. 
Such could be the inclusion of a double vision, which means that spuriously two stimuli - here 
two attitudinal objects - are given in one item; this refers to the use of negative terms attached 
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to questions involving positive the notion about a phenomenon and vice verse. Alternatively, 
double vision could be included by dangling alternatives, which means that first the question 
is asked and then the answer options are given. Another important aspect to be kept in mind is 
that (5) the tasks or items are manageable, meaning that they are clear to a survey's subjects; it 
is important to distinguish between facts and attitudes or at least to distinguish between items 
for which subjective or factual answers are expected. This goes along with principles number 
one and two since definitions must be shared by scholar and subjects ensuring that both are 
talking about the same definition of an object or phenomenon, say a family; this might be 
ensured by giving examples. Finally, the difficult balance has to be found for (6) giving 
enough information for complex tasks, but sticking to the principles concerning simplicity 
(Converse and Presser 1986).  
On the following pages, the measures used in collecting data are presented in some detail; 
these are measures of (a) reference information on the study’s participants, (b) opportunity 
recognition, (c) problem construction, (d) information encoding, (e) category selection, and 
(f) category combination and reorganisation.  
Besides the measures with which the individual differences in processing information are 
assessed some other (a) reference information about participants of the study were collected. 
To start with, subjects were asked for their age and sex; however, the actual interest was to 
learn more about two relevant dimensions, for which homogeneity was regarded necessary: 
(1) Each individual’s level of knowledge in relevant domains and (2) their intention or 
motivation to start a business or recognise entrepreneurial opportunities. Main intend was the 
methodological necessity to have a sufficiently homogenous sample in relevant dimensions 
that allows to trace back differences in the dependent variable of opportunity recognition to 
information processing differences as causing effects or variables. The impact the level of 
knowledge and expertise in a domain can have on information processing has been 
emphasised throughout the entire present work and from a methodological point of view 
particularly in chapter III.A. Therefore, it seemed reasonable to assess some indicators in 
order to control data for different levels of knowledge.  
However, in the context of opportunity recognition it could be distinguished between levels of 
knowledge for entrepreneurship and starting a business on the one hand, and the specific 
domain, e.g. industry, technology, or simply the general field, the individual is situated in on 
the other hand. In order to collect data on subjects' knowledge on business, entrepreneurship, 
and starting a business they were asked four questions: (1) How many semesters they had 
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studied courses in business at university at the moment of the survey, (2) how many semesters 
they had studied courses in entrepreneurship at the moment of the survey, (3) if they had 
already started a business at the moment of the survey, and (4) if someone in their family 
(parents, brothers or sisters) has ever started a business? In order to control for relevant 
knowledge in a specific domain, subjects were asked for experience they had accumulated in 
the fields the two situations for measuring opportunity recognition in the present study. As 
will be shown later, the two questions were, firstly, about experience in or knowledge about 
culture and economy of a foreign country they spent some time in, and, secondly, on 
experience in or knowledge about mechanical engineering or production and fabrication of 
metal. 
Question Answer Options 
Knowledge in entrepreneurship 
How many semesters have studied courses in 
business at university?  
metric 
How many semesters have you studied courses 
in entrepreneurship? 
metric 
Have you already started a business? Yes; no  
Has someone in your family (parents, brothers 
or sisters) has ever started a business? 
Yes; no 
Knowledge in Relevant Domains 
Have you spend some time in a foreign 
country, e.g. doing a period of study or 
internship, etc.? 
yes, more than a year; yes, between 6 months and a year; 
yes, between 0 and 6 months; no 
How much knowledge or experience in the 
field of producing or fabrication of metals or 
mechanical engineering in general do you 
have?  
very good (expert); good (dealt with it many times); 
average (dealt with it several times); little (dealt with it 
from time to time);practically nothing (only heard about 
it); nothing 
Entrepreneurial Motivation 
How likely is it that you are going to start a 
business during studies?  
(already started; very likely (concrete plans); rather 
likely; rather unlikely; very unlikely; impossible) 
How likely is it that you are going to start a 
business within 5 years after graduation?  
(will definitely start a business; very likely (concrete 
plans); rather likely; rather unlikely; very unlikely; 
impossible) 
How likely is it that you are going to start a 
business within 10 years after graduation?  
(will definitely start a business; very likely (concrete 
plans); rather likely; rather unlikely; very unlikely; 
impossible) 
Figure 44 Question Items for Reference Measures. 
The statement that an economic agent's motivation to start a business should be controlled for 
can be inferred from a general psychological perspective since it has been shown in chapter 
III.C.3 that motivational or affective aspects strongly influence human information processing 
and from literature in the field of entrepreneurship dedicated to the role of entrepreneurial 
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motivation (see for an overview Shane et al. 2003). However participants were asked how 
they would rate the probability to start their own business (1) already during their studies, (2) 
within five years after graduation, and (3) within ten years after graduation? All items that 
subjects were asked for as reference measures are shown in Figure 44. 
Conceiving an appropriate (b) measure of opportunity recognition seems to be one of the most 
demanding tasks for scholars doing research on the phenomenon: Many problems have 
already been mentioned related to the operationalisation of the ability to recognise 
entrepreneurial opportunities. This construct or concept is difficult to measure, particularly 
because an opportunity is generally evaluated ex-post. This means that the market response is 
evaluated and, for instance, judged if it has been a rather incremental or revolutionary 
innovation. But in fact it is crucial to capture the process of finding an innovative idea for a 
product or service itself and not the market response to develop useful theories about 
opportunity identification and shaping. In addition, it has been pointed out that entrepreneurial 
opportunities are of subjective nature, at least from a cognitive perspective. This is definitely 
problematic for a measure’s validity and reliability.  
This objection can be attenuated by obtaining expert opinions from acknowledged and 
reputable experts (Gaglio 2004). But still, scholars might feel uncomfortable with the 
subjective nature of the measure: Nevertheless, it has to be admitted that opportunities are 
subjective at least if a cognitive perspective is assumed. In other words: “Because of the 
social nature of knowledge and information used to create innovation, it is impossible to 
suggest that reliance on subjective measures could diminish over time. One can only point to 
the recent advances in innovation research, which depend on these kinds of subjective 
measures, and hypothesise a similar outcome for entrepreneurship.” (Gaglio 2004, p. 130) 
In this sense it is relevant what other economic agents, i.e. customers, think whether they are 
facing an opportunity since this is the relevant factor when it comes to the acquisition of 
customers. From this point of view, there is no entrepreneurial opportunity as long as other 
economic agents are not convinced of the opposite. Consequently, it seems possible that a 
panel of appropriate judges is able to rate an individual's idea, problem solution, or option of 
action conceived for a particular situation as to the dimension whether it might be an 
entrepreneurial opportunity or not. Accordingly, in the present work a panel of seven judges 
rated the solutions given by subjects as to their personal conviction whether participants had 
been able to recognise an entrepreneurial opportunity for each of the two economic situations 
given. The judges were asked to provide a rating between zero and five for the quality and 
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originality of a subject in the two problem situations, so that from each judge four ratings 
were obtained as to the answers of the individuals in the sample. The idea to ask for a judge’s 
opinion as to the dimensions of quality and originality stems from general research on 
creative thinking (Mumford et al. 1996a, b, c, 1997). To ask only for two ratings per subject 
and situation was chosen since it ought to keep effort and complexity manageable for judges. 
However, the judges were provided with the definitions of the concepts of quality and 
originality in the context of entrepreneurial opportunities; those were drawn from the 
definition and characteristics of an entrepreneurial opportunity as has been outlined in chapter 
II.C.1 and general definitions of quality and originality of problem solutions in research on 
creative thinking; these are shown in Figure 45.  
All seven judges can be regarded as experts on entrepreneurial opportunities since doing 
research on entrepreneurship and having acquired experience in consulting start-ups. Indeed 
they highly agreed on the quality and originality of answers; this has been assessed by 
calculating interrater agreement coefficients (ICC), which can be interpreted as reliability 
across all judges for an indicator (Shrout and Fleiss 1979). A general definition of the ICC 
would say that it expresses “[…] the correlation between one measurement (either a single 
rating or a mean of several ratings) on a target and another measurement obtained on that 
target.” (Shrout and Fleiss 1979, p. 422) Generally, in statistic terms reliability is an indicator 
for the consistency of a set of measurements or a measuring instrument. This means that an 
experiment’s reliability is the extent to which the measurements remain consistent over 
repeated heats under identical experimental conditions. Hence, an experiment is regarded 
reliable if it yields consistent results of the same measure. Such reliability is of particular 
interest in experimental situations, in which judges subjectively evaluate phenomena: their 
ratings are often assumed to be subject to measurement error (Yaffee 1998). 
However, the ontological discussion entailed will not be treated here in detail, but it should be 
considered that such reliability has a different meaning in a relativistic and realistic view: 
Assuming the latter, the term of measurement error seems appropriate because there is an 
objective phenomenon at hand, which can be accurately and correctly observed by different 
judges. Therefore, reliability is an indicator of accurate measurement, i.e. the quality of 
reality’s measurement, by the group of subjects measuring a phenomenon under observation. 
In a constructivist view reliability does not refer to quality but a measure of agreement.  
The phenomenon at hand has no ‘real’ score or attribute that can be accurately observed or 
measured. Rather reliability only says something about the similarity of construction between 
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subjects. Assuming a cognitive constructivist perspective in the present work the reliability 
measures presented in the following should be consequently understood as measures, to 
which degree the judges agreed on a measurement or scale. However, there exist different 
possible coefficients with which rater reliability can be measured, but textbooks generally 
only present one or two forms. Since different use of such coefficients leads to different 
results, and, therefore, affects statistical analysis and interpretation, it is important to identify 
the most appropriate intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC).  
It would simply be too much and not really valuable to present all the different versions of the 
ICC in the present work. In case that in a study each target - the answers given in the present 
study - is rated by each of the same k- judges, which represent the totality of judges, the most 
appropriate measure is the so called ICC (3, k) since the k- judges are considered as fixed 
effects, which is referred to as case 3 (Shrout and Fleiss 1979). This means that targets (the 
scores of the variables) are deemed random, but the judges asked for their rating are the only 
ones of interest; this is known as the two-way mixed model. However, for any type of ICC 
two versions of reliability exist, depending on whether the unit of analysis is the individual 
rating of each judge or the mean of all the ratings (Yaffee 1998). In the present work the latter 
case applies, reason why those of type ICC (3, k) from the set of different kinds of intraclass 
correlation reliability coefficients are chosen for the present work. This measure is equal to 
Cronbach’s alpha that is introduced in chapter V.C.1, reason why the exact calculation is only 
presented there. As shown in Table 1, the ratings of the seven members of the panel 
evaluating answers given in opportunity recognition situations all produce agreement 
coefficients of 0.762 or higher, which is acceptable.  
Situation Variable ICC (3, 7) 
1 Quality 0.827 
1 Originality 0.908 
2 Quality 0.762 
2 Originality 0.792 
Table 1 ICCs for Opportunity Recognition Items. 
More precisely, it was assumed that the above mentioned information-processes are applied in 
coming to a problem solution and individual differences might account for variance in quality 
and originality of answers given. Subjects were asked to suggest one- or two-paragraph 
solutions to two complex, realistic, and novel economic problems. They were told that the 
author believed there might exist different entrepreneurial opportunities in the situation 
described. Furthermore they were asked to give away their ideas on how to realize a profit in 
this particular situation. In particular, subjects were hold up to name their problem solution, 
Assessing Cognitive Styles and Opportunity Recognition 
 263
how they would transform this into a marketable product or service, which major customer 
groups they would target, and if they could think of any particular USP of their solution. 
Construct : Ability of Opportunity Recognition 
Indicators Rating Definition (Criteria) 
Quality of 
Problem 
Solution in 
Situation  
 
Between 0 and 
5 (5 ? I 
totally agree 
0 ? I totally 
disagree) 
General aspects  
Completeness: Did the subject understand the instructions, used the 
information, and followed the instructions fully and completely? 
Effectiveness: is the plan usable, practical, or appropriate (reach and 
frequency)? 
 
Specific Aspects 
Economic value: Does the plan promise to yield a profit? 
Creating new wealth: Does the plan provide the subject with 
idiosyncratic advantages resulting from specific knowledge?  
Perceived desirability: Does the plan meet the general social and ethical 
requirements it is embedded is?  
Originality of 
Problem 
Solution 
Situation 1 
2 
Between 0 and 
5 (5 ? I totally 
agree 
0 ? I totally 
disagree) 
General aspects  
Unexpectedness: Did the subject approach the problem in a novel 
imaginative, unpredictable, or innovative manner? 
Description: Did the subject expand upon an idea, tell as story, or use 
fine detail to help the reader visualise the plan? 
 
Specific Aspects 
Novelty: Does the problem solution represent something new or novel? 
Uniqueness: Is the problem solution easy to imitate?  
Figure 45 Criteria for Judging Ability of Recognising Entrepreneurial Opportunities. 
The two tasks used in the present study were somehow different in their underlying nature, 
thereby, accounting for the insight that the nexus between individual and opportunity is of 
crucial impact in entrepreneurship. The first problem situation was based on Shane (2000), 
who described how eight entrepreneurs discover different opportunities for new businesses, 
exploiting the same technological invention. The idea behind selecting this particular case and 
describing the technology to participants of the present study was that judges could be 
provided with further information about which opportunities turned out to be successful and 
generated high profits, thereby, potentially increasing the quality of their judgement.  
Notwithstanding the advantages of such a well discussed case, it had been likely that most of 
the young business students participating in the study had never accumulated any experience 
in the field and might have low levels of affect or motivation in this field. Therefore, the 
second situation was intended to be more realistic to participants, aimed at resulting in a 
higher level of involvement. Further to this, the second situation was different to the first in 
that it had nothing to do with a technology; this also implied that, while the former was rather 
supply-driven, the second situation rather called for demand-driven opportunities. However, 
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both economic situations presented to the subjects, highlighting their capability of opportunity 
recognition, are shown in Figure 46. 
Situation 1 
While attending an interdisciplinary seminar on entrepreneurship at university you built up close relationships 
to engineers, who have recently been granted a patent for one of their projects, the 3DP™ technology. 3DP™ 
stands for three-dimensional printing for producing a variety of components; this technology allows to bring a 
malleable mass, comparable to powder, into almost any three-dimensional form and cure it with a special kind 
of glue. Excessive powder can be easily removed and reused. By calcinations and further procedures strength of 
the object produced can be increased significantly, resulting in solid and durable final products.  
The engineers emphasised their conviction that the technology’s possibilities of application are almost infinite: 
actually, each three-dimensional form can be produced at any level of robustness. However, the engineers are 
technology-focussed and do not care so much about the practical use and marketisation of 3DP™. This is the 
reason why they approach you; after all you attended different courses on starting-up a business. 
Situation 2 
Until recently you spend an academic year as visiting student at a university in a foreign country. Since you felt 
very well over there and knew the language quite well at the end of your studies, you prolonged your stay and 
did an internship in a company in the same city for a couple of months. Your decision really made sense, 
considering that this country's economy is one of the most important trade partners of your home country. 
Back in your home country, you are reflecting about your experiences concerning your stay in the other 
country; quite striking was the significant difference in prices levels for virtually all products and services. 
Further to this, labour costs seem are lower in the other country, notwithstanding that labour force seems to be 
comparably qualified.  
Probably even more important, you realised that within the rather short time in this country, you were able to 
build up an interesting social network with business people, entrepreneurs, etc., all showing high interest in 
your country and probably doing business with you. 
Question: Do you have any idea how to make a profit in this situation? Please do sketch a market solution 
(product, service, etc.) and name potential customers. What would be particular about your solution (its unique 
selling proposition, USP)? 
Figure 46 Economic Problems for Assessing Opportunity Recognition. 
The (c) measure for preferences for applying different types of representational elements in 
the process of problem construction was developed on the idea of Mumford et al. (1996a). 
They were assessed by presenting four problems to each subject. Each problem was presented 
in a short statement describing a complex situation, which were conceived in such a manner 
that the problem subjectively perceived could be defined in a number of different ways. After 
reading through the initial statement, subjects were confronted with sixteen alternative 
redefinitions or restatements of the problem and asked to select the two restatements they 
thought might be most useful in coping with the situation given (see appendix). In order to 
assess preferences for representational elements or types of information in defining and 
structuring complex, ambiguous situations each of the sixteen restatements were explicitly 
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generated to reflect the use of a certain type of information. Therefore, the sixteen alternatives 
presented to the subjects in random order consisted of four statements describing (1) key 
diagnostic information, (2) goals, (3) procedures, and (4) restrictions or constraints 
respectively.  
Several procedures were applied to ensure that each restatement included in the set of the 
sixteen has a certain degree of validity in representing a type of information; the set of 
restatements included in the survey for each problem situation was generated in the following 
manner: The problem situation was presented to a panel of three members. Each member was 
asked to generate sixteen alternative restatements with the restriction that four statements are 
based on (1) key diagnostic information, (2) goals, (3) procedures, and (4) restrictions 
respectively. This set or pool of alternatives was presented to ten further judges who built up a 
second panel, asked to rate the degree to which each of the 48 redefinitions produced by the 
fist panel is based on each type of information from their personal point of view, each 
alternative on a five-point scale. The ratings of this second panel for the different situations or 
tasks, shown in Table 2, all produce ICC scores of 0.927 or higher, which indicates an 
extremely high reliability of the measures since the judges agreed on the scale values of 
statements to a high extent.  
Situation ICC (3, 3)  
1 0.927 
2 0.933 
3 0.927 
4 0.945 
Table 2 ICCs for Problem Construction Items. 
These ratings allowed identifying alternatives of the initial set or pool that had strongly 
represented representational characteristics (e.g. goals) or types of information and low ones 
for the others (e.g. information, procedures, and restrictions). This information allowed 
selecting four alternative redefinitions for each information type to be included in the actual 
survey. Hence, subject’s individual scores for testing preferences regarding different types of 
information could then be obtained by counting the number of times subjects decided to use 
definitions across all four problem situations they were confronted with (Mumford et al. 
1996a).  
Figure 47 indicates which data as to the process of problem construction has been generated 
for each subject EAj in the survey; it is counted how often a subject has selected a redefinition, 
which represents a specific type of information. The numbers in the cells are the number of 
times a subject has selected a restatement representing each type of information across all four 
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situations; these sum up to eight for each individual. The relative weights could be interpreted 
as preference for a type of information. It should be noted that this methodological proceeding 
implies that the preferences are not independent but negatively correlated. 
 
Goals 
GTI  
Constraints
CTI  
Actions 
ATI  
Information
ITI  Sum 
jEA  2 3 1 2 8 
 Goals 
 , ,
PC
t j kg  
Constraints
, ,
PC
t j ki  
Actions 
, ,
PC
t j ka  
Information
, ,
PC
t j kc  
 
jEA  0.25 0.375 0.125 0.25 1 
Figure 47 Process-based Measures for Problem Construction for Each Economic Agent. 
The four situations in the general problem-solving domain were taken from the original study 
(Mumford et al. 1996a) and translated into German. The four situations in an entrepreneurial 
context were conceived for the present work, based on realistic experiences that could be 
gathered in consulting start-ups in a regional start-up promotion network (see for the tasks and 
respective redefinition or restatements included in the final survey the appendix).  
Preferences in kinds of (d) information attended to during information encoding were 
assessed, again, by presenting four problems to subjects (Mumford et al. 1996b). For each 
situation they were asked to read a first, initial description of the novel, ill-defined problem, 
which was specified by six short additional statements of information bearing on the 
respective problem. Based on this information the participants of the survey were asked to 
give a one- or two-paragraph solution to each problem. Each chunk of information for each 
problem situation or task (one initial problem description, six additional statements of 
information, one answer frame, altogether eight) was presented on a single page, which 
allowed assessing the time spent on each page or part of the task independently. Subjects were 
allowed paging back to a given page as often as desired in order to generate a solution. An 
individual’s preference for certain types of information could be assessed by manipulating the 
additional information given (see appendix). 
In all four problem situations the third, fourth, and fifth page presented key factual 
information seemingly necessary to solve the problem at hand. The remaining information on 
the first, second, and sixth page was manipulated to reflect other types of information: In two 
of the four tasks the first page presented additional factual information, the second page 
information apparently irrelevant to solving the problem at hand, and, on the sixth page, 
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principles that might be useful in generating a solution. The remaining tasks contained on the 
first page goals needed to be addressed in solving the problem, on the second page less 
relevant issues, which, albeit pertinent to grasping the situation, seemed not essential for 
generating a solution, and on the sixth page, restrictions or constraints that might be worth 
being considered in solving the problem. 
Again, the information included was selected inter-subjectively in a similar process as already 
outlined for the problem construction-measure: A first panel of three individuals was asked to 
produce statements they regard to belong to the seven types of information included: (1) 
relevant factual information, (2) additional contradictory information, (3) information 
apparently irrelevant to solving the problem at hand, (4) principles, (5) goals, (6) less relevant 
issues, and (7) restrictions or constraints for each problem situation. The second panel, 
consisting of ten individuals, then rated independently on a scale from zero to five whether 
they personally thought a statement given belonged to the type of information it was 
originally conceived for by the first panel (see for the interrater agreement in the second panel 
Table 3). For each situation those statements were included in the survey that received the 
highest average score in the ratings of the second panel.  
Situation Domain ICCs (3, 10) 
1 General 0.674 
2 General 0.859 
3 General 0.709 
4 General 0.723 
5 Entrepreneurship 0.698 
6 Entrepreneurship 0.769 
7 Entrepreneurship 0.692 
8 Entrepreneurship 0.731 
Table 3 ICCs for Information Encoding Items. 
The actual measure or indicator of personal preferences in encoding information was then 
obtained by assessing a relative-time-spent measure (RTS) of the time spent by subjects 
examining a type of information. The idea behind this measure is that individuals must, due to 
limited processing capacity, direct attention to particular cues in the external world. By 
comparing the relative time spent on information of a particular type, individual’s preference 
should be uncovered in the sense that some information types are more attended to than 
others. 
To start with, since each chunk of information was presented on a single page and subjects 
were allowed browsing through each task, total time spent examining each page was 
identified. Then, for each problem relative time spent on a page was calculated by dividing 
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the absolute time spent on a page by the total of absolute time spent on encoding information 
in a task. These RTS for each type of information TI were then averaged over all l = 4 
problem tasks. By dividing this measure for each type of information by the sum of all these 
measures, an overall or average relative-time-spent score (ARTS) for each information type 
was obtained. More formally, the average relative time spent on one type of information was 
calculated by dividing the sum of relative-time-spent-measures for each situation by the 
cardinality of this set of measures: 
1
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Put more formally, relative time-spent for a type of information in a problem situation was 
calculated by the absolute time spent on pages of an information type divided by the sum of 
time spent on all types of information in this situation divided by the numbers of pages 
containing such information in this situation: 
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with: TIkTS = Absolute time spent on information type TI in situation k. 
 TIkP  = Number of pages containing information type TI in situation k. 
 r = Total number of information types included. 
This information on each participant EAj of the study for the process of information encoding 
are shown in Figure 48. 
ARTSTI
in % 
Relevant 
Information 
RITI  
Contradictory 
Information 
CITI  
Irrelevant 
Information 
IITI  
Principles 
PTI  
Objectives 
GTI  
Less relevant 
Information 
LRITI  
Constraints 
CTI  
Sum 
EAj 19 13 15 13 21 9 10 100 
Figure 48 Process-based Measures for Information Encoding for Each Economic Agent. 
In order to generate a (e) measure of the kind of information serving as central base on which 
individuals tend to select or activate extant knowledge categories, a process here called 
category selection, subjects were confronted with five different problems; the whole 
procedure for generating this measure resembles to those for assessing problem construction 
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and information encoding. Each of these problems was briefly described in a three- or four-
paragraph description. All the problems presented to subjects - five for the general and 
entrepreneurial setting respectively - were taken from Shorris (1981), a book describing real-
world economic problems, and were presented in such a manner that the problems were ill-
defined and allowed for generating many different, albeit viable, solutions based on an array 
of different categories or concepts (Mumford et al. 1996c). After reading through a problem 
description subjects were presented eight concept statements that seemed useful in 
understanding the situation and generating a potential solution to it (see appendix). 
From these eight they were asked to select the four statements they were convinced would be 
most appropriate in understanding the situation and solving the problem. Each of these 
concept statements reflected a different category or conceptual framework; two of the 
statements described concepts based on (1) general principles, (2) long-term goals, (3) 
evaluation of others (social peering), and (4) discrete action plans respectively. Data assessed 
for each subject are shown in Figure 49. 
 Long-term 
Goals 
GTI  
General 
Principles  
PTI  
Discrete Action 
Plans  
ATI  
Evaluation of 
Others 
 
STI  
Sum 
jEA  5 4 4 7 20 
 Long-term 
Goals 
, ,
CS
t j kg  
General 
Principles 
, ,
CS
t j kp  
Discrete Action 
Plans 
, ,
CS
t j ka  
Evaluation of 
Others 
, ,
CS
t j ks  
Sum 
jEA  0.25 0.2 0.2 0.35 1 
Figure 49 Process-based Measures for Category Selection for Each Economic Agent. 
Similar procedures to those in developing the problem-construction-measure were applied to 
guarantee inter-subjective validity of the concept statements used as representatives of types 
of information: A first panel of three individuals produced a pool of ten to twelve statements 
for each information type and each problem situation. These were evaluated by a second 
panel, consisting of ten members, with ratings from zero to five; high ratings suggesting that 
panel II-members agreed with panel 1-members' conviction that the respective statement is 
representative for a type of information. For each problem and information type, based on 
these evaluations, the two statements showing the highest ratings were included in the final 
survey task and randomly ordered. This proceeding was necessary for only nine situations 
since one problem and the corresponding answer alternatives could be adopted from a study 
by Mumford et al. (1996c). The ratings of this second panel for the nine situations developed 
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all produced interrater agreement coefficients higher than 0.5; if situation 7 and 9 are 
excluded even 0.67 and higher (see Table 4).  
Situation Domain ICCs (3, 10) 
1 General 0.765 
2 General 0.859 
3 General 0.764 
4 General 0.668 
5 Entrepreneurship 0.729 
6 Entrepreneurship 0.809 
7 Entrepreneurship 0.560 
8 Entrepreneurship 0.691 
9 Entrepreneurship 0.534 
Table 4 ICCs for Category Selection Items. 
The ten problem situations and the selected concept statements for the four information types 
are presented in the appendix. On this basis, category-selection-scores could be obtained by 
counting the number of times subjects chose a particular type of concepts bearing on general 
principles, long-term goals, evaluations of others, or actions plans. Concluding, the maximum 
score achievable for each information-type-concept was ten since subjects could choose two 
of a type in five tasks at most.  
As has been said in chapter IV.C.1 it is assumed that individuals have a regulatory focus that 
particularly guides their initial information processing, including problem construction, 
information encoding, and category selection. According to previous research in cognitive 
psychology on creative thinking already touched, the preference type of promotion style as 
constructs is measured by the preferences for goals in problem construction, information 
encoding, and category selection, while a prevention style is as shown measured by the 
preferences for goals in problem construction and information encoding; the constructs’ 
measurement is shown in Figure 50. 
Construct Definition Scores 
Promotion Style  
Preference for Objectives in Problem Construction 0-8 
Preference for Objectives in Information Encoding 0-100 
 
Preference for Objectives in Category Selection 0-20 
Prevention Style 
Preference for Constraints in Problem Construction 0-8  
Preference for Constraints in Information Encoding  0-100 
Figure 50 Operationalisation of Promotion and Prevention Style of Regulatory Focus. 
CTI
GTI
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The design for the (f) measure used to assess category combination and reorganisation was 
based on a method developed by Mobley et al. (1992). The measurement for this process was 
designed differently to those dealt with before since it is not a preference- but a capability-
indicator. However, subjects participating in the study were confronted with four situations; in 
each, three categories or concepts were given to them. However, in order to avoid verbal 
planning these categories were not named or labelled, but only defined by four typical 
exemplars of the relevant categories, (Mumford et al. 1997); one of the tasks included in the 
survey is shown in Figure 51. 
Category 1: Chair; Couch; Lamp; Picture; 
Category 2: Wheel; Seat; Steering Wheel: Brakes; 
Category 3: Mars; Jupiter; Earth; Venus; 
Figure 51 Example  for Category Combination and Reorganisation Task. 
The categories and category exemplars used were all artificial since findings indicate that 
those show a greater flexibility than biological categories, thus, apparently providing a 
superior indicator for individual differences (Mobley et al. 1992). The four tasks and the 
respective twelve categories in the general setting were taken from the study of Mobley et al. 
(1992). The four tasks in the entrepreneurial setting were developed for the present study, 
based on the same requirements that led to such categories and exemplars in the above 
mentioned studies.  
Subjects participating in the study were then asked to read through the list of exemplars, 
defining the three categories on a given task. They were then requested to combine these three 
categories into a new category, accounting for all twelve presented exemplars, and find a label 
for this new category. Further to the (1) label, they were asked to find a (2) brief, one-
sentence description of the category, (3) to list as many additional exemplars or members of 
the new category they can think of, and, finally, (4) to name as much emergence features for 
the new category, that is list as much additional features tying together the exemplars 
included in the new category (see appendix). The actual measure for each subject was 
obtained by a panel of three judges, who were asked to give one rating (between 0 and 5) for 
the quality and originality of the new category developed and the respective descriptions 
provided by participants on a given task; the instructions to judge the responses given are 
shown in Figure 52.  
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Figure 52 Criteria for Evaluating Ability of Category Combination and Reorganisation. 
Overall quality and originality of the new category conceived, represented by label, one-
sentence description, additional exemplars and emergent features were the same as for the 
problem-construction measure. The experts were all psychologists familiar with the fields of 
cognition and creative thinking; additionally, they were briefed as to the definitions of quality 
and originality in the present context (Mumford et al. 1997). The interrater agreement 
coefficients for these judges and their ratings on the answers given in the four category 
combination and reorganisation tasks are shown in Table 5.xxxi 
Domain Situation ICC (3, 3) 
Entrepreneurship 1 .364 
 2 .283 
 3 .364 
 4 .345 
General 1 .355 
 2 .365 
 3 .310 
 4 .388 
Table 5 ICCs for Category Combination and Reorganisation Items. 
 
B. Causal Analysis and Structural Equation Models 
1. Basic Ideas and Purposes 
Generally, causal analysis is a holistic approach for theory testing, controlling for 
measurement errors and possible testing of complex networks of statements (Bagozzi 1984). 
Depending on the historical or intellectual antecedents, causal analysis may also be called 
structural equation modelling (SEM), covariance-structure analysis, or linear structural 
Construct : Ability of Category Combination and Reorganisation  
Indicators Rating Definition (Criteria) 
Mean Quality 
of Category 
Recombinations 
in Situations 1 
to 4 
Between 0 and 5: 
 
5 ? high 
0 ? low 
General aspects  
Completeness: Did the subject understand the instructions, used 
the information, and followed the instructions fully and 
completely? 
Mean 
Originality of 
Category 
Recombinations 
in Situations 1 
to 4 
Between 0 and 5: 
 
5 ? high 
0 ? low 
General aspects  
Unexpectedness: Did the subject approach the problem in a 
novel imaginative, unpredictable, or innovative manner? 
Description: Did the subject expand upon an idea, tell as story, 
or use fine detail to help the reader visualise the plan? 
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relations-approach (LISREL). Indeed, the use of the term causal analysis is somehow 
problematic in scientific terms, since it might be objected that causality can only be tested in 
experimental settings; notwithstanding since most prominent and rarely criticised in the 
literature, the term is used hereafter (Homburg and Hildebrandt 1998). The term of structural 
equation models is used synonymously in the present work because such describe a causal 
model mathematically.  
In effect, this tool offers many possibilities of analysis others cannot, e.g. it is not only 
possible to consider random errors like in usual regression analysis, but also to dissect 
variances and covariances of manifest variables into components that can be attributed to 
different factors and other components that represent random errors by using factor models. 
Simultaneously the method still permits tests for classical validation concepts. Therefore, 
some scholars even argue that it might be the best available method in the social sciences for 
theory testing since it allows for a more rigorous test of formalised theories than usual 
bivariate or multivariate statistics for testing causal relations (Homburg and Hildebrandt 
1998). Causal models are built to investigate or analyse causal dependencies that have been 
inferred by the researcher beforehand, as indicated in the general description of the research 
process, on basis of the existing body of theory. Thus, they have a rather confirmatory 
character since an ex-ante theoretical system of hypotheses is analysed on basis of empirically 
generated data.  
Particular about this method is that relations between empirically unobservable, so called 
latent variables can be analysed. Latent variables are hypothetical constructs that cannot be 
observed and measured directly in the empirical world. In terminology of causal analysis, 
therefore, they are denominated with Greek small letters and drawn in circle, while observable 
variables are put in Latin small letters and drawn in rectangles. Put differently, hypothetical 
constructs are characterised by abstract contents, for which cannot be imminently decided, 
whether the statement given by the superordinate system of hypotheses holds true in reality or 
not (i.e. image, intelligence, creativity, etc.). Hence, a construct might be defined as ”[…] a 
conceptual term used to describe a phenomenon of theoretical interest” (Edwards and Bagozzi 
2000, p. 156-157). Alternatively it might be seen as “[…] an abstract entity which represents 
the ‘true’, non-observable state or nature of a phenomenon.” (Bagozzi and Phillips 1982, p. 
24) It should be quite apparent that causal analytic models realise the general idea that has 
been outlined for research in general by generating less abstract, measurable hypotheses that 
can serve as representations for more abstract ones; causal analytic models exactly allow to 
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investigate such rather abstract constructs by their operationalisation, i.e. to find appropriate 
measures or indicators, also called manifest variables (Homburg and Hildebrandt 1998).  
Altogether, four general purposes can be identified for which causal analysis can be applied, 
of which the first two have already been mentioned as central idea of the whole method: 
construct validation of the measurement models and test of hypotheses structures by the 
structural model. Further to this, causal analysis can also be applied to execute multiple group 
comparisons by testing averages and applied as an exploratory instrument for detecting 
structures (Homburg and Hildebrandt 1998). However, only the first two functions are applied 
in the present work.  
Obviously this data analysis model seems to be most appropriate to the present research 
objectives; in particular it is possible to explicitly test for causal relations between 
hypothetical constructs, such as the two regulatory focus styles, category combination and 
reorganisation, opportunity recognition. In a nutshell, the basic idea of causal analysis and 
structural equation models is to define one or more indicators (manifest variables) for each 
latent variable or hypothetical construct in order to analyse the relationships between the 
latter. However, in causal analysis latent variables that ought to be explained, i.e. dependent 
variables, are called endogenous, while explaining, independent variables are called 
exogenous.  
It follows that a complete structural equation model consists of a structural model describing 
relations between hypothetical constructs and two measurement models; one for latent 
exogenous variables and one for latent endogenous variables. Empirical data on indicator 
variables then allows calculating covariances and correlations between them. These can serve 
to analyse the relations between latent variables and their indicators, allowing to determine (1) 
validity of indicators for measuring a hypothetical construct (Homburg and Giering 1996), 
and (2), secondly, analyse the relations between latent endogenous and latent exogenous 
variables in the structural model. These two aspects equal to the ideas of factor and regression 
analysis. In fact, the method is a combination of factor analysis for testing operational 
hypothesis and a structural equation model for testing general hypotheses on the level of 
hypothetical constructs. The path diagram usually used for depicturing represents all 
underlying measurements and causal hypotheses, which are formalised for estimations. The 
starting point of causal analysis is, therefore, not the initial data matrix observed in the field, 
but the respective covariance matrix or correlations. Put differently, structural equation 
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models analyse data on an aggregate level and test a system of hypotheses as a whole 
(Homburg and Hildebrandt 1998). 
 
2. Causality and its Testing in Structural Equation Models 
Since causality is tested some basic concepts and terms are briefly repeated in the following 
that are crucial for the approach chosen. However, the concept of causality cannot be 
discussed in detail because it is a whole research topic of its own (see e.g. Hellevik 1984; 
Pearl 2000). Nevertheless, it should be noted that such models are always proxies, i.e. 
incomplete and simplified: Statements and explanations always only refer to the model 
structure at hand. Furthermore, a causal model has an inherent preliminary character since it 
cannot be rejected or confirmed by underlying data. The method, like any other multivariate 
method, only tests statements whether a causal relation, developed on basis of exploratory 
assumptions of the researcher at work, statistically exists or not. This means that causal 
conclusions must be based on criteria beyond the system of data analysis (Homburg and 
Hildebrandt 1998). 
In the present work, causality is regarded to prevail between two variables x1 and x2, if 
variable x1 is a direct cause of x2 (written as x1→x2); i.e. if a change in x2 is caused by a 
change in x1, while all other variables that do not depend on x2 are held constant in a causal 
model (Hodapp 1984). It is exactly this control problem that makes causal analysis so difficult 
since actually only experimental situations can control for relevant variables and are able to 
identify the effect a single independent variable has on the dependent variable (Hellevik 
1984); due to this, parsimony is critical to scientific inquiry.  
Therefore, researchers in the IPP usually try to dissect complex behaviours into simpler 
component stages. Hence, such research is less daunted than other psychological approaches 
by behavioural variability because it attends to information and information processing of 
component stages rather than to global behaviours (Massaro and Cowan 1993). This 
dissection into several process-based measures is also intended in the present work, as a 
potential starting point for more fine-grained research on cognitive processes in opportunity 
recognition. However, in the present work it is assumed that a relation can be formally 
expressed through covariance and correlation between two variables. The empirical 
covariance s(x1,x2) between x1 and x2 is defined as:  
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( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1 1 2 21, 1 k kks x x x x x xK= − ⋅ −− ∑  
With: 1kx = Score of variable 1 for object k. 
 
1x  = Mean of scores of variable 1 across all objects k =1,…,K. 
 
2kx = Score of variable 2 for of object k. 
 
2x  = Mean of scores of variable 2 across all objects k =1,…,K. 
An empirical covariance of approximately zero suggests that no linear dependence exists 
between x1 and x2, i.e. they are not found together more often (their contingency is not higher) 
than chance would predict. In turn, a covariance smaller or larger than zero indicates that both 
variables’ scores develop more frequently in the same direction (positive) or in opposite 
directions (negative) than statistic chance would suggest. However, covariance solely cannot 
tell much about the strength and direction of the relationship between x1 and x2; in order to 
gain information about the strength of the relationship, covariance is standardised on an 
interval, transforming it into an indicator that can give a statement about the strength of the 
relation. Standardisation is obtained by dividing covariance by both variables’ standard 
deviation, resulting in the correlation coefficient 
1 2,x x
r  of x1 and x2.  
( )
1 2
1 2
1 2
,
,
x x
x x
s x x
r
s s
= ⋅  
with: ( )1 2,s x x = Covariance between 1x  and 2x  
 
1x
s  = ( )21 11 1 kk x xK −− ∑  Standard deviation of variable 1x  
 
2x
s = ( )22 21 1 kk x xK −− ∑ Standard deviation of variable 2x  
Apparently, such a standardised indicator can adopt scores between -1 and +1; the closer its 
absolute score approaches 1, the larger is the dependence of the two variables, while a 
correlation coefficient close to zero suggests independent variables. Although such an 
indicator can state something about the strength of relation, it cannot tell anything about the 
question, which variable is actually causing the other; a question for which, generally, four 
possible interpretations exist. The first two are both named a causally interpreted correlation 
since an unambiguous direction of causality can be assumed: These are the cases in which 
variable x1 is causing the score of variable x2 (x1→x2), or, vice versa, variable x2 is causing the 
score of variable x1 (x2→x1). Thirdly, it might be the case that variables x1 and x2 are partially 
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explained by the influence of an exogenous (hypothetical) cause or factor ξ ξ(read: Ksi) 
underlying the two variables. If so, the calculated correlation between x1 and x2 is only 
partially interpretable causally since x2 (in this example) is not only directly influenced by 
variable x1, but also in two ways by the hypothetical cause or factor ξ1 that alters variable x2 
directly and, in addition, indirectly via x1 as depicted in Figure 53. 
 
Figure 53 Causal Interpretation of Variable Relationships. 
Finally, a correlation cannot be interpreted causally if the relationship between variables x1 
and x2 only results from an underlying exogenous (hypothetical) cause or factor ξ1 (this would 
mean graphically that the arrow between x1 and x2 in Figure 53 would have to be deleted). 
This last possible interpretation can be examined by testing if the correlation between x1 and 
x2 is really zero in case ξ1 is held constant, i.e. the influence of ξ1 is eliminated. This can be 
tested by using partial correlation coefficients; considering the example given, three 
correlations could be identified ( )1 2 1 2, , ,; ;x x x xr r rξ ξ , represented by the three arrows in Figure 53. 
Generally, the partial correlation coefficient for x1 and x2 while keeping ξ constant can be 
calculated in the following manner: 
( ) ( )1 2 1 21 2 1 2
, , ,
,
2 2
, ,1 1
x x x x
x x
x x
r r r
r
r r
ξ ξ
ξ
ξ ξ
⋅
− ⋅=
− ⋅ −
 
with: 
1 2,x x
r ξ⋅ = Partial correlation coefficient between 1x  and 2x  eliminating the influence of ξ  
 
1 2,x x
r = correlation coefficient between 1x  and 2x   
 
1 ,x
r ξ = correlation coefficient between 1x  and ξ  
 
2 ,x
r ξ = correlation coefficient between 2x  and ξ  
If this partial correlation coefficient is zero, that is requirement 
1 2 1 2, , ,x x x x
r r rξ ξ= ⋅ is met, it tells 
that variable ξ is indeed responsible for the measured correlation between x1 and x2. These 
four different ways of interpreting a statistical correlation are mentioned since all of them are 
applied in structural equation models. It follows from these considerations that explicit 
Assessing Cognitive Styles and Opportunity Recognition 
 278
assumptions as to the relationships between the variables by a set of hypotheses must be made 
ex ante by the researcher, which, consequently, also applies to the conception fo the entire 
structural equation model. 
 
3. Assessing Latent Variables  
It has been hinted to the particular characteristic of structural equation models that they can 
estimate the relations between not directly observable hypothetical constructs by 
operationalising them via empirically observable indicators. This automatically implies that 
each construct included is described by at least one indicator variable. In order to avoid any 
confusion all indicator variables representing exogenous latent variables are here denominated 
by x, while all indicators referring to endogenous latent variables are represented by y. For 
differentiating indicators from latent variables the latter are denominated by η (read: Eta) for 
exogenous latent variables and by ξ
ξ
 (read: Ksi) for endogenous latent variables. A complete 
structural equation model further includes residual variables that, analogous to the residual 
score in regression analysis, ought to account for such causes or factors having an influence 
that are not considered in the model. All the variables of a complete structural equation model 
are summarised in Figure 54. 
Abbreviation Pronunciation Meaning 
η  Eta Latent endogenous variable explained in the model 
ξ  Ksi Latent exogenous variable not explained in the model 
y  - Indicator variable for latent endogenous variable 
x  - Indicator variable for latent exogenous variable 
ε  Epsilon Residual variable for indicator variable y 
δ  Delta Residual variable for indicator variable x 
ζ  Zeta Residual variable for latent endogenous variable 
Figure 54 Variables in a Complete Structural Equation Model. 
The structural model of Figure 53 with latent variables would consequently look as shown in 
Figure 55.  
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1η
1ξ
2η
1ζ
2ζ
21β
21γ
11γ
 
Figure 55 Structural Model with Latent Variables. 
The structural equations for the two latent endogenous variables in the path diagram look as 
follows: 
( )
( )
1 11 1 1
2 21 1 21 1 2
1
2
η γ ξ ζ
η β η γ ξ ζ
= ⋅ +
= ⋅ + ⋅ +  
It is assumed that the latent variables are standardised and, consequently, coefficients between 
variables can be regarded as standardised path coefficients; those between latent endogenous 
variables are represented by β (read: Beta) and those between latent exogenous and 
endogenous variables by γ (read: Gamma). Instead of writing two equations, the structural 
model of latent variables can be expressed in a matrix: 
1 1 11 1
1
212 2 21 2
0 0
0
η η γ ζξβη η γ ζ
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞= ⋅ + ⋅ +⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
 
or in general terms: 
Bη η ξ ζ= ⋅ + Γ ⋅ +  
The crucial point in this regard is that the matrixes of coefficients B and Γ cannot be 
calculated, simply because no empirical data is available for the correlations between latent 
variables, which are, by definition, hypothetical and therefore unobservable constructs. 
Accordingly, it is assumed that all latent variables can be described by indicator variables in a 
measurement model. Considering the example given, a measurement model of the latent 
exogenous variable ξ1 defined by two empirically observable indicator variables would look 
as depicted in Figure 56. 
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Figure 56 Measurement Model of Exogenous Latent Variables. 
If such variables are standardised the measurement model for the example given can be 
expressed in form of the regression equations of each indicator variable:  
( )
( )
1 11 1 1
2 21 1 2
1
2
x
x
λ ξ δ
λ ξ δ
= ⋅ +
= ⋅ +  
1 11 1
1
2 21 2
x
x
λ δξλ δ
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= ⋅ +⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
 
or in general terms: 
xX ξ δ= Λ ⋅ +  
Here, Λx represents the matrix of path coefficients, ξ the vector of the exogenous variable and 
δ the residual scores. As already indicated, measurement models are based of the idea of 
factor analysis and could be interpreted as factor analytic models. Both approaches share the 
idea that correlations between observable variables are caused by a latent variable, i.e. 
correlations between them cannot be interpreted empirically directly but only via an 
explaining force (Homburg and Giering 1996). However, in order to assess the relative 
influence each indicator variable has on the hypothetical construct it can be resorted to the 
fundamental theorem of factor analysis, which states that the matrix of correlations Rx 
describing correlations between indicator variables (x), can be reproduced by: 
x x xR δ′= Λ ⋅Φ ⋅Λ +Θ  
Here, Λx′ is the transposed of the Λx-matrix and matrix Θ contains the correlations between the 
factors respectively the endogenous latent variables. Since exogenous latent variables are here 
assumed not to correlate the fundamental theorem of factor analysis is reduced to: 
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x x xR δ′= Λ ⋅Λ +Θ  
Here, matrix Λx contains the factor loadings of all indicator variables on the latent exogenous 
variables, while Θδ stands for the covariance matrix between the residual scores δ. Factor 
loadings are, in case of standardised variables, nothing else than the regressions of the 
indicators on the latent variable, for which regression coefficients and path coefficients are 
identical. Furthermore - exogenous variables are assumed to be independent - factor loadings 
correspond to the correlations between indicator variables and hypothetical constructs. 
Similar to these considerations on the operationalisation of exogenous variables, the 
measurement model of latent endogenous variables is portrayed in Figure 57. 
 
Figure 57 Measurement Model of Endogenous Latent Variables. 
Mathematically this measurement model can be expressed by this matrix equation: 
1 111
2 221 1
3 332 2
424 4
0
0
0
0
y
y
y
y
ελ
ελ η
ελ η
λ ε
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟= ⋅ +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎝ ⎠⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
 
or in general terms: 
yY η ε= Λ ⋅ + . 
Again, Λy contains the factor loadings of the indicator variables y on the latent variables 
1η
 η1 
and η2, while ε is the vector of the residual scores. Accordingly, the measurement model of 
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latent endogenous variables and the correlations between the empirical indicator variables can 
be reproduced by regarding it as a factor model: 
y y yR ε′= Λ ⋅Λ +Θ  
The measurement model of endogenous latent variables is different to that of exogenous 
latent variables in that it permits direct causal dependences between the endogenous variables; 
for instance, in the example given endogenous factor η1 has a direct effect on endogenous 
factor η2. Bringing together what has been said so far, a complete causal model can be 
calculated. As shown in Figure 59 it consists of the two measurement models and the 
structural model. 
2ζ
4ε
3ε
2ε
1ε
 
Figure 58 Path Diagram of a Complete Structural Equation Model. 
In summary, notations for all necessary parameter matrices of a complete causal model are 
depicted in Figure 59. However, in order to be mathematically specified it must be identified 
for all eight matrices, which elements must be estimated. The first four matrices, containing 
the postulated causal relations, have already been introduced above. While matrix Φ contains 
covariances and, if the latent variables are standardised, correlations between latent 
exogenous variables, matrix Ψ covariances or correlations of the residual scores in the 
structural equations, which reflect the unexplained variance in the latent endogenous 
constructs. Finally, Θε and Θδ contain the matrices of covariances between the measurement 
errors (Backhaus et al. 2004).  
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Abbreviation  Pronunciation Meaning 
yΛ  Lambda - y  Matrix representing the coefficients of paths between y and η-variables. 
xΛ  Lambda - x  Matrix representing the coefficients of paths between x and η ξ-variables. 
B  Beta Matrix representing the postulated causal relations between η -variables. 
Γ  Gamma Matrix representing the postulated relations between ξ and η -variables. 
Φ  Phi Matrix containing the covariances between ξ - variables. 
Ψ  Psi Matrix containing the covariances between ζ - variables. 
εΘ  Theta-Epsilon Matrix containing the covariances between ε - variables. 
δΘ  Theta-Delta Matrix containing the covariances between δ - variables. 
Figure 59 A Complete Structural Equation Model’s Matrices. 
Based on these parameters, the matrix of covariances for the observed variables x and y can be 
reproduced by exactly these eight matrices: 
( ) ( ), , , , , , ,y x B ε δ π= Λ Λ Γ Φ Ψ Θ Θ =∑ ∑ ∑  
In this equation ( )1,..., tπ π π=  represents the vector of the model parameters to be estimated 
in the eight parameter matrices. This equation is called the model’s structure of covariances 
(see for a complete mathematical derivation Homburg 1989). Accordingly, the problem to 
solve is estimating the theoretical covariance matrix ( )π∑  between the latent variables that 
has the highest probability of creating the empirically observed covariance matrix S  of the 
measurement model drawn from the data set. In mathematical terms it is the minimisation of 
the difference between those two matrices in an iterative estimation procedure. Self-evidently, 
there exist several estimation algorithms to calculate this difference, varying in the 
discrepancy function to be minimised.  
Available or often used algorithms are not discussed here in detail, rather simply explained 
which one has been chosen and why (see for an overview e.g. Hildebrandt and Görz 1999). 
Backhaus et al. (2004) recommend to consider four criteria in selecting an estimation 
algorithm: To begin with, it should be checked if a (1) multinormal distribution of the 
manifest variables is given; if (2) the discrepancy function is scale invariant, that is an 
alteration of the indicators' scaling does not influence the function's minimum; if (3) the 
sample size is sufficient for the algorithm to be applied, and, finally, (4) if inference statistics 
are available that allow testing the null hypothesis that the empirical covariance matrix is 
equal to the theoretical one. 
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The validity of the entire model can be assessed with a likelihood-ratio-test; by calculating a 
chi-square value the null hypothesis can be tested, whether the empirical corresponds to the 
theoretical covariance matrix. If rejected, the alternative hypothesis is that the empirical 
matrix corresponds to any positive matrix A. The resulting likelihood-ratio statistic χ2 
compares the frequency of an observed score of a variable in the sample with the theoretically 
expected frequency in case the scores of the variable are randomly distributed (Backhaus et al. 
2004). Mathematically, this can be determined with: 
( ) ( )2 1 ,n F Sχ π= − ⋅ Σ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  
with: F       = Minimum score of discrepancy function 
 S       = Observed covariance matrix 
 ( )πΣ = Estimated covariance matrix 
In the present context a causal model is usually accepted if the chi-square-score is smaller or 
equal to the degrees of freedom; this means if χ2 is divided by the degrees of freedom, the 
resulting test statistic should equal to one or even be smaller. In practical applications, a 
model fit is considered good if the ratio is 2.5 or smaller (Homburg and Baumgartner 1995). 
Further to this, the probability (p) can be calculated with which the rejection of the null 
hypothesis would be an error; it should be noted that the probability of error in classical test 
theory here corresponds to (1-p). Since the scholar does not want to reject the null hypothesis 
and, thereby, the model at hand, a high score of (p) is positive expressing that the theoretical 
model can be accepted as good approximation to observed empirical data. As will be clear 
soon, the interpretation of χ2 for evaluating the model fit is somehow critical for the present 
model, particularly because its application requires normal distribution of the manifest 
variables and a sufficiently large sample; issues which both must be taken with caution in the 
present case. Therefore, other fit indices based on the likelihood-ratio-χ2 could be considered 
in evaluating the model fit that provide further information. For instance, the Akaike-
Information-Criterium (AIC), a relative indicator, only suggests selecting the model from the 
set of possible ones that exhibits the lowest score: 
 
2
D DAIC dχ= +  
with: Dd   = Number of parameters to be estimated 
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Another criterion is the so called single-sample-cross-validation index (ECVI), which uses the 
likelihood-ratio-χ2 to measure the degree of agreement between the theoretical covariance-
matrix estimated on basis of the empirical data and that of the matrix which is reproduced 
from the validation sample with identical sample size (Brown and Cudeck 1993). Jöreskog 
and Sörbom have implemented a variant which is simply a transformation of the likelihood-
ratio-χ2 (Jöreskog and Sörbom 1993): 
 
Compared to these global criteria, all criteria of partial model fit are based on a somehow 
different idea, although also using the likelihood-ratio-χ2: They compare the model fit under 
to be assessed (the default model) with a chosen reference model, which is more restrictively 
specified, disposing of less estimators. The model of reference is usually the null-model or 
independence model; for this it is assumed that all manifest variables are uncorrelated and, 
therefore, only the variances of manifest variables are calculated (Bentler and Bonnet 1980). 
For instance, the normed fit index (NFI) compares the minimum of the default model’s 
discrepancy function with the independence model. In contrast, a so called saturated model, 
for which all possible parameter are estimated, demonstrates a perfect fit of one (Bentler and 
Bonnet 1980). The NFI can be calculated as follows: 
2
2
ˆ
1 1ˆ
D D
II
FNFI
F
χ
χ
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= − = −⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦  
with: ˆ
DF = Minimum score of default model’s discrepancy function 
 
IˆF = Minimum score of independent model’s discrepancy function 
 2
Dχ = Likelihood-ratio- 2χ  for default model 
 2
Iχ = Likelihood-ratio- 2χ  for independent model 
The default model’s quality can vary between the worst fit (the independent model), which 
exhibits the score zero, and the perfect fit of the saturated model and the score one. The NFI, 
hence, indicates whether the model at hand rather equals to one or the other model. 
Practically, a good model fit can be assumed if NFI exceeds the score of 0.9 (Bentler and 
Bonnet 1980).  
2
2 DdECVI
n n
χ ⎡ ⎤= + ⋅ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
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However, subsequent studies were able to show that the NFI is directly dependent of the 
sample size, reason why it was intended to be improved by the Relative-Fit-Index (RFI) 
accounting for model complexity via degrees of freedom that, unfortunately, brought up 
similar problems (Marsh et al. 1996):  
 
Similarly, Bollen’s Incremental-Fit-Index (IFI) explicitly considers sample size and model 
complexity but also co-varies with the former (Marsh et al. 1996): 
 
Therefore, it is often suggested to consider, additionally, for the Tucker-Lewis-Index (TLI) 
that offers several advantages beyond its independence of the sample size (Bentler and 
Bonnet 1980) and was found to be one of the best partial indices (Marsh et al. 1996).xxxii The 
TLI is calculated by the following formula: 
2 2
2
1
I D
I D
I
I
d dTLI
d
χ χ
χ
−
=
−
 
with: 
Id = Independent model’s degrees of freedom  
 
Dd = Default model’s degrees of freedom  
Another index found to deliver good estimates in terms of being not systematically related to 
sample size and appropriately reflecting systematic variation in model misspecification, is the 
Bentler (1990)'s Comparative-Fit-Index (CFI) that is equal to the Relative-Noncentrality-
Index (RNI). The CFI measures the relation between the non-centrality parameters of the 
population (NCP) for the default and independent model: 
2
2
D
D
I
I
dRFI
d
χ
χ
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
2 2
2
I D
I D
IFI
d
χ χ
χ
−= −
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with NCP (Non-Centrality Parameter) =
2 d
n
χ −
. 
Again it is suggested that a CFI exceeding 0.9 indicates a good model fit. However, all the 
indices based on the likelihood-ratio-χ2 that have been presented so far assumed that the 
specified model applies to the whole population; models that only approximately apply to the 
entire population are consequently falsified for large samples. However, there exist criteria 
that are dedicated to this population error of approximation and the reliability of the 
adjustment criteria. Browne and Cudeck (1993) have developed an estimate called Population 
Discrepancy Function (PDF) for a population assumed only to have on group: 
 
Since, the PDF decreases if additional parameters are estimated in the structural equation 
model, but at the same time model complexity increases, the Root Square Error of 
Approximation (RMSEA), originally developed by Steiger (1990), is a similar but more 
valuable indicator, providing information about the average discrepancy per degree of 
freedom and, therefore, the approximation of the model to reality, i.e. empirical data. For 
practical applications it is recommended to interpret the RMSEA as indicator for model fit as 
follows (Backhaus et al. 2004; Browne and Cudeck 1993): 
 
RMSEA ≤ 0.05 Close model fit 
RMSEA ≤ 0.08 Reasonable model fit 
RMSEA ≥ 0.10 Unacceptable model fit 
In addition, by providing PCLOSE, AMOS gives information about the probability of error 
for the null hypothesis that RMSEA is lower than 0.05 for the default model. Is this score 
2
0ˆ ,01 1
D Dd NCPF Max
n n
χ⎡ ⎤−= =⎢ ⎥− −⎣ ⎦
0ˆ
D
FRMSEA
d
=
1 D
I
NCPCFI
NCP
= −
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smaller than a given level (usually α = 0.05) a good model fit can be assumed (Backhaus et al. 
2004).  
 
C. Causal Model of Opportunity Recognition 
A causal model is usually built and interpreted in two major steps: to begin with, the 
constructs or factors are tested for their validity and reliability. Then, after the theoretical data 
fits the empirical, the model as whole and causal relationships are assessed (e.g. Garson 
2007). 
1. Assessing Construct Validity and Reliability 
The general problem in operationalising theoretical constructs is that they, by definition, 
cannot be observed directly. Therefore, they are measured, respectively operationalised, by 
several indicators and, thus, quality of construct measurement must be judged in order to see, 
whether indicators can be accepted as approximations (Homburg and Hildebrandt 1998). 
Even though actually directed to scholars in the field of consumer behaviour research, the 
statement that “[…] most of our measures are only measures because someone says they are, 
not because they have been shown to satisfy standard measurement criteria […]“ (Jacoby 
1979, p. 91) can equally be applied to entrepreneurship research, where it has been said that 
efforts intending to explain entrepreneurial behaviour need to improve validity of constructs 
(see e.g. Mitchell et al. 2005). At least, it seems to be a scholar’s duty to increase transparency 
concerning this issue in his research. Main criteria usually drawn on in assessing construct 
quality are reliability and validity. Hereafter, reliability is understood as “[…] the degrees to 
which measures are free from random error and thus reliability coefficients estimate the 
amount of systematic variance in a measure.” (Peter and Churchill 1986, p. 4) Hence, 
measurements of indicators are reliable for a factor or construct if a high portion of variance 
can be explained by their association; at the same time, the influence of measurement error is 
low (Homburg and Giering 1996).  
Validity is an indicator of conceptual appropriateness of the measurement instrument and 
states whether it really measures what it is supposed to; it is high, “[…] when the differences 
in observed scores reflect true differences on the characteristic one is attempting to measure 
and nothing else […].” (Churchill 1979, p. 65) The relation between a measurement’s 
reliability and validity can be illuminated by the following equation: 
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O T S RX X X X= + +  
It states that the observed score of a measurement X0 equals to a variable’s true score XT plus 
its systematic XS and random error XR. The former term refers to a systematic error occurring 
independent of any random influences with the same value for any measurement; the latter 
term contains all factors that non-systematically or randomly influence a measurement. Thus, 
a measurement is reliable if it leads to consistent results or scores, i.e. XR = 0, while it can 
only be considered valid if the systematic error can be excluded as well, so that X0 = XT 
(Homburg and Giering 1996).  
However, there exist more fine-grained concepts of validity focussing on different aspects of 
conceptual appropriateness; in fact four types of validity must be given in order to assume a 
valid construct measurement: content, nomological, convergent, and discriminant validity 
(Hildebrand 1984). While content validity describes the extent to which an indicator 
represents all facets of a given construct or factor (Bohrnstedt 1970), nomological validity is 
the extent to which predictions or statements are confirmed in dealing with a larger theory 
(Peter and Churchill 1986). Convergent validity is the extent to which two or more attempts 
of measuring the same concept are in agreement, meaning that all indicators describing one 
construct or factor must exhibit a sufficiently strong relationship. In turn, discriminant validity 
refers to the extent to which indicators of distinct constructs or factors differ (Bagozzi and 
Phillips 1982; Homburg and Giering 1996); i.e. indicators for one construct ought to be as 
homogenous (convergent) as possible, while those describing different ones as heterogeneous 
(discriminant) as possible.  
In the present work the review of relevant literature has led to three, respectively four 
constructs, which have been measured by at least two indicators and are discussed in the 
following paragraphs: regulatory focus (promotion- and prevention style), category 
combination and reorganisation, and opportunity recognition. It should be noted that in the 
present study the terms of construct and factor can be used synonymously since each 
construct is only described by one factor. All of them are measured by reflective indicators, 
i.e. the construct or factor causes the indicator variable’s scores and the latter can be regarded 
as a construct’s measures (Homburg and Giering 1996). Homburg and Giering (1996) have 
suggested a general proceeding for quantitatively analysing hypothetical constructs, which is 
adjusted to the needs of the present work, respectively the type of constructs used. They 
propose that a construct's quantitative analysis is carried out in four stages and already 
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preceded by an extensive conceptualisation of the construct by qualitative techniques in order 
to gain a fundamental understanding and an initial set of measuring indicators. Those are then 
tested in several pre-tests for finding clear and unambiguous formulated items, as well as 
testing the indicator's textual relevance for the construct to be measured. 
The extensive literature review as well as the efforts to produce test items, outlined in chapter 
V.A.3, could well be seen as such conceptual preparation. However, many aspects described 
in their general model are only relevant to multidimensional constructs, which are not 
included in the present work, since only one-dimensional constructs with one factor are 
included. Hence, the factors or constructs are separately tested for validity according to the 
second step of the general process outlined, starting with calculating Cronbach’s alpha and 
item-to-total correlations followed by an exploratory and a confirmatory factor analysis. For 
each factor or construct the following steps are taken:  
Firstly, Cronbach’s alpha, a reliability coefficient of the first generation, measuring the 
reliability of a group of indicators describing one factor or construct is calculated (Cronbach 
1951). It can be obtained by applying the formula: 
2
1
211
k
i
i
k
k
k
σ
α σ
=
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟= ⋅ −− ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
∑
. 
with: k = Number of factor’s indicators  
 2
iσ = Indicator i’s variance  
 2
kσ = Variance of all k - indicator’s sum  
This coefficient can be interpreted as a measure of a factor’s indicators internal consistency; it 
is obtained by dividing the factor’s indicators into two equal sets in any possible constellation 
and correlating the sum of each half. The mean value of all possible combinations of split ups 
is Cronbach’s alpha. As any correlation coefficient it can assume values between zero and 
one, whereas usually it is followed Nunnally (1978) and suggested that a reliable factor 
exceeds a minimum value of 0.7 (see e.g. Backhaus et al. 2004; Homburg and Giering 1996). 
In case a construct does not reach this value, item-to-total correlations are calculated for each 
indicator; these measures also refer to one factor’s indicators but express an indicator’s 
correlation with the sum of all other indicators for this construct. They can be used as iterative 
criteria for selecting appropriate indicators since manifest variables showing relatively high 
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correlations with total scores have more variance relating to the factor and add more 
reliability (Nunnally 1978).  
Based on this information, indicators with the lowest item-to-total correlation are removed 
until Cronbach’s alpha exceeds the suggested value of 0.7 (Homburg and Giering 1996). 
When the factor under investigation complies with this requirement, exploratory factor 
analysis is applied to control whether factor extraction really only detects a single factor and, 
thus, a reasonable degree of convergent validity can be assumed. Since the objective of 
detecting such factors in structural equation modelling is finding the causing construct for the 
measured variables, principal axis factoring or common factor analysis seems to be the 
appropriate method to be used (Garson 2007; see for details Backhaus et al. 2004). The 
remaining indicators for each factor are then finally assessed by a confirmatory factor analysis 
of the factor’s model (Homburg and Giering 1996). 
For evaluating reliability of estimates in a causal model several criteria exist: Generally, in 
structural equation models it is often drawn on squared multiple correlation coefficients, 
which are automatically calculated by AMOS for all indicators as well as latent endogenous 
variables. These coefficients can assume scores between zero and one; the higher this score 
the more reliable is the measurement in the model. In general terms, reliability of a variable 
reflects the degree to which a measurement is subject to a random error, i.e. the degree to 
which this measurement tallies other independent, comparable measurements of the same 
variable. Regarding an observed variable the coefficients given in AMOS state, to which 
extent this measurement contributes to the measurement of the corresponding latent construct. 
The multiple correlation coefficients for latent endogenous variables can be interpreted as 
measure of strength of the causal relationship (Backhaus et al. 2004). In case the latent 
variables are standardised, as in the present model, the indicator reliability is equal to its 
squared factor loading. The minimum reliability an indicator usually should exceed is given 
with 0.4 or 0.5; i.e. it is claimed that a construct or factor can explain at least 40 or 50% of an 
indicator’s variance (Homburg and Baumgartner 1995; Homburg and Giering 1996). In case 
several criteria are not met, further indicators with relatively low reliability must be removed.  
The whole process outlined above results in set of indicators for each factor or construct that 
has been adjusted considering for reliability and convergent validity. The outlined method of 
assessing a model’s construct is now applied to those treated in the present study, namely (a) 
the ability of opportunity recognition, (b) promotion style and (c) prevention style of 
regulatory focus, and the (d) the ability of category combination and reorganisation. 
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An important argument in research on (a) opportunity recognition that has also been discussed 
in the present work is that the term of entrepreneurial opportunity describes a quite 
heterogeneous group of different situations (see chapter II.C.1). Accordingly, an individual’s 
ability to recognise a specific type of opportunities might not be helpful in other types of 
situations; in order to account for this plausible argument, subjects in the survey were 
confronted with two quite different situations for which it was assumed that different aspects 
might be responsible for explaining the ability of recognising opportunities. If this is the case, 
two constructs ought to be included in the model of opportunity recognition, explaining two 
different types of opportunity recognition. 
Interestingly, as shown in Table 6, the reliability of the construct opportunity recognition 
measured by Cronbach’s alpha is higher than 0.7 if the quality and originality of answers 
given for problem situation one and two (OR1_Quality; OR1_Originality; OR2_Quality; 
OR2_Originality) are included as manifest variables. Such a factor can explain 60.02% of 
these indicators’ variance. Meeting both initial criteria set for construct reliability, this 
indicates that the ability of recognising opportunities is given to some individuals in the 
population independent of the situation they are situated in.  
Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
Variance of 
Indicators 
Explained 
Items 
0.771 60.02% 
OR1_Quality; 
OR1_Originality; 
OR2_Quality; 
OR2_Originality 
Table 6 Reliability Indicators for Opportunity RecognitionConstructs. 
However, the method outlined suggests that in a second step it is tested whether exploratory 
factory analysis executed with SPSS really suggests only one factor for the variables at hand. 
Indeed, a common factor analysis with a varimax-rotation and Kaiser-normalisation (see 
Backhaus et al. 2004) for the four indicators suggests to work with two different factors, both 
exhibiting Eigenvalues larger than one; as Table 7 shows the first would include the variables 
describing the ability of recognising opportunities in situation one (OR1_Quality; 
OR1_Originality) and the second those for situation two (OR2_Quality; OR2_Originality). 
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Factor   
  1 2 
OR2_Quality 0.190 0.839 
OR2_Originality 0.180 0.836 
OR1_Quality 0.866 0.196 
OR1_Originality 0.863 0.187 
Table 7 Rotated Factor Matrix for Opportunity Recognition Constructs. 
Considering this result of principal axis factoring, these two constructs for the ability of 
opportunity recognition in different situations k logically deliver reliability indicators even 
higher than the general construct of opportunity recognition, as is shown in Table 8. 
Consequently, in the present study two different models might be dealt with: The first one 
only including a general construct of opportunity recognition, while the second explicitly 
distinguishing between the two types of problems in situation one (ORk=1) and situation two 
(ORk=2). Following the suggestion given by factor analysis, the latter option is chosen. 
Option Construct Cronbach’s alpha 
Variance of 
Indicators 
Explained 
Items 
1 (One 
Construct) General Opportunity Recognition 0.771 60.02% 
OR1_Quality; 
OR1_Originality; 
OR2_Quality; 
OR2_Originality 
Opportunity Recognition in Situation 1 
(ORk=1) 
0.868 89.19% OR1_Quality; OR1_Originality 2 (Two 
Constructs) Opportunity Recognition in Situation 2 
(ORk=2) 
0.848 86.82% OR2_Quality; OR2_Originality 
Table 8 Reliability Indicators for Independent Opportunity Recognition Constructs. 
Starting the assessment of (b) promotion style, Cronbach’s alpha is calculated for preferences 
for objectives or goals (TIG) in problem construction (PC), information encoding (IE), and 
category selection (CS). This measure assumes a negative value as indicated on the left-hand 
side columns of Table 9, meaning that the mean covariance between the variables is negative. 
Cronbach’s 
alpha 
Cronbach’s 
alpha for 
standardised 
items 
Items 
-0.191xxxiii 0.353 
PC_Objectives; 
IE_Objectives; 
CS_Objectives 
Table 9 Cronbach’s Alpha for Initial Promotion Style Construct. 
Assessing Cognitive Styles and Opportunity Recognition 
 294
A closer look at item-to-total correlations in Table 10 shows that it is the preference for 
objectives in category selection (CS_Objectives) that is negatively correlated with the other 
two variables.  
Indicator  
Scale mean 
value if item 
removed 
Scale variance 
value if item 
removed 
Adjusted 
item-scale 
correlation 
Squared 
multiple 
correlation 
Cronbach’s 
alpha if item 
removed 
PC_Objectives 5.497 2.293 -0.106 0.574 -0.031 
IE_Objectives 6.887 3.470 0.409 0.575 -0.330 
CS_Objectives 1.758 1.876 -0.146 0.025 0.160 
Table 10 Item-to-total Correlations for Initial Problem Style Construct. 
Removing this indicator leads to a standardised Cronbach’s alpha (which is relevant here due 
to different scaling of the indicators) of 0.645, meeting the theoretical criteria usually stated 
for reliable constructs. Therefore, a construct comprising the preference for objectives in 
constructing problems and encoding information called promotion style is included in the 
present model of opportunity recognition, for which exploratory factor analysis shows that it 
accounts for 87.86% of its indicator’s variance (see Table 11). 
Cronbach’s 
alpha 
Cronbach’s 
alpha for 
standardised 
items 
Variance of 
Indicators 
Explained 
Items 
0.160 0.862 87.86% PC_Objectives; IE_Objectives 
Table 11 Reliability Indicators for Promotion Style. 
Interpreting this, it was argued before that cognitive style might guide information processing 
throughout the whole process or just in several sub-processes (chapter IV.C.1); however, it 
seems that in category selection people do not stick to their preference for objectives, i.e. to 
their promotion style. In general, the correlations between preferences for an information type 
in category selection with those in information encoding and problem construction are 
negative. The suspect that styles and preferences might be different for the initial stages of 
creative thinking often described as divergent thinking in contrast to subsequent stages of 
convergent thinking seems to apply in terms of different cognitive styles guiding individuals’ 
processing. More generally, it might be argued that the initial, tentative representation must be 
seen different form subsequent processing, such as the selection of an appropriate category 
from extant knowledge; however, this is an issue researchers in the field of cognitive 
psychology must dedicate to themselves. 
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For (c) prevention style in regulatory focus the indicators initially were the preference for 
restrictions or constraints TIC in problem construction (PC_Constraints) and information 
encoding (IE_Constraints), which were expected exhibiting high reliability. Please note that, 
while the preference for objectives or goals has been named for problem construction, 
information encoding, and category selection, the preference for constraints or restrictions - 
here referred to as prevention style - in selecting categories has not been found to have an 
impact of the output of creative thinking processes. Therefore it was not included in the 
present work in order to assess the construct of prevention focus. Indeed, they reach a 
standardised Cronbach’s alpha of 0.77 and the resulting factor is able to explain 81.37% of 
the two variable’s variance, thus, meeting the requirements for reliable constructs (see Table 
12).  
Cronbach’s 
alpha 
Cronbach’s 
alpha for 
standardised 
items 
Variance of 
Indicators 
Explained 
Items 
0.150 0.771 81.37% PC_Constraints; IE_Constraints 
Table 12 Reliability Indicators for Prevention Style. 
Alltogether, the subjects’ answers in the survey largely support the theory of regulatory focus: 
The two concepts of promotion and prevention style are negatively correlated with a 
correlation coefficient of -0.72, which is a result of two facts already introduced. Firstly, in 
the survey the preferences for different types of information for a cognitive process (e.g. 
problem construction) are automatically negatively correlated since subjects could only select 
a limited set of answer options; i.e. in the rather theoretical case an individual only selected 
answer options representing a preference for goals this implied that they did not chose any of 
those standing for a preference for constraints. In addition, it has been shown above by high 
reliability indicators that individuals showing a preference for one type of information in 
problem construction also tend to exhibit such for information encoding as well. 
Consequently, the negative correlation can be explained by methodological restrictions and 
actual answer behaviour in the survey. This arguments are here seen as sufficient to assume 
that individuals indeed differ as to their regulatory focus,i.e. their preference for attaining 
goals or restrictions or constraints, in constructing problems and encoding information.  
Similarly, the reliability for the (d) construct of category combination and reorganisation 
measured by the judges average rating’s for quality (CC_Quality) and originality 
(CC_Originality) of answers given meets, with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.892, the criteria for a 
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reliable factor and is capable of explaining 90.29% of the two indicator’s variance (see Table 
13). Here, it is not necessary to calculate Cronbach’s alpha for standardised items because the 
variables are equally scaled.  
Cronbach’s 
alpha 
Variance of 
Indicators 
Explained 
Items 
0.892 90.29% CC_Quality; CC_Originality 
Table 13 Reliability Indicators for Category Combination and Reorganisation. 
All further factors included in the model are treated as constructs but only measured by one 
indicator. This has the advantage that different variances can be restricted for the error terms, 
which otherwise would be automatically zero, assuming that the variable perfectly measures 
what it is supposed to.  
Construct 
Cronb
ach’s 
Alpha 
Varian
ce of 
Indicat
ors *2 
Indicators 
Fact
or 
Loa
ding 
Preference for Objectives in Problem Construction (PC_Objectives) 0.90 
Promotion Style 0.862*1 73.8% 
Preference for Objectives in Information Encoding (IE_Objectives) 0.84 
Preference for Constraints in Problem Construction (PC_Constraints) 0.91 
Prevention Style 0.771*1 81.37% 
Preference for Constraints in Information Encoding (IE_Constraints) 0.90 
Quality of Categories Combined (CC_Quality) 0.89 Category 
Combination 0.892  90.29% Originality of Categories Combined (CC_Originality) 0.91 
Quality of Opportunity Recognised in Situation 1 (OR1_Quality) 1.00 
Originality of Opportunity Recognised in Situation 1 (OR1_Originality);  0.78 
Quality of Opportunity Recognised in Situation 2 (OR2_Quality) 0.40 
Opportunity 
Recognition 0.771  60.02% 
Originality of Opportunity Recognised in Situation 2 (OR2_Originality) 0.35 
Quality of Opportunity Recognised in Situation 1 (OR1_Quality); 0.98 Opportunity 
Recognition in 
Situation 1 
0.868 89.19% 
Originality of Opportunity Recognised in Situation 1 (OR1_Originality) 0.79 
Quality of Opportunity Recognised in Situation 2 (OR2_Quality) 0.88 Opportunity 
Recognition in 
Situation 2 
0.848 86.82% 
Originality of Opportunity Recognised in Situation 2 (OR2_Originality) 0.81 
*1 Standardised Alpha 
*2 Common Factor Analysis 
Table 14 Construct Reliability in Present Model. 
Table 14 shows a summary of constructs with more than one indicator used in the present 
model after testing for construct validity. In addition, Figure 60 lists those constructs that are 
only operationalised by one indicator.  
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Theoretical Constructs Variable Name of 
Constructs Indicators 
Action focus in problem construction  PCActionStyle PC_Actions (Preference for Actions in Problem 
Construction) 
Information focus in problem 
construction 
PCInfoStyle PC_Information (Preference for Factual 
Information in Problem Construction) 
Relevance of information focus in 
information encoding 
IEInfoStyle IE_Relevant_Information (Preference for 
Relevant Information in Information Encoding) 
Principles focus in information 
encoding 
IEPrincipleStyle IE_Underlying_Principles (Preference for 
Underlying Principles in Information Encoding) 
Principles focus in category selection CSPrincipleStyle CS_Underlying_Principles (Preference for 
Underlying Principles in Category Selection) 
Objectives focus in category selection CSObjectiveStyle CS_Underlying_Objectives (Preference for 
Underlying Objectives in Category Selection) 
Social Peering focus in category 
selection 
CSPeeringStyle CS_Social_Peering (Preference for Evaluation 
of Others in Category Selection) 
Action focus in category selection CSActionStyle CS_Actions (Preference for Action Plans in 
Category Selection) 
Figure 60 Constructs with only One Indicator in the Present Model. 
As said before, when the constructs used can be regarded as valid and reliable, the general 
model fit must be assessed before causal relations in the structural model can be interpreted. It 
has to be assessed whether the theoretical model and its estimates reproduce empirical or 
observed data to an acceptable degree. 
 
2. Assessment of Model Fit 
A variety of criteria exist to evaluate the fit between the theoretical model estimated and the 
empirical data, which must be selected carefully since their meaningfulness is often bound to 
requirements; in general terms, it is distinguished between global and partial or relative 
criteria. Before turning attention to such criteria some mathematical requirements that allow 
calculating structural equation models have to be met: First of all, the manifest variables were 
tested for normality because maximum likelihood-estimates require their normal distribution. 
This was assessed by Kolmogorov-Smirnov- and Shapiro-Wilk-tests, which as goodness-of-
fit-test overlay a normal curve on actual data, to assess the fit. Such tests assume a null 
hypothesis of a normal or Gaussian distribution, which means that the fit of the data at hand 
with the normal curve, is poor.  
As Table 15 shows, for all manifest variables included in the model of opportunity 
recognition the null hypothesis of normal distribution must be rejected since all show low 
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levels of significance, which means that the null hypothesis is incorrect with a high 
probability. 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov(a) Shapiro-Wilk  
 Statistics d.f. significance statistics d.f. significance 
PC_Information .202 112 .000 .919 112 .000 
PC_Objectives .213 112 .000 .882 112 .000 
PC_Actions .157 112 .000 .900 112 .000 
PC_Constraints .199 112 .000 .914 112 .000 
IE_Objectives .096 112 .012 .976 112 .040 
IE_Relevant .095 112 .014 .984 112 .221 
IE_Constraints .082 112 .063 .981 112 .109 
IE_Irrelevant .118 112 .001 .884 112 .000 
IE_Principles .085 112 .047 .983 112 .174 
CS_Principles .132 112 .000 .962 112 .003 
CS_Actions .139 112 .000 .941 112 .000 
CS_Objectives .167 112 .000 .948 112 .000 
CS_Social_Peering .154  112 .000 .965 112 .005 
CC_Quality .108 112 .003 .904 112 .000 
CC_Originality .094 112 .016 .955 112 .001 
OR_Overall_Quality .088 112 .033 .980 112 .092 
OR_Overall_Originality .092 112 .021 .980 112 .087 
A correction of significance according to Lilliefors. 
Table 15 Test for Normality for Manifest Variables. 
Another important theoretical requirement for applying empirical methods based on 
covariances and correlations is that linearity prevails between variables; it can be tested by 
comparing the total variance explained by the independent variable 2η  - not assuming a linear 
relationship exists between the variables - with the proportion of variance in the dependent 
variable accounted for by the linear relationship 2R . Hence, Table 16 including all manifest 
variables assessed can be interpreted as follows: For instance, the independent variable of 
PC_Information is capable of explaining 12.52% of the dependent variable’s (OR1_Quality) 
variance, if no linear relationship is assumed; a linear model reproducing the relation between 
them can only account for 0.15%. Evidently, the linear contribution to the total explanation is 
only approximately 1% and linearity cannot be assumed. However, the contribution of linear 
models is not always as low as for PC_Information; e.g. its explanatory power for the 
relationship betwenn PC_Objectives and the indicators of opportunity recognition are 
immensly higher. However, although linearity is not strong between the manifest variables 
used, covariances and correlations are used nevertheless and build the fundament for the 
following data analysis. 
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OR1_Quality OR1_Originality OR2_Quality OR2_Originality 
     Dependent 
 
Independent 2R  2η  2 2R η
 
2R  2η  2 2R η
 
2R  2η  2 2R η
 
2R  2η  2 2R η
 
PC_Information 0.0015 0.1252 0.01 0.0005 0.1018 0.00 0.0059 0.0590 0.10 0.0111 0.0924 0.12 
PC_Objectives 0.0479 0.0999 0.48 0.0170 0.0521 0.33 0.0408 0.0711 0.57 0.0773 0.0886 0.87 
PC_Actions 0.1130 0.0060 0.05 0.0150 0.1250 0.12 0.0330 0.0630 0.52 0.0620 0.0900 0.69 
PC_Restrictions 0.0160 0.1470 0.11 0.0030 0.0960 0.03 0.0170 0.0830 0.20 0.0340 0.0940 0.36 
IE_Objectives 0.0390 0.5080 0.08 0.0310 0.5230 0.06 0.0790 0.4890 0.16 0.0630 0.5150 0.12 
IE_Not_Essential 0.0003 0.4668 0.00 0.0061 0.4117 0.01 0.0271 0.5038 0.05 0.0181 0.4644 0.04 
IE_Relevant 0.0036 0.3999 0.01 0.0027 0.3735 0.01 0.0003 0.5205 0.00 0.0067 0.4724 0.01 
IE_Restrictions 0.0168 0.3526 0.05 0.0005 0.3200 0.00 0.0325 0.4292 0.08 0.0283 0.3924 0.07 
IE_Additional 0.0009 0.4390 0.00 0.0019 0.5055 0.00 0.0166 0.4954 0.03 0.0051 0.4171 0.01 
IE_Irrelevant 0.0042 0.4035 0.01 0.0284 0.4000 0.07 0.0072 0.4809 0.02 0.0029 0.4128 0.01 
IE_Principles 0.0126 0.4359 0.03 0.0013 0.4202 0.00 0.0034 0.4038 0.01 0.0095 0.4308 0.02 
CS_Principles 0.0149 0.0770 0.19 0.0078 0.0544 0.14 0.0032 0.0907 0.03 0.0027 0.0792 0.03 
CS_Actions 0.0005 0.0251 0.02 0.0000 0.0420 0.00 0.0037 0.0197 0.19 0.0016 0.0584 0.03 
CS_Objectives 0.0007 0.0323 0.02 0.0066 0.0420 0.16 0.0005 0.0278 0.02 0.0000 0.0539 0.00 
CS_Social_Peering 0.0002 0.1554 0.00 0.0031 0.1172 0.03 0.0019 0.0609 0.03 0.0041 0.0707 0.06 
CC_Quality 0.0224 0.2751 0.08 0.0160 0.2455 0.06 0.0298 0.2370 0.13 0.0053 0.1335 0.04 
CC_Originality 0.0229 0.2788 0.08 0.0240 0.2427 0.10 0.0126 0.2320 0.05 0.0005 0.1355 0.00 
Table 16 Test for Linearity for Manifest Variables.  
Another requirement is the identifiability of the model, which refers to the question whether 
an equation model can be unequivocally solved; it must be tested if information from the 
empirical data is sufficient to identify the equations included in the model. A multi-equation 
model (which all structural equation models are per definition) is solvable if the number of 
equations at least equals to the number of parameters that must be estimated; put differently, 
the equation system's degrees of freedom (d.f.) must be at least zero or even positive. This 
could be seen as a rule of thumb (Backhaus et al. 2004). A model including all cognitive 
styles discussed before has 89 d.f. and AMOS indicates the model is identified. Since in the 
present work manifest variables are not normally distributed, as shown above, the discrepancy 
is scale invariant, the sample size sufficient but not very large, and inference statistics 
available the unweighted and the scale free least-squares method seem to be most appropriate 
(see Arbuckle 1997; Backhaus et al. 2004). 
In order to find an acceptable causal conceptualisation of opportunity recognition, a first 
model could be developed that includes all reliable and valid constructs that have been 
introduced so far. Such an initial structural equation model including all preference types for 
problem construction, information encoding, as well as category selection and the constructs 
of category combination and reorganisation as well as opportunity recognition was developed 
and calculated; it is depicted in Figure 61.  
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Figure 61 Structural Model of the Initial Model of Opportunity Recognition.xxxiv 
However, the actual goal was to arrive at a model for which a causal analysis seems 
potentially sensible, in the sense that the causal relationships within are sufficiently unlikely 
to be produced by chance (Backhaus et al. 2004). Indeed, a look at empirical correlations 
between indicator variables already showed that only a few indicators for independent 
constructs are significantly correlated with those for opportunity recognition. Table 17 shows 
that only the highlighted indicators for the constructs of promotion and prevention style of 
regulatory focus, of action style in problem construction, as well as category combination 
seem to have an statistically mentionable impact on opportunity recognition.  
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 OR1_Quality OR1_Originality OR2_Quality OR2_Originality OR Overallxxxv  OR 1 Overall OR 2 Overall 
PC_Information -0.039 0.022 0.077 0.105 0.089 0.037 0.123 
PC_Objectives .219(*) 0.130 .202(*) .278(**) 0.066 0.013 0.111 
PC_Actions -0.076 -0.124 -0.182 -.248(**) -0.144 -0.062 -.196(*) 
PC_Restrictions -0.127 -0.054 -0.131 -.183(*) -0.029 0.006 -0.064 
IE_Objectives .198(*) 0.175 .281(**) .252(**) 0.151 0.079 .187(*) 
IE_Not_Essential -0.019 -0.078 -0.165 -0.134 -0.095 -0.043 -0.127 
IE_Relevant -0.060 -0.052 -0.018 -0.082 -0.063 -0.061 -0.041 
IE_Restrictions -0.130 -0.023 -0.180 -0.168 -0.064 -0.006 -0.114 
IE_Additional -0.030 -0.044 -0.129 -0.072 0.005 0.023 -0.020 
IE_Irrelevant -0.065 -0.169 -0.085 -0.053 -0.162 -0.145 -0.120 
IE_Principles -0.112 -0.036 -0.058 -0.098 -0.123 -0.089 -0.119 
CS_Principles -0.122 -0.088 0.056 -0.052 -0.095 -0.145 0.009 
CS_Actions -0.022 0.007 0.061 0.040 0.048 0.001 0.091 
CS_Objectives -0.026 -0.081 -0.022 0.005 -0.012 -0.020 0.003 
CS_Social_Peering 0.015 0.055 -0.043 -0.064 -0.024 0.051 -0.113 
CC_Quality 0.150 0.126 0.173 0.073 .210(*) 0.172 0.176 
CC_Originality 0.151 0.155 0.112 0.022 .198(*) .200(*) 0.116 
CC_Overall 0.158 0.148 0.149 0.049 .214(*) .196(*) 0.153 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Table 17 Empirical Correlations between Indicator Variables. 
Additionally, it has been controlled for the influence of the reference measures that were 
assessed and no significant role could be found: Firstly, it was checked whether more 
knowledge in the two domains, in which the opportunity recognition processes of the present 
study were situated in, had an influence on opportunity recognition: However, they showed 
no significant influence, measured by analysis of variances and correlations, on the dependent 
variables. Similarly, individuals who had already started a business and, therefore, could be 
considered as entrepreneurs did only show a slightly higher ability to recognise 
entrepreneurial opportunities; however this effect was not significant for the present data, so it 
could not be considered hereafter. This result supports the assertion repeatedly stated in the 
present work that venture creation per se is not a good proxy for investigating opportunity 
recognition. The same was true for the characteristic whether an individual's family member 
had already started a business. Even the motivation or intention to start a business showed no 
positive effect on the ability to recognise entrepreneurial opportunities as judged by the 
experts asked in the present study. 
In a next step, these four constructs were included in a structural equation model. It revealed 
that only the constructs of promotion style and category combination have an significant 
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influence on opportunity recognition. Conseuquently, the null hypotheses no. 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 
9, 10, and 11 were accepted that no empirical correlation exists between all other constructs 
and the ability to recognise entrepreneurial opportunities. In fact, this does not mean that there 
necessarily exists no causal relationship; methodological insufficiencies of the present study 
might have hindered such to be revealed.  
Disregarding such possible caveats, the modification process led to a smaller model, which is 
all the more interesting in the results it reveals. This final model with 16 d.f. only includes the 
constructs of promotion style of regulatory focus, category combination and reorganisation, 
and opportunity recognition in the two opportunity recognition-situations. This model showed 
a similar quality in terms of global criteria of AIC and ECVI, assuming lower values for the 
final model, which has been named as selection criteria. The model fit of the final model is 
shown in Table 18. 
Fit Criteria Good Model Fit Final Model 
 χ2 < 2.5 1.890 
AIC - 70.346 
ECVI - 0.617 
NFI > 0.9 0.939 
RFI > 0.9 0.887 
IFI > 0.9 0.970 
TLI > 0.9 0.943 
CFI > 0.9 0.970 
RMSEA < 0.8 0.08 (reasonable fit) 
Table 18 Model Fit of Final Model. 
 
3. Analysing and Testing Hypotheses 
The second main application of causal analysis, besides assessing constructs, is the 
confirmatory analysis of hypotheses that can be done after accepting the model’s global 
adjustment by evaluating the structural model. Here, this means that for each parameter in the 
final model the level of significance is given, also between latent variables, which allows 
hypothesis testing. It should be noted that causal analysis is superior to any regression 
analysis because it is possible to (1) determine global adjustment criteria, which provide 
information about to which extent the specified model structure as a whole is capable of 
explaining covariances between manifest variables, and (2) secondly, to analyse more 
complex causal structures (Backhaus et al. 2004).  
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The latter point is of particular interest since it must be differentiated between empirical 
correlations and causal effects: While regression analysis only provides correlation 
coefficients as proxies for causal relations, causal analysis allows dissecting such into 
different causal effects. Generally, it is possible to differentiate three, respectively four, types 
of effects between latent variables: direct and indirect effects as well as illusory correlation 
and non-correlation effects. The former two can certainly be illuminated by the following 
example taken from Homburg and Hildebrandt (1998): It is intended to obtain information 
about the total effect variable A has on variable D by dissecting it into direct and indirect 
effects. 
 
A
B
D
C
0.6 0.2
0.4
0.3 0.3
. 
Figure 62 Effects Between Latent Variables (Homburg and Hildebrandt 1998). 
In this example shown in Figure 62, the direct effect of A on D is practically amplified by the 
indirect effects via variables B and C (apparently such effects might also be attenuating). In 
addition to this, it is possible to identify illusory correlations between variables that empirical 
correlation coefficients cannot reveal. In contrast to direct and indirect effects, this illusory 
effect does not describe a causal relationship between involved variables. In turn, it might be 
that only including a third variable reveals the direct causal effect between the two variables 
of interest. A detailed abstract discussion is left out and instead pointed out, what is meant 
with the terms in relation to the causal analysis of the model of opportunity recognition under 
investigation. Figure 63 shows the resulting causal model of opportunity recognition in the 
present work only including significant relationships, which serves as the footing for a more 
detailed analysis.  
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Figure 63 Final Structural Model of Significant Relations.xxxvi 
AMOS calculated estimated a correlation coefficient between promotion focus and 
opportunity recognition in situation one of 1, 0.263GTI ORr =  and in situation two of 
2,
0.348GTI ORr = . Further, these two measures can be interpreted causally by considering the 
path coefficients ( )p  given in the model depicted in Figure 63, which are equal to the 
standardised partial regression coefficients that have been introduced in chapter V.B.2:  The 
causal model reveals that the direct causal effect measured by the path coefficients is higher 
than the empirical correlation measured with 1, 0.344GTI ORp =  and 2, 0.426GTI ORp = . Reason is 
that an indirect causal effect through the intervening construct of category combination and 
reorganisation attenuates the bivariate correlation between promotion focus and opportunity 
recognition.  
This impact can be quantified by multiplying the negative regression coefficient of promotion 
style on category combination and reorganisation with the positive one of category 
combination and reorganisation on opportunity recognition; in situation one this effect 
amounts to 1, ( 0.29) 0.28 0.081GTI CC CC ORp p⋅ = − ⋅ = −  and in situation two to 
2,
( 0.29) 0.27 0.078GTI CC CC ORp p⋅ = − ⋅ = − ; these considerations for the causal relationship 
between a promotion style and the ability to recognise entrepreneurial opportunities are 
summarised in Table 19. These direct effects permit to state for the promotion style of 
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regulatory focus that regression weights or path coefficients in the prediction of opportunity 
recognition in situation one ( )1,GTI ORr and two ( )2,GTI ORr  are significantly different from zero at 
the 0.001 level of significance, practically ruling out that the correlations measured are only 
caused by chance, if the theoretical model is accepted. Therefore, null hypothesis is rejected 
for hypotheses no. 3 and concluded that the empirical data indeed supports the conjecture that 
a promotion style of regulatory focus enhances the ability to recognise entrepreneurial 
opportunities.  
General ,, ,G G G CC ORTI OR TI OR TI CCr p p p= + ⋅  
 Empirical Correlation = Direct Causal Effect + Indirect Causal Effect  
OR-Situation 1 ( )1, 0.263 0.344 0.29 0.28GTI ORr = = + − ⋅  
OR-Situation 2 ( )2, 0.348 0.426 0.29 0.27GTI ORr = = + − ⋅  
Table 19 Relation between Promotion Style and Opportunity Recognition. 
Concerning the relationship between regulatory focus and category combination and 
reorganisation, it has been said that relevant literature and empirical results on the relationship 
between an individual’s regulatory focus and creativity suggest that a promotion focus 
significantly produces more novel outcomes than a prevention focus (e.g. Friedman and 
Förster 2001). However, the present data do not support this argumentation; and even though 
it is not at the core of the present work, some considerations should be provided to the reader, 
showing that the negative relationship between a promotion focus and category combination 
and reorganisation in the present model does not necessarily question its validity. First of all, 
it must be said that studies supporting the enhancing effect of a promotion focus on creativity 
experimentally manipulate the situational regulatory focus. Their results indicate that an 
induced situational promotion focus is positively correlated with creativity. In turn, the 
present study intended to assess an individual’s rather chronic preference style for aspirations 
or responsibilities, independent of a currently activated focus experimentally manipulated. 
Therefore, it might be argued that the contradictory findings can be explained by 
differentiating between chronic and situational regulatory focus. In addition, it might be 
argued that category combination and reorganisation is just one out of many creative abilities 
that make up the rather aggregative construct of creativity (see chapter III.C.2). 
Even though the model depicted above suggests that the effects of category combination and 
reorganisation on opportunity recognition are unequally more intuitive and palpable since 
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indirect the former construct only influences the latter directly: However, in fact the direct 
causal effects of category combination and reorganisation on opportunity recognition are not 
as high as a first look on the path diagram suggests because they embrace a illusory 
correlative effect that is caused by the effect promotion style has an opportunity recognition 
as well. These considerations and the respective numbers are summarised in Table 20.  
General , ,CC OR CC ORr p=  
 Empirical Correlation = Direct Causal Effect + Illusory Correlative Effect 
OR-Situation 1 1, 0.182 0.281 ( 0.29) 0.34CC ORr = = + − ⋅  
OR-Situation 2 2, 0.145 0.270 ( 0.29) 0.43CC ORr = = + − ⋅  
Table 20 Relation between Category Combination and Opportunity Recognition. 
However, the null hypothesis for no. 12 (see Figure 64) is also rejected and on the basis of the 
present study it can be stated that the ability to combine knowledge categories indeed 
positively influences the ability to recognise entrepreneurial opportunities.  
In summary, there are only two constructs for which the null hypothesis can be rejected and 
there indeed a relation with the ability to recognise entrepreneurial opportunities can be 
assumed: the promotion style of regulatory focus and category combination and 
reorganisation. Both show regression weights in the prediction of opportunity recognition in 
situation one and two which are significantly different from zero at least at the 0.05 level of 
significance. It can be inferred on basis of the present data that a promotion focus in problem 
finding and information encoding as well as a high ability to combine and reorganise 
knowledge categories contribute to the ability to recognise entrepreneurial opportunities. 
Summarising the results of the causal analysis, Figure 64 highlights those preferences or 
styles for which a causal relationship can be assumed based on the present study. 
Explaining Construct Explained Construct Postulated Effect 
GH1: Promotion Style of Regulatory Focus + 
GH2: Prevention Style in Regulatory Focus - 
GH3: Action Style in Constructing Problems + 
GH4: Information Style in Constructing Problems + 
GH5: Inconsistent Information Search Style + 
GH6: Irrelevant Information Search Style + 
GH7 Principle Search Style + 
GH8: Principle Style in Category Search + 
GH9: Goal style in Category Search + 
GH10: Peering style in Category Search - 
GH11: Action style in Category Search - 
GH12: Ability to category combination and 
Ability to opportunity 
recognition 
+ 
Figure 64 Causal Relationships Tested For in the Present Study. 
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Indeed, the studies that found the positive relationship between promotion focus and 
creativity used other abilities or tasks as approximations for creativity, such as visual insight 
tasks (e.g. Friedman and Förster 2001). 
                                                 
xxx The model developed later on also includes category combination as depdendent variable; however, the 
investigation of these relations is not the present study’s primary obejctive since category combination is 
only relevant as intervening variable having an effect on opportunity recognition as dependent variable.  
xxxi Although these results indicate that the measures are not as reliable as others used in the present work, they 
are used for assessing opportunity recognition hereafter.  
xxxii The Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) is sometimes also referred to as Non-Normed-Fit-Index (NNFI) (see e.g. 
Bentler and Bonett 1980). 
xxxiii Theoretically, Cronbach’s alpha, as a reliability coefficient describing a proportion of variance, can only 
assume a value between 0 and 1. However in paractical terms, looking at its mathematical definition it will 
be negative whenever the average covariance among the items is negative, as in the present case of 
unstandardised items. 
xxxiv Please note that the present work does not deal with hypotheses regarding the ability of category 
combination and reorganisation, it is only seen as intervening variable effecting the interesting ability of 
opportunity recognition.  
xxxv Please note that these overall measures for opportunity recognition do not equal to the constructs used later 
on; they are only mean scores and, therefore, rather represent simple total scores for opportunity recognition. 
xxxvi Please note that two independent models could have been given here since the path coefficients of 
promotion style as well as category combination and reorganisation on opportunity recognition exhibit 
different values and, therefore, strengths. 
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“Weather forecasting, also, would be easier in the absence of an athmosphere.“ 
(Shackle 1972, p. 231) 
 
VI. Conclusion 
To begin with, it must be admitted that besides the methodological caveats already discussed, 
the theoretical discussion and the results of the empirical study have shown that creative 
achievement in economic situations, i.e. performance over time across multiple economic 
situations, will require many skills in applying a variety of heuristics, which are highly 
interactively applied. This definitely limits the possibilities to generalise any implication 
drawn from observed behaviour, although the present study intended to account for such an 
embeddedness-view. These leads to various limitations, such as that the sample was only 
drawn from one region in Germany. Thus, results are somewhat limited in applicability to 
other cultures.  
Even bearing these caveats and the many not even mentioned here in mind, it is argued that 
the present study has some noteworthy implications for scholars in the field and 
entrepreneurship education respectively. Hence, the first part of this concluding chapter will 
interpret the results observed theoretically for the relations between opportunity recognition 
and regulatory focus as well as category combination and reorganisation respectively, causal 
relationships for which the present study insinuates the initial suspicion they might be 
important. Then, for each of these two concepts some major implications for entrepreneurship 
education and policy-making, aiming at influencing the ability of opportunity recognition are 
outlined. The second part is dedicated to future research that might tie up to the present study. 
Finally, the whole work is briefly summarised in the last part C. 
 
A. Interpretation and Implications 
The results of the present study suggest, similar to other studies (e.g. Bryant 2007; McMullen 
and Shepherd 2002), that a situation’s framing expressed via a regulatory focus significantly 
influences entrepreneurial behaviour. Further, the theoretical suggestions that a promotion 
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focus should be advantageous in recognising entrepreneurial opportunities can be supported 
by the present findings. However, it is theoretically hypothesised by scholars that individuals 
with such a promotion focus generate more and more unique alternatives in a given situation 
compared to those in a prevention mode (Brockner et al. 2004). The main argument for a 
superior ability to recognise entrepreneurial opportunities is thus seen in a higher degree of 
creativity. The present study, given category combination and reorganisation is accepted as an 
operationalisation of creativity, does not support these findings since promotion style shows a 
significant negative correlation with this ability. Therefore, it is argued that the aspect of 
creativity is not the main reason why people with a promotion focus are better in opportunity 
recognition. This appears to be an interesting finding, considering that category combination 
and reorganisation as a creative ability is nevertheless positively correlated with opportunity 
recognition, opening the room for discussions which aspect of a promotion style offers some 
explanatory power for the present observations?  
Generally, the present study suggests in this concern that individuals intending to attain 
desired ends are more successful in developing entrepreneurial opportunities than those who 
aim at moving away from undesired ends, i.e. it can be argued that framing economic 
situations so that opportunities are tried to be realised, seemingly more open to risk and 
avoiding to miss such situations, increases the probability of recognising an entrepreneurial 
opportunity or, more precisely, the quality and originality of novel problem-solutions. Studies 
were able to show that people with different regulatory styles approach thinking tasks with 
significantly different strategies. For instance, experiments by Roese, Hur, and Pennington 
(1999) revealed different strategies of individuals in either a promotion or prevention style in 
counterfactual thinking, which has been suggested as one critical information process in 
opportunity recognition (Gaglio and Katz 2001). Very briefly, it was found that individuals in 
a promotion style apply counterfactual thinking in the absence of a positive outcome, for 
which they then produced more additive counterfactuals than individuals in a prevention 
style. In addition, causal inference from counterfactuals and the affective activation of the 
latter is moderated by regulatory focus (Roese et al. 1999). Such findings, similar to the 
findings in the present study, suggest that cognitive strategies or heuristics applied by 
individuals in a promotion focus are more successful in recognising entrepreneurial 
opportunities, at a first glance, totally irrespective of transformational processes, such as 
category combination and reorganisation.  
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Considering the general conclusion that a promotion style is advantageous not only for 
entrepreneurial behaviour in general, but also for opportunity recognition in particular, 
together with the insight that an individual’s regulatory focus can be primed and enhance 
through appropriate interventions, measures could be incorporated into the training and 
education of entrepreneurs for enhancing the ability to recognise entrepreneurial opportunities 
(Bryant 2007). Such efforts could be linked to those that are already implemented in 
entrepreneurship education in order to induce a sense of self-efficacy, which has been 
introduced as a self-regulatory concept as well (Béchard and Grégoire 2005). All such efforts 
base on the postulate that the discovery of entrepreneurial opportunities can be taught (Fiet et 
al. 2004b), and particularly that the research shift from personality to cognition allows 
developing education and training that have a significant impact on entrepreneurial behaviour 
(Bryant 2006; Young 1997). In this regard, a literature review by Béchard and Grégoire 
(2005) has revealed that theoretical efforts to enhance entrepreneurship education by psycho-
cognitive education theories mainly focus on learning processes, prior knowledge, 
spontaneous representations, or cognitive conflicts, which are all dimensions that play a role 
in individual learning embedded in the formal educational context.  
Given the premise that a promotion focus or style can positively influence the likelihood of 
opportunity recognition, a sensible way for entrepreneurship education might be to influence 
the latter by promoting the former via such inducing individual learning processes. In the 
present context of self-regulation, it seems that educational measures should aim at 
strengthening the relationship between an individual’s regulatory focus and metacognition. 
Such knowledge about cognition, which refers to declarative and procedural knowledge, 
should be able to nurture and strengthen the relationship between the regulatory concepts, 
between the sense of prior success in achieving positive goals, the sense of efficacy for 
entrepreneurial tasks, and self-awareness of their cognitive skills (Bryant 2006).  
Basically, two different ways could be gone to promote entrepreneurial behaviour via this 
psychological concept: The first, (1) regulatory pride, is related to regulatory focus as a 
chronic schema and refers to an individual’s personal, subjective history of success in the 
relevant domain. In turn, the second approach, focusing on (2) factors influencing regulatory 
focus strengths in a situation, targets on the situational logic behind this concept and the 
extent to which a particular focus is salient, meaningful, or important.  
Theoretically, it seems to be more fruitful to shape individuals' chronic regulatory focus 
towards a promotion focus in order to enhance the ability to recognise entrepreneurial 
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opportunities in a given population. However, such a way requires a long-term effort to 
promote this particular preference style since it is, as already argued, already highly shaped by 
parents in early childhood. It could be hypothesised that this is one of the reasons why an 
entrepreneurial family is often found to be a good indicator for an individual's propensity to 
start a business; entrepreneurial parents do have a promotion-focus regulative style and 
transfer it to their children, which themselves are more entrepreneurial, for instance more 
likely to identify an opportunity than other economic agents.  
Notwithstanding it seems clearly sensible to encourage a promotion-oriented regulative style 
in a population from the present perspective, although it must be admitted that it seems quite 
difficult and costly for entrepreneurship education to shape chronic schema. This 
consideration provides another argument for those scholars claiming for efforts of 
entrepreneurship education directed at younger children, already starting in childhood. 
Assuming an evolutionary perspective, a regulatory focus might here be seen as a selection 
mechanism for the decision to become an entrepreneur, induced by an opportunity and not a 
necessity. Accordingly, it might be argued that educational efforts directed to individuals 
exhibiting a chronic promotion focus might be more promising, reason why such individuals 
should be promoted more intensively than those in prevention focus (Bryant 2006).  
However, in case the distribution of regulatory focus in a population is assumed to be 
exogenously given and, therefore, shaping chronic regulatory focus is not considered as 
feasible, other measures must be conceived that follow another logic: Then, it is not an 
individual's regulatory style that is supposed to be influenced but instead the situational 
framing is changed. This idea is based on studies (Brendl et al. 1995; Crowe and Higgins 
1997; Friedman and Förster 2001) showing that the deliberate framing of situational context 
is capable of activating either a prevention or promotion focus, independent of an individual's 
chronic regulatory focus (Corbett and Hmieleski 2007). If that is possible, educational 
measures for enhancing the ability of recognising entrepreneurial opportunities can be 
conceived that target the framing of particular situations in a promotion style, e.g. in 
appropriate cases studies or start-up simulations. For instance, a teacher can frame a situation 
in a gain-nongain concern with the presence and absence of positive outcomes (promotion 
concerns) or in form of a nonloss-loss concern with the presence and absence of negative 
outcomes (prevention concerns) (Higgins 2000). This fits to claims that rhetoric in 
entrepreneurship education should focus on ideals that are put into exciting visions that are 
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desirable (Brockner et al. 2004), more specifically teachers should talk about attaining hits 
and the means necessary to achieve such. 
Further elaborating this argument, psychologist state that the pursuit of goals with a higher 
regulatory fit provides an individual with a higher personal value than that without; this 
insight, together with the seemingly superior ability of promotion-focussed individuals to 
recognise entrepreneurial opportunities, might provide interesting insights for 
entrepreneurship research that aims at enforcing opportunity recognition.  
Research on regulatory fit has shown that a high fit, i.e. that means an individual pursuits to 
meet goals, which fit its regulatory orientation, thereby increasing the subjectively perceived 
value of what it is doing. In this case, a decision is often perceived as good independent of the 
value of worth, i.e. the more objective value of this decision’s outcome. Thus, individuals 
taking decisions with a high regulatory fit are inclined towards goals and means fitting their 
regulatory orientation, are more strongly motivated, imagine feeling better if they made a 
desirable decision and feeling worse in the opposite case, feeling more alert when they make a 
choice, and evaluate it more positively afterwards; similarly, they prospectively and 
retrospectively enjoy goal pursuit more and assign higher monetary value to an object they 
have chosen when the choice was made with higher regulatory fit (Higgins 2000).  
Apparently, the concept of regulator fit is based on the conviction that a decision’s evaluation 
can be theoretically dissected into worth, e.g. monetary value, and regulatory fit. However, 
practically this differentiation, for instance by identifying the relative contribution of these 
two parts, is hard to make in particular by individuals themselves. In fact, the contribution of 
regulatory fit seems to be more subtle than that of worth, and it might often be the case that 
the value from fit contribution is subjectively transferred to the value from worth contribution. 
This fact, which is based on the constructivist view of the present work, opens the road for 
certain measures influencing an individual’s decision making, by manipulating regulatory fit, 
because a change in the latter is independent of the outcomes of a decision; i.e. a change in 
regulatory fit can change the perceived worth of the same choice or decisions with the same 
outcomes (Higgins et al. 2003). What does this possibility to frame situations imply for 
measures aimed at enhancing entrepreneurship and opportunity recognition?  
If it is true that promotion-focused individuals are more entrepreneurial and a have higher 
ability to recognise entrepreneurial opportunities, this could be used in entrepreneurship 
education to influence their propensity to start a business or consider this option of action; the 
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framing of such an option or situation could be changed to provide a higher regulatory fit for 
a promotion style so that such individuals attribute a higher total value to this option, whereas 
the rather objective value of worth is not changed at all. In some more detail, goals should be 
framed as positive outcomes, as promotion concerns such as independency, that appeal to 
promotion-focussed individuals; consequently, ensuring a high regulative fit, necessary 
actions for starting entrepreneurial activity should be communicated as eagerness means. In 
summary, entrepreneurial situations could be framed as positive task achievement scenarios, 
for which individuals are prompted to associate such learning experiences with their 
accumulated subjective history of positive task achievement, e.g. successful performance in 
school or sports (Bryant 2006; Lumpkin et al. 2001).  
Attached to such individual learning processes, it might turn out sensible to explore how 
metacognitive thinking can be deliberately practised in an entrepreneurial context leading to 
the creation of entrepreneurial expertise by facilitating self-reflection, understanding, and 
finally the control of an individual’s entrepreneurial cognitions (Bryant 2006; Mitchell et al. 
2007)? Thinkable aspects of such efforts in entrepreneurship education might consist in 
teaching the ability of metamemory, which is knowing about using memory systems, 
metacomprehension, the ability of monitoring the sense-making of incoming information and 
employing certain strategies to such processes, as well as self-regulation, which refers in this 
particular context to the ability of adjusting individual learning processes depending of 
feedback experienced (Mitchell et al. 2007).  
Another, probably rather complementary, educational strategy might consist in finding 
educational measures that relate positive task achievement with cognitive self-awareness of 
intuitively applied strategies and heuristics. Such increased awareness on a meta-level should 
encourage the conviction that such cognitive strategies are normal and necessary in 
entrepreneurial behaviour (Bryant 2006); further, given that an individual’s regulatory focus 
can really be identified, it might also have an impact on interaction between players in the 
entrepreneurial process. For instance, such information could be used by entrepreneurs, 
investors, or consultants to evaluate individuals in terms of their personal eligibility. This 
might be an important aspect, considering the general importance that is attributed to the 
entrepreneur or the team in investment processes (see e.g. Muzyka et al. 1996). Even more 
generally, information about other individual’s regulatory focus could increase mutual 
understanding and reduce information asymmetries, e.g. between entrepreneurs and venture 
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capitalists that might be oriented towards avoiding misses, i.e. investing in unsuccessful start-
ups.  
Category combination and reorganisation, by virtue of its role in the creation of new 
knowledge, has traditionally been seen as a foundation of creative thought. In the present 
study, it has been shown that conceptual combination also contributes to the recognition of 
entrepreneurial opportunities. Admittedly, this is not a new nor surprising result, given that 
transformational process, such as analogical reasoning or bisociation, have been often been 
named as crucial to opportunity recognition. However, the central value of the findings here is 
that it is dealt with an underlying process or ability of many transformational processes that 
are hypothesised to enhance the ability of opportunity recognition. Many implications for 
teaching and educating entrepreneurship can be inferred from the starting point that it seems 
sensible to search for appropriate measures to enhance the ability of category combination and 
reorganisation in order to promote the ability of opportunity recognition. This corresponds to 
the general postulation already made in entrepreneurship research that teaching creativity 
skills can enhance opportunity recognition (Lumpkin et al. 2001); however, as said, being 
aware of a more basic cognitive process facilitating opportunity recognition might lead to an 
expansion of entrepreneurship education measures by efforts that are directed towards a 
greater audience since such basic ability to combine categories should be productive in more 
situations than more specific transformational thinking processes.  
A feasible strategy might consist in taking a look at general literature on developing this 
ability and adapting it to the field of entrepreneurship and opportunity recognition. Such a 
general instrument might be case-based teaching of combination and reorganisation 
procedures: Studies were able to show that measures to enhance the ability of category 
combination and reorganisation - in the sense of producing novel, high-quality problem 
solutions - highly depends on a situation’s framing. For instance, information on a problem 
might be made available in form of general principles or underlying mechanisms (analogical 
approach) or alternatively as a case (case-based approach); in reaction to these two different 
ways of providing relevant information, different heuristics are applied (Scott et al. 2005). 
Since entrepreneurial cognition is embedded in specific situations it seems sensible to choose 
a case-based approached rather than one organised in terms of abstract principles to teach the 
ability of category combination and reorganisation, and, hence, the ability of opportunity 
recognition in the context of entrepreneurship. If potential entrepreneurs are trained with such 
instruments, they may be able to activate such stored cases, on basis of similar goals 
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recognised, and specify necessary actions along with attributes that might have an impact on 
the success of options of actions available in that situation.  
This argument is supported by findings stating that for creating innovative problem solutions 
supposed to work in complex socio-technical systems a case-based approach seems more 
promising than an analogical approach as alleged by other scholars in the field of 
entrepreneurship (Mumford 2002; Scott et al. 2005). Such case-based approaches differ from 
analogical ones mainly in that they are more bound to specific characteristics of situations and 
less to underlying principles or mechanisms. Particularly, goal attainment, as well as key 
contingencies, necessary resources, and constraints from previous situations or cases are 
evaluated regarding their relevance for the situation at hand and rearranged or restructured to 
create a new solution (Hammond 1990; Scott et al. 2005).  
The execution of such a process can be facilitated by educational efforts aiming at teaching 
appropriate cognitive strategies and heuristics by studying cases. In a first phase, individuals 
are first provided with several cases that are somehow similar to the problem to be solved 
within. Then, they are confronted with the actual case they are supposed to deal with, 
providing them with independent information, e.g. concerning inherent goals, content, and 
outcomes. Subsequently, several heuristics can be applied in order to merge the best of 
previous cases and embed these into the current one’s new context (Scott et al. 2005). These 
steps of different heuristics are outlined in Figure 65; it starts with the identification of those 
aspects in the case that seem relevant to potential solutions. However, after defining aspired 
goals and outcomes, a list of strengths and weaknesses of these aspects is developed. On this 
fundament, an initial action plan for solving the problem in the case is conceived and likely 
positive and negative outcomes predicted. These provide further information for revising the 
initial model to a final solution. As often stated for cognitive process models, the stages are 
highly intertwined and many feedback loops could be integrated in a more sophisticated 
model. 
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Step Heuristics 
1. Identify the critical case characteristics, i.e. operative goals, relevant causes, contingencies, resources, 
and restrictions. 
2. List the strengths and weaknesses of the cases presented with respect to the attainment of different 
goals and outcomes. 
3. Create an initial solution model, using goals, relevant causes, contingencies, resources, and restrictions 
of previous cases. 
4. Predict both the positive and negative action outcomes of your model if it were implemented. 
5. Adjust your initial solution model and formulate a revised solution based on the forecasted outcomes. 
Figure 65 Heuristics for Case-Based Category Combination and Reorganisation (based on Scott et al. 
2005). 
However, there exist further training interventions in order to enhance the ability of 
opportunity recognition based on this cognitive process. For instance, planning skills were 
found to facilitate creative information processing and, thus, the ability to produce novel 
outcomes (Osburn and Mumford 2006); put differently, planning can be seen as the mental 
simulation of future actions. Again, the skill to plan in a domain is rather experiential or case-
based than based on principles (Hammond 1990). Accepting the role of planning for creative 
thinking, two skills, penetration and forecasting, are of importance for planning performance, 
and, therefore, qualify as starting point for educational measures.  
While penetration refers to the identification of key causes, restrictions, resources, and 
contingencies in a given situation, forecasting refers to the process of anticipating the 
implications of the implementation und different conditions (Osburn and Mumford 2006). 
Ostensibly, a high ability in penetration should help individuals to find key cues or facts in a 
situation, on which problem-solutions should be built, thereby enhancing the ability to 
execute the case-based approach outlined above. These cognitive capacities can be developed 
by training interventions that intend to provide individuals with an understanding of the 
strategies underlying skilled performance, and, additionally, of how to apply them (Mumford 
et al. 2003). Accordingly, penetration and forecasting skills could be trained by 
familiarisation of individuals with strategies that contribute to these processes. This could be 
followed by practising the steps needed for effective execution of each of these strategies, as 
summarised in Figure 66 (Osburn and Mumford 2006).  
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Penetration Forecasting 
1. Identification of the causes operation in a 
situation: Determine the factors that impact or 
influence other elements of the situation 
1. Projection of positive outcomes: Assess how plan 
implementation will change a situation and the 
number and nature of the positive consequences. 
2. Identification of critical causes: Determine the 
causes that have a significant impact or influence 
or other elements of the situation.  
2. Projection of negative outcomes: Assess how plan 
implementation will change a situation and the 
number and nature of the negative consequences. 
3. Identification of causes having multiple 
outcomes: Determine causes that influence more 
than one of the outcomes you hope to attain. 
3. Projection of short-term outcomes: Assess the 
outcomes that will result immediately after 
implementation of a plan.  
4. Identification of causes subject to change or 
manipulation: Determine the causes that you are 
able to act on and alter. 
4. Projection of long-term outcomes: Assess the 
outcomes of plan implementation likely to emerge 
over an extended period of time if planned actions 
are sustained. 
5. Identification of indirect outcomes of change in a 
cause: Determine the unique outcomes that will 
occur if multiple causes are alternated at the 
same time.  
5. Projection of likely contingencies and restrictions: 
asses the conditions required for or likely to shape 
the successful implementation of a plan. 
6. Identification of interdependencies among 
causes: Determine causes that must occur 
together if the desired effects are to be attained.  
6. Anticipation of likely errors in plan execution: 
Assess the conditions under which the plan will 
encounter obstacles or things might go wrong. 
7. Evaluation of the relative importance of causes: 
Evaluate the importance of outcomes influenced 
by altering a cause. 
7. Anticipation of the conditions calling forecasting 
of backup plan: Assess conditions that might arise 
and will require an alternative approach to plan 
implementation.  
Figure 66 Strategies for Enhancing Cognitive Planning Skills ( Osburn and Mumford 2006, p. 181). 
 
B. Future Research 
The results obtained showed significant influences of cognition on entrepreneurial behaviour 
and, therefore, stands in line with other studies and scholars (e.g. Mitchell et al. 2004, 2007) 
suggesting the high value cognition research promises for entrepreneurship research in 
general, and the assessment of opportunity recognition in particular; simply because 
entrepreneurs are somehow different from a cognitive perspective. 
Assuming a general perspective, it was shown that a constructivist approach to the 
phenomena of truly creative economic agents seems justified, given the fact that economic 
actors indeed create different situations they feel situated in, a framing process which has 
significant effects on the actions and decisions they take. Such an ontological argument 
supports the claims for research on entrepreneurial thinking, in order to overcome 
shortcomings of other research streams such as personality- or trait-approaches. The present 
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study was an attempt to comply with such demands and do research on cognitive preferences 
or heuristics under complex conditions with a quite sophisticated method, as demanded by 
scholars in the discipline (e.g. Bryant 2007).  
However, while the present work has chosen a model of creative thinking as reference 
framework for conceiving opportunity recognition, future research must be more specific 
about the underlying notion of creativity that too often remains vague and fuzzy; in fact, it has 
many dimensions and in view of recent results the trivial assertion that creativity per se is a 
prerequisite for entrepreneurial individuals does not seem acceptable anymore. A solution to 
this could be in assuming a continuum view on creativity regarding it as expressed in the 
thinking process’ output, as the present work has done.  
The present study’s findings strongly suggest continuing the path of assessing information 
processing, heuristics, cognitive preferences, strategies or styles that are typical 
entrepreneurial in specific situations. Similarly, it could be shown hat elaborated and highly 
developed methods are available from the cognitive psychologist’s toolbox that can be 
applied in the particular context of economics. However, this general insight that cognitive 
styles do have explanatory power for entrepreneurial behaviour automatically implies that 
there are many other heuristics, preferences or styles that could contribute to uncover more 
about cognitive aspects of entrepreneurs. The author is convinced that a look into literature on 
such topics in cognitive psychology, usually dealing with cognition in other contexts, 
promises further concepts that explain individual ways of processing and can be applied to 
entrepreneurial settings, thereby helping to identify more distinctive cognitive characteristics 
that describe entrepreneurial thinking and proving that these people are indeed somehow 
different. 
Being more precise, a first implication for future research concerns the construct validity of 
opportunity recognition as ability: The high reliability and inner coherency of a general 
construct (including situations one and two) could be seen as a starting point to argue that 
certain individuals dispose of a general ability of opportunity recognition, independent of the 
current situation they are confronted with. According to this argumentation, the index k 
accounting for economic situations could be removed from a general model of opportunity 
recognition as developed in the present work. In other words, the general statement that there 
exist more alert individuals than others is indeed supported here. However, at the same time 
the results indicate that this general aptitude assumes different forms and strengths in different 
situations.  
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This implies that subsequent studies must explicitly aim at finding out whether the ability to 
recognise entrepreneurial opportunities really significantly differs across economic situations, 
and, if so, what relevant dimensions, on which a reasonable classification could be built on, 
are. Notwithstanding these efforts still have to come, more fine-grained studies that aim at 
providing valid implications for further research and entrepreneurship practice should already 
now clearly point out, which type of entrepreneurial opportunities or economic situations they 
are dealing with, thereby embracing the nexus between individual and opportunity. 
The present study empirically confirms the arguments alleged by other scholars that 
regulatory focus indeed plays a role in the entrepreneurial process. For future research, three 
main directions could be proposed: (1) efforts to investigate the dimensions of regulatory 
focus, (2) efforts to assess its chronic or situative form, and (3) efforts aimed at shedding light 
on the whole concepts role in different phases of the entrepreneurial process.  
Regarding its (1) dimensions entrepreneurship scholars might direct their attention to the role 
of multiple self-regulatory factors in entrepreneurial decision making and behaviour; i.e. the 
more demanding research question arises which self-regulatory skills influence an 
individual’s ability to recognise, evaluate, and exploit entrepreneurial opportunities (Bryant 
2007)? The present study, as well as others mentioned here, only suggest that an individual’s 
regulatory focus plays a significant role; however, it has been shown that the concept is far 
more fine-grained, distinguishing between underlying motives, goals and standards, salient 
outcomes, and means used. This calls for independent investigations of these aspects and their 
impact on entrepreneurial behaviour, promising far more interesting results and implications, 
e.g. for entrepreneurship education, than the general investigations available so far.  
The considerations as to implications of the findings on promotion focus largely targeted on 
the (2) difference between its chronic form and such an approach to a particular situation, 
thereby already hinting at the significance further insights in this regard might have. If more is 
known about the influence these different levels have in taking entrepreneurial decisions, 
educational measures can be adjusted to these requirements in order to positively influence 
entrepreneurial abilities. 
Further to this, upcoming research efforts could focus on the question whether the role of 
regulatory focus (3) varies along the entrepreneurial process and different measures are 
necessary to deal with this; in the present study, its role in opportunity recognition was 
investigated and educational measures outlined that facilitate entrepreneurial behaviour at this 
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stage, while other studies focussed on later stages. Subsequent research in the field should 
elaborate on these initial insights, in finding more details about self-regulatory processes at 
the entrepreneurial process’ different stages. For instance, it has been shown here that even 
the process of opportunity recognition consists of sub-processes that require different thinking 
modes, such as divergent and convergent thinking. Hence, there seems a long, but 
nevertheless promising, way to go in assessing the role of regulatory focus in different 
information processes. 
The crucial role of category combination and reorganisation in conceiving entrepreneurial 
opportunities has been underlined by theoretical considerations, previous studies, as well as 
the present research. The central issues that ought to be addressed in upcoming research 
efforts seem to be (1) which sub-processes are more decisive in producing high-quality, novel 
problem solutions in which situations, and which (2) preferences and styles in combining 
categories can be identified in such regard.  
Regarding (1) strategies and heuristics, future research should dig deeper into the process 
entering a more detailed level, e.g. the four sub-processes of (a) identifying central properties 
or key features of category members, (b) mapping the identified features or properties for one 
category onto the features of other categories, (c) using shared features to construct a new 
category, and (d) identifying additional feature or properties of category members through 
elaboration. In fact, studies in related fields suggest that different strategies or approaches to 
category combination and reorganisation produce significantly different results measured by 
quality and originality of the problem solution in a given problem situation (e.g. Scott et al. 
2005). Hence, it could be investigated which heuristics and knowledge structures are more 
innovative in which economic situation? Such research approaches would follow the 
postulation made by many scholars that distinguishing types of economic situations opening 
the road for entrepreneurial opportunities is necessary; i.e. it must be accounted for the nexus 
of opportunity and individual.  
The present study has not investigated (2) individual styles in category combination and 
reorganisation due to methodological limitations in assessing such; however, scholars might 
soon be able to identify individual preferences in the sub-processes mentioned. As soon as 
this is possible, entrepreneurship scholars should test for relationships between cognitive 
styles in category combination and reorganisation; they should explicitly consider this 
dimension since it has been shown that the execution of combinational information-processes, 
such as case-based or analogical approaches, offer a variety of opportunities to teach and 
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influence such cognitive processing, and, thereby, probably also entrepreneurial abilities such 
as opportunity recognition. 
 
C. Summary 
The present worked was dedicated to introduce a general cognitive model of opportunity 
recognition and take advantage of this fundament for investigating individual differences in 
information processing. If this ‘problem’ has really been solved in a creative manner 
producing a desirable novel outcome will be judged by the future and the scientific 
community that might, or might not, deal with the approach chosen. 
It has been drawn on psychological theories and methods in order to open the black box of the 
human mind in economic situations. Principally it is a model in a subjectivist tradition that 
does, nevertheless, not intend to ex ante predict the emergence of future opportunities on 
certain chunks of information. The justified doubts concerning predictions of novel problem 
solutions do not apply to the present work since it is based on types of information that build 
up any human knowledge structure and, thus, provide a sufficiently general unit to assess the 
mental production of true novelty. Put differently, it can be answered how creative outcomes, 
i.e. entrepreneurial opportunities, are conceived but not how they look like in a particular 
instance. 
Besides providing empirical insights on certain cognitive styles and abilities the work might 
also contribute to the discipline’s progress by providing a comprehensive cognitive 
framework for modelling entrepreneurial behaviour in general and opportunity recognition in 
particular. Previous research was either based on outdated models of thinking or only focused 
on single processes or styles. It was intended to point out that this framework meets most 
requirements set by other scholars in the field, such as considering the nexus between 
individual and opportunity by situating the human mind in specific economic situations. 
The empirical study was able to reveal that in the thinking process’ early stages of problem 
finding or convergent thinking a promotion style of regulatory focus positively influences the 
ability of opportunity recognition; this also holds true for the ability of combining and 
reorganising knowledge categories. Nevertheless, causal analysis has taught us that a 
promotion focus has a direct significant effect on opportunity recognition, apparently not only 
indirect via some form of creativity. However, these findings actually have an interesting 
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theoretical bottom line: In last consequence the denial of personality- or trait-based 
approaches in explaining entrepreneurial behaviour, and fruitful research on cognitive 
processes, imply that there does not really exists a nexus between opportunity and individual, 
but rather - from a cognitive constructivist perspective - between an economic situation an 
particular cognitive processes; the starting point of such research is the cognitive process and 
related issues such as cognitive styles and, in a way, entrepreneurs are simply those 
individuals executing such thinking. 
By no means, dealing with the two concepts of regulatory focus and category combination 
and reorganisation almost exclusively shall suggest that other cognitive constructs are of less 
importance for opportunity recognition or entrepreneurial behaviour. In fact, cognitive styles 
can assume a variety of forms and can serve as distinctive factor for individual thinking in 
many dimensions: for instance, regarding field dependence or field independence, type of 
scanning, breadth of categorisation, way of conceptualising, cognitive complexity or 
simplicity, degree of reflectiveness or impulsivity, degree of levelling or sharpening, 
flexibility of control, as well as tolerance for incongruous or unrealistic experiences (Hoover 
and Feldhusen 1994). This means that preference types or styles, which were found to be 
insignificant in the present study, might actually be important in explaining entrepreneurial 
behaviour as well, but were simply not detected as such due to the author's conceptual or 
methodological insufficiencies.  
Similarly, the suggestions aimed at contributing to entrepreneurship education should be 
handled with some caution: Although there are convincing arguments for their principal 
correctness, before integrating modules dealing with such topics into curricula, they must be 
investigated more thoroughly in order to find out, how successful entrepreneurs really think 
and, then, how this can be taught. In summary, the results of the present study should rather 
be considered as another piece of evidence hinting at the potential of entrepreneurial cognition 
research for helping the whole discipline entrepreneurship research to mark its boundaries and 
find appropriate measures to help individuals to start a business. 
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VIII. Appendix 
 
SURVEY QUESTIONS FOR PREFERENCES IN PROBLEM CONSTRUCTION, 
INFORMATION ENCODING, AND CATEGORY SELECTION 
These are the answer options developed by panel I for assessing subjects preference for 
types of information in the cognitive processes of problem construction, information 
encoding, and category Selection. The question or stimuli asking for participants’ 
answer or response is only given for the first example of each cognitive process since 
always the same for each problem situation.  
The answer options were presented in random order and, of course, no information was 
provided, which answer options represents which type of information. 
 
II. Problem Construction 
 
Generelle Aufgabenstellung: Nachfolgend beginnt das Experiment mit dem 1. von 4 Aufgabenblöcken. 
Dabei werden Sie mit 4 verschiedenen Problemsituationen konfrontiert. Nachdem eine solche 
Problemsituation beschrieben wurde, finden Sie unter der Beschreibung eine Auswahl von 
Antwortmöglichkeiten. Diese beschreiben mögliche Vorgehensweisen, die aus dieser Situation 
erwachsen können.  
Bitte geben Sie für jede dieser 4 Situationen die 2 Möglichkeiten an, die für Sie am ehesten zutreffend 
wären, wenn Sie sich in der beschriebenen Situation befinden würden. Bitte beachten Sie, dass wir an 
Ihrer persönlichen Meinung interessiert sind; es gibt keine "richtigen", "falschen", "besseren" oder 
"schlechteren" Antwortmöglichkeiten in diesem Aufgabenblock.  
 
III. General Domain 
 
Situation 1: Sie wohnen einer wichtigen diplomatischen Veranstaltung bei, die vom Außenministerium 
veranstaltet wird. Sie bemerken, dass ein Bekannter von Ihnen, der ein wenig zu viel getrunken hat, 
beginnt, den Botschafter eines wichtigen Landes und andere Gäste zu belästigen. 
 
Aufgabe: Bitte wählen Sie die 2 Möglichkeiten aus, wie Sie persönlich am ehesten versuchen würden, 
diese Situation zu meistern! 
 
Appendix 
 400
Information: „Wie kann ich...“ 
herausfinden, ob meine Bekannter sich absichtlich so verhält? 
herausfinden, wie bald mein Bekannter plant, die Veranstaltung zu verlassen? 
dem Botschafter sein Verhalten vor dem Hintergrund deutscher Traditionen erklären? 
herausfinden, wann die Veranstaltung zu Ende ist? 
  
Alternative Ziele: „Wie kann ich....“ 
meinen Bekannten dazu bringen, uns mit einem Volkstanz zu unterhalten, den er im Ausland 
gelernt hat? 
sicherstellen, dass er so etwas nie wieder macht? 
diese Situation in ein kurze Theatereinlage verwandeln? 
mich verhalten, als ob ich diese Person nicht kenne? 
 
Alternative Handlungen: „Wie kann ich....“ 
jemanden finden, der den Botschafter in ein anderes Gespräch verwickelt? 
meinen Bekannten dazu bewegen, sich vom Botschafter zu entfernen und sich bei ihm zu 
entschuldigen? 
Kellner überzeugen, meinem Bekannten nur noch nicht-alkoholische Getränke zu geben? 
dazu zu bringen, die Veranstaltung zu verlassen? 
 
Einschränkung/Restriktion: : „Wie kann ich....“ 
mich hinzugesellen und das Gesprächsthema wechseln, so dass niemand verärgert wird? 
es schaffen, nicht die Aufmerksamkeit des Botschafters zu erregen, während ich meinen 
Bekannten von ihm entferne? 
Es schaffen, dass mein Bekannter sein Getränk nicht über dem Botschafter ausschüttet? 
mich so verhalten, dass der Botschafter und die anderen Gäste nicht verärgert werden? 
 
Situation 2: Sie wurden auserwählt, ihr Land in Ihrer Lieblingsdisziplin bei den olympischen Spielen zu 
vertreten. Sie sind eine der größten Medaillenhoffnungen, aber ihr Arzt hat Ihnen geraten, sich sofort 
einer Operation zu unterziehen, oder eine schwerwiegende Verletzung zu riskieren. Allerdings würde 
diese Operation bedeuten, dass sie nicht an den olympischen Spielen teilnehmen können. 
 
Information: „Wie kann ich...“ 
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herausfinden, ob und wie andere Sportler eine solche Situation gemeistert haben? 
herausfinden, ob ich durch spezielles Training den Ausbruch der Verletzung vermeiden kann? 
herausfinden, ob verletzte Athleten dennoch viel Geld verdienen können? 
herausfinden, ob ich die olympischen Spielen dennoch gewinnen kann? 
  
Alternative Ziele: „Wie kann ich....“ 
meine Bekanntheit nutzen zu verhindern, dass anderen diese Situation erspart bleibt? 
verhindern, dass ich entmutigt werde? 
meine Gegner verunsichern, indem ich Reporter überzeuge, ich sei nicht verletzt? 
den olympischen Spielen als Zuschauer beiwohnen, wenn ich schon nicht teilnehmen kann? 
 
Alternative Handlungen: „Wie kann ich....“ 
gelange ich an modernste (legale) Hilfsmittel, so dass ich teilnehmen und gewinnen kann? 
eine bessere Lösung finden? 
es schaffen, dass die olympischen Spiele nach hinten verlegt werden? 
meinen Trainer und Arzt davon überzeugen, dass sie mich teilnehmen lassen? 
 
Einschränkung/Restriktion: : „Wie kann ich....“ 
diese Entscheidung treffen, so dass es für das gesamte Team am 
besten ist? 
teilnehmen, aber nicht verletzt werden? 
mich selber davon überzeugen, dass die Verletzung eine Absage 
rechtfertigt? 
mein Land nicht im Stich lassen? 
 
Situation 3: Sie sind Rektor eine Grundschule. Einer der Schüler hat eine Schlange mit in die Schule 
gebracht, diese wird nun vermisst. 
 
Information: „Wie kann ich...“ 
herausfinden, wie gefährlich die Schlange ist und ob externe Hilfe benötigt wird? 
herausfinden, um welche Art von Schlange es sich handelt, und ob sie für Menschen gefährlich 
ist? 
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herausfinden, ob Tränengas die Schlange aus ihrem Versteck lockt? 
herausfinden, wie die Schlange abhanden gekommen ist? 
  
Alternative Ziele: „Wie kann ich....“ 
in eine Lernerfahrung für die Schüler verwandeln? 
die Schulregeln verbessern, was das Mitbringen von Tieren betrifft? 
in Zukunft Schulungen gegen die Angst vor Schlangen für Lehrer und Schüler einführen?  
verhindern, dass ich die direkte Verantwortung übernehmen muss? 
 
Alternative Handlungen: „Wie kann ich....“ 
einen Biologen, der sich mit Schlangen auskennt, diskret um Hilfe bitten? 
eine systematische Suche nach der Schlange organisieren? 
einen Schlangenbeschwörer finden, der die Schlange mit Musik anlockt? 
das Problem einfach ignorieren? 
 
Einschränkung/Restriktion: : „Wie kann ich....“ 
diese Situation händeln, ohne dass jemand verletzt wird (inklusive der Schlange)? 
die Schlange finden, ohne das eine Panik ausbricht? 
eine „Maus-im Aquarium“-Falle aufstellen, ohne das jemand davon etwas mitbekommt? 
eine Durchsage machen, ohne dass jemand Angst bekommt? 
 
Situation 4: Sie sind im Rahmen eines Seminars mit einer Gruppenarbeit beauftragt, die 25% der 
Endnote ausmacht. Ein Mitglied ihrer Gruppe ist ohne Grund nicht zu Gruppentreffen erschienen und hat 
seinen Teil der Gruppenarbeit noch nicht vorangetrieben. Zudem haben Sie Probleme ihn zu erreichen. 
Die gesamte Arbeit muss in 2 Wochen abgeben werden. 
 
Information: „Wie kann ich...“ 
herausfinden, was diese Person motiviert seine Arbeit zu machen? 
einen Rat des Seminarleiters bekommen? 
herausfinden, ob der Seminarleiter ihm aufgetragen hat, sich so zu verhalten, um die anderen 
Gruppenmitglieder zu testen? 
herausfinden, was der Seminarleiter tun wird, wenn die Arbeit nicht fristgerecht abgegeben 
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wird? 
  
Alternative Ziele: „Wie kann ich....“ 
lernen, Frühwarnzeichen zu erkennen, wenn jemand sich nicht voll einbringt? 
meine Leistung auf eine andere Weise erbringen (um den Schein zu erlangen)? 
zusätzliche Punkte bekommen, da wir das Projekt mit weniger Gruppenmitgliedern gestemmt 
haben?  
Seminare meiden, die Gruppenarbeiten beinhalten? 
 
Alternative Handlungen: „Wie kann ich....“ 
mit knappem Personal innerhalb der verbleibenden Zeit das Beste aus dem Projekt machen? 
die Arbeit am besten innerhalb der Gruppe umverteilen, wenn er es nicht schafft, seinen Teil der 
Arbeit zu erbringen? 
dieses Gruppenmitglied gegen ein anderes aus einer anderen Gruppe austauschen? 
dieses Gruppenmitglied loswerden? 
 
Einschränkung/Restriktion: : „Wie kann ich....“ 
mit der Situation umgehen, so dass alle als Gewinner hervorgehen, auch das unmotivierte 
Gruppenmitglied? 
mit der Situation umgehen, ohne dass die Störung der Gruppe zu groß wird? 
mit der Situation umgehen, ohne ihm das Gefühl persönlichen Versagens zu vermitteln? 
Mit der Situation umgehen, ohne den Seminarleiter mit einzubeziehen? 
 
 
IV. Entrepreneurship Domain 
 
Situation 1: Sie haben eine Geschäftsidee entwickelt und fest vor, diese auch in die Tat umzusetzen. Sie 
lesen nun in der Zeitung, dass ein großes Unternehmen ein ähnliches Vorhaben plant. 
 
Information: „Wie kann ich...“ 
an Information gelangen, welche Auswirkungen diese für meine eigenen Geschäftsprognosen 
hat? 
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herausfinden, ob ich dennoch einen USP (ein Alleinstellungsmerkmal) besitze? 
herausfinden, wer aus diesem Unternehmen mir persönlich bekannt ist, um genaure Einblicke in 
das Unternehmen zu erhalten? 
an Informationen gelangen, die das Konkurrenzunternehmen bei den Steuerbehörden 
kompromittieren? 
  
Alternative Ziele: „Wie kann ich....“ 
eine Kooperation mit dem Wettbewerber als Win-Win-Situation gestalten? 
meinen eigenen Markteintritt beschleunigen und Markteintrittsbarrieren errichten? 
das große Unternehmen dazu bringen mich als Manager ihres Unternehmens für das Vorhaben 
anzustellen. 
auf andere Art und Weise mein zukünftiges Einkommen sichern? 
 
Alternative Handlungen: „Wie kann ich....“ 
die entscheidenden Lieferanten zu Exklusivlieferanten für mein Geschäftsvorhaben machen. 
meine Geschäftsidee patentieren lassen? 
einen anerkannten Experten dazu bewegen, das Konzept des Konkurrenten öffentlich zu 
kritisieren? 
andere Zeitungen davon abhalten, auch davon zu berichten damit sich meine Aussichten nicht 
noch mehr verschlechtern? 
 
Einschränkung/Restriktion: : „Wie kann ich....“ 
meine Geschäftsidee so umgestalten, dass sie trotz der Konkurrenz so erfolgreich sein wird wie 
die ursprüngliche Idee ohne Konkurrenz? 
meinen Lebensunterhalt anderweitig absichern? 
den Arbeitsprozess des großen Unternehmens verlangsamen? 
aus dem Geschäft wieder aussteigen? 
 
Situation 2: Ihr neugegründetes Unternehmen beansprucht Sie sehr. Sie sind jeden Tag 12-14 Stunden in 
der Firma und auch die Wochenenden verbringen Sie größtenteils dort. Ihre langjährige(r) 
Lebensgefährtin (e) scheint diese Situation nicht mehr lange mitzumachen. 
 
Information: „Wie kann ich...“ 
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lernen, Arbeit zu delegieren? 
mir externe Unterstützung zu Hilfe holen? 
meiner Freundin einen ähnlich anspruchsvollen Job verschaffen? 
Unternehmensbereiche schließen? 
  
Alternative Ziele: „Wie kann ich....“ 
meiner(m) Freund(in) eine Perspektive bieten, indem ich einen fähigen Stellvertreter einstelle, 
der mich auf Dauer in der Firma entlastet? 
meine Einstellung zur Arbeit verändern? 
meine(n) Freund(in) motivieren, genau so viel Engagement in ihrem/seinem Job zu zeigen? 
meine(n) Freund(in) dazu bringen, sich weniger aufzuregen und zu beschweren? 
 
Alternative Handlungen: „Wie kann ich....“ 
meine Arbeitsprozesse optimieren, um mehr Zeit zu haben? 
ihr einen Job in der Firma vermitteln, der ihr Spaß macht, so dass wir mehr Zeit gemeinsam 
verbringen? 
meine EDV-Fähigkeiten verbessern, um den Zeitaufwand bei gleicher Leistung zu verringern? 
mich von meiner(m) Freund(in)trennen? 
 
Einschränkung/Restriktion: : „Wie kann ich....“ 
meine Arbeit mehr nach Hause verlagern, um wenigstens zu Hause zu sein? 
meine(n) Freund(in) dazu bringen, mich zu heiraten, um damit ihre Austrittsbarrieren zu 
erhöhen? 
meine(n) Freund(in) ein Hobby nahe bringen, dass sie/ihn an Abenden und Wochenenden stark 
beansprucht, so dass sie/er gar nicht merkt, dass ich nicht da bin? 
mir eine Partnerin suchen, die mehr Verständnis aufbringt? 
 
Situation 3: Ihr neugegründetes Unternehmen hat bisher nur wenige Großkunden, die deswegen sehr 
wichtig für Sie sind. Einer dieser Kunden ist verärgert, weil Sie zu einen vereinbarten Termin nicht 
liefern werden können. 
 
Information: „Wie kann ich...“ 
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ein innerbetriebliches Frühwarnsystem installieren, um zukünftig Engpässe früher festzustellen? 
dieses Problem in Zukunft schneller erkennen und hierbei proaktiv agieren? 
ohne diesen Kunden am Markt überleben? 
herausfinden welche Konsequenzen der Lieferausfall für den Kunden wirklich hat, um seine 
Verärgerung einschätzen zu können? 
 
Alternative Ziele: „Wie kann ich....“ 
versuchen, mein Kundenportfolio zu vergrößern, um meine Abhängigkeit von einzelnen 
Kunden zu verringern? 
meine Prozesse beschleunigen, um den Termin halbwegs einzuhalten? 
ihn dazu bewegen, dass er mir einen weiteren Auftrag gibt, um ihm von Gegenteil zu 
überzeugen? 
mittelfristig kleinere Kunden gewinnen, deren individuelles Bestellverhalten weniger Einfluss 
auf meinen Erfolg hat? 
 
Alternative Handlungen: „Wie kann ich....“ 
dem Kunden helfen, den Schaden konkret zu minimieren? 
kurzfristige Arbeitskräfte einstellen, um in mehreren Schichten arbeiten zu können? 
einen anderen Lieferanten dazu bringen, dass er einmalig termingerecht liefert und somit für 
mich einspringt, so dass dem Kunden keine Nachteile entstehen? 
den Verantwortlichen in meinem Unternehmen ausfindig machen, um ihn zu feuern und ein 
Zeichen zu setzen? 
 
Einschränkung/Restriktion: : „Wie kann ich....“ 
meine internen Systeme so verändern, dass so etwas nie wieder passiert und auch dem Kunden 
dies signalisiert wird? 
die Aufträge weniger wichtiger Kunden so aufschieben, dass ich den Großkunden doch noch 
bedienen kann? 
dem Kunden erklären, dass überraschenderweise der Termin doch gehalten werden kann, um 
Bedenkzeit rauszuschlagen. Es wird mir schon eine Lösung einfallen? 
mich eine Zeit lang verleugnen lassen, so dass er mich die nächsten Tage nicht erreichen und 
beschimpfen kann? 
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Situation 4: Ihr neugegründetes Unternehmen stellt ein hochmodernes biotechnologisches Produkt her. 
Auf einem Kongress an dem Sie teilnehmen wird diese Technologie in einer Diskussion als unmoralisch 
an den Pranger gestellt.  
 
Information: „Wie kann ich...“ 
die Kritiker mit Parallelen zu anderen erst umstrittenen Technologien zum Verstummen bringen? 
herausfinden was die Kritiker zu ihren Aussagen motiviert? (Hätten sie selber gerne den 
Triumph gehabt?) 
Teilnehmer aus den Vortests zu emotionalen Berichten über die Behandlungserfolge bringen? 
deutlich machen, dass die Vorteile die Nachteile bei weitem überwiegen? 
  
Alternative Ziele: „Wie kann ich....“ 
deutlich machen, dass diese Technologie in Zukunft eine Menge Arbeitsplätze schaffen und 
nachhaltig sichern wird? 
in der Diskussion die tatsächlichen, höchstmoralischen Hintergründe der Innovation richtig 
stellen? 
die Diskussion durch eine komödiantische Einlage beenden? 
deutlich machen, wie viel Geld sich damit verdienen lässt? 
 
Alternative Handlungen: „Wie kann ich....“ 
nicht nur die Aufmerksamkeit auf mich ziehen, sondern auch die Diskussion zur Vorstellung 
meines Produktes nutzen? 
zeigen, dass das eigene Produkt gerade am wenigsten unmoralisch ist? 
mit dieser angenommenen Unmoralität werben? 
die Diskussion möglichst theatralisch verlassen, um meine Empörung zum Ausdruck zu 
bringen? 
 
Einschränkung/Restriktion: : „Wie kann ich....“ 
den Referenten in Widersprüche verwickeln und damit sein Glaubwürdigkeit in Frage stellen? 
es meinen Gegnern verbieten, derartig über mein Produkt zu sprechen? 
meine Unternehmen umfirmieren und das Produkt umbenennen? 
schnell das Thema der Diskussion wechseln? 
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V. Information Encoding 
 
Generelle Aufgabenstellung: Bitte widmen Sie sich jetzt dem nächsten Aufgabenblock. Jede der 4 
Aufgaben im nachfolgenden Aufgabenblock ist wie folgt aufgebaut: 
Auf der 1. Seite wird die Situation erläutert, in der Sie sich befinden.  
Auf den 6 nachfolgenden Seiten finden Sie zusätzliche Informationen, die Sie bei Ihrer 
Problemlösung unterstützen sollen.  
Auf der 8. Seite können Sie Ihre persönliche Problemlösung in das dafür vorgesehene Textfeld 
eintragen. 
Bitte beachten Sie: Sie können sich jede Seite beliebig lange und beliebig oft anschauen. Benutzen Sie 
einfach die beiden Pfeile Ihres Browsers, um zwischen den Seiten vor und zurück zu wechseln! 
Selbstverständlich können Sie auch weiterhin den "next"-Button nutzen, um zur nächsten Seite zu 
gelangen. 
 
General Domain 
 
Situation 1: Sie sitzen in einer Straßenbahn und es sind nicht mehr viele Menschen unterwegs. Sie 
beobachten, wie drei Jugendliche in unmittelbarer Nähe einen Streit mit einem Farbigem provozieren 
und ihn massiv bedrohen. 
 
Aufgabe: Sie bekommen auf dieser Seite eine Situation beschrieben. Auf den nachfolgenden Seiten finden 
Sie weitere Informationen dazu. Sie können sich die Informationen auf den Seiten beliebig oft und lange 
ansehen. 
 
Zusätzliche 
Sachinforma
tionen 
Das Viertel, das sie durchfahren ist für seine hohe Kriminalitätsrate 
berüchtigt. 
Für die 
Lösung 
irrelevante, 
widersprüchl
iche 
Informatione
n 
Die Straßenbahn fährt mit ziemlicher hoher Geschwindigkeit. 
Wesentliche 
Sachinforma
tionen 
Sie sehen genau, dass die Jugendlichen bewaffnet sind. 
Wesentliche Sie könnten die Kabine des Zugführers leicht erreichen, ohne dass sie 
Appendix 
 409
Sachinforma
tionen 
große Aufmerksamkeit dabei erregen würden. 
Wesentliche 
Sachinforma
tionen 
Die Jugendlichen tragen eindeutig rechtsradikale Symbole auf Ihrer 
Kleidung. 
Prinzipien 
u.U. 
sachdienlich 
für die 
Lösung 
Sie wissen, dass Zugführer für den Umgang mit solchen Situationen 
ausgebildet und geschult werden. 
 
Situation 2: Sie und ihr Lebenspartner befinden sich im Keller Ihres Hauses. Sie wissen, dass ihr Partner 
panische Angst vor Mäusen hat. Unglücklicherweise haben sie eine ganze Menge Mäuse entdeckt, die 
Ihnen beiden den Weg aus dem Keller „versperren“. 
Ziele der 
Lösung 
Ihr Partner darf die Mäuse unter keinen Umständen entdecken. 
Sachdienliche
, aber nicht 
essentielle 
Informatione
n zur Lösung 
Eigentlich wissen Sie, dass Mäuse nicht gefährlich sind und auch 
Ihrem Partner dies prinzipiell bewusst ist. 
Wesentliche 
Sachinformat
ionen 
Ihr Partner ist beschäftigt und schenkt dem Teil des Raums, in dem 
sich die Mäuse befinden, momentan keinerlei Aufmerksamkeit. 
Wesentliche 
Sachinformat
ionen 
In greifbarer Nähe befindet sich ein Besen. 
Wesentliche 
Sachinformat
ionen 
Die Mäuse befinden sich ganz in der Nähe ihres augenscheinlichen 
Versteckes (einem Mäuseloch in der Wand), in das sie verschwinden 
könnten. 
Restriktionen
, die bei der 
Lösung 
berücksichtig
t werden 
sollten 
Sie sind am gleichen Abend noch bei Freunden eingeladen und 
müssen in spätestens einer halben Stunde aufbrechen. 
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Situation 3: Sie haben vor wenigen Sekunden einen Diebstahl im Kaufhaus beobachtet. Ein junger Mann 
hat sich CDs in die Jacke gesteckt. Er macht auf Sie einen gestressten, irgendwie furchteinflößenden 
Eindruck.  
Zusätzliche 
Sachinformationen 
Es könnte sich um einen Drogenabhängigen handeln. 
Für die Lösung 
irrelevante, 
widersprüchliche 
Informationen 
Sie konnten nicht erkennen, ob er sich um wertvolle Warte 
handelt. 
Wesentliche 
Sachinformationen 
Ganz in der Nähe befindet sich eine Verkäuferin. 
Wesentliche 
Sachinformationen 
Sie befinden sich im 4. Stock des Kaufhauses, es ist also noch ein 
weiter Weg aus dem Gebäude heraus. 
Wesentliche 
Sachinformationen 
Sie sehen, dass die Verkäuferin in Ihrer Nähe mit einem 
Funkgerät ausgestattet ist. 
Prinzipien u.U. 
sachdienlich für 
die Lösung 
Kaufhäuser beschäftigen immer Wachdienste und ausgebildetes 
Sicherheitspersonal. 
 
Situation 4: Im vollbesetzten Flugzeug setzt sich ein schwergewichtiger Mann auf den Platz direkt neben 
Sie. Er stinkt unerträglich, aber es ist kein anderer Platz in der Maschine frei. Was können Sie tun? 
 
Ziele der Lösung Sie können den Gestank in dieser Form nicht ertragen. 
Sachdienliche, 
aber nicht 
essentielle 
Informationen zur 
Lösung 
Der Flug wird etwa 10 Stunden dauern. 
Wesentliche 
Sachinformationen 
Das Flugzeug ist vollkommen ausgebucht und es ist kein anderer 
Platz frei. 
Wesentliche 
Sachinformationen 
Die Stewardess ist sehr hilfsbereit. 
Wesentliche 
Sachinformationen 
Für solche Fälle haben große Fluggesellschaften häufig 
Deodorants für Fluggäste an Board. 
Restriktionen, die 
bei der Lösung 
Der Mann ist aus einem anderen Kulturkreis und könnte sich in 
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berücksichtigt 
werden sollten 
 
seinem Stolz oder in seiner Ehre gekränkt fühlen. 
 
 
VI. Entrepreneurship Domain 
 
Situation 1: Sie stellen fest, dass Ihr Gesamtumsatz in den vergangenen Monaten permanent sinkt. Um 
diese Entwicklung zu stoppen, müssen Sie den Gründen für die negative Entwicklung auf die Spur zu 
kommen und zu reagieren. Was könnten Sie tun bspw. tun, um die Entwicklung zu stoppen? 
Zusätzliche 
Sachinformationen 
Der Cashflow den Ihr Unternehmen generiert ist dennoch positiv. 
Für die Lösung 
irrelevante, 
widersprüchliche 
Informationen 
Ihre Bank teilt Ihnen mit, dass Ihre gute Bonitätseinstufung 
gefährdet ist. 
Wesentliche 
Sachinformationen 
Einer Ihrer Großkunden verrät Ihnen seine wesentlichen 
Kritikpunkte, insbesondere beschwert er sich über zu kurzen 
Zahlungsziele, die Sie einräumen. 
Wesentliche 
Sachinformationen 
Eine Konkurrenzanalyse einer studentischen 
Unternehmensberatung zeigt deutliche Schwächen Ihres 
Kundenservices auf.  
Wesentliche 
Sachinformationen 
Eine Ertragsanalyse zeigt deutlich, dass nicht alle Produkte von 
dem Umsatzrückgang betroffen sind. 
Prinzipien u.U. 
sachdienlich für 
die Lösung 
Der Umsatz ist nicht das ausschlaggebende Kriterium, nachdem 
jede Entscheidung ausgerichtet werden muss. Ebenso wichtig 
sind Gewinn, Cashflow, etc.  
 
Situation 2: Ihre Kunden wollen rasch beliefert werden. Deshalb haben Sie von allen Artikeln größere 
Mengen auf Vorrat, so dass Sie auch die größtmögliche Nachfrage befriedigen könnten. Ihr Bankberater 
meint, dass Ihre Vorsorge zu viel Kapital bindet. Andererseits ist bei Ihnen der Kunde König. Was 
werden Sie in dieser Situation tun? 
Ziele der Lösung Es ist wichtig die optimale Lagermenge zu bestimmen, damit die 
Opportunitätskosten durch Vorratshaltung minimiert werden. 
Sachdienliche, Auch meine Konkurrenten haben dasselbe Problem. 
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aber nicht 
essentielle 
Informationen zur 
Lösung 
 
Wesentliche 
Sachinformationen 
Ein Freund empfiehlt Ihnen den Einsatz einer einfach zu 
bedienenden Software zur Verbesserung Ihrer logistischen 
Organisation.  
Wesentliche 
Sachinformationen 
Eine Analyse ergibt, dass die von Kunden akzeptierte Lieferzeit 
zwischen den Produkten stark variiert.  
Wesentliche 
Sachinformationen 
Ihr Bankberater hat berechnet, dass schon die Reduzierung von 
Beständen einiger Ihrer Produkte die Kapitalbindung merklich 
verringern würde. 
Restriktionen, die 
bei der Lösung 
berücksichtigt 
werden sollten 
Einige Ihrer Kunden sind Hersteller und eine einmalige 
verspätete Lieferung der Kunden würde eine Auflösung des 
Lieferantenvertrages bedeuten.  
 
Situation 3: Sie führen ein Computer- und Systemhaus. Sie bieten neben Individualsoftware auch 
Computerhardware in Form von PCs und Großrechnern. In den letzten zwei Monaten war der Verkauf 
der PCs rückläufig, die Software-Auftragslage start zunehmend und der Verkauf von Großrechnern 
gleichbleibend bei fallenden Preisen. Was tun Sie? 
Zusätzliche 
Sachinformationen 
Sie erfahren durch einen anderen Händler, dass es allen Anbietern 
im Moment genau so geht. 
Für die Lösung 
irrelevante, 
widersprüchliche 
Informationen 
Neue Generationen von Technologien lösen immer schneller Ihre 
Vorgänger ab. 
Wesentliche 
Sachinformationen 
Sie wissen aus Erfahrung, dass Ihr PC-Absatz durch gezielte 
Werbemaßnahmen gesteigert werden kann. 
Wesentliche 
Sachinformationen 
Eine Marktstudie einer großen Computerzeitschrift verspricht die 
Erholung des PC-Marktes innerhalb des nächsten Jahres. 
Wesentliche 
Sachinformationen 
Die Hersteller von Großrechnern reagieren auf die fallenden 
Preise und passen auch die Handelspreise nach unten an.  
Prinzipien u.U. 
sachdienlich für 
die Lösung 
Märkte unterliegen immer konjunkturellen Zyklen, somit muss 
sich diese negative Entwicklung nicht zwangsläufig fortsetzen.  
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VII. Situation 4: Sie eröffnen am 1.1. des nächsten Jahres ein 
Einzelhandelsgeschäft. Sie erwarten Ende des Jahres dann so gut etabliert 
zu sein, dass Sie drei Vollzeitkräfte benötigen werden. Was werden Sie 
tun? 
Ziele der Lösung Die Mitarbeitstruktur sollte eine stufenweise Anpassung auf 
steigende Nachfrage zulassen, aber keine ungenutzten 
Mitarbeiterressourcen binden. 
Sachdienliche, 
aber nicht 
essentielle 
Informationen zur 
Lösung 
Das Angebot an qualifizierten Mitarbeitern ist sehr hoch. 
 
Wesentliche 
Sachinformationen 
Einmal eingestellt, ist es augrund der rechtlichen Lage nicht 
einfach,  Vollzeitkräfte zeitnah wieder zu entlassen.  
Wesentliche 
Sachinformationen 
Eine Vollzeitkraft ist jedoch günstiger als zwei Halbtagskräfte.  
Wesentliche 
Sachinformationen 
Sie können nicht abschätzen, ob Ihr Geschäft nach Ablauf des 
nächsten Jahres noch weiter wachsen wird.  
Restriktionen, die 
bei der Lösung 
berücksichtigt 
werden sollten 
 
Wenn Sie zu wenig Personal beschäftigen, leidet Ihr Service und 
damit mittelfristig auch Ihr Geschäft. 
 
 
VIII. Category Selection 
 
Generelle Aufgabenstellung: Bitte widmen Sie sich jetzt dem nächsten Aufgabenblock. Jede der 
folgenden 5 Aufgaben ist wie folgt aufgebaut: 
Bei jeder Aufgabe bekommen Sie wiederum die Beschreibung einer Situation. Auf der gleichen Seite, 
unter der Situationsbeschreibung, finden Sie 8 Antwortmöglichkeiten, welche eine mögliche Handlung in 
dieser Situation beschreiben. Aus diesen wählen Sie bitte die 4 Handlungsmöglichkeiten aus, die Sie 
persönlich für sich am ehesten in Betracht ziehen würden. 
(Hinweis: Bitte beachten Sie, dass wir an Ihrer persönlichen Meinung interessiert sind; es gibt keine 
"richtigen", "falschen", "besseren" oder "schlechteren" Antwortmöglichkeiten in diesem Aufgabenblock.)  
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(Note: Most of the scenarios are based on short stories in Shorris, E. (1981), The 
oppressed middle: Politics of middle-management/scenes from corporate life. New 
York: Anchor/Press.) 
 
IX. General Domain 
 
Situation 1 
Die verrechneten Beträge auf dem Spesenkonto waren unglaublich hoch. Das waren nicht mehr nur die 
üblichen Geschäftsessen oder Theaterkarten. Dieser eine Außendienstmitarbeiter gab über 200.000 Euro 
im Jahr aus; das war mehr als das gesamte Reisekosten- und Bewirtungskostenbudget der gesamten 
Filiale. Die Belege waren zwar alle vorhanden, aber die Verhältnismäßigkeit der Ausgaben war schon 
sehr fraglich: trotzdem, dieser Außendienstmitarbeiter war früher enger Mitarbeiter des Staatssekretärs 
und seine Beziehungen zur Berliner Politik waren beeindruckend. 
Als der Leiter der Außenstelle die Spesenkonten seiner Außendienstmitarbeiter durchsah, fragte er sich, 
ob er wirklich ein Spesenkonto abzeichnen solle, dass fast jeden Tag Abendessen für 1000 Euro aufführt. 
Letzten Endes verkaufte seine Abteilung Maschinen an Hersteller sowie Zulieferer und kein anderer 
Außendienstmitarbeiter gab auch nur ein Zehntel dieser Summe aus. 
Als besagter Außendienstmitarbeiter vor 2 Jahren in die Berliner Filiale wechselte, hatte er deutlich 
gemacht, dass die dort sonst üblichen Regelungen hinsichtlich der Spesen für ihn nicht gelten würden, da 
er sich nur dem stellvertuenden Geschäftsführer in der Firmenzentrale gegenüber zu verantworten habe. 
Als der Filialleiter den Außendienstmitarbeiter auf die vereinbarten Ziele der Verkaufszahlen, die nicht 
erreicht wurden, ansprach, antwortete dieser, dass er sich an den stellvertretenden Geschäftsführer 
wenden solle, wenn es ein Problem gäbe. 
Ein wenig naiv, fragte der Filialleiter den Außendienstmitarbeiter, warum er nicht direkt für den 
stellvertretenden Geschäftsführer arbeite. Dieser antwortete, dass der die Kosten für Lobbyarbeit niedrig 
halten wolle. Als der Leiter um ein schriftliche Bestätigung dieser Aussage bat, lachte der 
Außendienstmitarbeiter ihm bloß ins Gesicht. In diesem Moment realisierte der Filialleiter, dass er selber 
die Verantwortung für die hohen Spesen übernehmen oder die Angelegenheit ans Tageslicht bringen 
müsse. 
 
Aufgabe: Bitte wählen Sie die 4 Möglichkeiten, welche Sie persönlich favorisieren! 
 
Generelle Prinzipien 
 • Unschuldige werden leicht Opfer politischer Systeme. 
 • Was ethisch und was praktisch ist, ist nicht immer das Gleiche. 
Spezifische Planhandlungen 
 • Der Filialleiter muss sich entscheiden, ob er die Verantwortung und die drohenden 
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Konsequenzen übernimmt oder die Angelegenheit aufdeckt.  
 • Der Filialleiter sollte in Erwägung ziehen, den Hauptgeschäftsführer in der Firmenzentrale 
auf die Sache anzusprechen und versuchen, so seinen Job zu retten. 
Langfristige Ziele 
 • Finanzielle Unverantwortlichkeit kann ein schlechtes Bsp. für andere 
Außendienstmitarbeiter setzen. 
 • Ausgaben und Beziehungen zu thematisieren könnte der Firma schaden. 
Bewertung Dritter 
 • Der Filialleiter sollte ethische Aspekte, die in Berlin üblichen Lobbygebräuche und 
persönliche Karriereüberlegungen in die Entscheidung mit einbeziehen. 
 • Der Filialleiter könnte den stellvertretenden Geschäftsführer um einen zusätzlichen 
Außendienstmitarbeiter für seine Filiale bitten, um den Mangel an Produktivität durch 
besagten Außendienstmitarbeiter, der nur Lobbyarbeit verrichtet, auszugleichen. 
 
Situation 2 (based on „The Maze“, pp. 166-172) 
Der Marketingdirektor des traditionsreichen Unternehmens, war nun schon seit 37 Jahren dort 
beschäftigt. Er hatte eine renommierte Universität besucht und dort auch sein Interesse für Philosophie 
und Kunst entdeckt. Als der neue Marketingvorstand ins Unternehmen kam, da verstanden sich die 
beiden eigentlich sehr gut. Sicherlich waren sie eher unterschiedliche Charaktere, aber ihre gemeinsame 
Leidenschaft für spanische Maler und das gemeinsame Diplom der Universität waren nur Ausdruck 
dafür, dass sie grundsätzlich „auf einer Wellenlänge“ lagen. 
Jedoch begann der Marketingvorstand nach einiger Zeit den Direktor immer mehr unter Druck zu setzen. 
Es wurden Ziele vorgegebenen, die unmöglich zu erfüllen waren. Der Vorstand unterstellte ihm sogar, 
ein Verhältnis mit seiner Sekretärin zu haben. Nach einigen Monaten hielt es der Direktor nicht mehr aus 
und kündigte.  
Bei seiner Abschiedsparty hatte er leider ein Glas zuviel getrunken und stieß lauthals mit fast jedem auf 
„das blöde A***** von Marketingvorstand“ an.  
Zwei Jahre später trifft der ehemalige Direktor im Flughafencafe einen alten Kollegen aus dem 
Unternehmen. Nach einem kurzen Gespräch spricht dieser ihn an: „Deine Abschiedsparty war toll, aber 
dass du so über den falschen Mann hergezogen hast, fand nicht nur ich seltsam.“ „Wieso der Falsche?!“ 
antwortete der ehemalige Direktor. „Der Marketingvorstand war doch ein großer Anhänger von dir, aber 
der Vorstandsvorsitzende hat ihn gezwungen, dich aus dem Unternehmen zu drängen.“ „Warum hat mir 
das den keiner gesagt?!“ brachte der ehemalige Direktor nur noch entsetzt hervor. „Ich dachte du 
wusstest das, jeder wusste es!“. Der ehemalige Marketingdirektor wurde plötzlich klar, dass er auf dieser 
Party einen schrecklichen Fehler begangen hatte, den er irgendwie aus der Welt schaffen musste.  
 
Generelle Prinzipien 
 Die unmittelbar Beteiligten wissen oft weniger als das Umfeld. 
 
Häufig müssen Mitarbeiter die Entscheidungen der Vorgesetzen verantworten und sich in 
deren Namen (erkannt oder unerkannt) unbeliebt machen. 
Spezifische Planhandlungen 
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Der Marketing-Direktor spricht den Marketingvorstand direkt an. Er klärt das 
Missverständnis auf und entschuldigt sich bei ihm. 
 Der ehemalige Marketingdirektor sollte sich bei dem Marketingvorstand entschuldigen. 
Langfristige Ziele 
 Langfristig schadet so eine ungeklärte Angelegenheit immer dem guten Ruf. 
 
Er sollte in seinem jetzigen Unternehmen wenigstens klare und transparente 
Entscheidungsstrukturen einführen, um die Wiederholung eines solchen Vorfalls zu 
vermeiden. 
Bewertung Dritter 
 
Den Kollegen auf dem Flughafen fragen, ob der Vorstand die Situation richtig einschätzen 
konnte und seine Verärgerung folglich verstehen konnte. 
 Den ehemaligen Arbeitskollegen um Rat fragen, mit dem beide viel zu tun hatten. 
  
 
Situation 3 (based on „Rootlessness”, pp. 166-172) 
Es war Liebe auf den ersten Blick. Er studierte Maschinenbau und war ganz anders als die Jungs an ihrer 
Kunstakademie. Sie verbrachten schöne und glückliche Studentenjahre zusammen und heirateten kurze 
Zeit später. Ursprünglich wollte sie auch ihre eigenen beruflichen Ziele verwirklichen, aber als sie dann 
mit ihrer ersten Tochter schwanger war, hatte sich das dann doch zerschlagen. 
Er war ein guter Ingenieur und machte Karriere in seinem Unternehmen. Nach wenigen Jahren wurde er 
immer wieder befördert, leider war dies fast immer mit einem Unzug verbunden: in 6 verschiedenen 
deutschen Städten hatten sie inzwischen gelebt. Die Frau und die Kinder gingen immer mit, ihre Freunde 
und eigenen Interesse stellten sie hinten an.  
Dann kam die große Chance für den Mann. Er sollte in den Vorstand des Unternehmens aufrücken: auf 
genau jenen Posten, von dem aus man auf den Vorstandsvorsitz gelangte, wenn man sich bewährte. Der 
Vorstand saß allerdings in den USA. Seine Frau und die Kinder waren es Leid. Sie hatten genug von der 
Umzieherei, und jetzt auch noch nach Amerika?! Nein, sie wollten nicht. Der Ingenieur musste eine 
Lösung finden, denn er liebte seine Frau immer noch.  
 
Generelle Prinzipien 
 Der berufliche Erfolg steht nicht über allem. 
 Man muss auch Kompromisse eingehen können. 
Spezifische Planhandlungen 
 Herausfinden, welche Tätigkeiten oder Anreize für die Familie in den USA gegeben sind. 
 Er sollte mit seiner Frau alle Szenarien durchsprechen, inklusive der Konsequenzen. 
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Langfristige Ziele 
 Familie und Karriere müssen sich einfach irgendwie unter einen Hut bringen lassen. 
 
Er sollte eine Lösung finden, die sowohl Sicherung der Familie durch Zusammenhalt als 
auch finanzielle Absicherung ermöglicht. 
Bewertung Dritter 
 Die Frau eines Kollegen, die in den USA gelebt haben, könnte berichten, wie es dort ist. 
 Er könnte einen Kollegen fragen, wie er diese Aufgabe gemeistert hat. 
 
 
Situation 4 (based on „Esprit“, pp. 204-208) 
Er konnte sich nicht an viel erinnern, was in den letzten tagen passiert war. Ab und an war er wach 
gewesen, zumindest glaubte er das, und hatte wahrnehmen können, was um ihn herum in dem 
Krankenhauszimmer passiert war. Aber die Schmerzen übertönten sowieso seine Erinnerungen. 
Vier Tage später erklärte der Oberarzt ihm und seiner Frau die Schwere der Magenblutung. Nur knapp 
sei er dem Tod entronnen und musste sich nun schonen und auf eine lange Genesungsphase einstellen.  
Als der Arzt den Raum wieder verlassen hatte, sprudelte es aus ihm heraus. „Dieser Quacksalber. Ich 
fühle mich schon viel besser. Spätestens in 2 Wochen bin ich wieder in der Firma.“ Er erklärte seiner 
Frau, wie sehr das Unternehmen in brauche, und selbst wenn nicht, dann würden sie sich schnell jemand 
anderen suchen, der seinen überaus wichtigen Platz einnähme.  
In diesem Moment wurde seiner Frau bewusst, dass er mit seinem Leben spielte, ohne es auch nur zu 
bemerken.  
 
Generelle Prinzipien 
 Ein Kranker kann seine Situation selber selten richtig einschätzen. 
 Gefahren oder Ängste werden häufig verdrängt. 
Spezifische Planhandlungen 
 Sie könnte dem Arzt alles erzählen und ihn bitten, was zu tun. 
 Sie könnte ihrem Mann noch mal die Gefahren vor Augen führen. 
Langfristige Ziele 
 
Sie könnte ihm die möglichen bleibenden Schäden und Risiken für sein Leben vor Augen 
führen. 
 
Sie könnte ihm deutlich machen, dass er seinen Job mit seiner Gesundheit dann nicht mehr 
lange machen könnte. 
Bewertung Dritter 
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 Sie könnte den Arzt fragen, wie sie sich verhalten soll. 
 Sie könnte einen Psychologen zu Rate ziehen, wie sie ihn von der Gefahr überzeugen kann. 
 
 
Situation 5 (based on „Manna“, pp. 220-225) 
Es war nicht die erste Nacht, die er ihm Büro verbrachte. Aber er war gut in dem was er tat und wenn das 
Unternehmen die Krise überwinden wollte – und die Chancen dafür standen gut – dann mussten alle hart 
arbeiten. Er tat das eigentlich immer, denn sein Gehalt wurde zu einem hohen Anteil durch einen 
variablen Bonus am Endes des Geschäftsjahres ausgemacht, dessen Höhe sich daran bemaß, wie 
erfolgreich das Unternehmen in diesem Jahr war.  
Er brauchte dieses Geld aber auch, denn beide Kinder studierten und wurden von ihm und seiner Frau 
finanzielle unterstützt. Er hatte seinen Kinder versprochen, dass sie sich voll auf ihr Studium 
konzentrieren könnten und sich nicht so viel Gedanken um Geld machen müssten. Und die Kinder taten 
das wirklich und dies zeigte sich auch in dem Erfolg den beide im Studium hatten.  
Als der Abteilungsleiter am Endes des Geschäftsjahres die diesjährigen Bonus-Abrechnungen verteilte, 
traf ihn fast der Schlag: es war nicht nur weniger als erwartet, sonder einfach viel zu wenig, um die 
Ausgaben zu decken, wenn er die Kinder weiter unterstützen wollte. Aber sollte er sich nun beschweren 
oder fragen, ob vielleicht ein formaler Fehler unterlaufen sei? Oder würden Sie ihm dann im nächsten 
Jahr bei der Bonuszahlung noch schlecht dastehen lassen? 
 
Generelle Prinzipien 
 Vertrauen ist gut, Kontrolle ist besser. 
 
Leistung die immer angeboten wird, wird nicht mehr unbedingt als außergewöhnlich oder 
überdurchschnittlich anerkannt. 
Spezifische Planhandlungen 
 
Er sollte das offene Gespräch suchen, um zu ergründen ob die Minderzahlung auf seine 
Person oder die wirtschaftliche Lage des Unternehmens zurückzuführen ist. 
 
Er sollte auch mit seinen Kindern und seiner Frau offen über das Problem sprechen, um 
verschiedene Handlungsalternativen zu finden. 
Langfristige Ziele 
 
Er könnte versuchen, dass er in Zukunft einen Arbeitsvertrag erhält, der weniger variabel 
und von Bonuszahlungen abhängig ist. 
 Die Sicherung der Arbeitsstelle ist am wichtigsten. 
Bewertung Dritter 
 Er könnte sich mit seiner Frau beraten, wo man einsparen könnte. 
 
Er könnte einige wenige vertraute Kollegen einweihen und Fragen, wie sie mit der Situation 
umzugehen gedenken. 
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X. Entrepreneurship Domain 
 
Situation 1 (based on „Movement“, pp. 183-187) 
Er hatte dieses Unternehmen selber aufgebaut. Alleine hatte er angefangen in der Scheune eines 
Verwandten. Nichts und niemand hat ihm dabei geholfen, außer seiner Disziplin und seinen Prinzipien, 
von denen er nie abgewichen war.  
Das Unternehmen war ein stattlicher Konzern geworden und immer noch stand er an der Spitze. Aber die 
Zeiten hatten sich geändert: früher war alles einfacher, denn das Unternehmen wuchs jedes Jahr und das 
Geschäft war übersichtlich. Heute drehte sich alles nur noch um Asien: aber nicht nur die großen 
Absatzmärkte oder die billigen Lohnkosten beschäftigten ihn, vor allem der große japanische Konkurrenz 
machte seinem Unternehmen zu schaffen. 
Hier in Thailand sollte sich nun entscheiden, wie es um die Zukunft des Unternehmens bestellt war. Aber 
auch die Japaner schliefen nicht. In diesem Land kam man nur durch Beziehung und Bestechung weiter, 
in diesem Fall war der Kabinettsminister der thailändischen Regierung der ausschlaggebende Faktor. Der 
würde sich für einen der beiden Anbieter entscheiden und somit das Schicksal des anderen in diesem 
wichtigen Markt besiegeln.  
Darum war der Tipp den man bekommen hatte eigentlich auch Gold wert. Der Regionalmanager des 
Unternehmens hatte in Erfahrung bringen können, dass der Kabinettsminister ein besonderes 
Etablissement geradezu verehrte. In diesem hatten Japaner keinen Zutritt, weil sie seit dem 2. Weltkrieg 
in Teilen der hiesigen Bevölkerung nicht sonderlich beliebt waren. Aber diese Art des Geschäftemachens 
war ihm zutiefst zuwider.  
Nun war er in seinem Hotelzimmer und in 5 Minuten sollte er für den Termin mit dem Kabinettsminister 
abgeholt werden. Dabei sollte es natürlich in das bevorzugte Etablissement des Ministers gehen. Der 
bloße Gedanke daran erregte schon Übelkeit in ihm. Wenn er dabei persönlich nicht erscheinen würde, so 
erklärte ihm der Regionalmanager sei dies eine Beleidigung und der gesamte thailändische Markt 
verloren. 
 
Generelle Prinzipien 
 
Geschäftserfolg hängt nicht unbedingt von der Frage ab, wer das beste Angebot 
macht. 
 Manchmal muss man von seinen Prinzipien abweichen können. 
Spezifische Planhandlungen 
1. 
Er sollte überlegen, wie wichtig der thailändische Markt für die Zukunft des 
Unternehmens ist und dann entscheiden. 
2. 
Er sollte mit dem Minister mitgehen, aber die Dinge für sich klar ausschließen, die 
er moralisch nicht vertreten kann. 
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Langfristige Ziele 
 Nur mit diesem Geschäft kann das Unternehmen dauerhaft überleben. 
 
Persönliche Prinzipien müssen manchmal hinten anstehen, insbesondere wenn die 
Arbeitsplätze anderer Menschen davon abhängen. 
Bewertung Dritter 
 Er könnte den Regionalmanager nach Alternativen fragen. 
 Er könnte einen Freund anrufen, der schon öfter in Asien Geschäfte gemacht hatte. 
 
 
Situation 2 
Ihre Unternehmensgründung war ein voller Erfolg. Nachdem Sie Ihr Studium erfolgreich absolviert 
hatten, haben Sie direkt den Sprung in die Selbständigkeit gewagt und haben ein 
Biotechnologieunternehmen gegründet. 
Die nachfolgenden Jahre sind eine einzige Erfolgsgeschichte, das Unternehmen kann sich am Markt 
etablieren und ihre Kenntnisse aus dem Studium haben Ihnen dabei geholfen ein vollkommen neuartiges 
Insektenschutzmittel auf den Markt zu bringen. Gerade mit diesem Produkt sind sie sehr erfolgreich und 
generieren einen beachtlichen Umsatz. 
Dieses Produkt hat das Interesse eines Waffenherstellers geweckt. Zwar kommunizieren dieses 
Unternehmen dies nicht so deutlich, aber Ihnen schwant, dass das Interesse vor allem wegen des Patentes 
und des Know-how in der Herstellung des Insektenschutzmittels herrührt. Der Waffenhersteller bietet 
Ihnen an, Ihr Unternehmen für einen unglaublich hohen Preis zu übernehmen. Aber was werden die wohl 
mit dem Wissen Ihres Unternehmens anstellen? 
 
Generelle Prinzipien 
 Nicht alles ist käuflich. 
 Jeder Mensch muss für sich entscheiden ob seine Werte zum Verkauf stehen. 
Spezifische Planhandlungen 
 Sie könnten zusätzliche Informationen über den potentiellen Käufer einholen. 
 Sie könnten nicht verkaufen, um das Wissen zu sichern. 
Langfristige Ziele 
 Sie wollen die Verwendung als Kampfmittel auf jeden Fall verhindern. 
 
Sie können versuchen, immer die Kontrolle über das von Ihnen entwickelte Know-how zu 
behalten. 
Bewertung Dritter 
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Sie könnten einen Waffenexperten hinzuziehen, der Ihnen Aussagen über die 
wahrscheinlichste Verwendung Ihres Mittels geben kann. 
 
Sie könnten einen Juristen befragen, inwiefern Sie eine Verwendung als Kampfstoff 
verhindern könnten. 
 
 
Situation 3  
Das Gespräch mit dem Kunden war anstrengend und wurde hart geführt, aber es schien als ob der erste 
große Auftrag tatsächlich an Land gezogen werden könne. Alles lief sehr gut und der Geschäftspartner, 
mit dem sie zusammen das Unternehmen vor kurzem gegründet hatten, machte einen richtig guten Job in 
den Verhandlungen. 
Als ein weiterer Kollege sie aus dem wichtigen Meeting rief, waren Sie zwar etwas irritiert, aber nicht 
weiter besorgt. Das änderte sich allerdings schlagartig als dieser Ihnen mitteilte, dass ihnen bei der 
Angebotskalkulation ein grober Fehler unterlaufen sei, den ihr Kollege gerade erst entdeckt hatte: bei 
dem zunächst kalkulierten Preis würde Ihr Unternehmen sogar noch draufzahlen. 
Auf der einen Seite ist Ihr Unternehmen noch sehr jung und kann sich einen solchen Verlust auf keinen 
Fall leisten. Auf der anderen Seite kann man einem solch wichtigen potentiellen Kunden, nicht vor den 
Kopf stoßen und seine eigene Unerfahrenheit in solchen Dingen so offen legen. Es musste etwas 
passieren! Und zwar schnell! 
 
Generelle Prinzipien 
 Fehler passieren. Man sollte nur verhindern, dass sie sich wiederholen. 
 Eine genaue Prüfung sollte immer vor der Abgabe eines Angebotes erfolgen. 
Spezifische Planhandlungen 
 Eine genaue Prüfung sollte immer vor der Abgabe eines Angebotes erfolgen. 
 
Sie könnten, bevor sie irgendeinen weiteren Schritt unternehmen, die Berechnung des 
Kollegen überprüfen. Diesem kann auch ein Fehler unterlaufen sein. 
Langfristige Ziele 
 
Auf Dauer müssen bessere Kontrollmechanismen eingerichtet werden, die eine solche Panne in 
Zukunft verhindern. 
 
Die Bindung dieses Kunden ist langfristig wichtiger als der begrenzte kurzfristige Schaden 
durch die fehlerhafte Kalkulation. 
Bewertung Dritter 
 Sie könnten versuchen, noch die Meinung ihres Geschäftspartners einzuholen. 
 Sie könnten den Finanzvorstand fragen, ob das Unternehmen dieses Minusgeschäft verkraften 
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kann. 
 
 
Situation 4 (based on „The War of Atoms“, pp. 230-234) 
So hatten Sie sich das nicht vorgestellt: Das Unternehmen hatten sie selber aufgebaut, jahrzehntelang auf 
so vieles verzichtet. Jetzt wo sie auf die 70 Jahre zugingen, wollten Sie sich bald zurückziehen, 
jemandem anderes das Ruder im Unternehmen überlassen und ihr Leben noch ein wenig genießen. 
Aber noch mehr als die wirtschaftlichen Probleme Ihres Unternehmens ärgerte sie, dass sich Ihre beiden 
potentiellen Nachfolger ständig die Schuld für die Krise gegenseitig in die Schuhe schoben, anstatt 
gemeinsam an einem Strang zu ziehen. Es schien als läge den beiden das Wohlergehen des 
Unternehmens nicht wirklich am Herzen, sondern sie wollten sich lediglich in eine bessere, bzw. den 
Konkurrenten in eine schlechtere, Position bringen. 
Nach einigen Wochen bemerkten Sie, dass nur einer von den beiden falsch spielte: Aber welcher? So 
sehr sie auch deren Berichte und Zahlen studierten, es gab keine Hinweise darauf, wer von den beiden 
auf keinen Fall das Unternehmen bald leiten sollte. Aber es kamen auch nur diese beiden Kandidaten als 
Nachfolger in Frage, weil sie das Unternehmen und die Kunden in dieser sehr speziellen Branche 
kannten. Für wen sollten sie sich bloß als Ihren Nachfolger entscheiden? 
 
Generelle Prinzipien 
 
Es darf einem Nachfolger nicht nur ums Geld gehen, er muss auch am Fortbestand des 
Unternehmens interessiert sein. 
 Ein Unternehmen lebt von der Qualität der leitenden Angestellten. 
Spezifische Planhandlungen 
 
Sie könnten den beiden potentiellen Nachfolgern Aufgaben stellen, die wahrscheinlich 
weiteren Aufschluss geben können. 
 
Sie könnten bei einzeln zur Rede stellen. Die Reaktion dürfte Ihnen weitere Aufschlüsse 
geben. 
Langfristige Ziele 
 
Sie wollen mit ruhigem Gewissen aus dem Unternehmen gehen und ihren Ruhestand 
genießen. 
 
Der beste Nachfolger muss gefunden werden, um das Unternehmen in seiner Existenz zu 
sichern. 
Bewertung Dritter 
 
Ihr ehemaliger Stellvertreter, der beide potentiellen Kandidaten damals in das Unternehmen 
geholt hatte, kann Ihnen vielleicht weiterhelfen. 
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Sie könnten andere Unternehmensangehörige befragen. Die kennen die beiden besser als sie 
es als Ihr Chef jemals werden. 
 
 
Situation 5  
Das Gespräch mit dem Sachbearbeiter der Band würde alles entscheiden. Der Businessplan ist 
geschrieben und er macht wirklich was her. Die Argumente sind überzeugend, eigentlich kann der Mann 
von der Bank nur zustimmen.  
Von allen Seiten hat man Ihnen bestätigt, dass das Gerät, welches sie im Rahmen Ihrer Diplomarbeit 
entwickelt haben, wirklich etwas Neues darstellt und mit Sicherheit genügend Abnehmer finden wird. 
Aber zunächst müssen Sie erst einmal das Geld für den Bau des Prototypen haben, denn ohne war kein 
Kunde von der Machbarkeit zu überzeugen. 
Sie selber waren vom Nutzen des Gerätes überzeugt, genau wie ihr betreuender Professor, einem 
Fachmann auf dem Gebiet. Dennoch waren die Probemessung im Labor nicht eindeutig positiv und 
hundertprozentig überzeugend gewesen. In einer Stunde sollte das entscheidende Gespräch mit der Bank 
sein und sie hatten die besagten Laborergebnisse bisher verschwiegen? Sollten Sie dieses potentielle 
Risiko wirklich nicht ansprechen? 
 
Generelle Prinzipien 
 Ehrlich währt am längsten. 
 Wer nichts wagt, der nichts gewinnt. 
Spezifische Planhandlungen 
 
Sie könnten mit offenen Karten spielen und versuchen, den Bankier ebenfalls zu überzeugen, 
schließlich haben Sie das bei anderen ja auch geschafft. 
 Sie könnten das Gespräch verlegen und neu testen. 
Langfristige Ziele 
 
Langfristig ist ein vertrauensvolles Verhältnis mit der Bank überlebensnotwendig für ein 
junges Unternehmen. 
 Nur auf vertrauensvoller Basis kann man auf Dauer Geschäfte machen. 
Bewertung Dritter 
 
Sie könnten einen Freund anrufen, der bei einer anderen Bank arbeitet, um herauszufinden, 
wie wichtig dieser Aspekt dem Bankier wohl sein wird. 
 
Sie könnten einen Ihnen bekannten Experten auf dem Gebiet anrufen, um sich zu 
erkundigen, ob ernsthafte Probleme zu erwarten sind. 
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XI. SURVEY QUESTIONS FOR ABILITY IN CATEGORY 
COMBINATION AND REORGANISATION AS WELL AS 
OPPORTUNITY RECOGNITION 
 
 
XII. Category Combination and Reorganisation 
 
Grundsätzliche Aufgabenstellung: Bitte widmen Sie sich jetzt den nächsten Aufgaben, deren 
Grundidee wir Ihnen nun kurz vorstellen möchten: 
Diese Aufgabe unterscheidet nun 4 zentrale Konzepte: Begriffe, Kategorien, Überkategorien und 
Attribute. 
Kategorien werden durch Begriffe gebildet. So sind z.B. d "Amsel, Drossel, Lerche, Star" alles Begriffe 
der Kategorie "Vögel". Anders geschrieben: 
Vögel: Amsel; Drossel; Lerche; Star; 
Diese Kategorien wiederum bilden auf nächster Ebene Überkategorien. So gehört bspw. die Kategorie 
"Vögel" zur Überkategorie der "Tiere". 
Attribute sind schließlich einfache Eigenschaften, die man einem Begriff, einer Kategorie oder einer 
Überkategorie typischerweise zuspricht. Bspw. würde man der Kategorie der "Vögel" wohl das Attribut 
"kann fliegen" zuordnen. Ein weiteres Bsp. wäre das Attribut "klein" für den Begriff der "Lerche".  
 
Jede der 4 folgenden Aufgaben im folgenden Block ist nun wie folgt aufgebaut: Sie sehen drei 
unbenannte Kategorien, die von 4 Begriffen beschrieben werden. Sie werden daraufhin gebeten, für diese 
3 Kategorien: 
eine gemeinsame Überkategorie zu benennen, 
diese mit einem Satz zu beschreiben,  
weitere Begriffe dieser Überkategorie zu benennen, und 
weitere Attribute dieser Überkategorie zu benennen. 
 
General Domain 
 
SET 1    
 Stuhl Reifen Mars 
 Couch Sitz Jupiter 
 Lampe Lenkrad Erde 
 Bilder Bremsen Venus 
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SET 2    
 Protestant Liter Objektiv 
 Muslim Esslöffel Papier 
 Baptist Milligramm Kamera 
 Katholik Teelöffel Blitzlicht 
 
SET 3    
 Licht Handschuh Reiten 
 Hupe Maske Laufen 
 Bremsen 
Springen 
Hockeyschläger 
 Lenkrad Fußball Gewichte 
 
SET 4    
 Kissen Bootfahren Skalpell 
 Matratze Segeln Nadel 
 Federn Tauchen Klammer 
 Leinen Schwimmen Gummihandschuh
e 
 
 
Entrepreneurship Domain 
 
SET 1    
 Sparquote Tresor Steuern 
 Präferenzen Überweisung Defizit 
 Konsum Konto Außenhandelsbilan
z 
 Einkommen Schalter Verschuldung 
 
SET 2    
 Stand Fernsehen Verpackung 
 Hostess Radio Preis 
 Halle Zeitung Bedienungsanleitu
ng 
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 Werbegeschenke Plakat Garantie 
 
SET 3    
 Risikobereitschaft Banken Startkapital 
 Stressresistenz Freunde Standortwahl 
 Visionen Förderungsgesellsc
haft 
Gewerbeanmeldun
g 
 Engagement Venture Capital-
Geber 
Businessplan 
 
SET 4    
 Anleihen Angebot Hammer 
 Rallye Gleichgewicht Bieter 
 Optionen Nachfrage Auktionator 
 Aktien Tausch Hoechstgebot 
 
 
 
Opportunity Recognition 
Generelle Aufgabenstellung: Bitte widmen Sie sich jetzt den nächsten Aufgaben. Sie werden mit 2 
wirtschaftlichen Situation konfrontiert. Jede Situation beinhaltet unserer Meinung nach die Gelegenheit, Geld zu 
verdienen.  
Haben Sie eine ungefähre Idee, wie man aus dieser Situation heraus, Geld verdienen könnte? Beschreiben Sie 
Ihre Idee kurz in etwa 5-7 Zeilen (verstehen Sie diese Angabe bitte als Mindestwert. Wenn nötig, können Sie 
natürlich auch mehr schreiben!) und gehen dabei bitte vor allem auf das von Ihnen erdachte Produkt oder die 
Dienstleistung und potentielle Kundengruppen ein!  
Die organisatorische Umsetzung, wie bspw. die Rechtsform, sollte bei Ihrer Antwort nicht im Vordergrund 
stehen. 
 
Situation 1 
In Ihrem Studium an einer renommierten Universität haben Sie im Rahmen eines interdisziplinären Seminars die 
Gelegenheit gehabt, engen Kontakt zu einigen Ingenieuren zu knüpfen. Diese haben jetzt für eins Ihrer Projekte, 
die 3DP™ Technologie, ein Patent erwirken können. 3DP™ steht für dreidimensionales Drucken zur 
Herstellung von verschiedensten Komponenten.  
Diese Technik ermöglicht es Ihnen, eine verformbare Masse, vergleichbar mit einem Puder, in eine Form zu 
bringen und diese kann dann solange verändert werden, bis ein Bindemittel an den gewünschten Stellen 
aufgebracht wird. Überschüssiges Pulver kann dann einfach entfernt und wiederverwendet werden. Durch 
Erhitzen und andere Prozeduren kann die Festigkeit des Materials erhöht werden, so dass das gefertigte Objekt 
sehr robust und widerstandsfähig ist. Die Ingenieure betonen, dass die Anwendungsmöglichkeiten dieser 
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Technologie fast unbegrenzt sind: eigentlich kann fast jedes Material in fast jede dreidimensionale Form 
gebracht werden. 
 Die Ingenieure selber sind sehr auf die Technologie fixiert und haben sich noch nicht sonderlich viele Gedanken 
über eine praktische Anwendung der Technologie gemacht. Nun sind sie an Sie herangetreten, schließlich haben 
Sie im Rahmen Ihres Studiums Veranstaltungen zum Thema "Unternehmensgründung" besucht. 
 
Situation 2 
Sie waren bis vor kurzem als Gaststudent an einer ausländischen Hochschule. Weil Sie sich in dem Land 
wohlgefühlt haben und auch die Sprache inzwischen gut beherrschten, hängten Sie auch noch ein mehrmonatiges 
Praktikum in diesem Land dran. Hier Erfahrung zu sammeln konnte auch sicherlich nicht schaden, schließlich ist 
es ein wichtiger Handelspartner Ihres Heimatlandes.  
Als Sie wieder in Ihrem Heimatland zurück sind, lassen Sie Ihren Auslandsaufenthalt noch einmal Revue 
passieren....aufgefallen ist Ihnen insbesondere, dass die Länder unterschiedliche Preisniveaus aufweisen...dies 
gilt für fast alle Produkte...Konsumgüter, Lebensmittel etc. Zudem sind die Lohnkosten erheblich niedriger, 
obwohl die Arbeitskräfte eine vergleichbare Qualifikation aufweisen, wie die in Ihrem Heimatland.  
Besonders ist Ihnen auch aufgefallen, dass Sie in der kurzen Zeit ein großes Netzwerk an Geschäftsleuten, 
Unternehmern, usw. aufbauen konnten...anscheinend war das Interesse an Ihnen bzw. der Wirtschaft Ihres 
Heimatlandes sehr groß. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
